SUB-REGIONAL SECURITY CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA: THE ECOMOG EXPERIENCE

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UJ/PGSS/14158/02

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AUGUST 2006
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this work is the product of my own research efforts; undertaken under the supervision of Professor Sonni Gwanle Tyoden and has not been presented elsewhere for the award of a degree or certificate. All sources have been duly distinguished and appropriately acknowledged.

____________________
Habu Shuaibu Galadima
UJ/PGSS/14158/02
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HABU SHUAIBU GALADIMA
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the ECOMOG Soldiers who put down their lives for the sake of peace and stability in the West African Subregion.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TITLE PAGE</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECLARATION</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERTIFICATION</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATION</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>xvii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# CHAPTER ONE

## GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM ... ... ... 6

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM ... ... ... 21

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ... ... ... ... ... 22

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ... ... ... ... 23

1.5 CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... ... 23

1.5.1 Traditional Peacekeeping ... ... ... ... ... 38
1.5.2 Modern Peacekeeping … … … … 50
1.6 HYPOTHESES … … … … … 65
1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY … … … … … 65
1.8 METHODOLOGY… … … … … 66
1.8.1 Data Collection… … … … … 66
1.8.2 Data Analysis… … … … … 69

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT … … … … 70

2.2 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: FROM OAU TO AU … … … 91

2.2.1 The OAU and Conflict Management … … … … 103

2.2.2 The African Union (AU) and Conflict Management … … … … … … 116

2.3 SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE ECOWAS MECHANISM … … … … 134

CHAPTER THREE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICTS IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

3.1 THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT… … … … 148
3.2 THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT … … … … … 156

CHAPTER FOUR
SECURITY CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA

4.1 SECURITY CO-OPERATION MECHANISMS
IN WEST AFRICA … … … … … … … 174

4.1.1 The ANAD Mechanism … … … … … … 174

4.1.2 Protocol on Non Aggression (PNA) … … … … 178

4.1.3 Protocol on Mutual Assistance
in Matters of Defence (PMAD) … … … … 179

4.1.4 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism
For Conflict Prevention, Management,
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security … … … … 184

4.2 FORMATION OF ECOMOG… … … … … … 189

4.2.1 ECOMOG’S Command and Control … … … 192

4.3 ECOWAS PEACE PROCESS IN LIBERIA … … … … 193

4.4 ECOWAS PEACE PROCESS IN SIERRA LEONE… … … 209

CHAPTER FIVE
THE ECOMOG EXPERIENCE IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

5.1 ECOMOG EXPERIENCE IN LIBERIA … … … … … 222

5.1.1 ECOMOG: Logistics, Deployment and
Force Movements in Liberia… … … … … 224

5.1.2 ECOMOG Peace Operations in Liberia… … … … 227

5.1.3 Impact of ECOMOG’s Peace Operation on Liberia … … 243

5.2 ECOMOG EXPERIENCE IN SIERRA LEONE … … … 246
5.2.1 ECOMOG: Logistics, Deployment and Force Movements in Sierra Leone...

5.2.2 Impact of ECOMOG Peace Operations...

5.3 PROBLEMS...

5.3.1 Doctrine...

5.3.2 Logistics and Transportation...

5.3.3 Equipment...

5.3.4 Command and control...

5.3.5 Irregular warfare...

5.3.6 Intelligence...

5.3.7 ECOMOG's manpower...

5.3.8 Communications...

5.3.9 Foreign troops and mercenaries...

5.3.10 Refugees...

5.3.11 ECOMOG air strikes...

5.3.12 Working with humanitarian aid agencies...

5.3.13 Splintering of militia's...

5.3.14 Child soldiers...

5.3.15 Trafficking in small arms...

5.4 LESSONS LEARNED...

5.4.1 Clear and achievable mandates...

5.4.2 Planning...

5.4.3 Status of forces agreement (SOFA)...

251

251

266

266

267

268

269

270

271

271

272

272

273

275

276

277

278

280

281

281

282

283
5.4.4 Logistics… … … … … … … … … 284
5.4.5 Intelligence…… … … … … … … 286
5.4.6 Sectorization… … … … … … … 287
5.4.7 Standard operating procedure (SOPs)… … … … 288
5.4.8 Finance and budget … … … … … … 289
5.4.9 Negotiating a peace accord…… … … … … 290
5.4.10 Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration… … … 291
5.4.11 Medical and health… … … … … … … 297
5.4.12 Public awareness/ local ownership… … … … … 297
5.4.13 Increased coordination between headquarters and missions … 300
5.4.14 Security sector reform… … … … … … 300
5.4.15 Rule of law … … … … … … … 301
5.4.16 Demilitarization and destruction… … … … … 302
5.4.17 Massive human rights abuses… … … … … 302
5.4.18 The regional dimension of the conflict… … … … 303
5.4.19 Relations with local population… … … … … 304
5.4.20 Training for peace operations… … … … … 306

CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS.. … … … … … … … … … … … 307
6.2 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE … … … … … … 308
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>RECOMMENDATIONS ON AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 1:</td>
<td>Expanding Size of UN Peacekeeping Forces: 1947-2004</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 2:</td>
<td>ECOMOG Strengths in Liberia (June 1994)</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE 3:</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: Contributions As At 10 January 2000</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Reviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACRI</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAFC</td>
<td>Allied Armed Forces of the Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU/UMA</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAD</td>
<td>Accord de Non Aggression et d' Assistance en Matiere de Defence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>contingent-owned equipment</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>COPAX</td>
<td>Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Co-operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOwAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>EO</td>
<td>Executive Outcome</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Stabilizing Force</td>
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<td>ETF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Task Force</td>
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<td>IFOR</td>
<td>NATO Implementation Force</td>
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</tr>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Inter-Governmental Development Authority</td>
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</tr>
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<td>LPC</td>
<td>Liberia Peace Council</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutual Assistance in Matters of Defence</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPMR</td>
<td>Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>MPMC</td>
<td>Mission Planning and Management Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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</tr>
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<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD 25</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directives 25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEO</td>
<td>Peace Enforcements Operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>Protocol on Non-Aggression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSLMF</td>
<td>Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces</td>
<td></td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>SMC</td>
<td>Standing Mediation Committee</td>
<td></td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-contributing countries</td>
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</tr>
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<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDHA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization</td>
<td></td>
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<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAF</td>
<td>United Nations Task Force</td>
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</tr>
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<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slovenia, Baranja and Western Sahara</td>
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<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<td>WAFF</td>
<td>Women Associated with the Fighting Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

This thesis examined the experience of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, in conflict management in the intra-state conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone between 1990 and 2000, when ECOMOG’s operation lasted. The specific objective of the study was the evaluation of the experience of ECOMOG, as a mechanism of subregional security cooperation, and how it conducted peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone under Chapter VII of the UN charter. It appraised the conceptual and theoretical framework for conflict management, especially peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The research relied on primary sources and secondary data sources. The case study method of analysis as well as tables to summarize some of the information found was used. The research provided an in-depth study of the ECOMOG peace enforcement strategy in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as rendered an evaluation of the experiences of ECOMOG. It also provided lessons from the ECOMOG experience and rendered appropriate recommendations. It noted that ECOMOG’s peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone had raised complex issues about the legitimacy, competence, effectiveness and neutrality of subregional security mechanisms in conflict management. It argued that: i) regional and sub-regional organizations have a growing role in peace operations under Chapter vii and viii of the UN Charter; ii) the ECOMOG experience in peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone had raised serious questions about consent, competence, effectiveness and neutrality of subregional organizations in peace operations; and, iii) the experience of ECOMOG provide lessons for future peace operations by subregional organizations in intra-state conflicts. The ECOMOG experience illustrates the importance of getting the consent of adversaries before the
commencement of peace operations. This study confirms previous claims that intra-state conflicts do not lend themselves to interventions that are premised on ‘traditional peacekeeping.’ This means that intervention forces must be prepared to invoke robust mandates when necessary; if incapable of mustering the necessary resolve, they should not get involved in the first place. Despite the numerous setbacks that were experienced by ECOMOG, this intervention was seen as a possible first attempt by a subregional organization. There is the possibility of ECOMOG serving as a basis for a new regional security co-operation arrangement in Africa since Africans now take responsibility for Africa’s security.
CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The deteriorating security situation across the globe, especially the growing incidence of intra-state conflicts, along with its attendant impact, has become a major source of concern to the international community. Intra-state conflicts occur within states, not only by regular armies but also by militia and armed civilians with ill-defined chains of command. The parties to the dispute or the belligerents may or may not have professional armies or organized groups responding reliably to a chain of command. The conflicts may take place within a functioning state or within a failing or failed state. Rogue, undisciplined elements or paramilitary units may be present. Decisions by the leaders may not bind the subordinate elements. Loosely organized groups of irregulars, criminal syndicates, or other hostile elements of the population may be present. There are usually multiple parties, each having a different agenda. Disputing or belligerent forces may range from insurgent forces to large military forces with ground, air, and maritime capabilities. Weapons may range from conventional munitions and mines to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) devices. Modern weapons systems may include surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles as well as long-range mortars.

The world has experienced 229-armed conflicts, after World War II (1946–2003), in 148 countries. Of these, 116 conflicts in 78 countries were active in the period after the end of the Cold War (1989–2003). Most conflicts were internal: only seven interstate armed conflicts were recorded in the period 1989–2003, of which two were still active in 2003 (Eriksson, 2004:3; Eriksson, Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2003; Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000:7-9; Holsti 1995:320-21;
Licklider 1995: 681-90). Managing these conflicts has posed serious challenges to the international community and has become a major source of concern. This concern has become even more worrisome with the increasing inability of the United Nations Organization (UN) to respond to or cope with the escalating task of conflict management around the world.

The UN, since its inception, has never been as over-tasked, overstretched and overwhelmed with the responsibility of conflict management as on the eve of the 21st century. Let us provide some illustrations. During its first four decades, the United Nations was called on to conduct 18 peacekeeping missions (an average of one new mission every other year), almost all of which resulted from conflict between states. However, between 1989 and 1998, the UN launched 36 new peace operations (Cilliers and Mills 1999, 1). Almost all have responded to ‘internal’ conflicts in troubled states. However, the United Nations has been unable to deal adequately with this surge of new missions. The exponential increase in peace operations, personnel and budget fast exceeded the institutional capacity and financial capability of the UN. It found itself incapacitated and practically bankrupt by October 1995 (Goshko 1996:6). The expenses of the UN’s expanded peacekeeping role between 1988 and 1994 exceeded the rest of the UN budget by more than 2 to 1 (Goldstein 1999, 304). See Table 1 below for more details of the UN’s expanded peacekeeping role between 1947 and 2004.

The UN began a drastic scaling back of its peace operations around the world as a response to this development and because the leading members of the UN became unwilling to support UN peace operations. The United States (US) Presidential Decision Directive 25(PDD 25) of May 1994 provides us with an illustration. The PDD 25 outlined new highly restrictive guidelines for US support
of and participation in UN peace operations (Griffin 1999:44). Consequently, the
capacity of the UN to respond quickly to new conflicts or complex emergencies
began to slow down. The UN began shifting focus from the multi-dimensional
peace operations to a selective approach within which smaller UN observer
missions and civilian police play a much more important role (Cilliers and Mills
1999:1).

The United Nations Security Council abandoned large-scale, multifaceted
peace operations, replacing them with smaller and more specialized monitoring
missions. The figures provide dramatic evidence of this downsizing. In 1993, more
than 78,500 Blue Helmets deployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations; by
mid-1999, that number came down to 18,400. In Africa, the reduction was even
starker: in 1993, United Nations peacekeeping forces numbered almost 40,000; in
June 1999, they had dwindled to less than 1,600. Between 1989 and 1993, the
Council authorized ten United Nations peacekeeping operations throughout Africa;
over the next five years, only five were established.

Whereas there were seven concurrent United Nations peacekeeping
operations on the continent in 1993, in June 1999 there were three (Cilliers and
Mills 1999:1).

With the incapacitation of the UN, the momentum for conflict management
started moving from the Security Council to regional and sub-regional
organizations, ad hoc coalitions of UN member-states, and even individual states.
TABLE 1. Expanding Size of UN Peacekeeping Forces: 1947-2004

+ Highest Month for Each Year, Rounded to the Nearest Hundred. Figures Include Troops, Military Observers and Police.

**Source:** UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2005) New York.
In 1995, the then UN Secretary General, Boutrous Ghali, encouraged by the role of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the Liberian conflict, recommended that enforcement mandates be delegated to coalitions of willing member-states and that regional organizations assume a more active role in conflict management.

The UN Security Council accepted the recommendation and emphasized that the role of the UN would be setting general standards for peacekeeping and stressed the need for [the council] to be fully informed of peacekeeping activities carried out or planned by regional or sub-regional organizations. The council encouraged the Secretary General to establish appropriate United Nations Liaison with regional and sub-regional organizations (S/PRST/1998/28 of 16 September 1998).

Although regional organizations are an integral part of the UN system for maintaining international peace and security, as contained in the provisions of Article 33(1), 51, 52 and 53 of its charter, until recently, have been largely inactive in managing conflicts within their respective regional spheres. Many regional organizations have been too dependent on the UN to manage their conflicts although they ‘do not require prior authorization of the UN or any of its organs to exercise this competence’ (Eze 1993, 11).

The nature of intra-state conflicts, especially their localization, has no doubt challenged regional security requiring a collective regional response. From the early nineties, many regional organizations have been responding to conflict management activities within their regions. Since the early nineties, the UN Security Council has given its blessing to various regional and sub-regional peace operations, including
the ECOWAS (ECOMOG) operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the peace mission by Russia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) that took over from the UN in Bosnia, and many others. With these developments, the major feature of the 21st Century is the acceleration of subregional security co-operations to cope with the challenges of conflict management at subregional and regional levels.

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Africa has been experiencing a variety of complex political, economic, environmental and social upheavals in degrees and intensity that is unprecedented in the continent. These factors conspired to launch the continent into a series of devastating intra-state conflicts ever experienced in a single continent anywhere in the world in the last decade and a half. Intra-state conflicts have ravaged Africa. Bakwesagha (1997:4) observed that intra-state conflicts in Africa today have given the continent the ‘unenviable record of hosting the highest number of uprooted communities in the world: 7 million refugees and close to 20 million internally displaced people’.

The United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) now refers to this type of conflict situations as ‘complex emergencies’. Indeed eight of the fifteen ‘complex emergencies’ declared by the UNDHA were in Africa. Conflicts erupted into ethnic warfare in Central Africa, Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda. There was armed uprising in Northern Uganda, civil war in Sudan and border conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Somalia remains a collapsed state inspite of attempts to resuscitate it. In Southern Africa, Lesotho witnessed an armed uprising. Angola was also in turmoil. In West Africa, Liberia was almost a
collapsed state; Sierra Leone experienced a bloody civil war, and Cote d’Ivoire has become an embattled state; While Guinea-Bissau experienced armed rebellion.

A common denominator of these conflicts is that many of them suffered initial neglect, even by African countries. The responses of the United Nations (UN) to many of these conflicts were usually slow and in some cases erratic. Many of the responses came only after a major humanitarian disaster had occurred.

Given the increase in intra-state conflicts in Africa, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its 28th Ordinary Session in Dakar, Senegal, between June 29 and July 1, 1992 decided on a mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Assembly expressed concern with the proliferation of conflicts in Africa and the immense suffering that they have brought to the people of Africa. Worried by the adverse implications of conflicts for the security of Africa and the socio-economic development of the continent, it decided to ‘adopt, in principle the establishment, within the framework of OAU, and in keeping with the objectives and principles of the charter, a Mechanism for Preventing, Managing and Resolving Conflicts in Africa’ (Salim 1992: 13).

It was at the 29th Summit of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Cairo, Egypt, on June 30, 1993, that the leaders voted for the establishment of a ‘Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution’ (MCPMR) within the organizations Secretariat. The Assembly was convinced that intra-state conflicts in Africa pose serious threats to the peace and security of the continent. Driven by a humanitarian imperative, the OAU leaders seem to have given new meaning to the traditional inhibitions contained in the
OAU Charter, Article 3, paragraph 2, 3 and 4, against intervention in the internal affairs or the use of force against member states (Taw and Andrew 1999).

The MCPMR was built around the Bureau of the Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government. It provides that:

The Secretary General under the authority of the Central Organ and in consultation with the parties involved in the conflict, deploy efforts and take all appropriate initiation to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts (OAU 1993: P11).

The Central Organ acts as a kind of Security Council to the OAU. The Central Organ was involved in many conflicts, among them Angola, Burundi, the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, and Ethiopia and Eritrea. Its level of involvement has been peacemaking efforts. The decision to deploy the OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros, taken at the ambassadorial level of the Central Organ, represents an important achievement. The OAU Peace Fund has succeeded in securing crucial funding for various peace and security initiatives. The OAU Secretariat’s Conflict Management Division is slowly acquiring the skills and equipment necessary to support OAU peacekeeping initiatives. However, paragraph 16 of the June 1993 Mechanism shows that the OAU intends to call in the UN where peacekeeping becomes inevitable. It provides that:

...In the event that conflict degenerate to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance or where appropriate, the services of the United Nations shall be sought under the general terms of the charter (OAU 1993: Para 16).

To say that the nineties was a decade of armed conflicts in Africa is indeed an understatement. Every sub-region in the continent of Africa was engulfed in conflict. In Central Africa, Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda, conflicts erupted into ethnic warfare. There was armed uprising in Northern Uganda, civil war in Sudan
and border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Somalia has remained a collapsed state. In Southern Africa, Lesotho witnessed an armed uprising. Angola was also in turmoil. In West Africa, Liberia was almost a collapsed state; rebels embattled Sierra Leone; While Guinea-Bissau experienced armed rebellion.

Largely overwhelmed by the number of conflicts in Africa, the OAU played minimal roles. It could not even kick-start its own mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. It played mediator roles between sub-regional organizations and United Nations. The Sub-regional organizations became the primary units of conflict management in Africa consequently. These sub-regional organizations are the Inter-Governmental Development Authority (IGAD) in the East; The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the West; the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA) in the North; The Southern African Development Community (SADC); and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the Central Africa Sub-region. ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, organizations originally formed for economic and development reasons, have been developing a peace and security role because of the inevitable realization that these two issues are closely linked. Of all these, only ECOWAS and SADC have established some form of subregional security response mechanism for the purposes of conflict management.

Members of ECOWAS have played a pivotal peacekeeping role in the sub-region through the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Since its creation in 1990, ECOMOG has intervened militarily in three subregional conflicts: first in Liberia, then Sierra Leone, and in Guinea-Bissau. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, especially, ECOMOG responded when no other body was willing and proved committed to remaining engaged.
SADC member states have also exhibited a growing interest in responding to conflicts in their subregion. In 1996, they established a formal framework for addressing peace and security issues known as the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. Since then they have continued their efforts to resolve the impasse over the Organ’s structure and functioning. Even without a working mechanism for addressing peace and security issues, SADC members have undertaken important peacekeeping training and other capacity-building initiatives. In addition, SADC member states have fielded multinational operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Lesotho.

Several other African subregional groupings have moved towards establishing peace and security frameworks. The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) created an informal body called the Council of Common Defence in 1990. East African Cooperation (EAC) members undertook a successful joint peacekeeping exercise in 1998 and are presently considering a draft treaty to set up the East African Community, which provides a possible basis for joint military operations. In 1999, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) established a mechanism to promote, maintain and consolidate peace and security in their subregion known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX). The Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played a mediation role in Somalia and the Sudan since the early 1990s, and the IGAD Partners Forum has generated financial and international political support for these efforts since its creation in 1997.

Until the intervention of the member countries of the Economic Community of West African States in Liberia, Africa had no well-articulated sub-regional arrangement for the sole purpose of peace operations. Of the African subregional
organizations, ECOWAS has made the most progress in fielding a credible peacekeeping force, but each of its interventions has had troubling aspects and implications.

The events in Liberia came to the attention of the 13th Summit of the Heads of States of ECOWAS countries, which was held in Banjul, Gambia on May 30, 1990, under the Chairmanship of Sir Dauda Jawara of Gambia. The member states decided to set up the five member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) [the members of the Standing Mediation Committee were Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo] (Decision A/DEC. 9/5/90, Document 20).

For three weeks, from July 6, 1990, the committee met with representatives of the rebel groups and the government and proposed an ECOWAS Peace Plan. On July 20, 1990, Charles Taylor rejected the peace plan, proceeded to capture about 90 percent of Liberia, and then declared himself President on July 27, 1990 (Newswatch, Feb. 18, 1991: 20-23). By August, no peace settlement was achieved. Seeing no alternative, and believing that some member states of ECOWAS were providing a platform from which the guerilla war against the government of Samuel Doe was launched and any further delay could result in enormous bloodbath in Monrovia, the SMC, in realization of the obvious security problem and in the spirit of the ECOWAS protocol on MAD, met on August 6, in Banjul, the Gambia, and decided to intervene in the Liberian conflict. The aim then was to douse the flame of disaffection and to seek to restrain the genocidal war, which at that time was becoming very alarming.

The Mediation Committee, at its meeting in Banjul, called for:

a) The parties to observe an immediate cease-fire;
b) ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to be set up to:
   i) keep peace,
   ii) restore law and order, and
   iii) ensure respect for the cease-fire;

c) the setting up of a broad based interim government through a national conference of political parties and other interest groups;

d) Conducting free and fair elections within twelve months leading to the establishment of a democratically elected government;

e) The exclusion of all leaders of the various warring factions to the Liberian conflict from the Interim Government; and,

f) The creation of a Special Emergency Fund for ECOMOG Operation in Liberia (Decision A/DEC/1/8/90, Document 50, p.67-69.)

ECOMOG was created, consequently, with troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and the Sierra Leone. The SMC gave reasons for the decision to establish ECOMOG as follows:

The failure of the warring parties to cease hostilities has led to the massive destruction of property and the massacre by all the parties of thousands of innocent civilians, including foreign nations, women and children... contrary to all recognized standards of civilized behaviour.... The civil war has also trapped thousands of foreign nationals, including ECOWAS citizens, without any means of escape or protection. The result of all this is a state of anarchy and the total breakdown of law and order in Liberia. Presently, there is a government in Liberia, which cannot govern, and contending factions, which are holding the entire population as hostage, depriving them food, health facilities and other necessities of life. The developments...have also led to hundreds of thousands of Liberians being displaced and made refugees in neighbouring countries. (SMC 6-7 August 1990: Para 6-9).

ECOMOG was at first tasked with the responsibility of facilitating the evacuation of citizens mainly women and children of member states and other Liberians that were trapped in the war zones. The force was also to establish some form of order through effective policing action especially in Monrovia while arrangements were made for the establishment of an Interim Government.

Unable to get a cease-fire from the warring parties in Liberia, the ECOMOG
force landed in Monrovia on August 24, 1990 under heavy attack from Charles Taylor's NPFL. ECOMOG fought its way into Monrovia to create a beachhead that enabled the evacuation of many trapped civilians of various nationalities (Vogt 1992). Within a month of landing, ECOMOG's strategy had evolved into conventional offensive, with the aim of driving Taylor's troops out of Monrovia and creating a protected buffer zone around the capital city. By November 1990, ECOMOG controlled Monrovia and a ceasefire was subsequently established (BBC Monitoring Report, 11 September 1990; Document 74).

ECOMOG succeeded only in July 1997, after 12 failed peace accords, to end the conflict in Liberia. For eight years, the force suffered a huge loss, both in materials and men in the hands of an intransigent rebel movement. Just as the peacekeeping force was beginning to receive praises and credit for restoring peace to Liberia, some dissident elements of the Sierra-Leonean Army, led by Major John Koromah, acting in concert with the Revolutionary United Front, (RUF), violently seized power and overthrew the democratic government of President Tejan Kabbah on May 25, 1997. The situation in Sierra Leone after the coup degenerated into anarchy and threatened the peace and security of the sub-region. Furthermore, the unfolding developments in the country continued to pose serious threats to the fragile peace that was then subsisting in Liberia.

The ECOWAS, the OAU and the United Nations condemned the coup. The sub-regional organization identified a combination of three-conflict management techniques to resolve the conflict. These were:

a) dialogue and negotiation;
b) imposition of sanctions and embargo; and
c) the use of force.
When (a) and (b) failed, force was used. ECOMOG intervened and flushed out the military junta and brought back the ousted civilian government. The actual ECOMOG operations, in terms of fighting, lasted for only seven days. ECOMOG, which had deployed about 20,000 troops in Sierra Leone, restored President Tejan Kabbah, as the President of Sierra-Leone, on Tuesday, March 10, 1998, in a colourful ceremony attended by some ECOWAS leaders. It is worthy of note that without ECOMOG’s quick intervention in Sierra Leone, the conflict would have degenerated beyond proportions. However, ECOMOG assumed the responsibility of defending the civilian government by fighting a complex and an unending battle with a coalition of rebel forces. The peace enforcement mission in Sierra Leone by ECOMOG turned out to be a war of attrition with the RUF, and proved a very difficult experience in peace operations.

Guinea Bissau is the third West African nation that ECOMOG became involved since its inception in 1990. Fighting in Guinea Bissau broke out in June 1998 after President Joa Bernardo Vieira sacked his Army Chief-of-Staff, Brigadier Ansumane Mane over allegations that top Guinean military officers were smuggling weapons to separatist Casamance rebels in neighbouring Senegal. More than 350,000 people were displaced, and hundreds, most of them non-combatants, were killed, when the fighting erupted. The arrival of the more than 600 ECOMOG’S peacekeepers in the former Portuguese colony stemmed the tide of the rebellion and provided a major boost for the ECOWAS peacekeeping initiative in the region. Contingents of soldiers from Niger, Benin, Togo, and Mali deployed to the capital Bissau. ECOMOG ensured that the peace agreement, signed at the 21st summit of the ECOWAS in the Nigerian capital of Abuja, and ratified in Lome, Togo, was not
violated. President Vieira stepped down and handed power to a new 10-member Interim Government of National Unity, headed by Prime Minister Francisco Fadul. Under the agreement, signed by Vieira and Mane, the more than 3,000 troops from neighbouring Guinea-Conakry and Senegal were backing Vieira were to withdraw and return to their respective countries to make way for the ECOMOG.

Unlike its previous operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where external financial and logistical support were, for the most part, non-existent, France supported the ECOMOG operation in Guinea Bissau. France provided both logistics and a daily allowance of 16 US Dollars for each soldier. The allowance was considered as part of the assistance of France to Africa.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), which now embraces Congo-Kinshasa, has a defence forces coordinating organ, the ‘Organ of Politics, Defence and Security’ that could, in theory, sponsor subregional or regional peace enforcement activities. Although they have not yet intervened in complex emergencies, they have mitigated the conflict in Lesotho and performed well.

ECOMOG was outstanding in Africa, especially with its performance in West Africa. At no time, ever, has a regional or sub-regional economic organization executed peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions as ECOMOG. However, this is not without serious implications for consent, neutrality, impartiality and minimal force used only in self-defence, which have long been the defining aspects of peacekeeping. ECOMOG appears to have highlighted the debate on approaches to African security and conflict management. It has become Africa's flagship in peace-making, peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
The intervention and performance of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone seem to have influenced other regional and subregional organizations. The West African experiment provided the basis for a mechanism on the management of continental conflicts adopted by the OAU’s security agenda in 1992. It was followed by the adoption of the MCPMR in 1993. The Southern African Development Community in 1996 established an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, which later organized and deployed an intervention force in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

ECOMOG also provided the big powers in the West with a clear starting point. Largely in response to criticisms from African states, Western countries began to coordinate their capacity-building programmes in Africa. In May 1997, France, the United Kingdom and the United States announced the P-3 Initiative, which sought to begin a dialogue with African countries as to how to best promote peace and security on the continent. An added goal was to foster and harmonize donor countries assistance in this effort. In December 1997, a meeting was held at United Nations Headquarters in New York to discuss the individual programmes of the P-3 as well as those of other countries and to listen to African concerns. At this meeting, the P-3 Initiative gave way to a larger group of interested states, which convened on subsequent occasions to share information and co-ordinate activities. The P-3 Initiative has fulfilled some of its objectives. A number of Western countries have begun to develop programmes to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities and to provide logistical assistance to African peacekeeping contingents. A crucial dialogue has begun between potential donor and recipient countries and organizations. Both African and non-African countries are more aware of what is needed and what is being offered. The greater degree to which this information was
available resulted in increased transparency and co-operation. However, the desired and necessary partnership between Western and African countries has yet to be established. Many African states remain skeptical of Western capacity-building initiatives.

Since the end of the Cold War, the geo-strategic significance of Africa to the United States has markedly declined, resulting in the treatment of Africa as a ‘backwater’ in official U.S. policy making in recent years. This informed the launching of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in 1996. Nicholas Burns, (1996) in a press statement pointed out that:

ACRI is a training initiative intended to work cooperatively with African States to create highly effective, rapidly deployable peacekeeping units, which can operate jointly in the event of a humanitarian crisis or in a traditional peacekeeping operation (Burns, 1996, 1).

The ACRI program is to enhance the capability of military units from a number of African countries, which will remain under the operational command of their respective governments. Furthermore, the ACRI program aimed solely at increasing the capability of the forces to be engaged in peacekeeping operations and not intended to conduct peace enforcement operations. The government of USA believes that ‘as African peacekeeping capacity is enhanced, African forces would be capable of working together more effectively to respond to peacekeeping, natural and humanitarian contingencies in Africa and elsewhere’ (Burns 1996, 2).

There is no doubt that conflict management has assumed a regional dimension requiring regions to find solutions to their problems. Thus, African countries will expectedly, manage future-armed conflicts in Africa, although with some logistic and financial support from the West and the UN.
Africa is a conflict prone continent with deep seated multiple crises. Domestic pressures, brought on by ethnic cleavages, overpopulation, poverty, mal-administration, environmental degradation, globalization, deteriorating social conditions, increasing fragility and decay of governmental institutions, especially those devoted to responding to the demands of the citizens, have resulted in violent intra-state conflicts. These have taken the form of civil wars, guerrilla wars, separatist movements, and ethnic violence over territory or government.

The end of the cold war triggered off, and in some areas intensified, a number of intra-state conflicts in Africa, especially in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Liberia and Sierra Leone among many others. A common denominator of these conflicts is that many of them suffered initial neglect, even by African countries. The responses of the UN to some of these conflicts have been slow and at times erratic. Usually some of the responses came only after a major humanitarian disaster had occurred. Let us provide some illustrations.

In Liberia, what began as an armed insurrection in the Northeastern border region of Nimba County on December 24, 1989 by an opposition group led by Charles Taylor, soon degenerated into ethnic/factional conflicts where combatants destroyed the economic infrastructure of Liberia and massacred many innocent civilians by August 1990. While this phenomenal humanitarian disaster was encapsulating Liberia, the UN hardly took notice. It was only in January 1991, thirteen months after the conflict started and five months after the establishment of ECOMOG that the Security Council publicly commented on the conflict. It took the UN about three years, from the start of the conflict, to set up a 31 member United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in 1993. The Liberian conflict claimed the lives of between 100,000 and 150,000 civilians and about 700,000
refugees as a result (Ghali 1995).

In a similar vein, the UN did not promptly respond to the collapse of the Somali State and its subsequent degeneration into anarchy. Its response came only on April 24, 1992 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 751 approving the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1). Its failure to achieve its objective of restoring peace in Somalia led to the Councils adoption of Resolution 794 by unanimous vote on December 3, 1992 authorizing the establishment of the United Nations Task Force (UNTAF). This mission ended in a fiasco thus giving rise to UNOSOM II in January 1993. UNOSOM II withdrew in March 1995 with neither peace nor order restored to Somalia.

Similarly, in Rwanda, when fratricidal conflict began in early April 1994, between the Hutus and the Tutsis, the United Nations force of about 5,500 troops took about seven months to arrive in Rwanda. However, the Rwandan conflicts, within twenty-four hours of its start, 250,000 refugees had crossed into Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Zaire. The death toll stood at about 500,000 (Ajala 1996, 35). Even then, the non-African countries withdrew their troops abruptly from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR 1) in 1994. The UN Secretary General had to appeal to African Governments to contribute troops to the United Nations under UNAMIR II. The UN operations in Rwanda withdrew in March 1995.

On January 6, 1999, Sierra Leone's democratically elected government was violently overthrown for a second time in less than two-years by the combined forces of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and soldiers of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF). The latter had seized power on May 25,
1997 from the same government after it had been in office for only one year. The January 6 invasion did not only paralyze the government; more than 6000 civilians were killed in the capital; the rebels abducted thousands of young men and women; hundreds were maimed or physically abused; and thousands of houses as well as government buildings were burnt down.

A common feature of these conflicts is the inability and lack of capacity of the African regional organization, the OAU (now AU), to mitigate the conflicts, especially as it lacks the political capacity and financial means to conduct major peacekeeping operations (Neethling 1999; Aning, 1994). As the international community failed to take rapid and meaningful steps to contain the carnage in Liberia, and later Sierra Leone, responsibility fell on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). ECOWAS quickly established a subregional security mechanism, ECOMOG, to intervene in the conflict. Although ECOMOG was initially intended to monitor a ceasefire that had yet to be signed by the NPFL at the time of deployment, it soon adopted a peace enforcement posture. Similarly, ECOMOG intervened in Sierra Leone and restored the legitimate government of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to power in February 1998. Unlike in Liberia, ECOMOG's mandate in Sierra Leone was to reverse the military coup and restore the legitimate government to power. ECOMOG was not expected to serve as a neutral force between the disputants. The Security Council in its Resolution 1132 (1997) endorsed this.

Indeed, ECOMOG's intervention raised the expectations of those who saw the peace operations as giving new expression to the co-operation envisaged in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter between regional organizations and the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security.
Unlike traditional notions of peacekeeping, which involved the interposition of lightly armed forces on the border between states, it immediately became clear that attempts to resolve the conflicts would involve outright intervention, inspite of the well-established principles of consent in peacekeeping.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The high propensity of armed intra-state conflicts in Africa, the changing nature of conflict management in the international system and the extent to which Africa generally and West Africa, in particular, have been responding to these developments since the abatement of the cold war, calls for a systematic study.

The ECOMOG's involvement in peace operations marked an important turning point in the subregional economic organization. ECOMOG became involved in peace enforcement operations in circumstances where the states involved were either collapsing or have collapsed and was left with the difficult task of dealing with array of shadowy non-state actors who have set up rival factions in what was once a sovereign state.

ECOMOG's peace enforcements in Liberia and Sierra-Leone, especially, have raised complex issues about the legitimacy, competence, effectiveness and neutrality of subregional organizations with no history of collective military action pursuing peace operations in conflicts within states. Although the circumstances of the formation of ECOMOG by ECOWAS have already received extensive treatment, the researcher was struck by what appears to be the absence of an in-depth study of ECOMOG's experience in peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, especially at a Ph.D. Level.
ECOMOG's peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone appear to have highlighted most of the problems of subregional mechanisms in peace operations, especially in intra-state conflicts: Did ECOMOG exacerbates the civil war in Liberia, and did its involvement there contribute to the civil war in Sierra Leone as well as prolong that conflict? Did ECOMOG’s inability to deploy a sizeable force in a timely manner in Guinea-Bissau set the stage for the subsequent coup? What happens when a peacekeeping force assumes a combative role? Why was ECOMOG vacillating from peacekeeping, peace enforcement to peace making and back again in Liberia and Sierra Leone? How did ECOMOG pursue a peace-enforcement strategy in Liberia and Sierra Leone? What were the experiences of ECOMOG in the peace operations? What are the lessons from the ECOMOG peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone for the subregion and the international community? Given the ECOMOG experiences in stemming the conflicts in Liberia and to some extent in Sierra Leone, do they provide bases for making some judgments about the performance of sub-regional security cooperation mechanisms in peace operations? What prospects exist for ECOMOG should similar challenges occur in the future? It is pertinent at this point to raise specific questions for the research.

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The objective of this study is the evaluation of the experience of ECOMOG, as a mechanism of subregional security cooperation, and how it conducted peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone under Chapter VII of the UN charter.

This research has the following specific objectives among others to:

1.3.1 Examine ECOMOG's peace enforcement strategy in Liberia and Sierra Leone and evaluate its experiences,
1.3.2 Identify lessons from the ECOMOG experience in peace operations in West Africa; and finally,

1.3.3 Contribute to the existing knowledge of the ECOMOG experience in peace operations in West Africa and to the process of evolving an effective and efficient regional framework for Africa.

1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is significant in a number of ways. It has among others:

1.4.1 Provided an in-depth study of the ECOMOG peace enforcement strategy in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as render an evaluation of the experiences of ECOMOG.

1.4.2 Provided lessons from the ECOMOG experience.

1.4.3 Rendered appropriate recommendations for effective and efficient peace operations by subregional and regional organizations.

1.4.4 Contribute to existing knowledge on the ECOMOG experience in conflict management in West Africa; and finally,

1.4.5 Contribute to existing knowledge on conflict management generally.

1.5 CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The conception of ECOMOG is deeply rooted in the theory of collective security. A theory derived from the idealist view of international system as one
based on community of states with the potential of cooperating to overcome mutual
problems. The dream of the idealists is to create an international system based on
collective security that would replace the anarchic system that lacks central
enforcement mechanisms (Kanto 1957; Olson 1971; Watts 1979; Lighten and Flak
1982; Nee 1988; Baldwin 1993; Kelley 1995; Vasquez 1983; Naradin and David
1992; Long and Peter 1995; Scott and Waltz 1995; Andreas and Rittberger 1997).

Essentially, collective security has three meanings. The first is the Kantian
or Wilsonian collective security model that is seen as an arrangement among states
for effective action against any aggressor from within that community of states.
When an aggression occurs, all member states would have the moral, political, and
legal obligation to act against the aggressor and restore peace. This is based on the
shared conviction that 'peace is indivisible' and that every state's security interests
are affected by any aggression anywhere.

The second meaning of collective security refers to an intervention, usually
undertaken by a coalition of states, against international aggression or internal
conflict or disorder with the explicit or implicit approval of the United Nations.
This intervention can take many forms, including mediation and conciliation,
economic sanctions, preventive force deployments, coercive military operations,
peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and crisis management.

The third meaning of collective security concerns an intervention by a single
state or a coalition of states against international aggression or internal conflict or
disorder without the approval of the United Nations Security Council.

Essentially, collective security is a ‘system of world order in which
aggression by any state would be met by a collective response’ (Kegley and
Wittkopf 1997, 451). It is a system of collective self-regulation' occurring when ‘a group of states attempt to reduce security threats by agreeing to collectively punish member states that violate systems' norms' (Downs 1994).

According to Leroy Bennett (1988) ‘the theory of collective security rest on the assumption that all nations share a primary interest in maintaining peace’. Bennett (1988:135) argued that:

In order for collective security to operate, peace must be viewed as indivisible, and threats to peace anywhere must be treated as the concern of all members of the international system. Furthermore, all members must agree in advance to react promptly and effectively against threats to peace and must be organized in such a way as to provide the procedures for collective response to such threats, even if the collection is directed against members with which they are friendly. The aggressor nation will be faced with such overwhelming opposition from all other members of the system that peace will be promptly restored. In fact, the promise of preponderant opposition will usually dissuade incipient aggressors from their inclinations towards breaches of international peace.

A collective security system entails the centralization of a society's coercive mechanisms. As a corollary the members of that society, in this case States, give up a great deal of their individual freedom to indulge in self-help, and are generally restricted to a limited right of self-defence, usually until the central authority takes over their protection.

The objective of collective security is to inhibit war through the threat of collective action. The theory of collective security is based on certain basic conditions, which are required for its effective applications. Henry Kissinger (1992) observed that collective security requires each state to share responsibility for every other states' security. He argued that it ‘assumes that every nation perceives every challenge to the international order in the same way, and is prepared to run the same risks to preserve it’ (Kissinger 1992, 239). Similarly, Bennett (1988: 135-136) pointed out the conditions as follows:
a) The first is a commitment on the part of all the members of the international system to peace as a paramount goal requiring the subordination of other goals of foreign policy ..., each state must commit itself to act in concert with other states as a party interested more in peace restoration than in other national interests or in relationships with the state accused of threatening international peace;
b) A second condition is the ability of the members of a system not only to reach initial consensus for establishing the system, but also to find that a threat to peace or a breach of peace does or does not exist. Furthermore, their consensus must extend to the identification of the aggressor State or States against whom collective action is required. Once an aggressor is identified, a collective determination must be made of an appropriate response to apply prompt and effective sanctions against the aggressor for the purpose of stopping the aggressive acts.

It is such that insecurity of one state makes all states less secure. A local dispute in one part of the world can threaten another part; economic and ethnic rivalries can spill over into other countries. Collective security therefore requires all states to take joint action against any aggressor, and all are to act in concert.

The United Nations, since inception in 1945, has been an institutional framework for collective security and has utilized contingents of multinational forces to keep the peace and maintain security. Regional organizations like NATO and sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS-ECOMOG have used peacekeeping and peace enforcement mechanisms to manage conflicts.

Indicative of the Westphalia influence, the UN Charter does not authorize the UN to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Non-intervention is the logical corollary of territorial sovereignty, which has traditionally underpinned interstate relations and the United Nations Charter. International attitudes toward this aberrant interpretation of domestic jurisdiction are changing (see Daniel and Hayes 1995).

The end of the Cold War has witnessed a significant shift in peacekeeping military intervention (see Fetherson 1994; Fetherson, Ramsbotham, and

It is the contention of the Globalists that the post-Cold War international system constitutes what can loosely be called a global community. Thus, when states undertake peace operation interventions, they do so primarily to alleviate human suffering in the target state. Furthermore, Globalists argue that the international community ought to intercede to prevent bloodshed by whatever means available. They further argue that states should no longer be allowed to hide behind sovereignty in the face of massive human rights violations and/or genocide. Implicit in the Globalists plea for humanitarian intervention is their acknowledgement of the imperatives of globalization that among other things has turned the world into a global village. The result is what Weiss and Chopra (1992) call global ‘moral interdependence’ and expanded ‘humanitarian space.’

The UN adopted the Globalists view in 1992 when it created the Department of Humanitarian Affairs in the Secretariat with Security Resolution 688 that linked internal repression to refugee flows. Ultimately, this defined threats of international peace and security. This initiative paved the way for the UN uninvited humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1993. This UN position brought into sharp focus the scholars of foreign policy long before globalization accepted what became a buzzword, that in an increasing interdependent world, the division between what is domestic and what is external to a state is a very thin one.

Over the life of the UN, the once rigid distinction between domestic and international issues has weakened, leading to an erosion of sovereignty. Global telecommunications and economic interdependencies, international human rights,
election monitoring, and environmental regulation are among the developments infringing on traditional areas of domestic jurisdiction and hence on states' sovereignty. Many of the conflicts, especially in the 21st Century are intra-state conflicts, which are not legally under the purview of the UN. Yet because international human rights that are being abrogated because of these conflicts, as well as refugees cross-national borders, and because weapons of war are supplied through transnational networks, such conflicts are increasingly viewed as international, and some as the appropriate venue for action view the UN.

Indeed, by finding that a situation constitutes a ‘threat to international peace and security,’ the Security Council overrules the UN Charter's otherwise blanket prohibition on interventions ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction’ of a state. Such declared threats to peace and security have included the risk of a conflict spreading to other states or an exodus of refugees that threatens political and economic stability in a region. Nevertheless, humanitarian interventions are also efforts to protect the source of a state's sovereignty, namely, its populace, from the ravages of civil war or a renegade government.

Interventions come in a wide array of levels and types, whether undertaken unilaterally, with a few partners, or through the UN and/or regional organizations. These form the continuum from non-coercive dispute settlement techniques under Chapter VI of the UN Charter – mediation, good offices, fact-finding, arbitration, monitoring, humanitarian assistance, traditional peacekeeping and preventive military deployments – to coercive measures under Chapter VII, including diplomatic and economic sanctions, trade and arms embargoes, and interventions carried out by military force. The consequences and implications of these various levels of involvement in regional conflicts vary. Yet the debate on interventionism
has tended to over-simplify matters, as if there are only two distinct choices – to intervene militarily or not to intervene at all.

Intervention debate attracted renewed attention with the passage of the UN Resolution 688 of April 5, 1991, authorizing member states to assist Kurdish refugees by dispatching humanitarian personnel inside the borders of Iraq. Transgressions against humanity in the past, even to the point of genocide, were never sufficient excuse to override the sovereignty of states. Although the UN is yet to codify conditions justifying interventions, overtime, the illegality of intervening in sovereign states has changed for a variety of reasons, especially for humanitarian aid, preventing genocide, protecting civil liberties, and promoting democracy.

The United Nations particularly in the Somalian situation adopted the concept of intervention on humanitarian grounds. In late 1992, the Security Council approved intervention in Somalia (Resolution 794) to ensure humanitarian access by military forces led by the United States, beginning in May 1993, for the first Chapter VII military operation unambiguously under the direct command and control of the United Nations Secretary General to ensure humanitarian access and disarm warlords (Resolution 814). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Security Council had earlier invoked Chapter VII to authorize member states to use ‘all measures necessary’ to protect humanitarian personnel and to coordinate life-saving ministrations (Resolution 770), but these actions were not to be under the Secretary-General’s direct control. Similarly, the non-interference barrier to collective action in destructive internal conflicts was reviewed in August 1990 by ECOMOG. Indeed, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in a report to the UN Security Council in 1998 noted that ‘preventing such wars is no longer a matter of defending
states or protecting allies. It is a matter of defending humanity itself” (Anan 1998, 1). These are indicative of the fact that the international community would no longer allow governments and insurgents to abuse their citizens with impunity.

Based on the international ramifications of domestic and regional conflict, a growing body of precedent has developed for humanitarian intervention without the consent of the ‘host’ country. Most justifications for interventions in domestic conflicts fall in the traditional categories of the *jus ad bellum*. These deal with just causes–self defence and vindication of rights; proportionality of values–the values destroyed should not exceed those that are being upheld; proper authority–who can legitimately decide the use of force; reasonable chances of success; and last resort–the exhaustion of all efforts to save peace.

The causes deemed important enough to require intervention are in two categories. The first is the humanitarian one: the disinterested duty to put an end to or reduce human suffering. The second category is the use of force inside the borders of other states: usually the just cause that in invoked is the defence of human rights when there are massive violations of them – in cases of genocide, brutal ethnic cleansing, or monstrous brutalities committed by rebel or rival gangs (as in Liberia and Sierra Leone).

The point we are making is that intervention for humanitarian goals is the vision of an international order in which state sovereignty is not absolute, but a set of attributes that can be curtailed when essential human rights are being violated and that international security is not just about territories of states but also the population in those territories. International intervention is employed to redress outrageous behaviour during the course of an internal conflict (such as significant
violations of human rights). It has also been used to resolve disputes of a considerable size, intensity, and length. It could be utilized to forestall the likelihood of intervention by outside states interested in assisting the government in power; the insurgents, or other intervening states; and to address actual or potential spill over of a conflict across international borders. In addition, new historical triggers of UN intervention are emerging.

The Security Council already is either pursuing some of these, with the consent of the states involved or by broadening the concept of 'threats to international peace and security' under the Chapter VII procedure. These new triggers include the abatement of large-scale refugee migrations [or example, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Iraq, and Sudan] and internal armed conflicts that ultimately spill over borders to cause broader armed conflicts [for example, Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique, Lebanon, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Cote D’Voire, Somalia, and El Salvador] (see Schaffer 1992:287).

Meanwhile, some prominent international relations theorists have begun to turn their attention to peacekeeping and peace building. Robert Keohane (2003) and Stephen Krasner (2004) look at the peace operations (broadly defined) from the perspective of an “unbundled” concept of sovereignty. In separate pieces, they argue that the classical, unitary conception of sovereignty as the exclusive right to determine policy within a defined territory is an obstacle to effective post-conflict reconstruction. They both draw on Krasner’s four meanings of sovereignty to offer a more nuanced account: domestic sovereignty: the effective organization of authority within the territory of a given state; interdependence sovereignty: the ability of a state to regulate movements across its own borders; international legal sovereignty: the fact of recognition of an entity as a state, established by states;
Westphalian sovereignty: the exclusion of external authority structures from the decision-making processes of a state.

Keohane (2003) argues that societies coming out of conflict should not aspire to all four types of sovereignty in an absolute sense; rather policies should be designed on the understanding that there are ‘gradations of sovereignty’. Ultimately, it may be necessary to by-pass Westphalian sovereignty altogether, sending so-called ‘troubled societies’ straight from limited sovereignty to integration in broader multilateral institutions with supranational powers, like the European Union.

Similarly, Krasner (2004) argues that existing policy tools for fixing ‘badly governed’ or collapsed states are inadequate because policy-makers in both powerful and weak states are reluctant to challenge conventional norms of sovereignty. His thesis is that new institutional forms that compromise Westphalian sovereignty must be devised in order to secure ‘decent domestic governance in failed, failing and occupied states’.

Oche (1998:25) has argued that in the light of the recent conflicts in Liberia, it must be accepted that there is a major revolution occurring at the level of international public opinion, which ‘supports military intervention in cases of severe conflicts and human rights abuses. ... In effect, the notion of what constitutes the domestic affairs of a state is undergoing some change’.

The UN, NATO and ECOMOG have used various forms of intervention as conflict management techniques under the umbrella of peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping is a technique, pioneered and developed by the UN, which defies simple definition. The term is not found in the UN Charter. Dag Hammarskjöld referred to it as belonging to ‘Chapter Six and a Half’ of the Charter,
placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as mediation and fact-finding (Chapter VI) and more forceful action, such as embargos and military intervention (Chapter VII).

Peace Keeping (PK) involves military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerent parties. These operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. The objective of these operations is to fulfill a mandate, in many cases to reduce or eliminate violence, facilitate the implementation of an agreement, and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. The peacekeepers’ main function is to establish a presence which inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. PK support continuing diplomatic efforts to achieve normalized peaceful relations.

The multinational force and observers (MAO) operation in the Sinai provides a classic example of a force conducting a PK operation. Peacekeeping operations have traditionally involved the deployment of primarily military personnel from a number of countries, under UN command, to help control and resolve armed conflict between hostile parties. From the first deployment of military observers in the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTO) in 1948, UN peacekeeping has evolved to meet the unique demands of sharply different conflicts in a changing political landscape.

Peacekeeping, initially developed as a means of dealing with inter-State conflict, has been increasingly applied to intra-state conflicts and civil wars. The post-cold war period has been characterized by a proliferation of civil wars and
other armed conflicts within States, which threaten international peace and security and cause massive human suffering. Today's conflicts frequently take place between multiple armed factions with different political objectives and fractured lines of command. Peacekeepers, consequently, have sometimes found themselves in situations where ceasefire agreements are ignored, where consent to the UN's presence is called into question, and where government and State institutions have ceased to function or have broken down. Actions by irregular forces and militias which ignore or willfully violate humanitarian norms, and constantly shifting lines of confrontation have complicated the peacekeeper's task.

The organization of a PK force headquarters will generally be structured around common military staff functions such as administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and civil affairs. The commander will also have a personal staff and civilian staff. In UN-sponsored operations, national contingents perform under operational control of the UN force commander. The geographic combatant commander exercises combatant command (command authority) over forces assigned to PKO, and operational control over forces attached for PKO in the combatant commander’s area of responsibility.

The mandate, Terms of Reference (TOR), and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) are important sources of information for mission analysis and planning. Additionally, commanders and staffs may gain valuable insights by reviewing lessons learned from previous PKO or training exercises. In PKO, just as in any other military operation, logistics considerations are as important as operational considerations. Intelligence is critically important to a PK force, not only for mission success but also to protect the force. The methodology for collecting intelligence is generally the same as that for any other military operation. Force
protection is a high priority for a deployed PK force. Coordination between the PK military organizations and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations is essential to providing a secure PK environment within which these organizations can operate. ROE are also an essential element of force protection and provide for appropriate action to protect the force.

Peacekeepers are often mandated to perform or to support complex civilian and military functions essential to maintain peace and to begin reconstruction and institution building in societies devastated by war. During more than half a century of service, UN peacekeeping mandates have ranged from keeping hostile parties peacefully apart, to helping them to work peacefully together. As tasks have become more varied and complex, proportionately larger, numbers of civilians have joined military personnel as UN peacekeepers.

UN peacekeeping is based on the principle that an impartial UN presence on the ground can ease tensions and allow negotiated solutions in a conflict situation. The first step, which often involves intense diplomatic efforts by the United Nations Secretary-General, is to secure a halt to fighting and the consent of the parties before peacekeepers are deployed. UN peacekeeping operations have normally fallen into two broad categories:

i) military observer missions composed of relatively small numbers of unarmed officers, charged with such tasks as monitoring ceasefires, verifying troop withdrawals, or patrolling borders or demilitarized zones;

ii) Peacekeeping forces composed of national contingents of troops, deployed to carry out tasks similar to those of military observers and, often, to act as a buffer between hostile parties.
Techniques and experience gained over the years have served as the basis for new peacekeeping tasks, such as preventive deployment, temporary administration or governance of a post-conflict region, protecting delivery of humanitarian assistance, and helping create stable and secure environments for ongoing efforts to consolidate the peace in the wake of conflict. The evolution of UN peacekeeping in response to changing needs has meant that a growing number of peacekeeping operations now fit into a third category: complex operations. These are operations composed of military, civilian police and other civilian personnel mandated to help create political institutions and broaden their base, working alongside governments, non-governmental organizations and local citizens' groups to provide emergency relief, demobilize former fighters and reintegrate them into society, clear mines, organize and conduct elections and promote sustainable development practices.

The presence of armed soldiers who can return fire if fired upon is just one of several factors that contribute to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. Its real strength lies in the peacekeepers' impartiality, the moral authority of the international community, the pressure of world public opinion and above all, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace. The presence of the peacekeepers allows continued political and diplomatic efforts towards a more durable peace. Peacekeeping can work only if the parties to a conflict demonstrate the political will to respect agreements and permit UN personnel to carry out their tasks.

UN peacekeeping forces have traditionally been only lightly armed and use minimum force in self-defense, or if armed persons try to stop them from carrying out their authorized tasks. UN military observers and civilian police are normally unarmed.
Peacekeeping faces its most difficult challenges when conflicting parties fail to live up to their commitments and fighting resumes; or when they purposely thwart peacekeepers' efforts. Peacekeepers have sought to stabilize such situations and to minimize suffering of non-combatants - often at great personal risk and despite unclear mandates and insufficient resources - primarily through persuasion and negotiation. At times, however, the peacekeepers' job has become all but impossible. The conflicts in Rwanda in 1994, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Somalia between 1992 and 1995 demonstrate the limits of peacekeeping where there is no peace to keep, and the dilemmas posed by combining peacekeeping and the use of force.

Once deployed, many operations have faced a difficult or hostile environment, where factions on the ground readily resort to threats or the use of force--and the threat of or resort to force has been an available option. During the 1960-1964 Congo operation, UN peacekeepers were authorized in 1961 by the Security Council to use the requisite measure of force to complete the removal of mercenaries who had contributed to the secession of the province of Katanga. In order to counteract foreign intervention that had led to the weakened position of the central Government, UN peacekeepers were drawn into violent exchanges with armed elements.

In more recent situations, the Council has sought to equip peacekeeping operations with a credible military capacity that has helped avoid the need to resort to force. In 1996, for example, in such a demonstration of ‘robust’ peacekeeping, the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slovenia, Baranja and Western Sahara (UNTAES) was well armed with some heavy weapons as a deterrent. The Security Council also authorized Member States to provide close air support or
other forceful action in support of the mission. In Sierra Leone, the UN operation combined strong political pressure with a strong military posture to dissuade one of the parties from resuming the military option. In July 2000, following a series of unprovoked attacks on UNAMSIL troops, and after exhausting all other options, UNAMSIL undertook a military operation to free more than 230 United Nations peacekeepers who had been trapped for over two months by forces fighting against the Government.

Just as a capacity to use force can deter attempts to hinder peacekeepers from performing their duties, recent experience has shown that civic action programmes aimed at improving the lives of people in the mission area can generate goodwill and serve as an incentive to the parties to cooperate with the peacekeepers. Peacekeepers in many missions have helped restore essential infrastructure, communications links and services damaged or destroyed during fighting. In Kosovo, for example, supporting these efforts constitutes one of the main responsibilities of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Peacekeeping operations have come to encompass three distinct activities that have evolved as 'generations' of UN peace operations. They include not only the early activities of Chapter VI ‘first-generation’ peacekeeping (traditional peacekeeping), which call for the interposition of a force after a truce has been reached, but the 'second and third generations' (modern peacekeeping).

1.5.1 Traditional Peacekeeping

Traditional peacekeeping missions were deployed during the cold war as an interstate activity. Born during the cold war years, traditional peacekeeping
developed under the ever-present shadow of potential nuclear confrontation. Figures such as Canada's Prime Minister Lester Pearson, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, his aide Ralph Bunche and personnel in the field from many countries adapted the technique to make peacekeeping an indispensable means for controlling conflict in a divided, tension-ridden world. Commonly referred to as 'Chapter VI and a half' activity, traditional peacekeeping is seen to lie somewhere between Chapter VI of the UN Charter on 'Pacific Settlement of Disputes' and Chapter VII, on action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. The term peacekeeping is used in so many different ways because it is not mentioned in the U.N. Charter (as are the collective security and other approaches to peace) and because the strategy has evolved out of ad hoc responses to various crises.

Traditional Peace Keeping activities include observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires and supervision of truces. Let us examine each of them.

Observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires

Individual military personnel may be called upon to observe, monitor, verify, and report that parties to a conflict comply with the commitments into which they enter, such as truces and cease-fires. They may also be called upon to monitor a developing situation and report on events to the authorizing authority. Soldiers involved in such activities are called observers or monitors. Observers and monitors execute their duties under the authority of an international agreement or a mandate. They must be impartial and responsible to the authorizing authority. The role of observers engaged in battlefield stabilization or confidence-building measures among regular armed forces involved in conflict has been extensively
developed since the establishment of the first such organization—the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)—in 1948.

Observers and monitors are most commonly deployed on an individual basis and normally form military observer groups with individuals from other nations. Some tasks, such as liaison, may be performed individually. Observers and monitors are armed or unarmed as the situation dictates. Civilian officials of international organizations or governments may also serve as observers and monitors. The employment of observers in an early warning role to report on a developing situation is another aspect of this mission. These observers may serve to deter aggression by reporting timely information about a potentially tense situation. Observers and monitors may also be selectively employed to oversee certain types of events, such as elections, in order to verify their validity.

Observer forces deployed under traditional peacekeeping could be placed in an area prior to the cessation of armed hostilities. Furthermore, they may patrol areas and help resolve cease-fire disputes. The major difference between peacekeeping and observer forces is that observer forces are not designed to act as interposition forces, although they may be placed in a neutral zone between the protagonists. Observer forces are often fewer in number and do not act as a buffer between the hostile parties. They may be stationed on either side of the conflict and do not perform such activities as checking local vehicles for weapons and guarding border areas, as do peacekeeping troops. This principle, which forbids the use of force by peacekeeping troops, except in cases of self-defence, has come under question.

Reporting and monitoring
Military observers report accurate and timely military information in their assigned sector of responsibility. Initially, observers may be required to report on the withdrawal of armed forces as belligerent parties begin the disengagement process. Subsequently, observers may monitor the interface among those forces, to include any demilitarized lines or areas. Observers and monitors do not act to interpose themselves between belligerent parties.

**Supervision**

Observers may be called upon to carry out numerous types of supervisory tasks. Observers do not normally act with regard to violations. They merely observe and report. These tasks include supervision of cease-fire lines, borders, buffers, demilitarized zones, restricted areas, enclaves, and other geographic entities; the execution of the provisions of treaties, truces, cease-fires, arms control agreements, and other binding agreements; the exchange of prisoners of war, civilians, human remains, and territory; refugee camps, collection points, and stations; as well as, censuses, referendums, plebiscites, and elections.

**Investigation of complaints and violations**

Observers may be required to conduct investigations of complaints and alleged violations of the provisions of an agreement. Such investigations must be carried out in a completely impartial manner.

**Negotiation and mediation:** Observers may be required to undertake negotiations on behalf of all parties to the conflict and to act as mediators among the parties to a dispute. Observers must be prepared to supervise any actions undertaken to remedy the situation. Impartiality is critical to the performance of these tasks; observers must be seen as part of the solution, not part of the problem.
Liaison

Observers may function as liaison officers with the mission of maintaining personal contact and exchanging information with any of a number of entities. These may include the belligerent parties, the host nation, local civilian officials, international agencies, higher headquarters, and other military units.

Supervision of truces

Military formations normally conduct truce supervision operations. Such formations are introduced into a conflict area to fulfill a specific mandate in order to permit diplomatic negotiations to take place in a conflict-free environment. These operations are possible only with the consent of the disputing parties. Truce supervisory forces operate in significantly greater numbers than observers do. Rather than simply monitoring the situation, truce supervisory forces can insist that the local population comply with the specific conditions of a peace agreement.

Truce supervisory forces can, for example, patrol in sensitive areas, investigate installations or vehicles for prohibited items, and establish movement control points. Truce supervisory forces may be used to supervise a peace or cease-fire agreement. Supervision of a truce is also known as traditional PK, even when no formal peace has been signed. In traditional PK, truce supervisory forces physically interpose themselves between the disputing parties. In such cases, they may occupy a disengagement line or buffer zone at the interface between the belligerent parties. Military forces that conduct truce supervisory operations are normally multinational, while sub-formations are usually exclusively national. Military forces supervising truces are generally armed with organic small arms. However, forces may deploy with other weapons systems, based on the threat.
These forces will normally commence operations once a truce, cease-fire, or peace has been agreed to and the situation has stabilized.

Truce supervisory forces may be required to supervise the disengagement and withdrawal of belligerent forces. Supervision actions are similar to those conducted by observers and monitors, but with the added requirement of maintaining the ability to supervise the terms of the mandate. Liaison tasks are likewise similar to those of observers and monitors. Intermediary tasks may require truce supervisory forces to act as a credible and impartial intermediary among belligerent parties. Such mediation is accomplished through negotiations on contentious issues or incidents to arrive at a mutually acceptable solution that will maintain the conditions of the mandate. Superior negotiating skills are critical to the successful accomplishment of these actions.

The operation has been established by extrapolation from certain charter articles, which embrace – as Chapters VI and VII of the Charter indicate – both peaceful and coercive measures. It has the following basic attributes:

Non-enforcement

One distinguishing attribute of traditional peacekeeping is the performance of noncoercive mission. Peacekeeping troops were not designed to restore order or stop the fighting between rival enemies. They were usually only deployed following a cease-fire agreement by the protagonists and acted as an interposition force between the protagonists. This means they had no offensive role (and no such capability) in the conflict. They do not use military force except under very limited conditions. Their goal was to provide a buffer between hostile forces and prevent hostile shooting incidents that might escalate hostilities and permanently jeopardize
the cease-fire agreement. Thus, a large part of a peacekeeping force's activities involves patrolling the deployment area, searching for violations of the cease-fire agreement, and attempting to resolve conflicts related to the agreement by acting as a conciliator between the hostile parties.

**Limited military capability**

Traditional peacekeeping forces also have the distinguishing feature of being only lightly armed. A typical peacekeeping soldier is equipped only with a rifle, and has vehicles for transportation purposes (e.g., helicopters and personnel carriers). Peacekeeping troops are only lightly armed because their mission is designed to use arms only in self-defence. Peacekeeping troops have neither an offensive military mission nor the capability to carry out one.

**Neutrality/Impartiality**

Peacekeeping forces do not brand one side or the other responsible for the military conflict. The concept of neutrality goes beyond the purpose of the composition and activities of the troops. Neutrality means that the actions of the peacekeeping troops are not intended to favour one side or the other in the dispute. To be impartial means acting without prejudice or bias, yet it is necessary to distinguish intent from effect. Impartiality of the peacekeeping forces is demanded by the fact that they must interpose themselves between the warring parties to avoid escalation of hostilities and secure compliance with a ceasefire where one is operable. Their independent character is relevant because the peacekeeping forces must be directed by the UN, by definition representing a neutral party in the conflict and the guarantor of the application of the principle of impartiality. Concern for intent leads to an emphasis on blind impartiality or impartiality toward a mandate,
including one which calls on UN forces to facilitate implementation of an agreement to which parties gave their prior consent.

**Consent**

Traditional peacekeeping operations recognize and respect the sovereignty of states and must have permission of the state or states on whose territory the troops will be stationed. Beginning with the first peace operation, it has been United Nations practice that the deployment of peace operation requires the consent of the parties’ concerned (Higgins, 1994:4). The ‘consent of the protagonists’ is the cornerstone of peace-keeping. Bearing in mind that traditional peace operations were devised for conflicts between States, consent had to be obtained from the States concerned in order to comply with Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, which stipulates that ‘nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...’.

The legality of a peace operation thus depends on whether its deployment and activities fall under the domestic jurisdiction of the state affected by it, which in turn depends on international law and the changing interpretation of Article 2(7). Hence without consent from the host Government, the deployment and activities of a peace operation on the territory of a State, would infringe on the sovereignty of the State, and could only be lawful by virtue of an enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter. The absence of such permission could jeopardize the mission of the peacekeeping operation. It is likely that any attempts to station troops without the consent of the host country would precipitate military attacks on those forces by the host country. Sovereignty requires consent for their presence on national soil (Bennett 1988, 145).
In traditional peacekeeping operations, unarmed or lightly armed UN forces are stationed between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal, and/or buffer zone while political negotiations go forward. They were devised by the UN as a practical mechanism to contain armed conflicts and facilitate their political settlement by peaceful means (see Liu, 1992: 11). They are based on consent and must be impartial, using force only in self-defence and as a last resort. Their success depends on the cooperation of the parties and the ability of the peacekeepers to resolve problems by negotiation rather than coercion.

Traditional peacekeeping operations are normally deployed in situations of inter-state conflict. They were possible during the Cold War years either because the superpowers had no interest in the conflicts, or because they had a mutual interest in ensuring the conflicts did not escalate. They provide transparency to the parties through an impartial assurance that the other party is not violating the truce. They also raise the costs of defecting from and the positive benefits of abiding with, the agreement by various means: the threat of exposure; the potential resistance of the peacekeeping forces; and the international legitimacy of UN mandates. Their deployment is meant to calm the military situation while a political settlement is pursued.

Traditional peacekeeping operations have shared a number of operational characteristics. First, peacekeeping operations inherently have been reactive to international conflicts. The United Nations, like many organizations, is crisis driven; peacekeeping operations are not often suggested, much less authorized, until lives have been lost and the prospects for war expansion are great. Before a peacekeeping operation can be contemplated during a crisis, there must be some opportunity for U.N. intervention. Most often this is a ceasefire agreed to by the
protagonists. On occasion, the peacekeeping operation may be deployed in an attempt to stabilize the situation. Thus, typical peacekeeping operations are not deployed in low-level disputes, and must await the opportunity for intervention that is provided by the consent of the parties.

A second set of characteristics surrounds the authorization of the typical peacekeeping mission. Although the Security Council is the authorizing body, consent of the host state (and usually of the protagonists) is necessary before the process can begin. The mandate of the operation is spelled out by the Security Council. Peacekeeping operations are usually authorized for limited periods of time, subject to periodic reauthorization as needed; a typical term of authorization is six months. A six-month renewal also allows the members to re-evaluate those terms in the light of changed circumstances since the last authorization.

A third aspect of a typical peacekeeping operation is its formation mechanisms. Peacekeeping operations remain distinctly ad hoc. Once an operation is authorized, the Secretary-General begins to acquire commitments from member states to provide troops and material for the peacekeeping force. Troops usually came from neutral countries that have little or no stake in the outcome of the conflict. Several U.N. members maintain national training programmes that earmark troops for peacekeeping duty. Other countries devote some portion of regular military training to peacekeeping methods so that troops will be available if needed. States that do not provide troops, for political or other reasons, may volunteer helicopters, vehicles, or other equipment to the peacekeeping force. Some costs of the operation are borne directly by those contributing men and material. The U.N. budget or voluntary monetary contributions by member states cover other costs. It may appear that a mad, last-minute scramble is hardly the most efficient
way to organize a peacekeeping operation, but most operations nevertheless are deployed and functioning within several days or weeks of authorization.

The size of peacekeeping operations generally ranges from one or two thousand to twenty thousand depending on the willingness of states to contribute troops, the mission assigned the operation, and the breadth of the area of deployment. There are yet no exact structures and procedures for peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, peacekeeping operations are under U.N. Command, not solely under the direction of national commanders. The commander of the operation is often from a neutral state.

The usual practice is for UN peacekeeping costs to be shared by all Member States in accordance with the Charter. The General Assembly accordingly apportions these expenses based on a special scale of assessments applicable to peacekeeping. This scale takes into account the relative economic wealth of Member States, with the permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

In response to a request from the Secretary-General, countries may volunteer personnel, equipment, supplies or other support for a peacekeeping mission. Countries providing these essential elements are reimbursed from the mission budget at agreed rates. Contributing personnel to peacekeeping is not obligatory; a troop-contributing country retains the right to withdraw its personnel from an operation. Military and civilian police personnel in peacekeeping operations remain members of their own national establishments but serve under the operational control of the United Nations and are expected to conduct themselves in
accordance with the exclusively international character of their mission. In addition, many countries have voluntarily made additional resources available to support UN peacekeeping efforts on a non-reimbursable basis in the form of transportation, supplies, personnel and financial contributions, beyond their assessed share of peacekeeping costs.

For decades, States have recognized the unique advantages of UN peacekeeping as a means of dealing with conflicts. Its universality makes it uniquely suited to a wide range of situations, and assures legitimacy as action taken on behalf of a global organization rather than based on national or regional interests.

Times have changed to the point where traditional peacekeeping no longer addresses the challenges of either managing or resolving many complex intra-state conflicts. Between 1989 and 1994, UN peacekeeping generally expanded its number of missions, criteria for intervention, and tasks of intervention. The unabated violence in cases like Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, has forced additional changes on peacekeeping. The solemn signing of peace agreements or ceasefires no longer meant an end to violence. In Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Bosnia, many cease-fire agreements were broken after signing. In all cases, the peacekeepers were confronted with all kinds of violence. National, regional, and local leaders as well as warlords and armed groups were involved – a difficult mix for the peacekeepers to handle. Establishing and upholding a secure environment for humanitarian aid and socio-economic and political reconstruction became a primary demand on the soldiers and on the police thus rendering the old doctrine untenable.
1.5.2 Modern Peacekeeping

This consists of ‘second and third generation’ peace operations. These peace operations activities lay beyond the strictly defined UN parameters (Mackinlay 1993). Unlike the first generation or traditional peacekeeping operations, their use could be ordered without the express consent of the disputants and they are trained and equipped to use force if necessary. This, according to Ruggie (1993) would enable the UN force to present a credible threat ‘to convince all conflicting parties that violence will not succeed...The military objective of the strategy, then, is to deter, dissuade, and deny’ (Rouge 1993, 27). Let us examine the second and third generation peace operations at this point.

Second-generation peace operations

These operations emerged after the cold war, often with a mandate from the UN Security Council, not only to facilitate the reduction of tensions between former enemies (as in traditional peacekeeping) but also to help implement a peace accord that addresses the causes of the underlying conflict. These operations involve peace enforcements operation (PEO).

PEO is the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The purpose of PEO is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. In PEO, the enemy is the dispute, not the belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. Although PEO may require combat, they are not wars and may have more restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) than wars. Conflict, violence, disorder, a high level of mistrust, and possibly even chaos, rather than peace, describe the
environment surrounding PEO. PEO are conducted in interstate conflicts, but increasingly have involved intrastate conflicts. In PEO, consent of the parties to the dispute is not a requirement, although some parties may extend it. Fundamentals that help guide the conduct of successful PEO include impartiality, restraint in the use of force, a goal of settlement rather than victory, the use of methods of coercion, and the presence of civilians. Accurate intelligence and comprehensive mission analysis will be the basis for determining the structure and composition of the force.

Peace enforcement (PE) missions may include enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of humanitarian assistance, operations to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. Transition to combat requires the successful application of war fighting skills. Intelligence is developed to support PEO using the same process used in war, but it will also seek information similar to that, which is required in PKO. In PEO, fire support is constrained by more restrictive ROE, and a prime consideration is the need to minimize collateral damage. Logistics planning and support in PEO are the same as in war but include the considerations for PKO. The combination of information operations with other advanced and non-lethal technologies that are integrated into an overall campaign or operation plan can help to support PEO. Use of special equipment requires special consideration for the capabilities of allies and coalition members. Well conceived, clearly stated, and thoroughly disseminated ROE can make the difference between success and failure in PO. ROE in PEO are usually less restrictive than in PKO, but more restrictive than in war. To ensure a mobile, survivable force, both engineer and chemical protection forces provide essential support during peace operations. Employment planning for PEO is the
same as for combat operations, since these may occur. Establishing phases for PEO provides an execution framework for staff planning.

PE operations are normally conducted in several phases. The first phase may involve the insertion of rapidly deployable combat forces in order to establish a significant and visible military presence. Subsequent phases will involve the transition from a military presence to support for the development of competent civil authority.

The forces employed for such operations will be armed and equipped based on commanders' estimates and. Infantry units, supported by engineer, military police, and aviation assets, are most often employed in this role. They are normally reinforced by civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) assets.

The missions assigned to PE forces include the restoration and maintenance of order and stability, protection of humanitarian assistance, guarantee and denial of movement, enforcement of sanctions, establishment and supervision of protected zones, forcible separation of belligerent parties, and other operations as determined by the authorizing body.

Unlike traditional peacekeeping, the second-generation peace operations have an implementation schedule and a time-line. When the tasks on schedule have been completed, the operation ends. The second-generation peace operations operate in a more complex domestic political environment than traditional peacekeeping and involve the settlement of internal conflicts. The operations are aimed primarily at assisting a state or group of states in executing an agreed political solution to a conflict. This means that greater military pressure might be used against local elements that actively hinder implementation of a peace accord.
The second-generation peace operations is not limited to an exclusively military mandate, but can have (and usually have had) a substantial nonmilitary mandate and composition. It requires substantial investment of civilian personnel with expertise in areas such as elections, human rights, public administration, and economics. It involves peace building. This entails promotion of reconciliation among former combatants. This means that the second generation peacekeeping undertakes the following non-military functions: verification, supervision and conduct of elections; supervision of civil administration; promotion and protection of human rights; supervision of law and order, as well as police activities; economic rehabilitation; repatriation of refugees; humanitarian relief; de-mining assistance; public information activities; and training and advice to governmental officials. Usually, a civilian chief of mission who carries the title, ‘Special Representative of the Secretary-General’ is appointed by the UN Secretary-General. The military help to maintain a secure environment in which the civilian components can work, a role that may involve a number of tasks not found in traditional peacekeeping, such as guarding polling stations, transporting refugees to resettlement areas, and assisting with the demobilization and disarmament of local forces.

Third generation peacekeeping

These new type peace operations are undertaken to relieve suffering in the midst of an ongoing conflict or situation of anarchy. This involves outright intervention by multinational forces to defend the victims of aggression and human rights abuses. Military forces may be employed to restore order and stability within a state or region where competent civil authority has ceased to function. They may be called upon to assist in the maintenance of order and stability in areas where it is
threatened, where the loss of order and stability threatens international stability, or where human rights are endangered. Very often, operations to restore and maintain order and stability may be conducted in conjunction with actions designed to provide and protect the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Third generation peace operations range from low-level military missions to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to full-fledged enforcement action to roll back aggression. Undertaken under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, their defining characteristic is the lack of consent. At first glance, the operations appear to violate local sovereignty, but when viewed as an effort to protect the source of a state's sovereignty, namely, its populace, from ravages of civil war or a renegade government. Somalia (1992-95) provides a clear illustration to this point. Militarily, these operations seek to deter, dissuade, or deny success to acts of aggressive force. The third generation peace operations may use coercive means to suppress conflict and create a de facto cease-fire and facilitate negotiations among local belligerents, or to protect non-combatant populations facing a general collapse of governance (as in the case of the US-led interventions in Somalia in late 1992).

A third generation operation may also be authorized to use coercive means to maintain a cease-fire or implement a peace accord in particularly dangerous circumstances. Also known as humanitarian intervention operation, they could evolve into peace enforcement if the interveners’ posses the political will to escalate their involvement and decide that the only way to protect civilians is to suppress or stop the conflict through use of coercive force.

The rules of engagement for a peace enforcement operation, which define the circumstances under which deadly force may be used, will seek to minimize
casualties, among both the peace enforcers and the local population. Implementing such a mandate generally requires clear superiority over combined local forces. Third generation peace operations may involve the overthrow of existing leaders and support to freely elected government officials or to protect existing and threatened democratic governments; activities in this category may include, action against antidemocratic forces and assistance in law, and order, and support services to democratic regimes (Bennett 1988,145). Protection of human rights, training of local police, guarding humanitarian relief deliveries, assisting in the maintenance of law and order, supervising cease-fires between irregular forces, the denial of an air space and the guarantee of rights of passage among others are all under the second generation peacekeeping operations.

A clear distinction between PKO and PEO is important. Although both are PO, they are not part of a continuum. A distinct demarcation separates these operations. PKO and PEO take place under different circumstances, characterized by three critical factors-consent, impartiality, and the use of force. Commanders who are aware of the importance of these factors and how military actions affect them are apt to be more successful in controlling the operational setting and the ultimate success of the operation. Consent is evident where parties to the conflict, those that share responsibility for the strife, exhibit willingness to accomplish the goals of the operation. These goals are normally expressed in the mandate. Consent may vary from grudging acquiescence to enthusiastic acceptance and may shift during the course of an operation. Impartiality means that the PO force will treat all sides in a fair and even-handed manner, recognizing neither aggressor nor victim. This implies that the force will carry out its tasks in a way that fosters the goals of the mandate rather than the goals of the parties.
During PE, the force maintains impartiality by focusing on the current behavior of the involved parties — employing force because of what is being done, not because of who is doing it. The French Army has called this notion active impartiality. Parties could believe that they have been treated unfairly and accuse the PO force of favoring the opposition. They will often set an impossible standard, demanding that the PO force affect all parties equally. Nevertheless, impartiality does not imply that a PO will affect all sides equally; even the least intrusive PO is unlikely to do so. However, the standard remains for the PO force to be impartial and even-handed in its dealings with all sides to a conflict. This standard does not preclude the use of force in either PKO or PEO. In the former, the use of force is for self-defense. In the latter, force is used to compel or coerce compliance with established rules. Moreover, the central ‘goal’ of PEO is achievement of the mandate, not maintenance of impartiality. While impartiality is desirable, it may be extremely difficult to attain and maintain in an actual PEO, no matter how the PE force executes its mission.

PKO and PEO are distinct operations, the dividing line being determined by the variables of consent, impartiality, and the use of force. The existence of a cease-fire to the conflict among the parties and a demonstrated willingness to negotiate on their part are indicators of the presence of consent. Other variables are more clearly within the control of outside actors. However, because of the dynamic environment in which these operations take place, gray areas can develop. Such operations foist on commanders and policymakers the potential for uncertainty, ambiguity, and lack of clarity, which requires extremely close political military communication. For example, during PKO conducted under the general provisions of Chapter VI of the UN Charter, cease-fires may break down, factions may
withdraw their consent, some elements may operate outside the authority of existing leadership structures, or new political entities may emerge that had no part in the original granting of consent to the PKO. Therefore, the assigned force will be capable of defending itself as appropriate to the threat level in its operational area. Force augmentation may be necessary, and the commander of the PKO force will monitor the situation to ensure the force is capable of self-protection. Commanders also should be prepared for transition to a PEO, if a change of mission is directed or for withdrawal if a higher authority decides the mission is not achievable. At the same time, geographic differences in the nature of the operation may develop or the conflict may spread to different geographic areas. Certain sectors of the operational area may assume different characteristics in terms of threat, consent, perceptions of impartiality, and other factors. In this case, commanders may need to be flexible and prepared to adjust the activity of the force in terms of composition, threat posture, and use of force to account for these differences and new or emerging guidance from higher authorities. In these cases, close political-military coordination and communication are essential. Many of these circumstances arose during the conduct of operations by the UN Protection Force in the Balkans in 1995.

During PEO conducted with the authority granted for the use of force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the deployment of a robust force, with flexibility in its authority to use force, may serve as a deterrent to unacceptable behavior by parties to the conflict and others. Such a force may encounter a degree of cooperation and consent. It may build on and foster this cooperation. In this case, such a force may conduct itself in most circumstances as if performing PKO, and be prepared to use force to implement the mandate by virtue of its size,
composition, and authority. Again, close political-military communication is essential to ensure that all military actions support the overall political objectives. Many of these circumstances apply to the conduct of operations by the peace implementation force in the Balkans during Operation Joint Endeavour.

In contrast to the traditional peacekeeping, the UN humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era have been much larger, more complex affairs than previous missions. These new interventions have involved a much wider range of tasks, including protecting territory, people, and aid operations, disarming belligerents, policing demilitarized sites and monitoring demobilization, monitoring and running elections, and helping to reconstruct governments, police forces, and armies. The third generation peace operations have been a source of controversy, especially amongst Britain, the United States of America, and France.

The British Army initially called these operations ‘Wider Peacekeeping’ (1995). The British doctrine acknowledges that the peace operations of the 1990’s are different to earlier ones. The key difference being the volatility of the environment in which peace operations take place and such factors as ‘the absence of law and order,’ the presence of ‘numerous’ and ‘undisciplined factions’ in a conflict, the ‘ineffectiveness of ceasefires,’ ‘the risk of local armed opposition to UN forces,’ ‘the collapse of infrastructure,’ ‘large numbers of displaced persons,’ and ‘undefined area of operations’ create ‘an environment that may be highly volatile’ (Wider Peacekeeping, 1995:1-8-9). This not only reflected the wider range of operational tasks involved, but also recognized that such peacekeeping operations occupied a grey area between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Not all aspects of these multitask missions had the full consent of all the involved parties. Whereas consent was central to traditional peacekeeping, it
was not to the new breed of wider peacekeeping. Peacekeepers had to be able to threaten and to use force to achieve their mandate; if necessary, they needed to be able to force aid through to the starving, to repulse attacks on civilians, to forcibly disarm troublemakers, and to arrest war criminals.

In fact, the British Army's interim doctrine on *Wider Peacekeeping* was designed to caution policymakers and the public about the costs of using force in peacekeeping. Critical here is the relationship between consent, force, and impartiality. *Wider Peacekeeping* distinguished between the tactical and operational level of consent for peacekeeping missions. The nature of consent implies that peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement should not be conceptualized in a linear relationship based on degrees of danger, risk or volatility. This reflects the British desire to keep the world of peacekeeping and the world of peace enforcement black and white. Those operations where consent is present, regardless of the volatility of the situation and the nature of the tasks, should be approached in a different manner than those operations for which consent is absent.

As long as consent is present, the well-worn rules of neutrality, impartiality and minimal use of force are the only appropriate ones. The rigid differentiation between wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement is based on the fear that the inappropriate use of force could endanger a mission's neutrality and impartiality, trigger the withdrawal of consent, and transform the mission to one of peace enforcement, albeit without the will or force structure necessary to succeed. British doctrine assumes that force has a negligible role to play in wider peacekeeping, because the conflicts, which peacekeepers become involved in at present require resolution by conciliation rather than termination by force. It argued that should consent be withdrawn at the tactical level, where one or
more groups that are belligerents, obstruct peacekeepers in the field, small amounts of force could be used to keep the mission on track. It warned, however, that excessive use of force could result in a collapse of consent for the mission as a whole. Under such circumstances, the mission would have crossed the 'consent divide', undermining its credibility as an impartial peacekeeping force and prejudicing mission legitimacy in the eyes of the belligerents. Uncontrolled escalation in violence (including attacks on peacekeepers) was bound to follow. There are several ways in which the actions of peacekeepers can endanger consent: they can take sides, use too much force, lose legitimacy and credibility, prompt disrespect, and cause misunderstanding.

Wider Peacekeeping deliberately painted a bleak picture of what happens when a modest force is given an ambitious mandate. It came at a time when the British Army was being asked to do much in Bosnia with few resources on the ground. This doctrine also reflected the UN operation in Somalia, which took on one of the warring factions and lost. It certainly resonated with the first British commander of the UN force in Bosnia, General Sir Michael Rose, who referred to the consent divide as the 'Mogadishu Line'. General Rose later articulated that lesson: 'In Somalia, it has been well demonstrated that it was the move by the UN Force from peacekeeping to war-fighting which so terminally damaged the prospects of the Mission'. This attitude, reflected in Wider Peacekeeping, was unhelpful, however, when peacekeeping missions had no choice but to cross the ‘consent divide’ into peace enforcement. Wider Peacekeeping warned that this must be a deliberate policy, but gave little advice as to what should happen next. This was because the chief author of Wider Peacekeeping, Colonel Charles Dobbie (like General Rose), considered peace enforcement to be synonymous with war, and thus
Colonel Dobbie's approach is too passive because it leaves peacekeepers dependent on the cooperation of the warring parties. Under such circumstances, peacekeeping missions can fall prey to 'spoilers' – leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it (Stedman, 1997:5). Where spoilers are identified, peacekeepers must be able to engage in robust and aggressive action to bring them to heel. This option was discouraged by the sharp distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement drawn in Wider Peacekeeping.

In contrast, the US Army grouped peacekeeping and peace enforcement under the category of ‘peace operations’. In its doctrine, the Americans conceive Peace Operations (1994), many of the tasks originally viewed as Wider Peacekeeping by the British as peace enforcement.

The American doctrine also sharply differentiates peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping depends on the consent of the warring parties and is designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term settlement. The American view of peacekeeping upholds the importance of neutrality, impartiality, and minimal, constrained use of force. The roles of peacekeepers in facilitating implementation of agreements include observing, monitoring, verifying, reporting, and investigating. On the other hand, peace enforcement is the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order (US
Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations 1994). No consideration is given in peace enforcement to cases where parties consent to a peacekeeping operation and then withdraw their consent. Rather, peace enforcement encompasses such missions as enforcement of sanctions and exclusive zones, protection of humanitarian assistance, operation of humanitarian assistance, operation to restore order, and forced separation of belligerent parties.

These tasks invariably involve coercing belligerents to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions: in short, to use force to induce consent for peace operations. The US doctrine maintains that the two operations have different implications for rules of engagement, equipment, and staffing, and warns that peacekeepers should not normally transit from peacekeeping to peace enforcement operations or vice versa. It states however, that such a transition may be unavoidable and therefore should be planned. Peace operations advise US commanders on how combat power can be used to ‘induce consent’. The British Army has since moved closer to this position. It now accepts that it must prepare to use force in peace operations, and that impartiality ought to be defined in relation not to the warring parties but to the mission mandate, that is, force will be used equally against all who threaten the mission.

The French peacekeeping doctrine refers to France's colonial heritage and suggests that its experience in policing its colonies is applicable to the challenges of peacekeeping today. The French doctrine divides the world of missions into three: Peacekeeping, Peace–Restoring, and Peace Enforcement. Peacekeeping is intervention with the consent of the parties to maintain peace where hostilities have stopped, carried out under Chapter VI auspices. The major tasks here are the supervision and enforcement of a cease-fire. Both peace- restoring and peace
enforcement occur where war is still being waged, but differ in one respect. In peace enforcement, a party is designated to be the aggressor in the conflict and must be defeated with force (mimeo, March 1995).

If British peacekeeping doctrine is an attempt to mould traditional peacekeeping concepts to new realities, French peacekeeping doctrine is an attempt to revolutionize the world of peacekeeping. Where the British doctrine shows a clear lineage to the traditional, the French demonstrate few qualms in reinventing the wheel. French doctrine is startling in its rejection of the basic premise of traditional peacekeeping concerning armaments and self-defense, even in peacekeeping operations. The doctrine requires that normally in supervising a cease-fire, there is little need for heavy armaments or anything greater than self-defence. Nevertheless, it notes that if the need arises to use greater force, then the operation faces a dilemma.

The shift from a traditional peacekeeping operation to another type of operation implying the use of military force can be difficult; it is risky to use troops outfitted for self-defence. The dilemma then is whether to put peacekeepers in harm's way or withdraw them. To overcome the dilemma, the doctrine states that French troops in peacekeeping missions should have the capability to take a tactical disposition, allowing it to react against provocations, harassment, and if need be, to intervene in order to stop violence against populations. Thus, for the French, it seems necessary to systematically equip the forces with real self-defence and even combat assets whatever their initial mission's environment may be (mimeo, 1995).

The French label for the principle that should guide their peacekeeping operations is ‘active impartiality’. For the French, impartiality is to be determined in relation to the warring parties' compliance with the mandate of an operation. The
French consider the mandate a law, and believe that it is the military's role to act as judge and police in ensuring that all parties live up to the law. To uphold the mandate actively, the peacekeeping force may have to use force.

In peace restoration, there is neither the consent of the belligerents or a cessation of violence. Although the mandate precludes going to war with a particular faction, force can be used to stop actions that put the local population in danger or that stop our troops from fulfilling their mission (escorting convoys, protection of a security zone or show of force).

The ‘consent divide – induce consent’ debate can be stated in more general terms as a clash of two perspectives: intervention pessimism versus intervention optimism. Intervention pessimism is the belief that little can be done about humanitarian disasters without the consent and cooperation of the major parties concerned; all is lost if the peacekeeping force crosses the consent divide. Intervention optimism is the belief that the international community can forcibly rebuild failed states and reform murderous ones; operational success depends on the ability to induce consent if required. The tension between these opposing perspectives was played out in the cases of the two greatest failures in the post cold war humanitarian intervention: Somalia and Rwanda.

Intervention optimism led the UN to launch a recklessly ambitious operation aimed at disarming Somalia and reconstructing the government. Intervention pessimism led the UN to do nothing to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Following the disaster in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali’s 1995 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace reasserts the crucial importance of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force to operational success. The UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and US President
Clinton started out as intervention optimists but turned into intervention pessimists following failure in Somalia. This resulting lack of political will prevented effective UN intervention in Rwanda.

From our discussion above, it can thus be seen that, UN peacekeeping operations have crossed the threshold of traditional peacekeeping into a new range of what is now termed ‘second generation and third generation tasks’. However, as we have seen, there is no internationally agreed doctrine that clearly spells out the range of tasks.

1.6 HYPOTHESES

This study was guided by the following:

1.6.1 The increasing wave of intra-state conflicts has compelled regional and sub-regional organizations to have a growing role in peace operations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

1.6.2 ECOMOG experience in peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, especially under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, has raised questions about mandate, consent, competence, effectiveness and neutrality of subregional organizations in peace operations.

1.6.3 The experience of ECOMOG in peace operations in West Africa (especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone), provide lessons for future peace operations by regional and subregional organizations in intra-state conflicts.

1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The scope of this study is the West African Sub-region. This is mainly because West Africa is the only sub-region in Africa that has an outstanding
subregional security cooperation mechanism that intervened at least, twice in intra-state conflicts under the auspices of ECOMOG. We further propose to focus mainly on Liberia and Sierra Leone as test cases of actual conflicts in which the sub-regional military force was deployed between 1990 and 1998. We shall eliminate from our study those conflicts that never involved ECOMOG intervention in the form of peace-enforcement operations (ECOMOG operation in Guinea Bissau) and those conflicts that are still under way. Thus, the time frame for this study is from 1990 to 1998. This approach has a number of advantages; prominent among which is that it enabled us examine, readily, the two deeply rooted and protracted conflicts, in which ECOMOG had intervened between 1990 and 1998. The mechanism for conflict intervention by the ECOWAS between 1990 and 1998 is officially referred to as ECOMOG. Subsequent intervention by the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) is outside the scope of this study.

1.8 METHODOLOGY

1.8.1 Data Collection

In examining the relationship between subregional security cooperation and conflict management, we focused on the ECOMOG experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone. To enable us do this successfully, we used a combination of primary and secondary data sources.

Interview technique was utilized in the collection of data on the ECOMOG experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Given the security nature of the research area and the fact that many of the data required are still classified, the researcher used the informal interview technique to interact with some of the former ECOMOG Commanders and some high level officers involved in the ECOMOG
operations. Many of them requested anonymity and the researcher assured them of treating many of the issues with the utmost confidentiality necessary. The flexibility of the informal interview technique enabled the researcher to interact freely with the key actors and had insight into the operations of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as their experiences. Important information was disclosed unconsciously by some of the key actors in the course of interactions with them.

Literature/Documents Research Method was also used for data collection. This involved a secondary analysis of information already published. It involved intensive scanning and search of written documents (both published and unpublished). It enabled the researcher to attempt to link previous research with the study. The review of literature and documents provided useful data and information that revealed the kind of questions on the problematic, which other writers have been concerned with.

Specifically, the literature/document research method enabled the researcher to re-examine the extent to which previous studies have been carried out in the area of conflict management in the West African Sub-region. Using this approach in the study has enabled the researcher to locate other studies. Some documents were not easily accessible for security reasons. Such documents contain some very useful data on the experience of ECOMOG, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The researcher consulted the following sources:

i) Books

ii) Documentations at the ECOWAS Secretariat in Abuja.

iii) Reports, periodicals and journals relevant to the study.

iv) Interviews, speeches and relevant addresses made by the essential
actors concerning ECOMOG experiences in West Africa.


vi) Television Documentaries, especially, NTA, CNN, BBC among others.

vii) Internet sites were consulted extensively as an important source of data.

In addition, the historical method was used in the study to carry out critical investigation into the ECOMOG experience in West Africa. The researcher consulted textual source materials such as governmental and other official documents. The autobiographies and other writings of a very large number of prominent and not so prominent but relevant people to the research provided a source of private, more or less candid, and ‘inside’ information bearing upon events of the past.

Although textual sources are often coloured by qualitative judgments and frequently recorded subjective personal impressions, the researcher carefully and systematically investigated and subjected some the data to vigorous analysis. The volume and bulk of extant historical source materials and their diverse nature constituted severe obstacles. The mere task of surveying historical sources to identify and locate potentially useful data was an undertaking of considerable magnitude.
1.8.2 Data Analysis

Essentially, analysis of data involves categorizing, ordering, manipulating and summarizing data in such a way as to render them useful in answering research questions and/or testing hypothesis (Kerlinger 1972, 703).

In this study, the researcher employed the case study methodology to analyze ECOMOG’s conflict management efforts in the West African Sub-region. Liberia and Sierra Leone were selected as empirical field of study. This method of analysis was useful for exploring, discovering, and communicating significant aspects of the experiences of ECOMOG in West Africa. This probably could not be delivered by any other scholarly style of research. Furthermore, an exceptionally useful Political Science instrument for reconnaissance, exploration, and discovery was applied to this study. The method also allowed for effective communication of data in ways that carry precision and understanding and synchronized beneficially with other forms of research. Additionally, the case study method provided benefits of a focused study and description of the forces, conditions, and sequences of action that led to, or affected, the outcome of the conflicts.

In the analysis of data, we used tables to summarize some of the information found.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter consists of a review of relevant literature in three main areas: the United Nations and conflict management; regional organizations and conflict management in Africa – from OAU to AU; and, ECOMOG and conflict management in West Africa. This literature survey focuses on books, book chapters and scholarly articles, as well as a number of touchstone works that help put the current literature in context.

2.1 THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The United Nations provides the global framework for security cooperation and conflict management among nations. The United Nations was created in 1945 to ‘maintain international peace and security,’ as well as ‘develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.’ It also aims to ‘achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character,’ and ‘to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends’ (U.N. Charter art.1).

In pursuing these objectives, the United Nations and its Member States are required to act in accordance with the seven principles enumerated in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter Charter). The most important of these principles is the prohibition on the aggressive use of force found in Paragraph 4 of Article 2. Although the fundamental precepts underlying these principles are the sovereign equality of all Member States and the peaceful settlement of disputes, Article 2 explicitly recognizes the primacy of the Chapter VII dealing with the
enforcement authority of the UN Security Council in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. The Member States of the UN have conferred upon the Security Council the ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf’ (UN Charter art. 24).

Two key chapters of the Charter provide the legal authority for the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. Chapter VI provides for the pacific settlement of disputes, and requires the parties to any dispute that may endanger international peace and security to ‘seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means by their own choice’ (UN Charter: art. 33).

Within the pacific settlement mechanism, the Security Council has investigative powers and the authority to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment. Should conciliation under Chapter VI fail, the Security Council is to rely on Chapter VII. Chapter VII gives the Council certain prerogatives: the sole authority to determine when a threat to, or breach of, the peace has occurred; the authority to order provisional measures; and the authority to order enforcement measures to be taken against a State, that is to impose economic and military sanctions against a State or entities within a State. The authority to impose economic sanctions is contained in Article 41, and that for military sanctions is contained in Article 42.

The UN Charter constitutes a collective security system, which gives the Security Council the primary role to maintain and restore peace and, under Chapter
VII, broad powers to achieve these objectives. The United Nations pursues the goal of peace as a process and mechanism of conflict management.


All specific references to sanctions are contained in Chapter VII, but the Security Council has maintained flexibility and has avoided legal restraints by dealing with most situations without reference to any particular charter provision. In this way, the distinction between peaceful settlement and collective action has become blurred and a new process not specifically described in the Charter has evolved in United Nations practice. The process is referred to as ‘Peacekeeping’ (Bennett, 1988:140). Bennett observed that peacekeeping operations, because of diverse circumstances leading to their creation, vary widely in function and size. They may perform duties of observing, patrolling, and acting as a buffer force, keeping or restoring order, or negotiating.

Secretary-General Boutros – Ghali (1992: 11-12) has defined four related operational concepts of UN conflict management: Preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building. He saw 'preventive diplomacy as action to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and limit the spread of the latter when they occur'. Preventive diplomacy presupposes confidence-building measures by which peace is sought through the intermediary of
entities or organizations regarded as honest brokers enjoying the respect of the parties to the conflict. Preventive diplomacy normally precedes peacemaking. According to Ghali (1992) peace-making is action to 'bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations', including negotiation, mediation and conciliation. He observed that peacekeeping is generally a collective action involving military personnel intervening with the aim of restoring peace between two states or the cessation of hostilities between warring parties within a state.

Ruggie (1993:27-31) while clarifying Ghali's position, noted that Ghali's bold ‘Agenda for Peace’ proposed the creation of a standing UN ‘peace enforcement force’ to quickly ‘enforce a ceasefire by taking coercive action against either party, or both, if they violate it.’ Under this innovation, the UN rapid deployment units would be established by voluntary contribution of member states, go into action when authorized by the Security Council, and serve under the command of the Secretary-General. Unlike traditional peacekeeping operations, however, their use could be ordered without the express consent of the disputants, and they would be trained and equipped to use force if necessary. This would enable UN forces, ‘by presenting a credible military threat...to convince all conflictual parties that violence will not succeed....The military objective of the strategy, then, is to deter, dissuade, and deny (D3)’ (Ruggie 1993:31).

Fetherston (1994) attempted to continue from Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace by proposing a theory of peacekeeping based on concepts of peaceful third party intervention. She traced the development of peacekeeping from its nascent stage through to its current period of expansion and noted that the UN's adhoc system of peacekeeping does not meet the demands posed by the post-Cold
War world. She examined the United Nations peacemaking and peace building efforts as they relate to the practice of peacekeeping and concludes that better coordination of all three roles is crucial for more effective conflict management. For the UN to be more effective in the management of conflict, she argued, a framework of intervention will be needed.

Otunnu (1997) observed that the evolution of the UN peacekeeping thus far may be divided into three distinct, though closely related, phases. In the first phase, the UN developed and practiced traditional peacekeeping with its emphasis on consent and cooperation; ceasefire; impartiality; and non-use of force except in self-defence. Traditional peacekeeping, which applied mainly inter-state conflicts, dominated UN practice in the period from 1948 to about 1988, he argued. Otunnu further observed that in the aftermath of the Cold War and with the proliferation of deadly internal conflicts, a broader more ambitious, and intrusive notion of peacekeeping emerged – the multi-dimensional peace operations. This evolution, according to him, highlighted the second phase that has been marked by increasing UN engagement in a broad range of intra-state conflicts undertaking some aspects of national political reconstruction, including supervision and observation of elections, the growth and evolution of humanitarian action. and new questions concerning the issue of impartiality. He noted that after several years of extensive engagement and experimentation in multi-dimensional peacekeeping, the UN has successfully conducted several major operations, such as those in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique. At the same time, he pointed out; the organization has experienced some tragic failures, as evidenced by Somalia, Rwanda, and the earlier operation in Angola. Meanwhile, some operations, like that in former Yugoslavia, ran up against a terrible impasse.
Otunnu (1997) observed that the UN was overwhelmed by escalating demands that could not be met; undermined by the lack of resources and capability; and perplexed by the complexity of some of those internal conflicts. He thus concluded by observing that there are signs that the UN may be entering a third phase of peacemaking and peacekeeping, a phase that could be marked by a reduced measure of ambition and optimism, a reassessment of the scope of engagement, and a renewed emphasis on the imperative of preventing conflicts before they degenerate into full-scale violence. He was not sure if these signs of retrenchment are a passing phenomenon, an interregnum marking the present period of great uncertainties, or whether we are witnessing an enduring wave of the future. Ratner (1996) observed that the UN is witnessing a ‘sea change in the nature and purposes of peacekeeping, one of the UN’s most cherished inventions.’ According to him, the UN peacekeeping, although envisioned at its creation as a stop-gap measure to preserve a cease-fire between two hostile armies has since the eighties ‘inserted itself with regularity into the domestic arena of war-torn states.’ Ratner concludes that ‘the international community appears to have decided, grudgingly and tentatively, to initiate a new process of peacekeeping on the assumption that the latest experiment offers tangible contribution to world order and the advancement of human rights’ (Ratner 1996: 241).

The Naval War College in the United States assembled scholars, experts and practitioners to a conference entitled ‘Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping’. Proceedings from the conference were edited by Daniel and Hayes (1995), and contain elaborate discussions on the issue, as we shall see below.

Weiss (1995:3-19) states that, while we are on the verge of entering an era in which the UN possesses such a right, operational problems constitute significant
barriers against moving briskly into it. To use Weiss’s words, enforcement for humanitarian purposes should be ‘timely and robust or shunned altogether’.

Dallmeyer (1995: 20-39) focuses on the differences in the international community concerning the UN’s right to intervene and argues in particular that developing states want a stake in how decisions are made, less the Security Council face a legitimacy crisis. Dallmeyer pointed out that many member states dislike a Security Council, controlled by the big powers, committing the organization to operations that chip away at the sovereignty of weaker states and erode the principle of non-intervention.

Stedman (1995:40-63), an expert in civil wars, argues that UN intervention can be effective only after a negotiated settlement has been reached. He points out how intra-state conflicts can be difficult to mediate, for the opposing parties generally exhibit winner-take-all mentalities that make compromise nigh impossible. Stedman phrased the central issue well when he asked whether the UN should seek to encourage peace or to enforce it in internal conflicts. Humanitarian imperatives may call for enforcement or more precisely for prevention of starvation, cruelty and injustice, but it is when it moves into enforcement that the UN stumble badly politically and operationally. All the problems associated with UN-controlled military operations increase geometrically when enforcement enters the picture; issues of proper planning, intelligence, equipment, communications, command and control, size and capabilities of contributed forces, coordination among them, agreement upon and uniform application of rules of engagement – all can have life-and-death consequences for the forces themselves and for the people they are supposed to help.
Edward (1995: 85-100) makes the case for a substantial American commitment to working with and through the UN to shape collective responses – including interventions if necessary – to international instabilities (Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes 1995:67-84).

Huldt (1995:101-119) examines the old peacekeepers, particularly the Nordic states, and outlines their reaction to the UN's foray into non-traditional missions. He observed that as far as peacekeeping is concerned, we are back to 1964 – the year the UN ended the United Nations Mission in Congo (ONUC). The latter constituted both an experiment and an unhappy baptism of fire into non-traditional peacekeeping. The UN found itself embroiled in the affairs of a collapsed state driven by civil war.

Kane (1995:120-148) takes an absorbing look at the reasons why others decide to participate or not in UN operations. She focuses the permanent members of the Security Council (excluding the United States), two states hoping to be permanent members (Germany and Japan), and several other countries who particularly well illustrate or reflect trends. She concluded hastily by predicting that the Security Council will not soon again mandate an operation necessitating large numbers of military forces under UN control.

The recent authorization by the Security Council of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) appears to contradict the prediction by Angela Kane. The question then arises: is there a future for enforcement? Huldt and Kane (1995) document skepticism among the member states yet see a willingness of some to go beyond traditional peacekeeping such as engaging in some nation-building tasks, only when there is no expectation of enforcement. There seems to be an increasing
consensus that the UN should always remain impartial and act only with the consent of the parties on the ground. Huldt and Kane (1995) shift the discussion to proposed changes in the UN organization, processes and procedures aimed at improving operational effectiveness and efficiency.

Durch (1995:165) recommends a restructuring of the Secretariat, while Whitman and Bartholomew (1995) made a case for new military staffing arrangements to strengthen UN planning. Durch, Whitman and Bartholomew (1995:151-188) argue that the UN must significantly change the way it does business if it is to inspire confidence that it can effectively undertake large-scale operations even where enforcement is not an element.

Harrel and Howe (1995:189-204) focus on how individuals or units used in peace support operations should be selected, trained, organized, equipped and controlled, and then concluded by noting that major changes will not be required for the US military in this regard. Harell and Howe point out that UN enforcement operation, when compared to traditional peacekeeping at one end of the spectrum or full-fledged Desert Storm-type combat at the other, may be the most difficult kind of military mission to undertake. The military personnel expected to enforce resolutions are also expected to do so with the lightest touch possible. Hence, it is no wonder that they often judge the means contradictory to the ends.

Rikhye a well-known military practitioner provides a first hand account of events in the Congo operation (ONUC). Rikhye (1995:207-227) opines that it never would have been attempted if member states had foreseen its complications and entanglements, which go beyond those of sovereignty and intervention that define the outer limit of the debate. They also concern such issues as the delivery of
food when, to the opposing parties, food is a weapon; avoiding taking sides and still alleviate the suffering of innocent people subjected to bombing or unspeakable cruelty; dealing with factional leaders who, in other circumstances, would be labeled 'war criminals'; and crafting rules of engagement for UN military personnel confronted by hostile armed local elements.

If enforcement is often too hard, this does not diminish the fact that, even with its recent setbacks and disappointments, there is still much the UN can do. First, it retains its role in traditional peacekeeping where consent of the parties and impartiality remain paramount. Second, it has recently added a new role of preventive deployment with the mission to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Unlike traditional peacekeeping, this involves inserting troops between belligerents before the outbreak of a crisis, as opposed to interposing them between belligerents after a conflict or monitoring a cease-fire. Third, it has established its undeniable utility to help new states' transit to self-government or to help collapsed states rebuild their basic governmental infrastructure and provide assurances to opposing parties that the other is abiding by an agreement and it can help deter a party contemplating independent action by threatening to expose or condemn it. Fourth, it remains the only legitimate global authority for sanctioning a coalition willing to act against an aggressor. Conversely, it remains the only global authority that can withhold sanction and even condemn a state or coalition that proposes wholesale aggression against another. To retain and enhance its newfound relevance, the UN must improve its capabilities for peacekeeping, especially for large operations and for those that may involve humanitarian intervention.

Zacarias (1996) looks at the structure of the UN, examines some UN experiences in peacekeeping, and explains some of the difficulties encountered and
reasons for success and failure. He attempts an analysis of general questions of international order raised by peacekeeping operations, and outlines an agenda for reforms needed to optimize UN action in the pursuit of peace. He traced the origin and development of the UN peacekeeping operations to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 1) established in February 1956 around the Suez Canal, which the crisis was regarded as a threat to international peace. He argued that the framework of peacekeeping was not formalized until 1965, when the UN General Assembly created a Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations. He pointed out that the characteristics of a bipolar world divided by rival ideologies, made it impossible for the UN to play an effective peacekeeping role. The end of the cold war reignited hopes of seeing the UN play this role. UN involvement in efforts to resolve regional and internal conflicts from 1988 to 1992 is illustrative of the new trend. He noted that the principle, which states that the consent of all parties to an internal conflict was a precondition for UN intervention, became diluted. He argued that peace-enforcement, by definition, signifies the imposition of an external model to resolve a conflict. This is often unacceptable to the warring parties, and not based on a compromise. According to him, Somalia is a good illustration of this instance.

Zacarias further pointed out that peace-enforcement call for peace building. These peace exercises often envisaged long-term solutions and prolonged intervention, as the withdrawal of the intervention force to prevent conflict may provoke its recurrence, as in India, Pakistan and Cyprus. He concluded that the classic peacekeeping operations of separation of forces and monitoring of a cease-fire are simply insufficient in some circumstances. He noted that the lesson of the end of the twentieth century is that the UN must be endowed with the machinery to take initiatives and fine-tune peacekeeping to the local environment. He concludes
that the legitimization of UN intervention in internal conflicts require the search for an international consensus followed by the amendment of the Charter.

Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, (1994) introduced the evolving efforts of the United Nations to combat threats to international peace and security. They discussed the theory of collective security; examined the UN security efforts during the Cold War as well as economic sanctions and the creation of the peacekeeping functions. They also explained the renaissance in UN activities, including peacekeeping, enforcement, and the series of actions in such troubled regions as Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia; and suggested changes in the UN to make it better able to address security challenges at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Their central argument is that the end of the cold war has not altered the fundamental fact that state decisions about power and policy constitute the primary force driving events at the UN. When important states show a convergence in policy, ‘the UN’ may be allowed to act in important ways. This, according to them, has been true since 1945.

Durch (1993:463) seeks to answer the question, ‘When should peacekeeping be used as an instrument of conflict containment or resolution, and when should it be avoided?’ He noted that over the years, peacekeeping practitioners have evolved certain rules of thumb to help answer basic questions about when peacekeeping should be attempted and what makes it work. He observed that UN peacekeeping has become a major topic of academic and political discourse because of the excessive demand for UN peacekeepers, which ‘has grown far beyond the cottage industry approach to planning, financing, command, and control’ and thereby creating stress on the system. He noted that protecting individual human rights while sustaining war-torn countries, may be peacekeeping’s new calling to its
traditional functions, but warned that UN involvement in national affairs is a potential political minefield for the Organization as the UN does not have the capacity to cope with the additional responsibilities. To be effective, member states and regional organizations must give it the muscle. That 'muscle', according to him, must still be used with the consent of beneficiaries – from people rather than governments; from the new source of sovereignty rather than the old.

Doyle; Johnstone and Orr (1997) observed that since the end of the Cold War, the community of nations has struggled to redefine the relation between those issues that fall within the realm of a state's sovereignty and those that represent a legitimate concern of the international community. The expanding scope of collective intervention, by coercive means, under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, they argued, is one manifestation of this struggle. They noted that from the Gulf crisis ceasefire resolution in 1991 to the US-led intervention to restore Haitian President Aristide, the United Nations Security Council has employed an increasingly broad interpretation of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security, authorizing action that would undoubtedly have been seen as an unlawful interference in sovereign affairs only a decade ago.

Doyle; Johnstone and Orr (1997) are of the view that setbacks encountered in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, have highlighted the difficulties of collective intervention by force. Limited forcible intervention, for humanitarian purposes, they averred, remains a viable and 'necessary task' – although even these operations have been the most successful when ‘contracted out,’ to multinational coalitions – but efforts to impose peace on recalcitrant parties have either failed or been abandoned before completed. The result, according to them, has been a retreat from ‘peace enforcement,’ though not a retreat from globalism or UN activism.
They viewed the future of UN peacekeeping as lying between the extremes of forcible intervention and absolute respect for sovereignty. In other words, the future of UN peace operations lies in ‘multi-dimensional peace operations. They examined multi-dimensional operations in Cambodia and El Salvador, where the UN undertook a threefold mission: it served as a peacemaker facilitating a peace treaty among the parties; as a peacekeeper, monitoring the implementation of complex agreements that go to the roots of the respective conflicts; and as a peace-builder, supporting the political, institutional, and social transformations necessary to overcome deep-seated internal animosities and strife. The goal of the UN was not merely to create conditions for negotiations between the parties, but to develop strategies and support structures that would bring about lasting peace.

Durch (1996) noted that the Cold War confined the United Nations (UN) to the margins of global security, yet, over the decades, it helped to keep the margins from unraveling. In the first years of the 1990s, the Security Council explored, reached, and exceeded the United Nations' capacity to undertake UN-run military and military-related field operations.

Adisa and Aminu (1996), examined traditional or classical peacekeeping and pointed out that activities carried out under this arrangement include the negotiation and arrangement of ceasefires, verification of truces including troop withdrawals and/or disengagement, interposition of barriers between hostile parties, investigation and mediation of violations and creation of buffer monitoring zones. They noted that peacekeeping operations involved two kinds of missions: unarmed observer missions and peacekeeping force. They identified four major principles that guided UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War to include a) authorization b) consent c) impartiality and d) the non-use of force except in self-
defence, derived from the premise laid out in Article 40. They further emphasize that peacekeeping operations must be based on a clear and practical mandate.

They acknowledged the gradual expansion of the role of peacekeeping and argued that the second-generation initiatives blur the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. They observed that in many instances, the execution of the operations have veered towards peace enforcement with attendant complications. They averred that by ‘wading into the realms of domestic disputes, the operations impinged on what had hitherto been regarded as the sovereign prerogatives of states’ (Adisa and Aminu 1996:91).

Mackinlay (1993) observed that the end of the Cold War removed some of the political tensions in the UN that had limited the scope and application of peacekeeping. No longer subject to superpower confrontation and competition, the Security Council became increasingly effective with an enhanced ability to negotiate peace agreements in longstanding conflict zones. Peace forces were deployed with more explicit and firmly stated mandates than in the past. He observed further that problems that had been artificially stabilized in the bi-polar world were now exacerbated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition to regional conflict, multi-ethnic states began to disintegrate and internal rather than inter-state conflicts proliferated. Humanitarian emergencies worsened and fragile governments emerged to fill the vacuum created by superpower withdrawals.

The range of UN tasks had, de facto, been extended beyond the recognized limitations of ‘peacekeeping.’ Mackinlay noted that in addition to the traditional roles of conventional observer missions and peacekeeping, UN forces were now involved in operations where the best case scenario could no longer be relied on:
supervising cease-fires between irregular forces, assisting in the maintenance of law and order, protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the denial of an air space and the guarantee of rights of passage. In many of these operations, local factions would continue to resist the presence of UN troops in defiance of agreements made on their behalf, in the distant environments of Geneva, Paris and London (see Lewis 1993:24-40).

Mackinlay (1993) argued that the demand for UN operations fast exceeded the supply as it exhausted the capacity of the middle nations (Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland, the Nordic countries, Poland and Fiji), which habitually provided contingents. Not only was there now a need to expand the pool of peacekeepers to include armies with more sophisticated assets, but also raise moral questions on why it was no longer acceptable for the major military powers to stand back and allow a group of smaller nations pay the price, in casualties as well as national resources, for their longstanding involvement in what should have been an international effort. Mackinlay was disturbed that the UN has no vestiges of a command organization, or even a map room, which could direct the operations of an effective military force. Since the outset of the Cold War, he argued, ‘the UN had abandoned the development of any machinery to execute the enforcement measures of Chapter VII, and after years of neglect any residual military staff capability, as opposed to the organization of peacekeeping events, had long since turned to dust’(Lewis 1993: 30).

Mackinlay (1993) pointed out that the concept of peacekeeping in the widely accepted but rigid form of the traditional prototype cannot be adapted any further. An emerging era of multipolar international restructuring has brought with it a new range of operational tasks for the UN. These are no longer predicated on
the logic of universal consent, and cannot safely assume the traditional scenario of an uncontested UN presence. They constitute a second generation of UN activities. He argued that the second-generation operations are already a fact of life. They fall between the techniques of peacekeepers and observers, and enforcement. In the second-generation tasks, authorized under an enforcement mandate, heavy weapon systems including armoured vehicles, combat aircraft and warships may be deployed. The rapidity of these developments has opened a doctrinal gap that is not covered by any international agreement. Mackinlay observed that there is a growing consensus among NATO member countries that the generic category of UN operations can now be more accurately sub-divided into nine distinct tasks arranged in three levels.

Level one operation (Monitors and Supervision) comprises the well-defined tasks of observer missions and peacekeeping forces. A UN observer can be military or civilian, whose principal task is to observe and report on a developing situation, or on the execution of a peace agreement reached between conflicting parties. Observers are usually unarmed; in some exceptional circumstances they may carry personal weapons. Their task will be to provide timely and impartial information to the internal community through the UN, of any threatening moves and developments.

Level two operations (Reinforced Military Presence) describes five categories of operation which usually occur in conflicts between communities within a state, rather than between states. Although UN multinational forces will be stronger and more effective, they will continue to operate under strict limitations of using the minimum amount of force required to achieve the immediate objective. This level is distinguished from Level One by the higher requirements for militarily
effective contingents and the presence of heavier weapon systems in the UN force.

Level two operations include preventive deployment (a UN multinational group or force at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising between parties); Internal Conflict Resolution Measures (these are actions taken by a UN multinational force to restore and maintain force to restore and maintain an acceptable level of peace and personal security in an internal conflict); Military Assistance to an Interim Civilian Authority (this usually follows a successfully conducted ceasefire. Their tasks include: maintenance of law and order; provision of security prior to, and during, an election; maintenance of smooth running of essential services – power, water, communications; planning for, reconstitution of, the national defence forces; relocation and rehabilitation of displaced elements of the population; supervision and assisting in the clearance and removal of unexploded ordnance and mines); protection of humanitarian relief operations; and guarantee or denial of movements.

Level three operations (Military intervention) refer to enforcement operations where UN military forces with substantial heavy weapons capability are used to redress a major threat to international peace and security. They are distinguished from Levels one and two by the likelihood that incidents between UN forces and the sanctioned party are likely to occur at a very high level, typically between troops formations, combat aircraft or warships and not between small groups on the ground. Level two operations are continuing to develop in their characteristics and scope. This is certainly the most dynamic area of UN operational activity. They include sanctions (denial of supplies, diplomatic and trading privileges and freedom of movement to an identified aggressor); and high intensity enforcement operations – involving the deployment of the most powerful combat
aircraft, warships and fire support capabilities in service (Lewis 1993:32-33). It is quite
obvious that there is no clearly defined boundary between each of the tasks
categorized above. Within the authority of a single mandate, the UN peace
operations have carried out several of these tasks.

Roberts (1995) observed that despite the notable achievements in recent
years – in Namibia, Cambodia, and El Salvador – United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping is still in crisis. This crisis, for him, is both conceptual and
substantive: tied-and-tested principles and practices of UN peacekeeping have to be
modified and abandoned; there have been repeated difficulties in the control and
management of peacekeeping operations; and the distinction between peacekeeping
and various enforcement activities have become blurred.

UN efforts to use peacekeeping forces in ongoing conflicts, as in Bosnia,
have exposed the organization to accusations of weakness and of failing to protect
fundamental human rights; some peacekeeping operations, as in Angola, have been
followed by a resumption of war; and responses to humanitarian crises, as in
Somalia in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, have been extremely slow. He observed that
the range of conflicts around the world far exceed the United Nations' capacity to
address them; there have been accusations of bias in the choice of which conflicts
the UN intervenes in and in the manner in which they are addressed; and states have
imposed numerous conditions on their participation in UN operations. Furthermore,
he argues, the many proposals to place forces at the disposal of the UN have failed,
and peacekeeping finances are in disarray. He noted that there have been
bewildering varieties of diagnosis and prescriptions for improvement, which have
not helped matters.
Kegley and Wittkopf, (1997), identified organizational problems as one of the major constraints to realizing the UN's security goals. They observed that the UN remains poorly designed to carry out a full-fledged peace and security programme. The goals have exceeded the institutional apparatus, they argued. UN troops no longer just patrol truce lines. Now they are asked to monitor elections, protect human rights, train local police, guard humanitarian relief deliveries, and take up arms against those who get in their way. The growing operations have not been accompanied by any serious reassessment of the UN's capacity to manage them effectively (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1997:502). As a UN internal report concluded, ‘the United Nations lacks the technical, administrative and logistical tools required implementing effectively the peacekeeping agenda’ (Michael 1993: 66-67).

In a similar vein, Goshko (1996) pointed out that the United Nations could not pay for its expanded list of expensive peace missions, let alone assume responsibility for further new initiatives. In 1987, peacekeeping operations cost UN members $240 million in assessments; by 1995, the bill had risen to $3.6 billion. In October 1995, UN members were $3.7 billion in arrears. In fact, in January 1996, the United Nations was practically bankrupt, with the United States alone responsible for 45% of the total UN deficit (Goshko 1996:6).

Griffin (1999) observed the trend in UN peace operations and argued that the UN peacekeeping has declined significantly in the past five years, primarily because the leading members of the UN are unwilling to support it – financially, politically or logistically. However, the need for peacekeepers in various parts of the world has not declined at all, and, in the absence of UN activism, other actors have begun to seize the initiative. External military interventions for conflict
management or humanitarian purposes by single states, groups of states and regional and subregional organizations have increased. Griffin frowned at the ‘notorious US Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25) of 3 May 1994, which outlined new, highly restrictive guidelines for US support and participation in UN operations’ and pointed out that this has highly crippled the UN (Griffin 1999:44). Griffin noted further, that while the UN has been incapacitated, the impetus for peacemaking and peacekeeping, including military action, has passed from the Security Council into the hands of regional and subregional organizations, ad hoc coalitions of UN member-states and even individual states. This development has, in part, been actively encouraged by the UN and its members, particularly with respect to peace enforcement.

Griffin noted that by 1995, the UN found itself ‘so overstretched that subcontracting by the Security Council was inevitable’ (Griffin 1999:45). Griffin was of the view that regional and subregional organizations could play a lead role in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building in their own areas because their efforts seem less intrusive in many instances and they know their region better than the UN (Griffin 1999: 47).

Corum (1995:132) believes that regional organisations and coalitions, due to their greater familiarity with conflicts in their own areas and their clear national interest in maintaining regional stability, are better motivated to employ force when necessary. The UN and United States ought to provide diplomatic support to such operations and, when necessary, aid and financial support. The UN can contribute more effectively to peace by entering a conflict as an observer or peacekeeper, after regional intervention has compelled stability.
Similarly, Cilliers and Mills (1999:1) observed that the nature of peacekeeping globally and in Africa has changed in recent years. They noted that while 13 operations were established in the first 40 years of the UN peacekeeping, 36 new operations have been launched 1988 and 1998. At its peak in 1993, the total deployment of UN military and civilian personnel reached more than 80,000 from 77 countries with a budget in 1994 of US $3.4 billion. By the end of 1998, there were still 16 UN peace missions involving just 14,000 troops from 77 countries, but the UN's peacekeeping budget had shrunk to less than US 1 billion. Only four of these missions were in Africa, whereas in 1994, 70% of UN deployment was on the continent. Cilliers and Mills noted the propensity of crises on the continent and the lack of Western strategic interests in Africa. Given this, Africa is expected largely to provide for itself. There is thus a gradual process of devolution of peacekeeping.

Mackinlay (1993) asserts that the concept of peacekeeping as a multipurpose conflict resolution device is already overextended and cannot be adapted any further to meet the dynamic contingencies of the future. He noted that the UN peacekeepers have already crossed the threshold of traditional peacekeeping operations into a new range of second generation tasks and what is now required, is to spell out these tasks with greater definition and develop an internationally agreed doctrine, to replace the ad hoc methods of the Cold War period (Mackinlay 1993:24).

2.2 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: FROM OAU TO AU

The UN Charter envisioned a very different collective security system than what exists today. It was to be more robust, more integrated, and more systematic, with a series of interdependent layers. Chapter VI of the Charter outlines
possibilities for non-coercive peacemaking. Chapter VII details the range of Security Council – authorized enforcement measures, and Chapter VIII presents related regional arrangements that would complement and bolster UN peace and security efforts. However, the third leg of the collective security triad, Chapter VIII, remains a largely dormant, unexplored area. Though UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has long had a personal interest in the role of regional organizations and devoted substantial space to the subject in his 1992 An Agenda for Peace, it remains the least studied and least understood aspect of the Charter's vision. Over the years, the Security Council has become the first stop in efforts to resolve many domestic, local, and regional conflicts, but that was not the original intention.

According to Article 33 of the Chapter VI, ‘the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.’ Chapter VIII is even more explicit on this point.

Indeed, White (1997) noted that the UN Charter, in Chapter VIII Article 52(1), recognizes 'the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action' (White 1997:29). He observed that Article 52(3) even provides that the Security Council 'shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements'. White is of the view that the Council's paramount is maintained by Article 52(4), whilst Article 53(1) provides that 'the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. Nevertheless, no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or
by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council' (White 1997:29).

White (1997) argued that designating regional organization or body within Article 51 or Chapter VIII is only a *prima facie* presumption that its actions will be used on those provisions, it does not prevent the organization from taking collective self-defence action under Article 51 even if it is a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII. Furthermore, it does not prevent a *prima facie* collective self-defence pact from taking enforcement action under Article 53(1) as long as the Security Council authorizes it.

The point is that the Security Council, in most cases, was to be the final recourse, not the first one. Regional organizations were to act as a buffer or filter, sorting through and addressing where possible, local security problems, with the Council getting involved directly only when lower levels could not handle the conflict. Instead of lurching from crisis to crisis, as it does today, the Council could play more of an oversight or supervisory role if regional organizations were up to the task assigned to them by the Charter. The Council, of course, has the legal authority to take enforcement action binding on all the member states. The Charter foresaw a division of labour in which regional arrangements and agencies could take a range of diplomatic and enforcement actions under the Council’s ultimate authority, which in turn, would ease its burden.

In January 1992, the Security Council meeting at the level of Heads of State requested the Secretary-General to prepare recommendations for strengthening the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, peace making and peacekeeping. The then Secretary-General, in his ‘Agenda for Peace’, raised among other issues, the
role of regional arrangements mentioned in the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in the settlement of regional conflicts. Noting that ‘today, a new sense exists that they [regional organizations] have contributions to make’ toward peace within their regions, the Secretary-General called for expanded consultations between the United Nations and regional bodies and for ‘complementary efforts’ and ‘joint undertakings’ between the two levels of international organization. He opined that there is the necessity for Africa to continue to work on the development of an African capacity for peacekeeping. In doing so, he enumerated four factors that to him are of uppermost importance, namely: the necessity for legitimacy of such operations, assurances of adequate resources, the consciousness of the fundamental principles for such operations, the development of the practical aspects of mounting the operations (Boutros – Ghali 1992: 22).

Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz, (1994: 203-205), observed that in chapter VIII, a role was also envisaged, though not precisely, for ‘regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.’ The basic idea of chapter VIII was (i) for member states to ‘make every effort to achieve the pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies, before referring them to the Security Council’ (Feld et al 1994:204); (ii) for the Security Council ‘to encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council and where appropriate (to) utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority’ (Feld et al 1994:204). In the post Cold War period, Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz (1994) have observed that a number of
situations have arisen involving regional agencies in the settlement of disputes viz:

a. Iraq – Kuwait – the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC);
b. Central America – OAS;
c. Liberia – OAU and ECOWAS;
d. Cambodia – ASEAN;
e. Somalia – the Arab League, the Islamic Conference, and OAU;

Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz (1994: 207) have also argued that regional peacekeeping efforts have not yet been successful, and that several of them are on the brink of failure. They stated that the UN involvement in four of the cases listed above came about essentially because the regional organisations were unable to act and that the existence of harsh political tensions within a region, combined with lack of resources and experience often creates intractable obstacles to the exercise of leadership by the regional body.

Ruth Wedgwood (2000) examined the strength and weaknesses of the evolving role of regional organizations in international conflict management. She noted that regional security cooperation mechanisms have evident attractions for conflict management in the post-Cold War world where civil war looms as large as interstate disputes. She believes that regional structures permit a multilateral voice and an opportunity for rapid response. In addition, regional structures build confidence, avoid unwanted triggers of provocation, and enable troops to reach a conflict area quickly. She noted further, that the involvement of developing militaries in regional peacekeeping forces could help to deepen their understanding of the virtues of stable democratic government.

Wedgwood, however, noted the weaknesses of regional approaches to
conflict management which include: First, regional structures cannot successfully impose the disciplinary measures of economic sanctions, especially as the constitutional structure of most regional organization does not allow mandatory sanctions or embargoes. She noted that even within a region, making decisions by consensus is often ineffective because they are not well suited for measures that lack broad political support or require universal implementation to be effective. Second, Ruth acknowledged the distaste of regional organizations for intervening in domestic conflicts as developing countries, especially; keep a tight grip on the protective shield of sovereignty. She noted that theories of sovereignty are coupled in regional organizations with a reluctance to employ military force abroad. It is her contention that any African standing force for peacekeeping will be subject to suspicions that it could be misused in interstate relations. A third problem for conflict management at regional level, Ruth argued, is lack of resources. She pointed out that sustained financial support for regional OAU peacekeeping is simply not available; nor are indigenous logistical capabilities.

Eze (1993: 11) inferred that the competence of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security includes that of setting up an unarmed interposition force. Such inference may also be extended to the competence to set up an armed peacekeeping force that can employ force only for defensive purposes. He argued that ‘regional organizations do not require prior authorization of the UN or any of its organs to exercise this competence’ (Eze 1993: 11).

On the other hand, Wedgwood (2000) observed that regional structures could not successfully impose the disciplinary measures of economic sanctions. Even among member-states, the constitutional structure of most regional
organisations does not allow mandatory sanctions or embargoes. Moreover, there is
the acknowledged distaste of regional organisations intervening in domestic
conflicts. Developing countries keep a tight grip on the protective shield of
sovereignty and are reluctant to employ military force abroad. Lack of resources
and sustained financial support for regional organisations are simply not available
as the case of OAU peace operations in Chad illustrates. The logistics required to
support a subregional deployment – including communications, supply, spare parts,
and transportation – exceed the capacity of most developing countries. In her
opinion, the overall capability to plan, coordinate, and sustain a complicated
mission is still beyond the experience of most regional militaries. She identified
underdeveloped political will as another drawback of relying on regional
institutions for conflict resolution. She noted that regional enforcement action is a
trickier business.

The charter provides that Security Council authorization must be obtained
for regional enforcement action—armed intervention or use of military power to
enforce sanctions. Retroactive blessing was given to the military actions of the
ECOWAS regional force in Liberia; two years after deployment, the Security
Council ‘commend[ed]’ ECOWAS efforts to ‘restore peace, security, and stability
in Liberia,’ condemned attacks on peacekeeping forces, and provided for the
participation of a UN observer force (Wedgwood 2000). Wedgwood concludes that
regional security response mechanisms remain attractive options in international
relations.

Two major themes have emerged in the debate on African Peacekeeping.
First, there is consensus on the desirability of indigenous African peacekeeping
structures, and second, the establishment and maintenance of such structures will be
fraught with problems, both political and practical. In the latter category, the issues of finance and logistics appear to predominate.

Griffin (1999:51) noted that the UN and its member – states have stepped up efforts to enhance the peacekeeping capacity of regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and have begun to take more notice of the work of bodies like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of American States (OAS). Griffin observed with interest that attempts to institutionalize contacts between the UN and regional organizations have made some progress.

Neethling (1999) observed that the UN has been forging partnership with the OAU in order to enhance the management of conflicts in the region. According to him, ‘the UN seems to have handed over responsibility for peace and security to willing regional organisations and alliances’. He noted that the end of bipolar rivalry has eased some regional conflicts, but enabled others to escalate to dangerous levels. To this end, regional organizations whether political or economic, are compelled to play an active role in regional security (Neethling 1999).

Solomon Islands (Ponzio 2005). These articles tend to be of the ‘lessons learned’ variety, either offering suggestions for mid-course correction of on-going missions or lessons for future missions elsewhere. There has also been a spate of case studies of older missions, designed to draw lessons with the benefit of some historical perspective (Jones 2001 and Dallaire 2004 on Rwanda, Howard 2002 on Namibia, Mays 2002 on the OAU in Chad, Murphy 2003 on Lebanon and Somalia, Dzinesa 2004 on Angola and Namibia, Razack 2004 on Somalia, Peou 2005 on Cambodia, and Mersiades 2005 on Cambodia and Somalia).

Edited volumes composed of case studies either in whole or part include Cousens and Kumar (2001), Adebajo, Sriram and Cousens (2001), Thakur and Schnabel (2001), Boulden (2001), Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens (2002), Boulden (2003), Malone (2004), Dobbins (2005a) and Dobbins (2005b). Some of these provide comparative analyses of the relative effectiveness and success of the operations studied. Thus Stedman et al (2002) evaluated nine cases of peace implementation between 1980 and 1997. They apply an analytical framework suggested by their review of peace implementation strategies and tasks. The project found that cases of peace implementation differ dramatically in terms of the difficulty of the implementation environment (measured in terms of eight variables such as the number of warring parties, whether or not a peace agreement has been signed and the likelihood of spoilers) and in the willingness of international actors to provide resources and risk troops. A number of policy recommendations follow, the most notable of which is that peace implementation is most successful when a major or regional power sees success as vital to its national security interests. They also argue for setting priorities among peacebuilding sub-goals, with demobilization of soldiers and demilitarization of politics topping the list.
Dobbins (2005a and 2005b) assess eight instances of nation building when the US took the lead and eight when the UN took the lead. They include in their studies the US occupations of Germany and Japan and UN intervention in the Congo, but most are of post-Cold War cases. Applying various criteria, they determined five UN-led cases to have been successful or mostly successful (Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia and East Timor), whereas three US-led cases fit that description (Germany, Japan, and Kosovo). Of the eight UN-led cases, seven were at peace in 2004 and six were democratic; of the eight US-led cases, four were at peace and four were democratic. The authors observe that, either by design or by necessity, UN-led operations tend to be smaller with more limited objectives than US-led ones, a strategy that tends to work well in the less demanding circumstances in which they are typically deployed.

The UN is able to compensate, to some degree at least, for its ‘hard power’ deficit with soft power attributes of international legitimacy and local impartiality. Dobbins concludes that ‘assuming adequate consensus among SC members on the purpose for any intervention, the UN provides the most suitable institutional framework for most nation-building missions, one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degrees of international legitimacy’. The US, on the other hand, brings greater coercive force to any operation, which is usually a useful complement to a UN operation.

A new feature of the peacekeeping literature is more rigorous empirical analysis of the cases, both quantitative and qualitative. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) undertook a widely cited quantitative study to test ten hypotheses about the probability of success of peace operations, creating a data set of 124 post-WWII civil wars. They found that UN peacekeeping is positively correlated with democratiza-
tation processes after civil war, and multilateral enforcement operations are usually successful in ending violence.

Other, less extensive empirical studies include Wall and Druckman (2003) on factors that impact the mediation techniques peacekeepers use, Lebovic (2004) on whether democracies are more likely to participate in peace operations, and Shimuzu and Sandler (2002) on whether peacekeeping burdens are being shouldered mainly by large countries. Gilligan and Stedman (2001) use empirical techniques to answer a simple but normatively important question: what determines where and when the UN sends peacekeepers. They look at all civil wars after 1988 (60 in total), the number to which UN peacekeepers were sent (19 in total), and how much time passed after the start of each war before a mission was deployed. The most significant of their ten findings is that the more severe a civil conflict, measured by the death toll, the more likely the UN is to intervene. They also find that the UN is significantly less likely to intervene in civil wars in militarily strong states, measured by the size of the government army. In addition, they identify a regional bias in favor of Europe over Africa and, surprisingly, Africa over Asia (in the sense that the UN tends to react more swiftly to crises in the former). Taken as completely, their results ‘suggest an image of the UN that attempts to balance between the dictates of power and concerns of principle’; it seems to respond to civil wars that involve the greatest humanitarian catastrophes, but is also guided by considerations of power, cost and risk.

Fortna (2003a, 2003b, 2004a and 2004b) employs similar techniques to measure the effectiveness of peacekeeping, as well as other mechanisms that may have an impact on the durability of peace. She finds that peacekeeping works, both in inter-state and intrastate conflicts. Her work on inter-state conflicts draws on co-
operation theory to make the case that ceasefire agreements are not just ‘scraps of paper’. Contrary to what scholars from a realist tradition may think, states and international organizations can institute measures to overcome the obstacles to peace. Based on her examination of 48 ceasefires in international wars ending between 1946 and 1997, she finds that peacekeepers, demilitarized zones, third party guarantees, joint commissions for dispute resolution, and specificity in the peace agreements are all effective tools. Confidence-building measures (like hot lines), formalizing an agreement, and withdrawal of forces may help, but the evidence is uncertain. Of particular interest to the UN is her finding of ‘a large and statistically significant difference between ceasefires overseen by a fresh set of international peacekeepers and those without the benefit of peacekeeping’.

A similar empirical analysis of the impact of peacekeeping on intrastate conflicts is more difficult because of the need to control for more factors. Fortna, like Gilligan and Stedman, takes on this challenge by considering many factors that might affect the durability of peace: the military outcome of the war (i.e. whether there was a decisive victory by one side); whether a treaty was signed; whether it is an ethnic conflict; the death toll; the number of parties to the conflict; the duration of the war; the level of economic development; the availability of ‘loot able’ resources; the level of democracy; and the size of the government’s army. Examining 115 ‘spells of peace’ between 1944 and 1999, she finds that consent-based peacekeepers tend to be sent to the hard cases rather than the easy ones. This is significant because it means peacekeeping is probably more effective than meets the eye; it can not be judged solely in terms of whether war resumes, without regard to the baseline prospects for peace. ‘Just as sicker patients are more likely to receive medical care, places in which the danger of another war is more likely are likely to re-
ceive peacekeeping’. Applying a duration model, she concludes that unarmed observer and traditional peacekeeping missions have been highly successful, reducing the risk of renewed war by 81% and 86% respectively. Multidimensional missions reduce the risk of war by 53%, peace enforcement by 43%. Thus, the empirical evidence is clear: as a conflict management tool, peacekeeping is not a silver bullet, but is well worth the effort.

2.2.1 The OAU and Conflict Management

The basic motivation for the establishment of the OAU was primarily political. This is confirmed in Article II of the OAU Charter, which was agreed upon at the Summit Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa in 1963. This Article stresses the promotion of the unity and solidarity of the African states and the defence of their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. Majority of the Addis Ababa conference participants rejected supranational Pan-Africanism and opted instead for the strict maintenance of the principle of sovereignty. Indeed, the principles enumerated in Article III of the Charter include the sovereign equality of member states, and respect for their sovereignty and integrity. Member governments pledged to settle all disputes among themselves by peaceful means (Article XIX) and affirmed a policy of nonalignment.

The supreme organ of the OAU was the Assembly of Heads of State and Government which meets at least once a year and can be convened in extraordinary session by a two-thirds majority of the member states. It can make only nonbinding recommendations, which require for their adoption, a two-thirds majority vote. Each member has one vote.

The executive machinery of the OAU consists of a Council of Ministers and
a Secretariat. The Council is composed of the foreign ministers of the member governments or other ministers when appropriate. It adopts resolutions by a simple majority. It prepares for the meetings of the Assembly, implements the latter's decisions, and coordinates inter-African cooperation (Articles XII-XV). The head of the Secretariat is called an administrative secretary-general, an indication that the member states were anxious to limit the powers of the office and to prevent any kind of enhancement of authority (Articles XVI-XVIII). Finally, a Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration was established, which was regarded as a principal organ. Its mandate was dispute settlement. However, despite many disputes between the members, the services of the commission have been invoked rarely. Instead, ad hoc commissions and committees have been set up to address the underlying problems and to find acceptable solutions.

Feld and Jordan with Hurwitz (1994) argued that the fragile nature of most governments of the OAU member states, tended to militate against a strong propensity to transfer too much authority to the OAU. Internal conflicts as well as interstate conflict have been major preoccupations. They observed that

The OAU has a mixed record in bringing about the settlement of the various – and all too frequent – disputes that have arisen. This is inspite of the use of ad hoc bodies and mandates by either the Council of Ministers or the Assembly to pressure the contending states to accept proposed solutions (Feld et al 1994:70).

Issues that have occupied the OAU include the Polisario involvement in the Western Sahara and the demand of Mauritius for the return of British-held Diego Garcia Island, which is located in the Indian Ocean. The Libyan intervention in Chad in 1980 prompted the OAU to establish a committee to investigate the crisis.

El-Ayouty (1991) examined the OAU and pointed out that the OAU, in its
role as a mechanism for conflict resolution, is an organization that starts from its Charter, but then takes a variety of forms: the personality and standing of its Chairman and its Secretary-General; the role played by bilateral diplomacy between one African State and another; the influence exerted by one or more of its Heads of State and Government beyond their national borders; the degree of cohesiveness within the African group of States; which is the largest regional group at the United Nations; and, perhaps above all, the personal and informal touch which permeates all African relationships.

El-Ayyouty (1991) saw in the OAU not only a formal organization, but an ideological framework based on the following principles: the sacred right of self-determination of all colonial African territories; respect for the frontiers inherited from the colonialists; non-intervention in internal affairs; non-alignment in the global super-power rivalry; cohesiveness on the global stage, especially at the United Nations; and the total parity among African States, whether large or small, with regard to their rights and obligations.

El-Ayyouty (1991) observed that the OAU, during its first decade, functioned, whether formally or informally, within a predictable course. However, things did change in the period 1973-1983, and researchers and educators found the unpredictability of events affecting the OAU to be very disconcerting. That was the low period for the OAU in terms not only of conflict resolution, but also in terms of its vitality as an organization. ‘How can we forget that the OAU, at its twentieth anniversary, in 1983, was on the verge of collapse when, in consequence of the Western Sahara issue, a group of States considered the launching of their own organization outside of the OAU’? he queried. This was a period when the usual OAU norms regarding boundaries, secession, foreign intervention, and refugees
were not enforced. The second decade, for El-Ayouty, was an unfortunate period of escalation of conflict, of massive supplies of arms and military training by non-African powers, of debilitated or non-used institutions and procedures, and of attempts by some countries hosting the OAU summits to manipulate those high-profile African events to serve their own national goals, even if those goals ran counter to all African objectives.

El-Ayouty (1991) argued that the technical weakness of the OAU institutional machinery for mediation, negotiation and arbitration – vital tools for peaceful settlement of disputes – was more than compensated for by the forceful roles of the OAU chairmen, by the mechanism of the regular African summit sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (which is a unique feature of the OAU, and which does not exist in either the League of Arab States or the Organization of American States); by daily activities of diplomatic interaction, through the United Nations African group meetings and contacts; frequent visits by Heads of State and other high officials, and the like.

Herbst (1998) in his article, ‘Securing Peace in Africa’ observed that the conflicts in many African states are such that traditional peacekeeping might not be useful. He posits that ‘traditional peacekeeping is all but irrelevant to Africa.’ This is because conflict in Africa does not come from the more traditional problem of separating warring armies that have resolved to end hostilities. Africa has experienced very little inter state wars and many intra state conflicts. According to him, of the ‘fifteen 'complex emergencies' declared by United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, eight (Angola, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, the Great Lakes, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Somalia, and Sudan) are in
Africa.’ Rather, peacekeeping in Africa involves Chapter VII peace enforcement operations: when there has not necessarily been a declared peace between armies, but when the international community tries, as in Somalia, to enforce a peace, within a country that is at war with itself.

Herbst suggests that the OAU has shown itself incapable of acting to secure peace in Africa. He was skeptical about regional actors alone resolving their own crises. Even though Africans want to develop peace enforcement modalities and forces on their own, he suggests that they can do so successfully only by involving the remaining post-Cold War superpower. He believes that peace in Africa ‘will clearly come when Africans invent a series of diplomatic and military methods of keeping it’. He also believes that multilateral security cooperation posed a set of technical and logistical problems that African countries could not address. He argued that the OAU is an extraordinarily weak reed upon which to base any initiative, much less difficult issues regarding peace and security. The OAU, for him, has also been paralyzed during the crises in Central Africa. While it is developing more of an ability to respond to crises in its Addis Ababa headquarters, there is no demonstration, as of yet, that ‘the political will exists within the organization to actually pull the trigger and authorize a peacekeeping operation that will inevitably be highly controversial within Africa.’

Shash (1991) pointed out that the OAU Charter enshrines the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes based on non-interference and non-intervention, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, and common solidarity against all forms of foreign aggression. The OAU, under successive chairpersons, he argued, has set a pioneering example for the rest of the world in this regard,
through the establishment of high-level committees of ‘wise men’, which have been instrumental in alleviating, if not solving fully, simmering conflicts between member States.

Akashi (1991) affirmed that within the African context, the Organization of African Unity offers a unique instrument for the promotion of peaceful and co-operative bilateral and multilateral relations among its member states. Since its establishment in 1963, the OAU has been directly or indirectly associated with nearly all the efforts to resolve local or regional conflicts in Africa. In addition, its Assembly of Heads of State or Government has often carried out political initiatives to control conflicts in the region.

Similarly, Imobighe (1998:4), posits that the ‘OAU is the main organ at the regional level responsible for the management of conflicts in Africa’. According to him, ‘before the establishment of OAU, the United Nations played a primary role in the management of the OAU. The UN essentially played a supportive role to OAU’s initiative, only by assuming control’ as in the case of Western Sahara when it is evident that OAU cannot cope with the problem (Imobighe 1998: 4).

Nwolise (1998) provided an assessment of the OAU mechanism in his article, ‘OAU Mechanism for Conflict Management: An Assessment’ and noted that Article 19 of the OAU Charter established the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA). The Protocol for this Commission was signed by 33 States in 1964 and made part of the OAU Charter. This means that arbitration was adopted right from the onset by the OAU as a mechanism for conflict management. The CMCA was not empowered to handle intra-state disputes. The CMCA was hardly utilized. On account of this, the OAU adopted the
mechanism of the Ad hoc Commission of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers.

In addition, Eminent Persons Committee, Good Offices of the OAU Chairman, and Secretary-General became involved in the management of conflicts in Africa. It was in 1993, that the Mechanism of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) was adopted. The MCPMR was built around the Bureau of the Assembly of OAU Heads of State and Government. It provides that ‘the Secretary-General under the authority of the Central Organ and in consultation with the parties involved in the conflict, deploy efforts and take all appropriate initiation to prevent, mange, and resolve conflicts’ (1993: Paragraph 22).


Salim (1991) noted that both the Organization of African Unity and the UN have a high stake in the stability of Africa. He observed that while the maintenance of peace and security is intrinsic in the United Nations Charter, the Charter of OAU makes no specific reference to peacekeeping operations or security arrangements. At the same time, the OAU Charter mentions co-operation for defence and security as one of the purposes of the organization. It also talks of the promotion of international co-operation, having due regard to the Charter of the UN, and the universal declaration of human rights. Salim submits that the OAU
Charter is, however, emphatic on the peaceful settlement of conflicts and noted that the major role of OAU and that of the United Nations in conflict resolution have been, largely, complementary.

Over the past years, OAU has tended to assume the primary responsibility for political and diplomatic aspects of conflicts in Africa, while the UN has been inclined to limit itself to humanitarian aspects. Salim opined that this partnership presents a classic pattern for permanent co-operation in the fulfillment of the principles and purposes underlying a policy of continental peace based on preventive diplomacy. He contends that the OAU has had one real experience of a peacekeeping operation. The Chad Initiative, according to him, failed to enlist the financial and political support necessary for its success, but what is important is that it was an African initiative undertaken by Africans. It showed that such an operation was possible and the lessons learned are important.

The OAU had its first practical experience in peacekeeping in 1982 in Chad. Indeed, Elaigwu (1996) observed that ‘the first African initiative in intervention had been taken by the organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1982 during the Chadian civil war’ (Elaigwu 1996: 16).

Ogwu (1998) took a cursory look at OAU efforts at peacekeeping in selected countries and concluded that Chad ‘represented the litmus test of OAU effectiveness in peacemaking’. She noted that after two decades of economic mismanagement and authoritarian rule, by 1980 Chad had slipped into a civil conflict between the South, which controlled the Central Government, and the North. The conflict degenerated further into a power struggle amongst several factions, with attendant high casualties and a large flow of refugees.
In this context, the OAU decided to establish a Pan-African Force in Chad to oversee a ceasefire until the end of the political transition process that had been agreed to by the parties earlier. Ogwu observed that because of ‘difficulties in adequate financing, the deployment of the Pan-African Force in Chad was delayed until late 1981, by which time the cease-fire had broken down and the parties were in conflict again’. By January 1982, a total of 3,000 troops of the expected 5,000 – strong force were in Chad, with a mandate to supervise the ceasefire, demilitarize N'djamena and its surrounding districts, ensure the defence and security of Chad until an integrated national army could be established, and assist the country in the integration of its forces.

Ogwu concludes that ‘this first OAU Peacekeeping Force was plagued from the beginning by organizational, logical and financial problems’. By the time, it became operational, the ceasefire had broken down and there was no peace to keep. Because of these problems, Ogwu argued that ‘the first OAU peacekeeping operation had to withdrawn from Chad by the end of 1982’.

Imobighe (1996) noted that the issue of peacekeeping has remained a recurring decimal in the OAU’s conflict management efforts in spite of the lack of organizational enthusiasm for putting in place the necessary mechanism for peacekeeping. He observed that until 1982, when the OAU became involved in peacekeeping efforts in Chad, the Organization had shied away from any peacekeeping efforts. He pointed out that the need for the Organization to mount some peacekeeping efforts was quite apparent. Somehow, the Organization always failed to face the realities of its conflict management efforts.

Imobighe averred that the mission was doomed from the start, as it could
not get the requisite number of troops that were projected for the operation. This meant that the troops available were particularly stretched. He also noted that apart from the problem of size, some of the battalions of the peacekeeping force arrived in Chad without the necessary equipment needed for the role assigned to them. He was of the view that the Organization could not generate the necessary funds to the service of the operation. Indeed, it was unable to take full responsibility for the mission, as it was unable to find the funds to sustain the mission, making the failure of the OAU's peacekeeping efforts in Chad not unexpected.

Aminu (1996:110) argued that the OAU’s response to the Chadian conflict ‘was a bold attempt by the OAU to solve its own problem by its own means.’ He, however, noted that the Pan-African Force did not do as much as the people had hoped for. He identified the reasons for the general failure of the operations to include:

a. The unrealistic expectations of the factions and the absence of adequate OAU infrastructures to deal with them;

b. Inadequate funds to finance the operation. The OAU had to withdrew its forces in 1982, barely a year after deployment as a result of the financial difficulties; and,

c. Inability of the OAU to establish a firm neutral political arrangement for Chad to which all matters relating to their country would be referred. Such a political unit would have been able to deal with the OAU and the rest of the world and not the kind of compromise which visibly divided GNUT that was on ground (Aminu 1996:110).

Jinmi Adisa (1996) also argued that Chad was the OAU’s first experience in peacekeeping and there was no field experience to draw upon. He was of the view that the OAU intervention in Chad was as much a function of ‘Libya-phobia’ on the part of states in the region, as it was a function of external pressures from the West, especially US and France, which promised logistic support. He observed that the politics surrounding the decision to initiate the peacekeeping operation were not
informed by a critical assessment of the state of preparedness and needs essential for effectiveness, as it ignored the fundamental fact that the OAU had never kept in focus a collective security role preferring as it were to be a ‘collegial’ body which ‘met from time to deliberate on the issues of common interest of the members’ (Adisa 1996 267). Adisa noted that the Charter of the OAU had no provision for peacekeeping and the Defence Commission created under Article XX of the Charter to deal with security was virtually moribund.

General Ejiga (1996: 382), a former Commander of the OAU Peacekeeping Force in Chad, pointed out that throughout the seven months of the OAU Force in Chad; it did not receive support from the OAU. He noted that the day-to-day operations of the forces were directed from Forces' Headquarters through the National Contingent Commanders, as the forces did not have integrated radio communications linking Forces Headquarters to the troops deployed in the operational zones. He also noted that the actual operations in the field were the routine operations of peacekeeping, which involve assistance to civil population; protection and movement of war refugees; interpositioning between warring parties; establishment and conduct of check-points; provision of food ration to civil population out of troops ration; restoration of essential services of water, electricity and sanitation; moderation of hostilities between the factions, among others. Ejiga concluded that the OAU Peacekeeping Force in Chad was the most poorly supported operation he had ever participated in. He noted that ‘the forces were very lucky that it was not engaged in any major combat’ (Ejiga 1996:382).

Similarly, another Commander in the operation in Chad, General Kupolati (1996), in his article: ‘The Nigerian Contingent in the OAU Peacekeeping
Operation in Chad’ noted with disgust that the OAU Secretariat did not only fail to establish communication with the Force Headquarters, but also had no logistics contingency plan for the force. Troops were launched into the field of battle and left to fend for themselves. He argued that the failure of the OAU to provide logistic support to the peacekeeping force affected command and control, efficiency and effectiveness of the operation. He noted that the ‘OAU peacekeeping effort in Chad suffered all the disadvantages of an ill-planned, ill-equipped and under-funded venture while enjoying none of the known advantages of a multi-national force of the United Nations’ (Kupolati 1996:395).

Erskine (1996) noted the major difficulties that were identified at the Harare Seminar following the OAU sponsored Chad operations as follows:

a. Failure to outline clear mandate for the peace operations;
b. Lack of clear definition of the role of the Secretary-General;
c. Placement of contingents under Separate Commands;
d. Unavailability of reliable means of Communications;
e. Failure of the OAU to provide logistics and financial support for the force; and
f. Lack of political will on the part of African governments (Erskine 1996:120).

May and Cleaver (1997) noted that the OAU was financially handicapped and this tended to affect its peacekeeping initiative. They observed that the financial handicaps of the OAU were highlighted at two conferences on peacekeeping, which were held in January 1995. The first was held in Cairo and attended by representatives from African and Western nations. The second was held in Harare and was co-hosted by the Zimbabwean Defence Minister, Moven Mahachi, and Britain's Chief of Defence Staff.

This conference drew the conclusion that the state of the OAU’s finances
made the creation of a standing OAU force impracticable. Instead, it was suggested that member states should earmark units to be made available for peacekeeping duties while the OAU should establish a number of logistical supply bases to meet their logistical requirements. They highlighted the problems of African military capacities, logistics and transport, command and control, different languages, communications and interoperability. They concluded that the problems that beset the peacekeeping effort of the OAU's Inter African Force in Chad are illustrative of the many difficulties surrounding such operations and are of significance to contemporary debate since most commentators are agreed on the importance of the role of the OAU to any African peacekeeping initiative.

In 1993, the OAU established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) to undertake political, economic and humanitarian activities to build peace in post-conflict situations to prevent the recurrence of further conflict in Africa. The mechanism referred to ‘civilian and military missions of observation and monitoring of limited scope and duration’. At the second meeting of the Chiefs of Defence Staff in Harare in 1997, the recommendations included reference to the principle that in ‘an emergency situation, the OAU should undertake preliminary preventive action while preparing for more comprehensive action which may include the UN involvement... If the UN is unresponsive, the OAU must take preliminary action whilst continuing its efforts to elicit a positive response from the world body’ (see Report of the Second Meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff of the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Harare, 22-25 October 1997:9).
Furthermore, the OAU might earmark a brigade-sized contribution to standby arrangements from each of the five sub-regions as a starting point, which could then be adjusted upwards or downwards according to evolving circumstances (Ibid., 1997:12). In an attempt to respond more effectively to many of its challenges, especially the challenge posed by intra-state conflicts, the OAU Heads of State and Governments decided to transform the name of the regional organization from the OAU to the African Union (AU).

2.2.2 The African Union (AU) and Conflict Management

In July 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was signed and adopted by the OAU Heads of State in Lome, Togo and the declaration of the African Union was made on March 1, 2001 in Sirte, Libya. The African Union effectively replaced the OAU in 2002, when it formally came into being. The objectives of the African Union have been articulated in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act.

The Constitutive Act of the AU recognizes the right of all member states to live in peace and security (Constitutive Act 2000, Article 4 (i)). The Constitutive Act of the AU restated the principle of non-interference as one of the basic principles of the organization. Specifically Article 4 (g) of the Constitutive Act states that one of the principles of the Union is “non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another”. This formulation is different from the formulation under the United Nations (UN) Charter, which specifically deals with the intervention of the UN in the internal affairs of member states, rather than the relation between member states (UN Charter Article 2(7)). The AU’s Constitutive Act is different from the OAU Charter in its clear exceptions to the non-
interference norm.

The objectives of the African Union provide an insight into the aspirations of African Heads of State and Government for the Union. They recognize the centrality of peace, unity, solidarity and cooperation among African States.

Eze (2002) observed that the formulation of the Constitutive Act of the African Union ‘took into account the principles stated in the Charter of the OAU and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community’. He noted that the ‘core motive for the establishment of the Union was the attainment, in an accelerated form, of the ultimate objectives of the OAU’ (Eze 2002:48).

In a similar vein, Dumoye (2002) noted the ‘little difference between the new African Union, which is expected to replace the OAU, and the African Economic Community, which was conceived by the Abuja Treaty of 1991’ (Dumoye 2002:257).

Joy Ogwu (2002), in an article ‘The African Union and the Problems of Collective Defence and Security’, pointed out that the Act does not go further to explain how these objectives and principles were to be established as ‘it does not establish any institutions or specialized agencies to promote these ideals’ (Ogwu 2002:187).

Article 4 of the Charter of the African Union provides for the functions of the Union. The principles, which deal with conflict management, are provisions relating to the establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent, peaceful resolution of conflicts through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly, and non-interference in the internal affairs of
member states.

Other salient provisions include the right of Member States to intervene in member states when war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are committed (Constitutive Act 2000, Article 4(h)). A member state is also given the mandate to request intervention from the AU to restore peace and security within its national borders (Article 4(J)). As such, intervention under AU is essentially solidarist, whereby sovereignty is qualified by obligations that should be respected by member states. A mass violation of the rights of citizens by a member state, as well as a lack of peace and stability in a member state, will make intervention by the AU justified. Intervention in such cases implies the option to use force by the AU if it is necessary to stop continuing human rights violations and resolve conflicts. However, it is not clear what mechanisms are to be used by the AU in order to determine the existence of the specified preconditions for intervention. Nevertheless, the marked difference between the AU and the OAU is the AU’s relatively clear legal delineation of when intervention by AU will be justified. Whilst the OAU was not conventionally banned from justified intervention, the lack of clearly stated exceptions to its non-interference norm was used by many member states to reject the involvement of the organization in all internal affairs.

Article 30 of the Charter specifically states that ‘Governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union.’ This is based on Decisions AHG/Dec.141 (XXXV) and AHG/Dec.142 (XXXV) on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Algiers, Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999, and Declaration AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) on the Framework for an OAU Response to

Eze (2002) observed that inspite of the non-interference provision in pursuance of peace, the Union has in principle the right to intervene in a member State, pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as occurred in such countries as Rwanda and Burundi.

Article 5 of the African Union provides for the Organs of the Union, which shall be:

a. The Assembly of the Union;
b. The Executive Council;
c. The Pan-African Parliament;
d. The Court of Justice;
e. The Commission;
f. The Permanent Representatives Committee;
g. The Specialized Technical Committees;
h. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and
i. The Financial Institutions and other organs that the Assembly may decide to establish (Article 5 of the Constitutive Act).

At the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 9 to 11 July 2001, the Assembly decided to incorporate the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as one of the organs of the Union, and, in the regard, requested the Secretary-General to undertake a review of the structures, procedures and working methods of the Central Organ, including the possibility of changing its name (see Decision AHG/Dec.160 [XXXVII]).
At the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the African Union expressed their concern about the continued prevalence of armed conflicts in Africa and the fact that no single internal factor has contributed more to socio-economic decline on the continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within and between our States. They also expressed concern about the fact that conflicts have forced millions of our people, including women and children, into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope.

Given these, the Assembly of the African Union, adopted the ‘Protocol Relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council’ of the African Union in Durban, South Africa on July 9, 2002.

The objectives for which the Peace and Security Council is established, is specified in Article 3 of the Protocol, as follows:

a. promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development;

b. anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the Peace and Security Council shall have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and peace-building functions for the resolution of these conflicts;

c. promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence;

d. co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects;

e. develop a common defence policy for the Union, in accordance with article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act;

f. promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms,
respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.

The Peace and Security Council shall be guided by the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It shall, in particular, be guided by the following principles specified in article 4:

a. peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts;
b. early responses to contain crisis situations so as to prevent them from developing into full-blown conflicts;
c. respect for the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law;
d. interdependence between socio-economic development and the security of peoples and States;
e. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States;
f. non interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another;
g. sovereign equality and interdependence of Member States;
h. inalienable right to independent existence;
i. respect of borders inherited on achievement of independence;
j. the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act;
k. the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act (Article 4).

Article 6 of the Protocol provides for the functions of The Peace and Security Council as follows:

a. promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa;
b. early warning and preventive diplomacy;
c. peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry;
d. peace support operations and intervention, pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;
e. peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction;
f. humanitarian action and disaster management;
g. any other function as may be decided by the Assembly.

In conjunction with the Chairperson of the Commission, the Peace and Security Council shall have the following powers as specified in article 7 of the protocol:

a. anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity;
b. undertake peace-making and peace-building functions to resolve conflicts where they have occurred;
c. authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions;
d. lay down general guidelines for the conduct of such missions, including the mandate thereof, and undertake periodic reviews of these guidelines;
e. recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments;
f. approve the modalities for intervention by the Union in a Member State, following a decision by the Assembly, pursuant to article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act;
g. institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in a Member State, as provided for in the Lomé Declaration;
h. implement the common defense policy of the Union;
i. ensure the implementation of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and other relevant international, continental and regional conventions and instruments and harmonize and coordinate efforts at regional and continental levels to combat international terrorism;
j. promote close harmonization, co-ordination and co-operation between Regional Mechanisms and the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa;
k. promote and develop a strong ‘partnership for peace and security’ between the Union and the United Nations and its agencies, as well as with other relevant international organizations;
l. develop policies and action required to ensure that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent takes place within the framework of the Union’s objectives and priorities;

m. follow-up, within the framework of its conflict prevention responsibilities, the progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by Member States;

n. promote and encourage the implementation of OAU/AU, UN and other relevant international Conventions and Treaties on arms control and disarmament;

o. examine and take such appropriate action within its mandate in situations where the national independence and sovereignty of a Member State is threatened by acts of aggression, including by mercenaries;

p. support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters;

q. submit, through its Chairperson, regular reports to the Assembly on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa; and

r. decide on any other issue having implications for the maintenance of peace, security and stability on the Continent and exercise powers that may be delegated to it by the Assembly, in accordance with Article 9 (2) of the Constitutive Act (Article 7 of the Protocol).

The Member States agree that in carrying out its duties under the Protocol, the Peace and Security Council acts on their behalf. The Member States agree to accept and implement the decisions of the Peace and Security Council, in accordance with the Constitutive Act. The Member States shall extend full cooperation to, and facilitate action by the Peace and Security Council for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, pursuant to the duties entrusted to it under the Protocol.

Article 10 defined the role of the Chairperson of the Commission. The Chairperson of the Commission shall, under the authority of the Peace and Security Council, and in consultation with all parties involved in a conflict, deploy efforts
and take all initiatives deemed appropriate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.

To this end, the Chairperson of the Commission:

a. shall bring to the attention of the Peace and Security Council any matter, which, in his/her opinion, may threaten peace, security and stability in the Continent;

b. may bring to the attention of the Panel of the Wise any matter which, in his/her opinion, deserves their attention;

c. may, at his/her own initiative or when so requested by the Peace and Security Council, use his/her good offices, either personally or through special envoys, special representatives, the Panel of the Wise or the Regional Mechanisms, to prevent potential conflicts, resolve actual conflicts and promote peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.

The Chairperson of the Commission shall also:

a. ensure the implementation and follow-up of the decisions of the Peace and Security Council, including mounting and deploying peace support missions authorized by the Peace and Security Council. In this respect, the Chairperson of the Commission shall keep the Peace and Security Council informed of developments relating to the functioning of such missions. All problems likely to affect the continued and effective functioning of these missions shall be referred to the Peace and Security Council, for its consideration and appropriate action;

b. ensure the implementation and follow-up of the decisions taken by the Assembly in conformity with Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;

c. prepare comprehensive and periodic reports and documents, as required, to enable the Peace Security Council and its subsidiary bodies to perform their functions effectively.

In the exercise of his/her functions and powers, the Chairperson of the Commission shall be assisted by the Commissioner in charge of Peace and Security, who shall be responsible for the affairs of the Peace and Security Council. The Chairperson of the Commission shall rely on human and material resources available at the Commission, for servicing and providing support to the Peace and Security Council. In this regard, a Peace and Security Council Secretariat shall be
established within the Directorate dealing with conflict prevention, management and resolution.

The Peace and Security Council shall be supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund.

Article 11 of the Protocol provides for the ‘Panel of the Wise’. In order to support the efforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention, a Panel of the Wise shall be established. The Panel of the Wise shall be composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent. The Chairperson of the Commission shall select them after consultation with the Member States concerned, based on regional representation and appointed by the Assembly to serve for a period of three years. The Panel of the Wise shall advise the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. At the request of the Peace and Security Council or the Chairperson of the Commission, or at its own initiative, the Panel of the Wise shall undertake such action deemed appropriate to support the efforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission for the prevention of conflicts, and to pronounce itself on issues relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.

The Panel of the Wise reports to the Peace and Security Council and, through the Peace and Security Council, to the Assembly. The Panel of the Wise
shall meet as may be required for the performance of its mandate. The Panel of the Wise shall normally hold its meetings at the Headquarters of the Union. In consultation with the Chairperson of the Commission, the Panel of the Wise may hold meetings at such places other than the Headquarters of the Union. The modalities for the functioning of the Panel of the Wise shall be worked out by the Chairperson of the Commission and approved by the Peace and Security Council.

The allowances of members of the Panel of the Wise shall be determined by the Chairperson of the Commission in accordance with the Financial Rules and Regulations of the Union.

Article 12 provided for a ‘Continental Early Warning System’. In order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, a Continental Early Warning System to be known as the Early Warning System shall be established. The Early Warning System shall consist of:

a. an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as ‘The Situation Room’, located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union, and responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module; and

b. observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room.

The Commission shall also collaborate with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and NGOs, to facilitate the effective functioning of the Early Warning System. The Early Warning System shall develop an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyze developments within the continent and to recommend the best course of action. The Chairperson of the
Commission shall use the information gathered through the Early Warning System to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also use this information for the execution of the responsibilities and functions entrusted to him/her under the present Protocol. The Member States shall commit themselves to facilitate early action by the Peace and Security Council and or the Chairperson of the Commission based on early warning information. The Chairperson of the Commission shall, in consultation with Member States, the Regional Mechanisms, the United Nations and other relevant institutions, work out the practical details for the establishment of the Early Warning System and take all the steps required for its effective functioning.

Article 13 provided for the African Standby Force. In order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force shall be established. Such Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. For that purpose, the Member States shall take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the Peace and Security Council or intervention authorized by the Assembly. The strength and types of such contingents, their degree of readiness and general location shall be determined in accordance with established African Union Peace Support Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and shall be subject to periodic reviews depending on prevailing crisis and conflict situations.
The African Standby Force shall, *inter alia*, perform functions in the following areas:

a. observation and monitoring missions;

b. other types of peace support missions;

c. intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;

d. preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement;

e. peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization;

f. humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and

g. any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly.

In undertaking these functions, the African Standby Force shall, where appropriate, cooperate with the United Nations and its Agencies, other relevant international organizations and regional organizations, as well as with national authorities and Non-Governmental Organizations. The detailed tasks of the African Standby Force and its modus operandi for each authorized mission shall be considered and approved by the Peace and Security Council upon recommendation of the Commission.

For each operation undertaken by the African Standby Force, the Chairperson of the Commission shall appoint a Special Representative and a Force Commander, whose detailed roles and functions shall be spelt out in appropriate directives, in accordance with the Peace Support Standing Operating Procedures. The Special Representative shall, through appropriate channels, report to the
Chairperson of the Commission. The Force Commander shall report to the Special Representative. Contingent Commanders shall report to the Force Commander, while the civilian components shall report to the Special Representative.

There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Peace and Security Council in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa. The Military Staff Committee shall be composed of Senior Military Officers of the Members of the Peace and Security Council. Any Member State not represented on the Military Staff Committee may be invited by the Committee to participate in its deliberations when it is so required for the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities. The Military Staff Committee shall meet as often as required to deliberate on matters referred to it by the Peace and Security Council. The Military Staff Committee may also meet at the level of the Chief of Defence Staff of the Members of the Peace and Security Council to discuss questions relating to the military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa.

The Chiefs of Defence Staff shall submit to the Chairperson of the Commission recommendations on how to enhance Africa's peace support capacities. The Chairperson of the Commission shall take all appropriate steps for the convening of and follow-up of the meetings of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Members of the Peace and Security Council. The Commission shall provide guidelines for the training of the civilian and military personnel of national standby contingents at both operational and tactical levels. Training on International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, with particular emphasis
on the rights of women and children, shall be an integral part of the training of such personnel.

To that end, the Commission shall expedite the development and circulation of appropriate Standing Operating Procedures to *inter-alia*:

a. support standardization of training doctrines, manuals and programmes for national and regional schools of excellence;

b. co-ordinate the African Standby Force training courses, command and staff exercises, as well as field training exercises.


In addition to their responsibilities as stipulated under the Protocol:

a. troop contributing countries States shall immediately, upon request by the Commission, following an authorization by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly, release the stand-by contingents with the necessary equipment for the operations envisaged under Article 9 (3) of the present Protocol;

b. Member States shall commit themselves to make available to the Union all forms of assistance and support required for the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the Continent, including rights of passage through their territories.

To assist Member States that have been adversely affected by violent conflicts, the Peace and Security Council shall undertake the following activities specified in article 14:

a. consolidation of the peace agreements that have been negotiated;

b. establishment of conditions of political, social and economic reconstruction of the society and Government institutions;

c. implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including those for child soldiers;
d. resettlement and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons;
e. assistance to vulnerable persons, including children, the elderly, women and other traumatized groups in the society.

The Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. In this respect, the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission, shall:

a. harmonize and coordinate the activities of Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability to ensure that these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union;

b. work closely with Regional Mechanisms, to ensure effective partnership between them and the Peace and Security Council in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability. The modalities of such partnership shall be determined by the comparative advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances.

c. The Peace and Security Council shall, in consultation with Regional Mechanisms, promote initiatives aimed at anticipating and preventing conflicts and, in circumstances where conflicts have occurred, peace-making and peace-building functions. In undertaking these efforts, Regional Mechanisms concerned shall, through the Chairperson of the Commission, keep the Peace and Security Council fully and continuously informed of their activities and ensure that these activities are closely harmonized and coordinated with the activities of Peace and Security Council. The Peace and Security Council shall, through the Chairperson of the Commission, also keep the Regional Mechanisms fully and continuously informed of its activities. In order to ensure close harmonization and coordination and facilitate regular exchange of information, the Chairperson of the Commission shall convene periodic meetings, but at least once a year, with the Chief Executives and/or the officials in charge of peace and security within the Regional Mechanisms. The Chairperson of the Commission shall take the necessary measures, where appropriate, to ensure the full involvement of Regional Mechanisms in the establishment and effective functioning of the Early Warning System and the African Standby Force. Regional Mechanisms shall be invited to participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Peace and Security Council whenever that question is being addressed by a Regional Mechanism is of special interest to that Organization. The Chairperson of the Commission shall be invited to participate in meetings and deliberations of Regional Mechanisms. In order to strengthen coordination and cooperation,
the Commission shall establish liaison offices to the Regional Mechanisms. The Regional Mechanisms shall be encouraged to establish liaison offices to the Commission. On the basis of the above provisions, a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation shall be concluded between the Commission and the Regional Mechanisms.

In the fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant UN Agencies in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Unions’ activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission shall maintain close and continued interaction with the United Nations Security Council, its African members, as well as with the Secretary-General, including holding periodic meetings and regular consultations on questions of peace, security and stability in Africa.

The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant international organizations on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa. Such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council on issues of common interest, if the latter considers that the efficient discharge of its responsibilities does so require.
Article 21 provided for a Peace Fund. In order to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security, a Special Fund, to be known as the Peace Fund, shall be established. The operations of the Peace Fund shall be governed by the relevant Financial Rules and Regulations of the Union. The Peace Fund shall be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of Union, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund raising activities. The Chairperson of the Commission shall raise and accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa, in conformity with the objectives and principles of the Union. There shall also be established, within the Peace Fund, a revolving Trust Fund. The appropriate amount of the revolving Trust Fund shall be determined by the relevant Policy Organs of the Union upon recommendation by the Peace and Security Council.

When required and following a decision by the relevant Policy Organs of the Union, the cost of the operations envisaged under Article 13 (3) of the present Protocol shall be assessed to Member States based on the scale of their contributions to the regular budget of the Union. The States contributing contingents would be invited to bear the cost of their participation during the first three (3) months. The Union shall refund the expenses incurred by the concerned contributing States within a maximum period of six (6) months and then proceed to finance the operations.
2.3 SUB-REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE ECOWAS MECHANISM

Founded in 1975 as a forum for economic promotion and development, social and cultural matters, and the general progress of the continent, ECOWAS has emerged from the Liberian civil war, as Africa's foremost economic, political, and security grouping. ECOWAS member States have realized that the economics of integration and the politics integration are inseparable. They have realized that regional peace and security are simply too critical and a sine qua non for the promotion of economic cooperation among member states. It has also become obvious that progress in economic cooperation is largely conditioned by political stability in the region as a whole. Until the member countries of ECOWAS intervened in Liberia, Africa lacked any well-articulated subregional arrangement for the sole purpose of conflict management.

The Economic Community of West African States is one of the subregional organisations most actively involved in conflict prevention and management. Since 1990 when the Standing Mediation Committee and the Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) were set up in Liberia, ECOWAS has been working relentlessly to restore peace to West Africa. ECOWAS is made up of sixteen West African Countries, comprising of both Anglophone and Francophone states, as well as the former Portuguese West African territories. Before it became involved in Liberia, what ECOWAS depended on for conflict management were the ‘Protocol on Non-Aggression’ and the ‘Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence’ (MAD). The ECOWAS Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Lagos on April 22, 1978, while the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD) was signed in Freetown, Sierra Leone, in May 1981. Eighteen
years after ECOWAS adopted the Protocol on MAD, it was confronted with its first practical challenge – how to respond to the conflict in Liberia. As the conflict persisted in Liberia, the situation in Monrovia became increasingly desperate, especially in August 1990. Tens of thousands of Liberians and hundreds of nationals from other ECOWAS states were trapped without food, water, medicine, or shelter. Pressure was mounted on ECOWAS leaders to take action (see Adebajo 2002; Aboagye 1999, Olonisakin 2000). The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was established as an *ad hoc* mechanism to provide credible response to the situation by keeping the peace, as well as restoring law and order in Liberia.

Adeniji (1997) presented an analytical background to the politics of colonial, post-colonial West Africa, and argued that it encouraged factionalism into the Anglophone and francophone blocs. He argued that the consequential distrust and suspicion dictated the nature of integration process in the region and the existence of institutions based exclusively on linguistic identity. He noted that *Accord de Non Aggression et d’Assistance en Matiere de Defence* (ANAD) was the product of this linguistic divide between the anglophone and the francophone in West Africa. The creation of ECOWAS was to bridge the linguistic gap. The paper pointed out the relative strength and weakness of each of the two security mechanisms. Adeniji noted that ANAD suffered from being an exclusively francophone mechanism in a multilingual region, and its coverage therefore cannot be region-wide. Its non-inclusion of Nigeria, the regional major power, makes it also an unlikely instrument for credible regional action. However, it has the advantage of commitment that has led to the development of Additional Protocols and the creation of institutions, including a functioning Secretariat. MAD, on the
other hand has the strength of being universal for the entire region and is situated within the context of the economic grouping of all the regional states. However, according to Adeniji, it remains undeveloped, and its institutions uncreated, leading therefore to the improvisations that had to be made for the intervention in Liberia.

Adeniji highlighted how the civil war in Liberia broke out in December 1989, and degenerated in early 1990 into a veritable mayhem. He noted its escalation in barbarity, and the vivid images carried on international television channels, and argued that ‘no organization showed any inclination to intervene’, especially as the United Nations was very engrossed in the Gulf crisis and the OAU had neither the mechanism nor the resources to intervene. ECOWAS was left with no option than to wade into the conflict. This generated the controversy surrounding the legality of the ECOWAS ECOMOG operation. He argued that ‘until the basic step for institution building envisaged in the Protocol is taken, any measure by ECOWAS in the security field is bound to be at least legally controversial as happened in the case of ECOMOG in Liberia.’ The paper suggested that the lack of those institutions left open the exercise of hegemony by a strong regional power as the ECOWAS involvement in Liberia has demonstrated.

Vogt (1996 52-61) presented the circumstances leading to the deployment of ECOMOG in an article ‘The Management of Conflicts in Africa’. Vogt observed that the West African states embarked on peacekeeping in Liberia after more than 150,000 people had either been killed or displaced in the civil war which started in Liberia in 1989. She noted that the member states of ECOWAS, frustrated by the deterioration of the Liberian crisis, mounted a multilateral force-ECOMOG that landed in Monrovia in August 1990. She explained that a decision was taken for the
multilateral force to fight its way into Monrovia, create a beachhead and evacuate the large number of civilians who were stranded at the port and in Monrovia to refugee camps in various African countries.

Vogt (1996:52) observed that ECOMOG pursued an enforcement action to create a secure zone, first around Monrovia, and then Greater Monrovia, by securing strategic assets, such as water reservoirs, electricity generation capacity, and the local and international airports, amidst resistance from Charles Taylor – leader of the rebel NPFL. Vogt pointed out that ‘the adoption of enforcement action raised questions on the ability of the force to continue a peacekeeping mandate, while remaining an impartial arbiter’ (Vogt 1996:52). Vogt, however, noted that the concept of multinational monitoring force in this African subregion was an innovative one in that it represented the first time that a subregional force would be mounted for peacekeeping in an internal war situation and in support of humanitarian action. She noted further that ‘Liberia represents the first time that a collaborative effort would be entered into at three levels of international action – the subregional: ECOWAS; the regional: OAU; and the world-wide: United Nations’ (Vogt 1996:52).

Vogt concluded that the experience of ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and the tremendous cost of that operation ‘seem to suggest that the mounting of such missions integrally by the subregional organization or by OAU lies beyond the capability of the regional bodies’ (Vogt 1996:61).

Aminu (1996) argued that in order to appreciate ECOMOG’s contribution to the Liberian peace effort, it would be necessary to divide the operation into two focuses, viz: (i) the politico-military efforts that meant finding an acceptable
political arrangement for Liberia and (ii) the actual humanitarian aid activities. He noted that while ECOMOG was holding firmly on to Monrovia, militarily, as a practical precondition for delivery of humanitarian aid, ECOWAS pursued diplomatic initiatives to resolve the crisis politically with the NPFL.

ECOMOG, in an attempt to ‘create the necessary conditions for normal life to resume to the benefit of the Liberians’, found itself engaged in a battle with the NPFL. Elaigwu (1996) in an article: ‘African Security in a changing environment’, observed that as a peacekeeping force, it soon became clear that there was no peace to keep and by September 1990, it was empowered to enforce the peace. He further observed that the size of ECOMOG was doubled (to around 6,000) and its firepower increased by the supply of more offensive weapons in order to face the serious challenges that were hampering its success. He identified some of the challenges faced by ECOMOG to include ‘the political in-fighting and factionalization among the warring parties, attacks against ECOMOG itself, and allegations by some factions compromising its neutrality’ (Elaigwu 1996:18).

The issue of the legality of ECOMOG intervention in Liberia has received considerable attention in the literature (Nwokedi, 1992; Adisa, 1992; Ofodile, 1994; Gye-Wado, 1996). Ofodile (1994), in his article, ‘The legality of ECOWAS intervention in Liberia’, observed the fruitless attempts by ECOWAS to get the warring factions in the Liberian conflict to agree to a cease-fire before the forceful intervention to impose a ceasefire on the parties. He noted that ECOWAS justified its intervention in Liberia on humanitarian grounds and on the fact that the Liberian crisis posed a threat to peace and security in the region. He argued that ‘under the present state of international law, there is no right to humanitarian intervention if
the intervention is undertaken, by a State or a group of States outside the auspices of the UN.’ He contended that the ‘ECOWAS action in Liberia exceed[ed] a purely humanitarian mission and therefore, required consent of all the warring factions or a prior authorization by the UN Security Council, neither of which was obtained.’ He further argued that ‘ECOWAS action could not be justified under the region's Protocol on Mutual Defence and Cooperation because the necessary consensus was not obtained before the intervention.’ He concluded that ‘ECOWAS initial intervention in Liberia was contrary to principles of international law’.

Bundu (1993) in his article ‘The ECOMOG operation in Liberia: A Political and Diplomatic Perspective’ expressed a sharply different view from Ofodile, when he argued that President Doe had written in July 1990 to invite an intervention force from ECOWAS. He cited the Protocol on Non-Aggression signed by Heads of States and Governments in Lagos in 1978 and Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters in 1981 as the basis for intervention in Liberian crises.

Gye-wado (1996) observed in his article, ‘The Legal Basis for Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: A Study of Regional and Subregional Charters’, that the legality of ECOMOG has been hinged on both the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression and the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance. He argued that these protocols cannot serve as basis for any action. However, granted that these protocols are in order, he noted, ‘their necessary intention was to eliminate aggression by one Member State against another and to provide assistance to a Member State in the event of aggression.’ He was quite certain that ‘the Liberian crisis is not an aggression against a Member State and should therefore be addressed from another perspective.’ He contended that ECOWAS as a regional
organization has no treaty capacity for the maintenance of peace and security and therefore cannot benefit from Article 52 for its international legitimization. He reasoned that Article 52 is, therefore, intended to provide a leeway for regional organizations to deal with issues within their domain and not to create competence for such organizations. He averred that the ECOMOG intervention could be predicated on the general principle of humanitarian intervention, given the extent of carnage and looting that was going on.

Fung (1996: 72) argued that ‘for humanitarian reasons, the principle of the consent of the parties to a conflict can be violated, particularly in situations where the central authority of a country has collapsed.’ He noted that this was the case ‘with the deployment of the United Nations operations in Somalia and with the intervention of ECOMOG in Liberia.’ He observed, however, that 'humanitarian intervention', be it what it may, the lack of consent can complicate the success of the mission when the non-consenting parties refuse to cooperate. This state of affairs, he argues, becomes even more dangerous ‘when a ceasefire had not been brokered before the deployment of the operations.’ The lack of ceasefire not only predisposes the peacekeeping mission to a combat situation, it retards negotiations for the peace process and prolongs the operations with an accompanying financial burden. It is against this background that he noted the importance of ceasefire agreements in conflict situations as they serve as ‘barometers with which the fluctuating momentum of the peace process is gauged’ (Fung 1996:72).

In another article, Vogt (1996) noted that the deployment of ECOMOG to Liberia also signifies a major breach of established tenet of relations among African states who argue against the interference of states in the internal affairs of other
states. She pointed out that the ECOWAS Secretariat described the deployment of ECOMOG into the Liberian civil war as the only option left for the subregional states in a situation of complete breakdown of sovereign authority in that country. She argued that the concept of inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity had already been compromised when the Liberian authority could not prevent the violation of the rights and security of individuals and of foreign nationals, embassies and properties in Liberia. She argued further, that the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Matters of Defence allows the subregional organization to intervene even in internal conflict situations, where clear evidence exists of external power involvement. She argued that by allowing the NPFL to organize and launch the invasion of Liberia from their territories, both Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso had opened the door for the internationalization of the crisis. She noted that the ECOMOG intervention facilitated the creation of the secure environment that made renewed humanitarian activities possible.

James (1996) observed the apparent lack of unity among ECOWAS member states, which made the ECOWAS peacekeeping efforts rather problematic at the initial stages. He also observed that certain ECOWAS states like Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire openly facilitated the rebellion in Liberia by providing base facilities, logistical support and safe passage for Charles Taylor's NPFL, while Libya provided arms and ammunition as well as training facilities. He pointed out the inability of the then Head of State of Liberia, Samuel Doe, to rule as he was confined to the Presidential Palace, while the rebel forces ransacked embassies of foreign missions and took nationals of several West African countries hostages. He argued that the deployment of humanitarian and medical assistance was made impossible by the complete state of anarchy into which Liberia was thrown. He
noted that the magnitude of human suffering and the obvious possible spill over effects of the Liberian conflict into the immediate neighbouring countries and the entire West African subregion led to the escalation of the crisis.

It was against this background, according to James (1996) that the ECOWAS Heads of States and Governments at their Banjul-Summit Meeting on the 30\textsuperscript{th} May 1990, decided to call on the warring parties, Charles Taylor (NPFL) and Samuel Doe (AFL), to observe an immediate cessation of hostilities, to end the wanton destruction of lives and to accept the holding of free and fair elections as a means of restoring peace and security to Liberia. Pursuant to this, on August 23, 1990, an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, consisting of ground and naval force were deployed in Monrovia to enforce a ceasefire amidst strong protestations from the main rebel group, the NPFL.

Yoroms (2001) noted that the basis for ECOMOG intervention was the accusations made against Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Libya for sponsoring Taylor's NPFL. He however argued that diplomatic channels ‘involving these countries in [sic] a peace table were not exhausted before the outright intervention’. He argued further that, ‘it seems that the Standing Mediation Committee had shown its tacit support for Doe, hence it was considered that an initial peace move involving Cote D'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Libya, and the SMC would have created another basis for misunderstanding’ (Yoroms 2001:102). Yoroms was of the view that at the time ECOMOG was established, it had no ‘clear cut mission to pursue apart from the foggy mandate to bring about ceasefire.’

James (1996) had noted the ECOMOG mission and mandate to include:

a. the granting of ECOMOG freedom of movement throughout the entire
territory of Liberia;
b. the willingness by all the warring factions to abandon their fighting positions and to move into designated camps;
c. the acceptance of the eminent persons of the International Negotiation Network (INN) into Liberia during the period of encampment and disarmament in order to reinforce the confidence of the parties;
d. the recognition by all the warring parties of the absolute neutrality of ECOMOG and the demonstration of their trust in it;
e. the location and recovery of all weapons inadvertently lost and their safe custody by ECOMOG;
f. the removal of all obstacles and the neutralization of all possible minefields, as well as;
g. monitor all entry points into Liberia (James 1996:335).

Yoroms and Anings (1997) highlighted the development of ECOWAS and its transformation from ‘an economic to political/security organization’. They argued that the original institutions of security regimes were abandoned because they were too cumbersome to implement and were not constituted at the time of the Liberian conflict. They noted the leadership role provide by Nigeria, especially in terms of the initiation of ECOMOG, and the provision of logistics, financial and troops support, which helped to sustain ECOMOG until the end of the conflict. They acknowledged that Nigeria spent up to $4.5b in the crisis in Liberia.

Ero (1999) observed that ECOMOG's activities in Liberia contradicted the belief that subregion’s are better placed and more acceptable than outside forces when intervening to settle internal conflicts. Ero noted that what ECOMOG eloquently displayed was that a body with a mandate to intervene was no less controversial because it was a 'home-made' or an indigenous initiative. She argued that the conflict in Liberia laid bare the divisive tensions between Nigeria and mainly Francophone states. She averred that although Nigeria contributed at least 70% of the troop presence in ECOMOG and spent an estimated US$4 billion in
financing the ECOMOG operations, the impression of its francophone neighbours, especially Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, was that Nigeria used Liberia as a means of exerting its dominance in the subregion. Beyond the political tensions among the West African states, Ero noted that ECOMOG intervention highlighted the operational dilemmas that confront institutions that lack the experience of undertaking peace operations in complex and violent civil wars. She identified numerous problems that ECOMOG encountered during its operation in Liberia, many of which were to plague its operations in Sierra Leone later, to include:

   a. inadequate structures for rapid deployment from troop-contributing countries;
   b. problems in the areas of command, control, organization, logistics and coordination; and
   c. Problems of force projection for ECOMOG troops.

Ero (1999) observed a serious criticism against ECOMOG to be its impartiality in the peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, especially, as ECOMOG was perceived to have fought against Charles Taylor and the NPFL, from the onset, in Liberia, and against RUF in Sierra Leone.

Johnson-Sirleaf (1999) observed that the intervention of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the Liberian civil war through the creation of ECOMOG represent unique lessons in regional cooperation for conflict resolution. She noted that the ending of the civil war and return to democratic governance, is generally attributed to the success of ECOMOG in effecting a ceasefire, in starting the process of disarmament and demobilization of combatants and providing the security required for organizing and holding elections. The paper provides a brief evaluation of the basis for ECOMOG's intervention, the pitfalls experienced in effecting maintenance of peace, and some
of the consequences of intervention for the development of the democratic process in Liberia, and suggests that ECOMOG's intervention provides valuable lessons for a regional approach to conflict resolution in similar situations. She concluded that the ECOWAS experience provides a good basis for support for a professionally trained neutral regional intervention force that is guided by a regional political institution, under rules of engagement that are clearly defined.

Mazrui (1999) pointed out that ‘once again this was a case of neighbouring African countries accepting responsibility for a malfunctioning brotherly state, and going into the weaker state to try and do something about it.’ Mazrui observed that ‘ECOMOG's lack of experience...initially resulted in many disastrous false starts in peacekeeping in Liberia’ (Mazrui 1999:4).

Bangura (1999) noted that ECOMOG's mandate in Sierra Leone was to reverse the military coup and restore the legitimate government to power. He pointed out that ECOMOG was not expected to serve as a neutral force between disputants. He noted the ‘spectacular and professional way the operation was done’ as the military junta was ejected within six days of the commencement of the operation. He argued that ‘there is a good case to be made, therefore, for further institutionalization of ECOMOG in order to strengthen its conflict resolution capacities.’ He observed that the key obstacles are the fears by some of the Francophone countries of Nigerian domination (with 55% of the regions population) and France's concerns that a successful ECOMOG would undermine its influence in the region. He suggested that the enhancement of ECOMOG's institutional capacity should be linked to a redefinition of its role in peacekeeping operations.
Francis (2001) observed that West African leaders, like the majority of those in Africa now recognize that non-intervention and political sovereignty are no longer sacrosanct, when it comes to deadly internal conflicts. He noted that the OAU, which had spent decades hiding behind the protection offered by the norms of international society, had to endorse ECOMOG's intervention in the West African Conflicts. He noted that the ECOMOG interventions were very expensive operations for the largely underdeveloped economies in the subregion. He argued that the ECOMOG experience demonstrates the need for the regional security organ to move beyond the traditional neutral inter-positionary approach to regional security that embraces peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict management and conflict prevention.

Adetula (2005) noted that regional mechanisms in Africa operate on an ad hoc basis because of their institutionalization. However, ECOMOG's experiences in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau, prompted discussions within ECOWAS on the need to institutionalize a mechanism for managing future subregional conflicts. On December 10, 1999, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, meeting in Lome, Togo, adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, as a way of building the organization's institutional capacity to manage subregional conflicts (see Adebajo 2002; Aboagye 1999, Olonisakin 2000).

Current happenings on the political scene underscore all too clearly, the crucial importance of the protocol relating to the mechanism, which the Authority of Heads of State and Government adopted on 10 December 1999. The ECOWAS Mechanism has three key organs: the Mediation and Security Council, the Defence
and Security Commission, and the Council of Elders (Article 4). The Protocol has made it possible for ECOWAS to avoid having to resort to ad hoc conflict resolution procedures. This task is now assigned to the Mediation and Security Council. This organ will undoubtedly play a crucial role in conflict prevention and management. The Mediation and Security Council is responsible for implementing the provisions of the Mechanism through the Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders, and ECOMOG (Article 7, 17). Peacekeeping missions of ECOMOG are planned by the Defence and Security Commission, while the Council of Elders is used primarily for conflict mediation and electoral monitoring (Articles 17, 19, 20). The inaugural meeting of the Defence and Security Commission held in Accra on 19 and 20 July 2000 and made relevant recommendations on the size of the model stand-by units provided for in the protocol relating to the mechanism, and on their training strategy.
CHAPTER THREE

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICTS IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

3.1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT.

In efforts to deepen understanding of internal conflicts scholars have typically identified several types of such conflicts; these include identity conflicts which driven by differences over issues of religion, ethnicity and space, among others (Gurr 2000); resource conflicts (Collier, 2000, 2003), conflicts linked to superpower rivalry and its aftermath (Copson, 1991; Hampson 1996) and conflicts associated more broadly with governance failure (Zartman, 1995).

Although such classification is important as an analytic tool, much deeper studies of specific conflicts are necessary if we are to understand the true nature of conflicts and their morphic processes. In the case of Liberia, a legacy of over-centralized and predatory government, sustained marginalization of large segments of the population and increasing repression constituted the underlying or structural causes of violent conflict (Berkeley 2001).

For over one hundred years the Americo-Liberian political party, the True Whig Party, ruled Liberia with an iron fist and kept the indigenous populations isolated from political participation, and socio-economic growth. Let us examine how this started as well as the processes that have brought Liberia into its present state.

Liberia has been inhabited for at least four millennia and the country is the first independent Republic in Africa. Not much is known about the earlier
inhabitants of the country. It is not known whether the earlier inhabitants had become extinct or were assimilated by the new settlers. In the four centuries after 1400 AD, waves of migration arrived in Liberia. From Sierra Leone came the Vai, and from Ghana the Mano. The Kpelle and the Belle, the Kissi and the Bassa and the De followed them. From Ivory Coast came the Krahn and the Grebo, and in their turn came the Gio and the Mandingo.

Over the succeeding decades, thousands more joined the early settlers. Most came from the United States, but there were also many immigrants from the West Indies. Some 6,000 slaves, mainly Congolese, who had been rescued from the slave ships by the British and American navies and landed in Liberia, further swelled their numbers. Between 1822 and 1861, the number of the freed slaves from the United States and the Caribbean swelled to about 25,000. Their descendants were referred to as ‘Americo-Liberians’ (see Dunn 1988; Liebenow 1987; Vogt 1992).

Liberia has seventeen ethnic groups, none of which comprises more than 20 percent of the population. Among these groups, besides the ‘Americo-Liberians’ who ruled Liberia until 1980, are the Mano and Gio in the North, the Mandingo in the west, and the Krahn in the northeast (CIA Fact File 2002).

Scholars such as Raymond Buell, Gus Liebenow and Christopher Clapham have documented the historical roots of Liberia’s conflict (Liebenow 1969; 1987; 1976). The reasons for the outbreak of the Liberian conflict could be traced to the nature of the post-colonial political and economic system that maintained the Americo-Liberian hegemony (freed slaves deported from America); and the politics of ethnicity and clientelism established by the Doe regime.

Although the Americo-Liberians represent only 5% of the total population
of Liberia, which was estimated at 1.8m in 1980, they nevertheless controlled political and economic power in the country almost to the exclusion of the majority of the citizens. Of the country's 19 Presidents before April 12, 1980 coup, none was an indigenous Liberian. Besides, 11 out of the 19 Presidents had actually been born in the United States of America. Accordingly, they paid little or no attention to the sensibilities of the indigenous Liberians with regard to their laws, customs and religious beliefs. Indeed, before 1946 there were separate laws for the indigenous people and the Americo-Liberians who inhabited Monrovia and other coastal areas of the country that is Montserrado County. This state of affairs remained more or less the same until the advent of the Tubman's Administration in 1944 (Buell 1947).

More than any other President, Tubman tried to narrow the gap between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous Africans and gave the latter some sense of belonging in the Republic. This is not to say, however, that the indigenous majority shared equal power and opportunities with the Americo-Liberians, during his administration.

The Liberian elite during the Tubman and Tolbert administrations came from the top 300 or more Americo-Liberian families, or less than 2% of the total population of 1.8 million in 1980 (Umoden 1992). Forming the core of the country's national bourgeoisie, they dominated all top government and cabinet posts, occupied most of the strategic positions in commerce, Industry, the Church fraternities (especially the Masonic temple), provided most, if not all, the officer corp. in the armed forces of Liberia before the coup in 1980. In short, they shared similar, if not identical, political, social and religious values and beliefs which bound them together. Three concentric circles of power and influence existed in the country: the True Whig Party (Political), the Church (religious), and the Masonic
Temple (fraternities). While providing important socialising avenues, they also
played a very vital role in ensuring cohesion among the Americo-Liberians
(Umoden 1992).

In short, the Americo-Liberian elites controlled effectively all the vital
vehicles for political participation and expression of dissent in the country. For
many years, President Tubman's son Shad Tubman Jnr., was the President of the
Confederation of Trade Unions in the country. The Minister of Finance was the
President's younger brother, Steve Tolbert, while the President of Senate and
Senator for Montserrado County, Frank Tolbert, was the President's senior brother.
Finally, the President's two daughters were both made Deputy Ministers in the
Ministry of Education.

Elite reproduction was done in several other ways. First, was through inter-
family marriages. Let us provide an illustration: President Tolbert's daughter was
married to the eldest son of President Tubman, Shade Tubman, at a time when
Tolbert was Tubman's Vice President. Second, was through careful but energetic
process of cooptation of bright and promising young indigenous Liberians.

Political domination, economic exploitation, and the lack of widespread
education prevented a common Liberian nationalism. Many observers believe that
the Americo-Liberian community, who were victims of American slavery, soon
became the victimizers of the ‘natives’ - an early distinction was made by the
settlers and others between themselves and the natives, as they called the
causes of state implosion and societal fragmentation in Liberia to the nature and
type of state formation, anti-democratic political framework, socio-economic
inequalities and underdevelopment, instituted by the Americo-Liberians since the 1800s. The Americo-Liberians exerted a monopoly of power over the majority of indigenous peoples and dominated the country's political, social and economic life for over 130 years.

On April 12, 1980, an indigenous non-commissioned officer, a 28-year-old Master Sergeant (Staff Sergeant) in the Liberian Army, and a member of the Krahn ethnic group, successfully terminated the half a century Americo-Liberian rule. The coup enjoyed widespread initial support.

The Doe government began its rule violently by publicly executing leading officials of the *ancien regime*. Doe promised that national elections would take place in 1985 and a new democratic constitution would come into force the same year. He also promised to end the system of corruption and redistribute the nation's wealth among the people. Samuel Doe, who promoted himself from Master Sergeant to General, failed on all counts. Instead, he created a governmental system that benefited one ethnic group, the Krahns, drove the country into deeper ethnic hostility and economic ruin, and paved the way for Liberia's civil war. Doe's regime became infamous for gross violations of human rights, political chicanery, economic mismanagement and personalization of the 'official' state of Liberia. The reign of terror of President Doe, 1980-1989, further impoverished the populace, privatized the state apparatus and other institutions of governance, to serve the private interest of his Krahns tribesmen and their supporters. During the 1980s, Doe heavily politicized - ‘ethnicized’- the AFL, making it essentially a Krahns Presidential Guard (Sesay 1992).

In addition, Doe stifled the attempt to create a draft constitution for a return
to civil rule in 1985. The National Constitutional Committee set up by Doe under the Chairmanship of Amos Sawyer in 1981 to prepare a draft constitution, was undermined as Doe objected to its contents of improving the powers, privileges and prerogatives of the Presidential office (see Ofuatey-Kodjoe 1994: 263). By 1984, Doe's military regime had transformed itself into transitional caretaker government, which he headed as the constitutional civilian President. By 1985, Doe's Special Election Commission declared him winner. From 1985, Doe eliminated opposition groups while his security forces subjected opposition leaders to harassment and intimidation. This triggered an abortive coup by the ex-commander of the Liberian Army, Thomas Quiwomkpa, an ethnic Gio and a former Doe's ally. The failure of the coup resulted in a brutal campaign of repression by Doe's Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) in Quiwomkpa’s home region of Nimba County. In 1985, the AFL killed as many as 3,000 Mano and Gio civilians who were thought to be Quiwomkpa's strongest supporters (see Sawyer 1992:297). The Liberian civil war, therefore, had root causes in the Samuel Doe's military regime and his failed promise to institute democratic reforms and return the country back to civilian rule after the 1980 coup which brought him to power.

The immediate cause of the Liberian civil war was the launching of an armed incursion on Christmas Eve by Charles Taylor, an Americo Liberian of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in 1989. The insurgency was against the nearly ten year’s tyrannical rule of President Doe. Charles Taylor's rebellion therefore reflected some element of popular revulsion against Doe's dictatorship. Taylor began his campaign in Nimba County, home of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups, which suffered greatly under Doe. Taylor's invasion, in less than a year, succeeded in controlling 90 per cent of the country, about 12 out of the 13 counties,
which he later called 'Greater Liberia' and then he proclaimed himself president. During this period, Liberia effectively degenerated into chaos and anarchy, and the authority of President Doe did not extend beyond the Executive Mansion where he was besieged (see Brehun 1991:24). Taylor had been a member of Doe's government as Director of General Services responsible for government procurement. Taylor fell out with Doe as he was accused of embezzling $900,000 from the government and had to flee into exile where he organized his guerrilla war against Doe's regime.

Taylor's rebellion was supported by Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire (both ECOWAS members) and Libya. Libya trained a core of his fighters, Burkina Faso supplied them with Libyan weaponry, and Cote d'Ivoire allowed them free transit across the border into Nimba County. Doe belatedly rushed a battalion of the AFL to Nimba County. The troops created more hostility against the already unpopular Doe by further brutal treatment of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups. Taylor took advantage of this anti-Doe backlash, and his NPFL force quickly spread through much of Liberia.

Charles Taylor's force's, joined by the Gio and Mano ethnic group, launched attacks on the Khran ethnic group and their ally, the Mandingo. By April and May 1990, Charles Taylor's forces had moved closer to the capital city Monrovia, and other heavily populated areas. By July 1990, it had reached Monrovia's outskirts. Taylor's onslaught, and its counter-reaction, created significant savagery.

The level of human carnage and destruction during the civil war led to a massive influx of refugees and created a humanitarian catastrophe. According to a US State Department Report in 1990 ‘all combatants routinely engage in
indiscriminate killing and abuse of civilians, looting and ethnically based executions, with one of the worst single episodes occurring in July when AFL soldiers killed approximately 600 persons taking refuge in the courtyard of St. Peter's Lutheran Church' on July 29. (US State Department Report on Human Rights in Liberia 1999:17). All parties to the conflict for allegedly supporting their opponent also targeted West African nationals for brutal reprisals. This brutal civil war and humanitarian catastrophe directly threatened regional peace and security.

In August 1990, a new faction, the INPFL (the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia), split off from Taylor's NPFL. The INPFL, led by Prince Yormie Johnson, fought both the AFL and the NPFL. Additional factions emerged: the Mandingo-based United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO/K); ULIMO/J, a Krahn-dominated splinter group; and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), another Krahn-based group. Before long, massacres and random killings precipitated an exodus of 500,000 refugees, later to grow to nearly 1,000,000; hundreds of thousands of Liberians faced starvation. Doe was subsequently caught and killed by the rival Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) led by Prince Yormie Johnson, whilst on an 'official mission' to the ECOMOG headquarters.

As the conflict continued, over half the country's population of 2.6 million was displaced internally (the population in Monrovia grew from 600,000 in 1991 to one million at the height of the crisis) and externally (Liberians who took refuge in neighbouring countries were estimated at 700,000) (see UNDP Monrovia, 1994). The rupture of civil administration through many areas of Liberia, especially the Gbarnga Divisions, Buchanon town and areas of Grand Bassa and cessation of most
forms of social services, and the disruption of economic activities, have resulted in considerable dependence on humanitarian assistance provided by the United Nations and non-governmental organisations.

3.2 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT.

The modern state of Sierra Leone owes its origin to the position of ‘free persons of colour’ in the United States, Great Britain and British possessions in America, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Freetown in Sierra Leone was established in 1787 with subsidiary settlements at Sherbro in Sierra Leone, up to the Liberian coast from Cape Mount to Cape Palmas. Slaves captured at sea and liberated by the British and other navies supplemented the original settlers in Sierra Leone. Their descendants were known as Creoles in Sierra Leone (Fyfe 1962).

Sierra Leone was founded under British supervision. Britain retained an interest in the settlement, especially as a naval base for operations against the slave trade. In 1808, after a turbulent beginning, the settlement then known as the province of Freedom became a crown colony administered directly from London under a British Governor (see Fyfe 1962). In 1896 the British extended her authority to the hinterland to establish a protectorate over the area based upon different peoples, speaking 23 languages and hundreds of dialects. Sierra Leone has the Mende, with some 31% of the country’s population. The northern savanna area of Sierra Leone is occupied by people’s possessing closer links with Guinea and Islam. The ethnic make-up of the country is varied, with fourteen main groups forming the bulk of the population.
The south and south-east consists mainly of the Mendes, Sherbro, Vais, Kissis and the Konos. In the North are the Temmes, which is the dominant group with about 30% of Sierra Leone's population, the Limba with about 8.5%; and smaller groups such as the Mandingoes, Loko, Kurankos, Yalunkas and Susus. In the Western area, particularly in the capital, Freetown, there has been a visible intermix among the various groups over the generations, blurring the linguistic and cultural distinctions of any one group especially the Creoles (Cartwright 1970).

The colonial history of Sierra Leone was not placid. The indigenous people mounted several unsuccessful revolts against British rule and Krio domination. Most of the 20th century history of the colony was peaceful, however, and independence was achieved without violence. The 1951 constitution provided a framework for decolonization. Local ministerial responsibility was introduced in 1953, when Sir Milton Margai was appointed Chief Minister.

The anti-colonial struggle culminated into the 1957 general election, which was contested primarily by the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) led by Albert Margai, and the United Progressive Party (UPP) led by Cyril Rogers-Wright. After the SLPP victory Sir Milton Margai, Albert Margai's brother, became prime minister. Britain was forced to grant Sierra Leone independence on the 27th April 1961. Sir Milton Margai's road to greater political authority ended with his death on 28th April 1964. Shortly after, on the 29th April, the Governor – General, Sir Henry Lightfoot Boston swore in Sir Milton Margai's younger brother, Sir Albert Margai, as Prime Minister (Fisher 1969).

The years between 1962 and 1967 were a drama in political party confrontation. Without the benefit of a long period of modern political socialization
and preparation, Sierra Leone was thrust into the world as an independent state to interact with the international community, and to replicate at home the Westminster style democratic model. This was a period of political turbulence and violence which in succeeding years was to produce great pain and torment in the political and social system that affects the nation till this day.

In the elections of 17th March 1967, the outcome was bristled with confusion. Both parties had made a predictably strong showing in their respective areas of influence, in the North by the APC and the South and South East by the SLPP. Konoland and the Western area had gone to the APC also.

Unlike his brother Sir Milton, Sir Albert was a radical with an imposing personality. His appointment as Prime Minister by the Governor – General was bitterly opposed by leading SLPP and APC men. Reacting to this opposition, Sir Albert dismissed four very important non – Mende Ministers who had criticized the Governor – Generals action. This dismissal turned out to be a political blunder as it caused considerable dissatisfaction in the country and marked the beginning of Sir Albert's problems, as the dismissed politicians were influential individuals in the SLPP who represented important areas of the country. Sir Albert bypassed traditional interests and forged a new alliance with the Army Commander, Brigadier David Lansana and some Civil Servants later to be referred to as the 'Moyamba' Group (Fisher 1969).

The APC used the media effectively to discredit the Prime Minister whose popularity took a sudden nose-dive. Sir Albert failed to realize that the Force Commander had no firm control over the armed forces, especially as he had fallen out with many of the officers.
On February 8, 1967, Sir Albert announced the discovery of a plot to overthrow his government. According to him, the plot was aimed at murdering the Force Commander. He clearly blamed the APC for the alleged plot.

The 1967 election was won by the APC leader, Siaka Stevens. The state of the parties in terms of seats won stood as follows: APC 32, SLPP 28 and Independent 4. After the 1967 election, the Governor General, a Creole, invited Siaka Stevens to form a government; shortly after being sworn in, he was arrested by the Army Commander, Brigadier Lansana who then declared a martial law. This marked the origin of the conflicts that the country was to face in the future. His middle-rank officers, who formed a military regime under the National Reformation Council (NRC), and invited Lt. Col Andrew Juxon-Smith to head it, ousted Lansana after two days. The NRC governed for just over a year. It was displaced in April 1968, by a further coup d'etat led by NCOs, mostly of northern origin. These invited Siaka Stevens back from Guinea, where he had gone into exile, to lead a civilian regime. In 1971, Siaka Stevens signed a quick – fix – defence pact with Guinea making it possible to bring down to Sierra Leone, Guinean troops for the protection of Siaka Stevens and to assist in the restoration of law and order in Freetown.

On April 19, 1971, barely a month after signing a defence pact with Guinea, Siaka Stevens declared Sierra Leone a Republic within the Commonwealth. Two days later, he amended the constitution and was sworn in immediately as the first executive President of the Republic of Sierra Leone. In June of that year, Sierra Leone carried out its first death penalty, when Brigadier Bangura and others, named in a phantom coup were executed. Others alleged to have been involved in the coup
continued to be tried and in April 1972, those found guilty were sentenced to various prison terms. A Corporal Foday S. Sankoh who had enlisted into the Army in 1957 and later to become leader of the RUF was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. This was also to be a source for future conflicts in Sierra Leone.

In 1978, Siaka Stevens declared Sierra Leone a one party state on the grounds of fostering national cohesion and eradicating tribalism. The opposition was completely silenced and his critics were forced to flee. He installed his own men in strategic positions to safeguard himself. The party thrived on corruption, sycophancy and nepotism, while beating off challenges from the army, the SLPP, and opponents of Stevens within the Party.

On November 28, 1985, Joseph Momoh took over the reigns of power from Siaka Stevens after winning what appeared to be a well conducted presidential elections. Momoh from the start was not in control of the government as he blatantly depended on a few loyalists to give the semblance of a united government. The nations confidence in Momoh reached an all time low when the conflict, which had earlier enveloped Liberia was now ignited in Sierra Leone.

The conflict in Sierra Leone began in March 23, 1991 when armed combatants crossed the border from Liberia into the South-Eastern part of the country, attacking and subsequently occupying the border town of Bomaru in Kailahun district.

The attack caught the national army, the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) unprepared: it was ill equipped, badly trained and highly politicized. A few months after the first attack, the RUF soon controlled one fifth of the country in the South-East region (Koromah 1996).
In a counter offensive, the army (RSLMF) hastily conscripted hundreds of recruits as its number rose from 3,000 to 14,000 men in the first two years of the conflict. The new recruits were rushed to the war front, poorly trained, poorly equipped and often highly undisciplined. With the blessings of the All People's Congress (APC) government of then President Momoh, an Anti-Charles Taylor movement ULIMO (the United Liberian Movement for Democracy) was formed in Sierra Leone. It was composed mainly of the former supporters of Liberia's former President Samuel Doe, and most of its fighters were members of his army, the Armed Forcers of Liberia (AFL). The RSLMF joined its forces with ULIMO, and Nigeria and Guinea also intervened military on the government side (Francis 2001).

The RUF invasion heralded the killing and maiming civilians, the burning down of houses, and the looting of property. It was seen then as Charles Taylor's revenge against Joseph Momoh's All People's Congress (APC) governments support for ECOMOG operations in Liberia. The NPFL faction leader Charles Taylor, who had vowed to make Sierra Leone taste the bitterness of war, supported the RUF led by Foday Sankoh. Charles Taylor did this because Sierra Leone was being used as a base for the West African Peacekeeping Force ECOMOG to launch operations into neighbouring Liberia and thus thwarting his attempt to take over the entire city of Monrovia and declare himself President of Liberia.

The RUF (Revolutionary United Front - Sierra Leone) and NPFL (National People’s Front of Liberia - Liberia) both drew initial impetus from a small international West African group of revolutionaries, inspired by the notion a Third Way (between Soviet style One Party Rule and Western party based democracy) as advocated in Gaddafi’s Green Book. Some of the group trained in guerilla warfare
in Benghazi, Libya. This guerilla group includes the ex-Liberian army officer, Prince Johnson, and a former NCO in the Sierra Leone Army, Foday Sankoh. Johnson was to assume charge of NPFL guerillas but later broke with NPFL leader, Charles Taylor to form his own independent militia. Sankoh, one time Army photographer, led and acted as spokesperson for the RUF force, entering Kailahun District in March 1991 (Koromah 1996).

Revolutionary concerns within the NPFL were marked by ethnic politics. Two ethnic factions within the Liberian army, in alliance, had displaced the Americo-Liberian regime of Tolbert in the 1980 coup. One of these factions comprising mainly the Gio and Mano from Nimba county, was the losing party in the post-coup rivalry between coup leaders Doe and Quiwonkpa. Quiwonkpa was killed by Doe in 1985 and in the aftermath, and again in 1989, Doe supporters in the Liberian army attacked and killed Gio and Mano civilians. Taylor, an Americo-Liberian, once a member of the Doe regime, then a member of the broad opposition coalition to Doe, and married to a woman from Nimba County, cultivated the Nimba-based opposition to Doe as an opportunity to advance his own political ambitions. He seemed to have understood the potential of the Libyan-supported West African revolutionary movement only late in the day. Introduced to Gaddafi by Burkinabe contacts in 1987, Taylor teamed up with Johnson and recruited a small group of ex-soldiers and farmers from Nimba for training in Benghazi, Libya.

In Liberia in 1989, Doe had rushed army units to Nimba County at the onset of the invasion. The military excesses of these units served as a potent recruiting tool for the NPFL. The easy going Sierra Leone president, Joseph Momoh, responded differently. An army kept largely for purposes of patronage and
ceremony was in no position to contest the RUF. The government mainly depended on a special security force - the SSD - and units of this force fled or were withdrawn in the face of the RUF advance (Koromah 1996).

The planner on the RUF insurgency seems to have been counting on violent army reprisals against local communities to build support for their own movement, as in Liberia. In the event, the impoverished Mende villagers supposed to rally to the RUF cause, faced only one source of harassment - the mercenary fighters of the RUF. Sankoh, and the RUF revolutionary war council, apparently had little control over these mercenaries, who applied the craft of terror in a mechanistic way with little thought for the political consequences. Confused as much as they were terrified by the politically incomprehensible alien violence, villagers fled the RUF and, in giving voice to their political confusion, helped consolidate the public perception throughout Sierra Leone that the RUF was little more than a diversion organized by Taylor to punish Sierra Leone for its involvement in the ECOMOG peace-keeping forces in Liberia.

On 29th April, 1992, a group of young officers struck Freetown from the war-front with Anti Aircraft Guns (AA) and AK 47 rifles. The coup occurred against a backdrop of rapidly deteriorating social conditions, labor and student unrest, and impending elections, which the opposition parties alleged the government was preparing to rig. The coup was extremely popular. The entire nation welcomed and gave the junior officers their overwhelming support. The initial reaction of the RUF was to welcome the change, and declare a cease-fire. In retrospect, it is not inconceivable that they were perhaps expecting to be invited into the government.
The new National Provisional Ruling Council NPRC promised an honest transparent Government, a speedy conclusion of the civil war and a return to a democratically elected. Captain Strasser, who was later sworn in as the Chairman, in his maiden broadcast to the nation, branded the APC as an oppressive, corrupt, exploitative and tribalistic bunch of crooks, who had misruled the nation for some 23 years during which it perpetuated nepotism, tribalism, gross mismanagement leading to the total collapse of the economy, the usual pronouncement by a military regime to justify their take over. Captain Valentine Strasser maintained that the APC either deliberately or by its incompetence had been prolonging the war, or promised to end it in the shortest possible time.

There was a sudden boost in the morale of the military as the government provided logistics (military gears, arms and ammunition, increased ration, risk allowance for soldiers at the war front, new vehicles, communication equipment etc.) which were lacking or inadequate under the former regime.

The army was re-equipped and the subsequent fighting caused major losses among RUF combatants. At a time when the pro government forces definitely seemed to have the advantage, they declared a unilateral cease-fire, and extended a general amnesty to any rebel who surrendered.

It turned out to be a costly tactical blunder. The RUF responded by changing its tactics. Several bush camps were built where young conscripts received military and ideological training instead of using established settlements, which could be easily identified. They launched a major campaign involving attacks on several locations in the country within very short intervals. Towards the end of 1992, they started attacking economic targets in the diamond-rich Kono district, and by 1994,
the military situation was definitely in their favor. The advance of the RUF cut the government from its major source of revenue, the diamond trade. In line with its new policy of hitting economic targets, the RUF overran the Sierra Retile titanium and SIEROMCO bauxite mines in January 1995, two of the biggest employers in the country and major sources of state income. The attacks also started taking place closer to the capital, Freetown.

Meanwhile civilian suspicion of the RSLMF complicity in RUF attacks continued to grow. A new word - sobel was coined, from the words soldier and rebel, to refer to soldiers who were rebel collaborators (soldiers by day, rebels by night). By late 1993 a new force had entered the war. Traditional institutions such as local paramount chiefs, men's secret societies and traditional hunter/warriors to initiate their own protection of the civilian population formed civil defence forces. Four main active groups were eventually to emerge. The Kamajors, drawn mainly from the Mende ethnic group the Temne Kapra's, Kurankos Tamaboros, and the Kono Donsos. The local militias started to cooperate with foreign troops from Nigeria and Guinea to ensure the protection of the civilians.

The NPRC, no longer fully in control of its own army, turned to foreign mercenaries for support. There had already been an attempt to use Nepalese Gurkhas in the fighting. This came in the form of the South Africa based Executive Outcomes (EO). The military operations of Executive Outcomes were linked to a business branch exploiting the diamonds of Sierra Leone. The revenue generated from the sale of the diamonds enabled the payment of Executive Outcomes. EO with its rank and file drawn from Southern African soldiers, and assisted by the civil defence groups had a wealth of experience from guerilla wars in Angola and
Namibia, and was highly successful against the RUF. The military balance at the war front soon changed, and the RUF rebels were driven from their positions close to the capital, and by mid-1995 were repelled from the main diamond mining areas. The RUF also suffered major losses on the battlefield. Of the total number of rebels, estimated at 1,500, one-third were reportedly killed (Koromah 1996). The government encouraged rebels to surrender, and a number of RUF captives surrendered to the army. As the RUF suffered reverses on the battlefield its attacks on civilians grew more callous and indiscriminate.

The NPRC government of Captain Strasser was meanwhile preparing to hold multi-party elections. Captain Valentine Strasser wanted the constitution amended to lower the age requirement of 45 years to allow him to lead the party, the National Unity Party, which they had formed, to contest the Presidential elections. For some reasons, his Deputy and other colleagues, who together wielded greater power and influence disagreed with him. They preferred supporting a civilian candidate of their choice and leaving the political scene altogether. The civilian opposition had already accused the government of backing one particular party with a view to transforming into a civilian administration. Amidst the allegations, his deputy Brigadier Bio, who accused him of sabotaging the democratic process and trying to perpetrate his hold on power, overthrew Captain Strasser.

By then, perhaps, the realization that an outright military victory over the RUF was unattainable had began to sink in. The NPRC proved to be nearly as ineffectual as the Momoh government in repelling the RUF. More and more country fell to RUF fighters, so that by 1995 they held much of the countryside and were on
the doorsteps of Freetown. To retrieve the situation, the NPRC hired several hundred mercenaries from the private firm Executive Outcomes. Within a month they had driven RUF fighters back to enclaves along Sierra Leone’s borders. Brigadier Bio made a whirl wind tour of regional states including Burkina Faso, alleged to be a key backer and conduit for supplies to the RUF in a bid to drum up support for a negotiated solution. His peace initiative seemed to be successful when for the first time radio contact between the RSLMF and the RUF was broadcast over national radio. Before this, many people were deeply skeptical about the existence of the shadowy RUF leader Foday Sankoh. Some swore he did not exist, and if he did was probably dead. This skepticism never fully dissipated until he was seen on national television.

As Sierra Leone prepared for multi-party elections, the peace initiative gathered pace, with contact between the two groups taking place in Abidjan, Ivory Coast. Brigadier Bio sought to have the elections postponed until the talks could be concluded, and the RUF insisted that the delay be allowed so they could transform themselves into a political party.

The population - and politicians - would have none of it. Brigadier Bio bowed to public pressure and allowed the elections to go ahead. The polls were characterized by widespread violence perpetrated both by the RUF who opposed them, and renegade members of the RSLMF, who were against the return to civilian rule. The first large-scale emergence of the RUF practice of amputating the limbs of civilians was also reported during this period, as a punishment for voting. Presidential elections were held in February 1996. The elections were won by the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), which gained 27 seats in the elections for
parliament making it the leading party in the government. The party's leader Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected president with 59.5% of the vote, and pledged to continue the peace process.

The NPRC reluctantly handed power to the elected civilian government of President Tejan Kabbah on March 29, 1996. A government of National Unity was formed embracing all the political parties.

On November 30, 1996, a peace agreement was signed in Abidjan between the government of President Kabbah and the RUF. The agreement provided, for the transformation of the RUF into a political party. However, the restoration of peace and the implementation of the accords immediately ran into problems, following a brief lull in fighting. Violence continued to be inflicted by rebels and soldiers opposed to demobilization, one of the key provisions of the accords.

In March 1997 RUF leader Foday Sankoh was arrested on charges of arms trafficking during a visit to Nigeria. The arrest, widely believed to have government complicity was followed by announcement by some members of the RUF leadership that they had deposed Sankoh as leader. They accused him of hindering the implementation of the peace accords, and becoming an obstacle to peace. An interim leadership led by Prince Palmer was unveiled, which the government promptly recognized. The RUF rank and file didn't. When the dissident leadership traveled to the rebel headquarters in Kailahun to elect a new leader, Sam Bockarie, a top RUF commander, arrested them. The government gamble of backing the RUF dissidents to deliver on the agreements had backfired badly, and the peace process finally collapsed.
When President Kabbah's SLPP government had come to power, mistrustful of the army, it had used the Kamajors extensively in its campaigns against the RUF. Relations between the Kamajors and the RSLMF, never very good, deteriorated rapidly, with occasional clashes between the two. After the signing of the Abidjan peace agreement, the government's contract with Executive Outcome (EO) was terminated, in line with the provisions of the accord (Sierra Leone Archives 1997).

On May 25 1997, the government was overthrown by a coup d'état, commencing with a spectacular jailbreak. The first accused in a previous aborted coup, Major Johnny Paul Koromah, was sprung from jail and installed as leader. The reasons the coup plotters gave were President Kabbah's failure to implement the peace agreement with RUF, his alleged 'ethnic favoritism', and his neglect and marginalization of the army. The coup d'état has been described as 'unprecedented in the history of Africa in terms of violence involved' and led to a total collapse of the judiciary as many judges, attorneys, police officers and other professionals fled the country.

Kabbah's Nigerian and Kamajors guards appear to have been overwhelmed and the President was airlifted out to Conakry in neighbouring Guinea. Major Koromah was a poorly educated soldier who had been over-promoted with the rapid army expansion of the early 1990s. Fearful that he would be dismissed when the army was 'down-sized', he had already been implicated in one coup plot. Earlier Koromah had also been involved in corrupt accumulation. He put together a military junta amidst widespread popular unrest against his intervention. After the coup, soldiers, loyal to the junta, engaged in indiscriminate looting, commandeered cars and persecuted members of Tejan Kabbah's party. Foday Sankoh gave
interviews to the BBC from his hotel room in Abuja, praising the overthrow of Kabbah. Koromah declared earlier that Sankoh was the ideological leader of his coup (Sierra Leone Archives 1997).

On June 1, 1997 Major Koromah invited the rebel RUF to join his junta and the feared RUF fighters came to town to misrule in the name of the merged 'People's Army'. Koromah junta was internationally isolated, an unstable, brutal, populist regime. Its main military challenge was from the Kamajors and from the Nigerian troops who maintained their military bases north of Freetown and on Lungi Island.

A four-nation committee of Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Ghana was formed by the subregional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to negotiate a return to constitutional rule with the Koromah junta. The four-nation ECOWAS committee imposed an embargo on military supplies to the Koromah junta; the Nigerian navy mounted a naval blockade of Freetown and told the junta to clear any cargo ship with ECOWAS officials first. The UN Security Council met, condemned the coup and endorsed ECOWAS measures to resolve the crisis through diplomatic means and sanctions. In Resolution UNSC1132 it imposed a ban on arms shipments to all parties in Sierra Leone.

After ten months in office, the junta was ousted by the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces, and the democratically elected government of President Kabbah was reinstated in March 1998. On January 6, 1999, the RUF launched another attempt to overthrow the government.

With the assistance of the international community, President Kabbah and RUF leader Sankoh negotiated the Lome Peace Agreement, which was signed on
July 7, 1999. The accord made Sankoh Vice President and gave other RUF members positions in the government. Lome called for an international peacekeeping force run initially by both ECOMOG and the United Nations. The UN Security Council established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, with an initial force of 6,000. ECOMOG forces departed in April 2000. Almost immediately, however, the RUF began to violate the agreement, most notably by holding hundreds of UNAMSIL personnel hostage and capturing their arms and ammunition in the first half of 2000. On May 8, 2000, members of the RUF shot and killed as many as 20 people demonstrating against the RUF violations outside Sankoh's house in Freetown (Sierra Leone Archives 1997). As a result, Sankoh and other senior members of the RUF were arrested and the group was stripped of its positions in government.

After the events of May 2000, a new cease-fire was necessary to reinvigorate the peace process. This agreement was signed in Abuja in November of that year. However, DDR did not resume, and fighting continued. In late 2000, Guinean forces entered Sierra Leone to attack RUF bases from which attacks had been launched against Liberian dissidents in Guinea. A second Abuja Agreement, in May 2001, set the stage for a resumption of DDR on a wide scale and a significant reduction in hostilities. As disarmament has progressed, the government began to reassert its authority in formerly rebel-held areas. By early 2002, some 72,000 ex-combatants have been disarmed and demobilized, although many still awaited re-integration assistance. On January 18, 2002 President Kabbah declared the civil war officially over.
In May 2002 President Kabbah and his party, the SLPP, won landslide victories in the presidential and legislative elections. Kabbah was re-elected for a five-year term. The RUF political wing, the RUFP, failed to win a single seat in parliament. The elections were marked by irregularities and allegations of fraud, but not to a degree to significantly affect the outcome.

On July 28, 2002 the British withdrew a 200-man military contingent that had been in country since the summer of 2000, leaving behind a 140-strong military training team to work to professionalize the Sierra Leone army. The Lome Accord called for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to provide a forum for both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations during the conflict to tell their stories and facilitate genuine reconciliation. Subsequently, the Sierra Leonean government asked the UN for help to establish to help set up a Special Court for Sierra Leone, which would try those who ‘bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes against humanity, war crimes and serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law within the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.’ Both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court began operating in the summer of 2002.

In November 2002, UNAMSIL began a gradual reduction from a peak level of 17,500 personnel. Under pressure from the British, the withdrawal slowed, so that by October 2003 the UNAMSIL contingent still stood at 12,000 men. The withdrawal plan, however, calls for a full withdrawal, contingent on the security environment, by the end of 2004.
On January 13, 2003 a small group of armed men tried unsuccessfully to break into an armory in Freetown. Former AFRC-junta leader Johnny Paul Koromah went into hiding, after being linked to the raid. In March, the Special Court for Sierra Leone issued its first indictments for war crimes during the civil war. Foday Sankoh, already in custody, was indicted; along with notorious RUF Field Commander Sam ‘Mosquito’ Bockarie, Johnny Paul Koromah, the Minister of Interior and former head of the Civil Defense Force, Hinga Norman, and several others. Norman was arrested when the indictments were announced, while Bockarie and Koromah remained at large (presumably in Liberia). On May 5, Bockarie was killed in Liberia, probably on orders from President Charles Taylor, who expected to be indicted by the Special Court and feared Bockarie’s testimony. Several weeks later word filtered out of Liberia that Johnny Paul Koromah had been killed, as well, although his death remains unconfirmed. In June, the Special Court announced Taylor’s indictment. Sankoh died in prison in Freetown on July 29 from a heart attack.
CHAPTER FOUR
SECURITY CO-OPERATION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN WEST AFRICA

4.1 SECURITY CO-OPERATION MECHANISMS IN WEST AFRICA

The protocols launching ECOWAS were signed in Lomé, Togo on 5th November 1976. In July 1993, a revised ECOWAS Treaty designed to accelerate economic integration and to increase political co-operation, was signed. The Economic Community of West African States, which started as an inter-governmental organization with a largely economic agenda has largely ventured into the area of regional security. ECOWAS has become known more for its activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in West Africa than in economic cooperation and integration. It found that it had to involve itself in conflicts in Member States to ensure that an environment conducive to the implementation of its economic programmes was maintained.

ECOWAS Member States have, over the years, established security cooperation mechanisms in the subregion such as: the Mechanism of ANAD, known as ‘Accord de Non Aggression et d’Assistance en Matiere de Defence’; ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA); Mechanism of Mutual Assistance in Matters of Defence (MAD); and, Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (MCPMRPS). Let us examine each of them.

4.1.1 The ANAD Mechanism

The *L'Accord de Non-Aggression et d'Assistance Matiere de Defence*, otherwise known as ‘Agreement on Non-aggression and Assistance in Matters of
Defence’ (ANAD) was concluded on June 9, 1977 in Abidjan between the six countries of the former CEAO (Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Togo); all of whom signed the Constitutive Act of ANAD. ANAD was essentially a francophone security cooperation arrangement within the West African sub-region. The Agreement established the general principles of the commitment of the parties not to use force to settle any dispute among them and to come to each other’s assistance in defence against aggression. Members are also committed not to encourage or sustain subversive actions against a member-State (see ANAD Protocol).

ANAD had three principal organs: the Conference of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers and the Secretary-General. The Conference of Heads of State and Government is the supreme authority in matters of security. It deals with all subjects regarding the agreement under ANAD including the general policy of non-aggression and assistance in matters of defence. It also decides on measures to be taken, including the use of the armed forces, in order to stop an armed confrontation between member-States. The Secretary-General only follows the implementation of decisions of the Conference. He has no specific or special powers. The mechanism is set in motion by the State that is threatened or victim of an aggression and which calls on to the current Chairman of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the agreement. The Council of Ministers were asked to go through the question and make proposals to the Heads of State and Government who will decide on measures to be taken during the meeting. When it is about a dispute between member-States that can threaten or break the peace, the affected States must set up a commission of settlement with the view to finding satisfactory solutions.
ANAD has two major components: Agreement on Non-Aggression and Assistance in Matters of Defence between the States of West African Economic Community and Togo. For the member States, therefore, ANAD is a privileged framework of co-operation and concentration in the field of security and defence for maintaining peace, which is *sine qua non* of economic and social development.

Although ANAD is an instrument of co-operation, it is nonetheless true that the sovereignty of each Member State is rigorously respected. From this sacred principle, it follows that political decisions may be taken only at the level of the Conference of Heads of State and Government, by virtue of a unanimous decision, and that no joint action may be implemented on behalf of a member State unless it is at the request of such State, or on the basis that it has previously given its agreement. Let us examine the two principles on which ANAD is based.

**Principle of Non-Aggression**

Non-aggression is non-war. The principle, then, is a declaration of peace that entails a certain number of obligations that the member States must respect within the framework of prevention of conflict and establishment of mutual trust. The member States agree to refrain from committing any warlike act that might give rise to conflict among them or with a third country. The member States agree to refrain from recourse to the use of weapons to settle their differences. Thus they are to maintain peace through good neighbourly relations among member States, reflected in:

a) The peaceful settlement of disputes, the procedures for which are:

i) Dialogue

ii) Mediation

iii) Conciliation
iv) Arbitration

b. Respect for the principle of inviolability of the frontiers inherited from colonial times;

c. The creation and maintenance of friendly relations of understanding, especially in frontier regions;

d. The exchange of police and security information with a view to preserving the tranquility of the populations; and

e. Offer one's good offices with a view to the peaceful settlement of a dispute.

Principle of Assistance in Matters of Defence

The member States agree to render each other mutual aid and assistance, within the framework of joint action, for their defence against any aggression. For the definition of the word ‘aggression’, ANAD refers to United Nations resolution 3314, adopted by the General Assembly in 1974.

There are three major sectors of co-operation and assistance:

a. the military sphere
b. the economic sphere
c. civil protection.

It should be stressed that ANAD has no permanent armed forces under its command. The military means required for the various joint actions are constituted as needed, through the participation of the member States.

ANAD was the first multilateral African mutual defence mechanism in the continent to be established. It also enjoyed remarkable degree of implementation. The Protocol of Application was adopted in 1981. Between 1981 and 1987, 12 other Protocols and seven related instruments were adopted. Additional protocols regulate the cooperation between the member-States of the ANAD. All institutions prescribed in the Protocol were made functional due to the commitment of parties to its implementations. ANAD, because of its exclusive francophone membership,
could not fit into a subregional security framework for the whole of West Africa, especially the Anglophone countries. Thus, the Protocol on Non Aggression was conceived.

4.1.2 Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA)

Member states of the Economic Community of West African States signed the Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA) in Lagos on April 22, 1978. The Protocol clearly recognizes the fact that ECOWAS cannot attain its economic objectives where there is no peace and harmony. To promote peace and harmony therefore, Article 1 of the Protocol specifies that ‘Member States shall, in their relations with one another, refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression or from employing any other means inconsistent with the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity against the territorial integrity of political independence of other Member States.

Article 2 of the Protocol clearly stipulates that ‘each Member State shall refrain, from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other Member States. Furthermore, ‘each Member State’ according to Article 3, ‘shall undertake to prevent Foreigners resident on its territory from committing the acts referred to in Article 2’. Article 4 also states that ‘each Member State shall undertake to prevent non-resident Foreigners from using its territory as a base for committing the acts referred to in Article 2’ (PNA Protocol: 1978).

Article 5 provides the procedure for responding to acts of aggression as follows: ‘Member States pledge to respond to all peaceful means in the settlement of disputes arising among themselves’ (Art. 5[1]). Article 5(2) specifies that ‘any
dispute, which cannot be settled peacefully among Member States, shall be referred to a Committee of the Authority. In the event of failure of settlement by the aforementioned Committee the dispute shall finally go to the Authority.’ (PNA Protocol 1978).

4.1.3 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Matters of Defence (PMAD)

It was in recognition of the fact that the Non-Aggression Treaty did not provide mutual security against the very real threats of internal insurrection that the member states, prodded by Nigeria and Ghana, negotiated and signed the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence in Freetown on May 29, 1981. The Protocol is aimed at promoting effective defence of the sovereignty of Member States through coordination and pooling together of the means of mutual assistance provided by respective Member States within the framework of this Protocol. These are the essential elements of the Protocol. Article 2 of the Protocol specifically affirms that ‘Member States declare and accept that any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community.’ When a condition of threat or aggression occurs, ‘Member States resolve to give mutual aid and assistance against any armed threat or aggression’ (Art. 3). However, the actual purpose of the Protocol is evident in Article 4(b). This provides for a collective response where a member state is a victim of internal armed conflict that is engineered and supported actively from outside, and which is likely to endanger the peace and security of other member states. The circumstances under which Member States would respond appropriately are:

a) In case of armed conflict between two or several Member States if the settlement procedure by peaceful means proves ineffective;

b) In case of internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the
security and peace in the entire Community. In this case the Authority shall appreciate and decide on this situation in full collaboration with the Authority of the Member State or States concerned [Art. 4] (Protocol on MAD: 1981).

Article 5 of the Protocol provides for the Institutions for the implementation of this Protocol. These are: (i) The Authority; (ii) The Defence Council; and, (iii) The Defence Commission.

The Authority examines general problems concerning peace and security of the Community on the annual ordinary meeting of ECOWAS. It may also hold extraordinary sessions on defence matters where circumstances so require. The Authority decides on the expediency of the military action and entrust its execution to the Force Commander of the Allied Forces of the Community (AAFC). Decisions taken by the Authority shall be immediately enforceable on Member States (Article 7).

The Defence Council was established by the Authority and consists of Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of Member States. However, in cases of crisis, the current Chairman of the Authority shall chair the Defence Council and it shall be enlarged to include any other Minister from Member States according to the circumstances. The Executive Secretary and the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of military matters shall attend meetings of the Council (Art. 7). The Defence Council meets, on the discretion of the Chairman, to prepare the items of the Agenda of Sessions of the Authority dealing with defence matters. However, when an emergency erupts, the Defence Council is to examine the situation, the strategy to be adopted, and the means of intervention to be used. In the case of armed intervention, the Defence Council assisted by the Defence Commission shall supervise with the authority of the State or States concerned all measures to be
taken by the Force Commander and ensure that all necessary means for intervention are made available to him. The actions of the Force Commander shall be subject to competent political authority of the Member State or States concerned. At the end of the operation, it is expected by Article 10 for the Defence Council to write a factual report to be addressed to the Authority. The Defence Council appoints a Deputy Executive Secretary (Military) at the Executive Secretariat for a period of four years and renewable only once.

The Defence Commission was established by the Authority and consists of a Chief of Staff from each Member State. The Defence Commission has the responsibility of examining the technical aspect of defence matters. The Commission is responsible for establishing its Rules of Procedure especially in respect of the convening of its meetings, the conduct of the business and the implementation of duties as assigned to it by the Defence Council.

The nature and composition of the military force envisaged under the Protocol is defined in Chapter V, Articles 13 and 14. Article 13 states clearly that ‘all Member States agree to place at the disposal of the Community, earmarked units from the existing National Armed Forces in case of any armed intervention.’ These units are to be referred to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). Member States are also encouraged to organize joint military exercises among two or more earmarked units of the AAFC, if approved by the Authority.

It is to be known as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). Each member state was required to earmark units from its national armed forces that, in an emergency, would be placed at the service of the Community. The AAFC was to be under the command of a force commander who would be appointed by the Head of State who chaired the Community on the
recommendation of the Defence Council of the Community, which consists of the
ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of member states. The force commander
is to act in concert with the chief of defence staff of the particular member state
that receives military assistance from the Community.

According to the Protocol, the AAFC would be used as follows:

a. Where two member states are in conflict, the Community will
   interpose the AAFC between them as a peacekeeping force;

b. Where a member state is the victim of internal armed conflict
   supported from outside and its head of state has requested
   military assistance from the Community in writing, the AAFC
   will be sent to it as an intervention force.

Article 14 specifies that ‘the Allied Armed Forces of the Community shall
be under the command of the Forces Commander appointed by the Authority on
the proposal of the Defence Council.’ It further specifies that he shall be entrusted
with powers that are conferred upon him by the Authority. He, together with the
Chief of Defence staff of the assisted country, shall be responsible for the
implementation of armed intervention and assistance as decided by the Authority.

Intervention by AAFC shall, in all cases be justified by the legitimate
defence of the territories of the Community in accordance with the mechanism
described in Articles 16, 17, and 18 of the Protocol.

Article 16 specifies that:

When an external armed threat or aggression is directed against a Member
State of the Community, the Head of State of that country shall send a
written request for assistance to the current Chairman of the Authority of
ECOWAS, with copies to other Members. This request shall mean that the
Authority is duly notified and that the AAFC are placed under a state of
emergency. The Authority shall decide in accordance with the emergency

Article 17 requires that ‘when there is a conflict between two Member
States of the Community, the Authority shall meet urgently and take appropriate action for mediation. If need be, the Authority shall decide only to interpose the AAFC between the troops engaged in the conflict.’ Article 18 provides that ‘in the case where an internal conflict in a Member State of the Community is actively maintained and sustained from outside, the provisions of Articles 6, 9 and 16 of this Protocol shall apply’. However, ‘Community forces shall not intervene if the conflict remains purely internal.’

While mediation and peacekeeping roles are obviously envisaged under the ECOWAS Defence Protocol, no concrete institutional arrangements were put in place to service the activities involved. Firstly, there was no AAFC when the Liberian conflict exploded into violence because no member-State had earmarked any unit in their defence forces for the Force nor had a Force Commander been appointed. Second, neither the Defence Council nor the Defence Commission had been set up. Third, the Deputy Executive Secretary (Military) had also not been appointed nor a military budget established in the Secretariat as provided for in the Protocol.

Under Article 18(2) of the Protocol, member states are not entitled to intervene militarily if the internal armed conflict poses no danger outside the borders of the afflicted state, and if it is not supported from outside. In order to secure the military assistance of the Community, the Head of State of the country desiring assistance is required to ask for it in writing through the Chairperson of ECOWAS. Once received, such a letter serves as a signal for the military force of the Community to be placed on an emergency footing.

Clearly, PMAD committed the ECOWAS member states to a collective defence treaty by accepting that armed threat or aggression against one constituted
a threat or aggression against the Community and resolved to give mutual aid and assistance for defence. The Protocol provides for a collective response where a member state is a victim of internal armed conflict that is engineered and supported actively from outside, and which is likely to endanger the peace and security of other member states.

Although the Protocol was invoked with respect to the Liberian crisis of 1989/90, the AAFC never materialized. Rather, a smaller group of ECOWAS member states put together the intervention force known as ECOMOG.


Concerned about the proliferation of conflicts, especially within the subregion, which have hitherto affected its economic development, ECOWAS member states in Abuja, adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security on October 31, 1998. The mechanism has the following objectives as contained in Article 3:

a) Prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-State conflicts under the conditions provided in Paragraph 46 of the Framework of the Mechanism ratified as per Decision A/DEC.11/10/98 of 31st October, 1998;
b) Implement the relevant provisions of Article 58 of the Revised Treaty;
c) Implement the relevant provisions of the Protocols on Non-Aggression, Mutual Assistance in Defence, Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment;
d) Strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early-warning, peacekeeping operations, and the control of cross bordercrime, international terrorism and proliferation of small arms anti-personnel mines;
e) Maintain and consolidate peace, security and stability within the Community;
f) Establish institutions and formulate policies that would allow for the organization and coordination of humanitarian relief missions;
g) Promote close cooperation between Member States in the areas of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping;
h) Constitute and deploy a civilian and military force to maintain or restore peace within the subregion, whenever the need arises;

i) Protect the environment and take steps to restore the degraded environment to its natural state;

k) Safeguard the cultural heritage of Member States;

l) Formulate and implement policies on anti-corruption, money laundering and illegal circulation of small arms (see Protocol on MCPMRPS: 1998).

The institutions of the mechanism are (i) The Authority; (ii) The Mediation and Security Council; and (iii) The Executive Secretariat.

The Authority is composed of Heads of State and Government of Member States. It is the Mechanism's highest decision-making body. It shall have powers to act on all matters concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping, security, humanitarian support, peace-building, control of cross-border crime, proliferation of small arms, as well as all other matters covered by the provisions of this Mechanism. The Authority, under Article 7, mandates the Mediation and Security Council to take, on its behalf, appropriate decisions for the implementation of the provisions of this Mechanism.

The Mediation and Security Council shall comprise nine (9) Member States of which seven (7) shall be elected by the Authority. The other two (2) members shall be the current chairman and the immediate past chairman of the Authority, each of whom shall have an automatic right to membership of the Mediation and Security Council. The Mediation and Security Council shall take decisions on issues of peace and security in the subregion on behalf of the Authority. It shall implement the provisions of the Protocol. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 7 of the Protocol, the Mediation and Security Council shall:

i) decide on all matters relating to peace and security;

ii) decide and implement all policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security;
iii) authorize all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military missions;
iv) approve mandates and terms of reference for such missions;
v) review the mandates and terms of reference periodically, on the basis of evolving situations;
vii) on the recommendation of the Executive Secretary, appoint the Special Representative of the Executive Secretary and the Force Commander (Protocol on MCPMRPS).

ECOWAS Member States shall accredit Ambassadors as permanent representatives to the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat. These Ambassadors may also be those accredited to the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Ambassadors of Member States of the Mediation and Security Council shall meet once a month to review issues relating to subregional peace and security. They may also meet when the need arises.

The Executive Secretary, by Article 15, shall have the power to initiate actions for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security in the subregion. Such actions may include fact-finding, mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict. The role of the Executive Secretary shall include the following:

i) recommend the appointment of the Special Representative and the Force Commander for approval by the Mediation and Security Council;
ii) appoint members of the Council of Elders;
iii) have responsibility for political, administrative and operational activities and provide logistic support for the mission;
iv) prepare periodic reports on activities of the Mechanism for the Mediation and Security Council and Member States;
v) deploy fact-finding and mediation missions, on the basis of his/her assessment of the existing situation;
vi) convene, in consultation with the Chairman of the Authority, all meetings of the Mediation and Security Council, the Council of Elders, and the Defence and Security Commission;
vii) Implement all decisions of the Mediation and Security Council.
The ECOWAS Secretariat shall service the Mediation and Security Council and the Defence and Security Commission. In implementing the provisions of the Mechanism, the Executive Secretary shall be assisted by the Deputy Executive Secretary in charge of Political Affairs, Defence and Security.

In carrying out their missions, the Institutions stipulated in Article 4 shall be assisted by the organs enumerated in Article 17 of the Protocol. The following organs are to be established to assist the Mediation and Security Council: (i) The Defence and Security Commission; (ii) The Council of Elders; (iii) ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).

The Defence and Security Commission shall examine all technical and administrative issues and assess logistical requirements for peacekeeping operations. It shall assist the Mediation and Security Council in:

a) formulating the mandate of the Peacekeeping Force;
b) defining the terms of reference of the Force;
c) appointing the Force Commander;
d) determining the composition of the Contingents.

The Commission examines reports from the Observation and Monitoring Centers and makes recommendations to the Mediation and Security Council.

Article 20 of the Protocol is about the composition and mandate of the Council of Elders. The Executive Secretary shall compile annually, a list of eminent personalities who, on behalf of ECOWAS, can use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators. The list is to comprise eminent persons from various segments of society, including women, political, traditional and religious leaders. The Mediation and Security Council at the level of the Heads of State and Government shall approve the list. These
Personalities shall be requested by the Executive Secretary or the Mediation and Security Council, whenever the need arises, to deal with a given conflict situation. Whenever the circumstances require, the Executive Secretary shall assemble eminent personalities from the approved list that shall now constitute the Council of Elders. Members of the Council of Elders shall be neutral, impartial and objective in carrying out their mission.

Article 21 of the Protocol provides for the composition of ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a structure composed of several Stand-by multi-purpose modules (civilian and military) in their countries of origin and ready for immediate deployment. ECOMOG is charged, among others, with the following missions, as specified by article 22:

a) Observation and Monitoring;
b) Peacekeeping and restoration of peace;
c) Humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian disaster;
d) Enforcement of sanctions, including embargo;
e) Preventive deployment;
f) Peace-building, disarmament and demobilization;
g) Policing activities, including the control of fraud and organized crime;
h) Any other operations as may be mandated by the Mediation and Security Council (Protocol on MCPMRPS: 1998).

Clearly, the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security elaborated more systematically, the criteria and objectives of ECOWAS interventions into states experiencing civil conflicts in West Africa. The Mediation and Security Council is responsible for implementing the provisions of the Mechanism through the Defence and Security Commission, the Council of Elders and ECOMOG. The Defence and Security Commission plan peacekeeping missions by ECOMOG,
while the Council of Elders is used primarily for conflict mediation and electoral monitoring. To ensure adequate preparedness for action, ECOWAS member states agreed to the creation of stand-by units that would be ready for quick deployment to quell subregional crises. The tasks of the stand-by units include military as well as observation missions in which ECOMOG will ‘supervise and monitor ceasefires, disarmament, demobilization, elections, respect for human rights, [and] humanitarian activities among other tasks. Five conditions could trigger intervention by ECOWAS in a member state: first, incidents of external aggression; second, conflict between two or more member states; third, internal conflict that may lead to a humanitarian disaster or seriously threaten regional peace and security; fourth, incidents of serious violations of human rights and the rule of law; and fifth, removal or attempts to remove a democratically elected government.

4.2 FORMATION OF ECOMOG

At the 13th Annual Summit in Banjul, The Gambia, in May 1990, the attention of ECOWAS leaders was drawn to the increasing incidence and escalation of inter and intra state conflicts within the subregion, which have increasingly affected the level of integration and development. The response of the leaders was Decision A/DEC.9/5/90 relating to the establishment of a five nation ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to examine the conflicts. The Authority of Heads of State and Government were mindful of Article 5 of the ECOWAS Treaty establishing the Authority of Heads of State and defining its composition and functions; and were aware of the disruptive effect that recurrent situations of conflict and dispute among Member States could have on the ultimate ECOWAS
goal of a harmonious and united West African society. These led them to recalling the ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression adopted in Dakar on 22 April, 1978.

On July 1, 1990, the then Executive Secretary of the ECOWAS, Mr. Abbas Bundu met with Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and delivered the message of ECOWAS Heads of State and Governments urging him to support the intervention of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee to end the crisis. On July 14, 1990, two weeks later, President Samuel Doe wrote a seven-paragraph letter to the Chairman of the SMC. President Doe stated in his letter, among other things: that,

Any attempt by Mr. Taylor's NPFL to subvert the process of democracy by displacing the Constitution through force of arms, could lead to an endless succession of armed insurrection, bring more deaths and destruction, as well as disrupt the socio-political and economic tranquility, not only in Liberia, but also the subregion of the ECOWAS as a whole. It is, therefore, my sincere hope, that in order to avert the wanton destruction of lives and properties, and further forestall the reign of terror, I wish to call on your honourable Body to take note of my personal concerns and the collective wishes of the people of Liberia, and to assist in finding a constitutional and reasonable resolution of the crisis in our country as early as possible. Particularly, it would seem most expedient at this time, to introduce an ECOWAS Peace-Keeping Force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension and to assure a peaceful transitional environment (Nyambuya 1997:80).

On the strength of a message received by the then ECOWAS Chairman, Gambia's Sir Dauda Jawara, from the Liberian leader, President Samuel Doe requesting for an ECOWAS intervention force, a ministerial level meeting of the SMC was convened in Freetown from July 5-20, 1990 to discuss the situation. Representatives of the parties in conflict: the Liberian Government and the rebel leader, Charles Taylor along with members of Liberian religious groups – The Inter-Faith Mediation Committee, political parties and pressure groups from Liberia, participated in the discussions. With no resolution of the conflict nor a
consensus on the way forward, the ECOWAS Chairman convened a summit meeting of the five-nation SMC in Banjul from August 6-7, 1990. Guinea, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire, although not members of the SMC, were invited because they share borders with Liberia and were experiencing large influx of refugees from Liberia.

Five national leaders of Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Gambia, and Sierra Leone attended, while Togo and Mali sent in representatives. The OAU Secretary General, Salim A. Salim and a member of the Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee attended the Summitry meeting as observers. At the end of the summit, Decision A/DEC/1/8/90 was taken. A comprehensive plan for restoring peace and security in Liberia was decided as follows:

a. That the warring parties observe an immediate ceasefire;

b. That an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) be constituted, with troops drawn from Member States of the Mediation Committee as well as from Guinea and Sierra Leone, placed under a commander provided by the Republic of Ghana and assisted by a Deputy provided by the Republic of Guinea, for the purpose of keeping the peace, restoring law and order and ensuring that the ceasefire is respected;

c. That a broad-based Interim Government be set up by the Liberians themselves, through a national conference of political parties, warring parties and other interest groups;

d. That none of the leaders of the warring factions should head the Interim government and that whoever heads it should be ineligible to stand for presidential election;

e. That the Interim Government establish an independent and acceptable Electoral Commission, for the organization of the general and presidential elections which should be held within 12 months;

f. That the elections to be open to international observation, with an ECOWAS Observer Group constituted at the appropriate time, to ensure that it is free and fair;

g. That in view of the substantial material and financial resources necessary to make ECOMOG and the Elections Observer Group possible, a Special Emergency Fund be established with an initial capital of 50 million US dollars generated through
That the entire international community, particularly members of the United Nations Security Council, lend support to ECOWAS humanitarian and political initiatives in Liberia, in the interest of the African people as a whole, and for the overall maintenance of international peace and security. (Vogt: 1992).

At the end of the summit, the ECOWAS Chairman conveyed the decision of the SMC to other Heads of State and Government, that were not in attendance, as well as the warring parties (the Government of Liberia, Charles Taylor of NPFL, and Prince Yormie Yedue Johnson of INPFL). The Government of Liberia and the INPFL accepted the ceasefire agreement, but Charles Taylor refused to accept the ceasefire agreement.

ECOWAS noted the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians by the armed groups the displacement of persons and the dangers posed by the conflict to the citizens of member countries of the community and resolved that it was humanly unbearable to allow such gruesome killings to continue unchecked. ECOMOG was then directed, in accordance with Article IV of the Resolution of the Mediation Committee signed in Banjul on August 7 1990, to commence operations forthwith.

**4.2.1 ECOMOG’s Command and Control**

The command structure of ECOMOG was hierarchically organized. At the top of the hierarchy was the Force Commander under who were the Deputy Force Commanders, who were also the contingent commanders of their countries’. The Force Commander operated a small planning staff headed by a Chief of Staff, who dealt with common problems and co-ordinate the activities of the various contingents in close co-operation with his deputies. The Central Planning Staff,
under the directive of the Force Commander, usually designates various sectors of the mission area to the respective contingent commanders taking into consideration their strength, instructions from their home governments, their affinity to the host country and the level of their equipment, arms and ammunition.

ECOMOG does not operate a common or central logistic administrative system. Each country provides its own contingent with arms, ammunition, food, transport and communication equipment. Nigeria provided the entire force with petrol, oil and lubricants. The United States only came at a later stage, through a private company called Pacific Architect Engineers (PAE), assisted ECOMOG operations with transport helicopter services, communication facilities, vehicles and general repairs and maintenance. All the contingents used the services provided by PAE commonly.

In operations, the Force Commander’s mission was given to the contingent commanders, who then tasked the various units of their contingents. Because of the high level of control by home governments, the contingent commanders enjoyed considerable autonomy from the control of the Force Commander. There have been instances where contingent units were pulled out of their areas of deployment without the approval or even the knowledge of the Force Commander, thus endangering the deployment of flanking contingents. Some contingents have also at times refused to come to the aid of other contingents without clearance from their home governments.

4.3 ECOWAS PEACE PROCESS IN LIBERIA

ECOWAS was involved in numerous peace processes in Liberia. These were the ECOWAS Peace Plan -Banjul Communiqué (7 August 1990); Bamako Ceasefire (28 November 1990); Banjul Joint Statement (21 December 1990); Lome

The Bamako, Banjul and Lome Agreements may be termed the first stage of ECOWAS diplomatic moves that were undertaken by the Gambian President and Chairman of the SMC, Sir Dauda Jawara. At the Bamako talks, the NPFL, the Armed Forces of Liberia, and the INPFL were the only factions existing actively. They were committed to the ECOWAS Peace Plan and to an immediate ceasefire. At the talks, they agreed to convene a National Conference, which would reconstitute the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) with the sole aim of including their own representatives within 60 days of signing the statement. The Lome agreement of February 1991 built on the earlier accords and specified the methods of implementation of ceasefire.

ECOMOG was given the role of disarming the factions, supervision of the handing in of weapons, the registration of the combatants, and receiving the sick, wounded and the displaced at the time. It had to work with a Technical Committee comprising of the nominated faction members, until the formation of the reconstituted Interim Government. A lot of military and diplomatic pressure was brought to bear on the NPFL before it signed the agreements. The National Conference was however, eventually convened in March 1991. The NPFL was not very comfortable with the conference and therefore refused to recognize the authority of the conference. Instead, it embarked on the consolidation of its
National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government, an alternative administration based in Gbarnga. Thus, IGNU was reconstituted in Monrovia without the NPFL participation. This marked the beginning of renewed hostilities, which was short lived.

ECOWAS revived the peace process in June 1991, when the first Yamoussoukro Summit was held in Cote d'Ivoire between June 29 and 30, 1991. The conference set up a five-member committee to monitor the ceasefire. Yamoussoukro II was convened on July 29, 1991 to mediate between IGNU and NPFL to advance the process of peace and reconciliation but no much progress was made. Yamoussoukro III was convened to host the third meeting of the Committee of Five on the Liberian Crisis between September 16 and 17, 1991. The Heads of State of Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Togo, Nigeria and Ghana attended. Charles Taylor (NPFL), Amos Sawyer (IGNU) and a representative of the International Negotiations Network were present. Encampment and disarmament processes were finalized, and it was agreed that warring factions would encamp troops, disarm them and deposit their arms in armories to be guarded by ECOMOG. Four meetings were hosted by Houphouet-Boigny at his country retreat in Yamoussoukro, in Cote d'Ivoire culminating on 30th October 1991, with the signing of the Yamoussoukro IV Agreement. This Accord, which was agreed by the warring factions, is said to have specified steps to be taken together to constitute a framework for the settlement of the crisis.

Specifically, these steps included the encampment and disarmament of warring factions under the supervision of an expanded ECOMOG by January 1992; the creation of a buffer zone along the Sierra Leone – Liberia border in order to insulate Sierra Leone from further attacks from NPFL forces; and the opening of all
roads into Monrovia. Taylor agreed to disarm his troops under the supervision of an expanded peacekeeping force and to confine his fighters (‘encamp them’) as part of the ongoing peace process. He however made this commitment to ECOMOG, on the condition that the composition of the contingent was changed to add troops from Senegal and reduce the Nigerian contingents. Until then, Nigerian troops made up approximately 90% of the ECOMOG force, and Taylor had always considered the Nigerian contingents to be particularly hostile to NPFL.

The Yamoussoukro Accord ran into a brick-wall at the implementation stage. The continued aggression by the NPFL gave rise to the emergence of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO). ULIMO is composed of Sierra Leone-based supporters of late Doe, and was formed with the aim of challenging the intransigence of Charles Taylor and to stop any of the factions from taking power by force of arms. This faction, led by General Roosevelt Johnson and Alhaji Kromah, crossed into Liberia and drove the NPFL out of Bomi, Lofa and Cape Mount counties. Charles Taylor accused ECOMOG of supporting ULIMO and refused to disarm thus effectively undermining the Yamoussoukro agreement. On September 8, 1992, a group of at least 500 ECOMOG troops sent into NPFL territory to prepare for the programme of disarmament and encampment were subsequently captured and held by NPFL (Human Rights Watch/Africa 1993:6). This development infuriated the high command, as these troops were tortured and humiliated. After intense negotiations, the NPFL reluctantly released the hostages.

On October 15, 1992, the NPFL forces launched what Charles Taylor dubbed ‘Operation Octopus,’ attacking ECOMOG forces near Bremervile and other ECOMOG positions, thus precipitating a collapse of the fragile cease-fire and
a two-month siege in Monrovia. Charles Taylor launched operation Octopus with the following aims:

i) to overrun the entire Monrovia and capture ECOMOG headquarters in the process;

ii) to neutralize the INPFL in the Caldwell area and capture its leader, Prince Yormie Johnson, alive; and

iii) to take the executive mansion for Charles Taylor to declare himself President (Dawyaro 2000:5)

ECOMOG pursued an offensive operation, using aircrafts to bomb NPFL positions and eventually regained Monrovia in December 1992. During this period, Prince Johnson's INPFL collapsed with some former members rejoining the NPFL. Johnson left Liberia to take refuge in Nigeria (Joseph 1992:1765).

In a last ditch effort to save the Liberian peace process, the ECOWAS Committee of Five, along with the UN Special Representative met in Geneva, Switzerland, April 6-7, 1992. At the end of the meeting, it was agreed that a buffer zone along the Liberia-Sierra Leone border be established without further delay; that all entry points out of and into Liberia be secured by ECOMOG with the NPFL maintaining unarmed administrative presence; and that Charles Taylor may maintain a personal security of a company strength equipped only with small arms. A new date for commencement of the deployment of troops was set for April 30, 1992. A Ministerial Evaluation Meeting of the Committee of Five in Dakar, Senegal, followed this meeting on May 11, 1992, at the request of Abdou Diouf, President of Senegal and Chairman of ECOWAS. The meeting again urged all parties to cooperate with ECOMOG.

The fifteenth ordinary session of the Authority of Heads of State and Governments of ECOWAS was held in Dakar, Senegal from July 27-29, 1992. The Authority observed the uncooperative conduct of the NPFL, especially with regard
to the encampment and disarmament of its combatants and the insertion of a buffer zone along the Liberia-Sierra Leone border, which had continued to pose a serious threat to peace, stability and security of the West African region. Accordingly, the Authority resolved that the Field Commander of ECOMOG should complete the implementation of the programme contained in the Yamoussoukro Accord of 30th October 1991, clarified by the Geneva Meeting of the Committee of Five, not later than thirty days, failing which comprehensive sanctions would be imposed against all NPFL-controlled territories.

The first Summit Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee and the Committee of Five held at Cotonou, the Republic of Benin on October 29, 1992. This meeting took a decision to impose comprehensive economic sanctions because of the non-cooperation of the NPFL with ECOMOG. On November 7, 1992, at the ECOWAS Summit Meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, reaffirmed the decision to impose comprehensive economic sanctions on NPFL controlled territories.

Peace talks were conducted in the summer of 1993 with the assistance of the UN and the OAU. These talks resulted in the Cotonou Agreement. On July 25, 1993 in Cotonou, Republic of Benin, a new peace agreement was signed by Amos Sawyer for IGNU, Charles Taylor for NPFL, and Alhaji Kromah for ULIMO. It was the most significant step in the efforts to stabilize the situation in Liberia. The 19 articles covered ceasefire, disarmament, demobilization, elections, repatriation of refugees, a general amnesty and the issues considered at the Geneva talks. In the reckoning of the Cotonou Agreement, the ceasefire article appeared to be the most important on which all subsequent articles relied for success. Under the agreement, the expanded ECOMOG and an UN Observer team, UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) were to ‘supervise and monitor’ its implementation.
ECOWAS and the United Nations were also mandated to impose military embargoes on the warring factions creating a buffer zone, in effect sealing Liberia's borders, to prevent cross-border attacks and importation of arms. All sea and airports of entry were also to be monitored. Violations of the ceasefire agreement included importation of arms and ammunition; attack against positions of warring faction by another; and recruitment and training of combatants. Disarmament, covered in article 6 required each warring faction to list all weapons and ECOMOG was given the authority to disarm combatants or ‘non-combatants’ and conduct searches to recover lost or hidden weapons. The success of this plan relied on receiving full disclosures of fighters and weapons. The ultimate sanction was that ECOMOG might forcibly disarm the factions raising NPFL fears that ECOMOG would implement the Accord with force. The agreement also provided for general and Presidential elections, approximately seven months from the signing of the Accord.

On 7 March 1994, under the terms of the 1993 Cotonou peace accord, the Interim Government of National Unity handed over power to the Liberian National Transitional Government. The Transitional Government was made up of representatives of the three parties to the accord – the Interim Government and the two-armed groups that then controlled large areas of Liberia, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO). However, the peace accord was undermined by the subsequent proliferation of armed factions and increased fighting. The Transitional Government exercised authority only in areas controlled by the forces of ECOMOG, which held the capital, Monrovia, and the coastal strip to Buchanan, but was unable to enforce a cease-fire and demobilize the warring factions in the
rest of Liberia. ECOMOG soldiers allegedly sold arms and ammunition to groups opposed to the NPFL, while the national army, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), increasingly acted as an armed group independent of the Transitional Government.

In April 1994, the UN Security Council renewed the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), established in September 1993 to help implement the Cotonou peace accord. However, in October 1993 the number of its military observers was reduced from 370 to 90.

In May 1994, a dissident faction within ULIMO, dominated by the Krahn ethnic group and led by ULIMO Chief of Staff General Roosevelt Johnson, seized control of ULIMO's headquarters in Tubmanburg, Bomi County, from ULIMO Chairman Alhaji Kromah and his faction (largely composed of members of the Muslim Mandingo community).

Fighting and killings of civilians on ethnic grounds forced some 36,000 civilians to flee the area. The two factions agreed to a cease-fire in November 1994.

In August 1994, three NPFL ministers in the Transitional Government, who had previously been ministers in the NPFL's administration in Gbarnga, Bong County, broke with NPFL leader Charles Taylor and set up a rival NPFL faction.

They subsequently joined in a coalition with other armed political groups: the AFL; the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), a Krahn offshoot of the AFL; the Krahn faction of ULIMO; and the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), a militia fighting the Mandingo faction of ULIMO in the northeast since late 1993.

In early September 1994 the Mandingo, faction of ULIMO and coalition forces attacked the NPFL's base in Gbarnga. Fighters from all the forces involved reportedly killed large numbers of civilians. Fighting continued throughout
September 1994 with ULIMO, coalition forces and NPFL all claiming control of Gbarnga or parts of it. In September 1994, NPFL forces were driven out of Maryland County in the southeast by the LPC; there was heavy fighting in September and October 1994 and human rights abuses by both sides were reported. Tens of thousands of people fled, both to Monrovia and to neighbouring Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, the largest exodus since 1992. International aid operations were halted in most areas outside the ECOMOG-controlled zone.

On September 12, 1994, an agreement was brokered by ECOWAS, the Organization of African Unity and the UN was reached in Akosombo, Ghana, between Lieutenant-General Hezekiah Bowen, Chief of Staff of the AFL, Charles Taylor and Alhaji Kromah. It aimed to give their factions more control of a new Transitional Government and to facilitate disarmament. Civilian groups meeting in a National Conference in Monrovia opposed the agreement. Further talks, which included civilians and other armed groups, led to a cease-fire in December 1994.

On 15 September 1994, ECOMOG forces thwarted a coup attempt by members of the AFL led by former Lieutenant-General Charles Julue. Five civilians subsequently arrested were released by the courts but were re-arrested in late September and charged with the capital offence of treason. In November 1994, General Julue and 37 other officers were charged with treason before a court-martial.

Armed young men and boys who lived by looting and extortion fought the civil war. Fighters from all the warring factions tortured and deliberately killed unarmed civilians suspected of opposing them, often because of their ethnic origin, as they seized control of territory or raided another group's territory. It was usually
not possible to confirm reports of killings, the identity of perpetrators, or whether abuses were criminally or politically motivated.

The Cotonou Agreement marked a substantial departure from the Yamoussoukro process. ECOMOG's role was reduced to the implementation of the Peace Accord in close association with the UN's observer team that conferred a more convincing impartiality on their supervisory role, whereas the Yamoussoukro IV Accord had made ECOWAS solely responsible. All sides in the Liberian conflict welcomed the Cotonou Peace Agreement. The warring parties saw it as a major step forward in the resolution of the conflict. The NPFL was particularly content to see that it incorporated the United Nations and reduced the authority of ECOMOG. Throughout the conflict, Charles Taylor had consistently declared that he would only disarm his troops to UN forces or some international body other than the Nigerian-dominated ECOMOG which he saw as not being impartial (see UN Secretary-General, Report on the Observer Mission in Liberia, UN Doc. S/26868, 1992: para. 19).

The progress towards implementing the Cotonou Agreement was slow. The larger part of Liberian territory and real power was still in the hands of the factions. The Cotonou Agreement did not bring the expected peace, but instead a multiplication of warring factions, which began to erode the authority of the three main factions that signed the Cotonou Agreement. The Command and Control of ULIMO, especially was completely eroded and had splintered into three groups. Let us provide some illustrations. ULIMO had split into three groups after months of tension and heavy fighting in Western Liberia. The three groups that remained opposed to Charles Taylor were, ULIMO-K largely consisting of Mandingo fighters and headed by Alhaji Kromah; ULIMO-J, which was made up of Krahn
and headed by Roosevelt Johnson; and the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) headed by George Boley. The latter group began attacks in NPFL-controlled areas in the south-east in late 1993. Another group, the Lofa Defence Force (LDF) also emerged on the scene. Even in NPFL-held territory, where unit cohesion was better than other factions, there was loss of control. These groups were not signatories of the Cotonou Agreement. All sides blatantly violated the ceasefire and there was a display of unwillingness by the factions to provide vital information on the number and location of their combatants, weapons and mines (Shiner 1994:64).

As a number of obstacles continued to impede the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement, several meetings were convened leading to the signing of two agreements. These were the Akosombo Agreement of September 1994 - which was a supplementary to the Cotonou Agreement - and the Agreement on the Clarification of the Akosombo Agreement and The Acceptance and Accession Agreement (known as the Accra Agreement) in December 1994. These meetings resulted in an agreement for power sharing in a new Transitional Government arrangement. This did not help matters. UN reports stated that the situation had reached a point where warlords, without any particular agenda but a control of a certain number of soldiers, were seeking territory for the sake of adding to their own claim to power (Seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on UNOMIL, UN Doc. S/1994/1167, October 14, 1994: para. 27).

On August 19, 1995, the six warring factions and a representative of the Liberian National Conference signed a new peace accord in Nigeria. The new peace accord known as the Abuja accord provided a formula for power sharing in the allocation of positions in the new Transitional Government headed by a new Council of State in which each of the factions is given responsibility for appointing
Ministers, Deputy Ministers and Heads of state owned enterprises. The new transitional Government was to have a life of twelve months and holders of positions in the Transitional Government were required to resign their positions three months before the date of elections. The Peace Plan for Liberia brokered by ECOWAS Heads of State required that a ceasefire would be maintained by ECOMOG troops that would also supervise the disarmament and demobilization of all combatants. Since it began in 1989, the civil war had cost an estimated 150,000 lives and uprooted over 700,000 people from their homes. The agreement provided for a cease-fire, disarmament and elections within 12 months. Unlike several previous peace agreements, it brought the leaders of the three warring factions into the Council of State, a joint presidency. The chairperson of the Council was a civilian, Professor Wilton Sankawolo, and it comprised two other civilian members.

The agreement was signed by leaders of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the national army, which had often acted as an armed group independent of government control; the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), an armed group operating with AFL support; the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL); whose cross-border attack started the war and which at times has controlled most of Liberia; both factions of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) –ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K– and two other armed factions. A representative of the Liberian National Conference, a body organized by Liberian citizens to discuss the peace process, also signed it. A major difference from previous peace agreements was that the AFL's role was limited to its Chief of Staff assuming the role of Minister of Defence. According to the agreement, the AFL would be disarmed, like other armed groups. In addition, as its members were
predominantly of the Krahn ethnic group, it was to be reformed by the incorporation of members of other ethnic groups. However, public statements made by the Army Chief of Staff after the Abuja agreement implied that the AFL would not be required to disarm and would immediately resume responsibility for national security, although the Council of State proposed that it should be restructured. The agreement was brokered by the ECOWAS.

The Abuja agreement provided for a Status of Forces Agreement between the government of Liberia and ECOWAS to determine the status of ECOMOG, something that had been lacking in previous agreements. Representatives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the UN attended the signing of the agreement.

The UN Observer Mission in Liberia, UNOMIL, sent to Liberia in 1993 to monitor an earlier peace agreement, had threatened to withdraw completely by September if no progress had been made towards peace. However, because of the August peace agreement, UNOMIL's presence in Liberia was expanded to 94 personnel and extended beyond the end of the year. The peace agreement, like previous ones, did not contain specific human rights safeguards, and provided for an amnesty, which could include those responsible for human rights abuses.

In the months leading up to the peace agreement, control of Liberia continued to be contested. The Transitional Government exercised authority only in areas controlled by ECOMOG forces, which held the capital, Monrovia, and the coastal strip to Buchanan, some 55 miles east of Monrovia.

This represented less than 15 per cent of Liberia's territory. In early August, two armed factions, the NPFL and the LPC, agreed to allow ECOMOG to extend its presence into Bong County in central Liberia and Rivercess and Sinoe Counties
in the southeast, which meant that normal commercial activities and relief supplies could be resumed. Various armed factions, with some areas being taken and re-taken by rival groups, controlled the rest of the country.

There were peace negotiations in April between the two ULIMO factions – ULIMO-J, headed by General Roosevelt Johnson (dominated by members of the Krahn ethnic group) and ULIMO-K, headed by Alhaji G. V. Kromah (dominated by members of the Mandingo ethnic group). However, fighting broke out again between the two factions in May in Grand Cape Mount and Bomi Counties.

There was also fighting between the NPFL and ULIMO-K in Lofa County, between the NPFL and ULIMO-J in Bong and Margibi Counties, and between the NPFL and LPC in Grand Bassa and Maryland Counties. After the peace agreement, fighting resumed between the ULIMO factions, between ULIMO-K and the NPFL, and between the NPFL and the LPC. In June, the conflict between the LPC and NPFL spread to Côte d'Ivoire. Dozens of people were killed, including Ivorians, and between 16,000 and 35,000 refugees fled into Côte d'Ivoire to escape from the fighting.

In July, Charles Julue, a senior commander under former President Doe, and six other officers were each sentenced to seven years' imprisonment after being found guilty of treason by a court-martial. They had led a coup attempt in Monrovia in September 1994 that was thwarted by ECOMOG (see Amnesty International Report 1995).

On 3 September, a civilian Chairperson of the Liberian National Transitional Government, Ruth Perry, was sworn in. She took office after the foreign ministers of the ECOWAS met to oversee the transition to an elected government, in accordance with the terms of the 1995 Abuja peace agreement (see
Amnesty International Report 1996). The ECOWAS meeting also agreed to a revised timetable for the Abuja agreement, envisaging its full implementation by June 1997, and called for an increase in the number of ECOWAS troops to monitor the cease-fire and oversee the disarming of combatants in preparation for elections in May 1997. In November, ECOMOG began the disarmament process, but by the end of the year, few weapons had been handed over. Of the estimated 60,000 combatants only about 5,000 had handed in weapons. The UN Security Council renewed the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), sent to Liberia in 1993 to monitor an earlier peace agreement and coordinate with ECOMOG. The Security Council stressed the human rights aspect of UNOMIL's mandate.

The fighting, which had remained sporadic in rural areas, spread to the capital, Monrovia, in April, when police believed to be allied to the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) attempted to arrest Roosevelt Johnson, leader of the rival United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson branch (ULIMO-J). The initial protagonists were the NPFL and ULIMO-J, but all the other armed groups were later involved in the fighting. The national army, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) and ULIMO-J fought together against the NPFL and its former rival, the ULIMO-K.

The fighting centered on the Barclay Training Centre military barracks in central Monrovia. Rival armed groups controlled different zones of Monrovia and many civilians fled Liberia or sought refuge in the US Embassy compound and at the ECOMOG base.

A cease-fire in Monrovia was re-established in May and appeared to be holding, but fighting involving the two factions of ULIMO, the NPFL and the LPC
continued in various parts of the country but in particular in Grand Gedeh, Tuzona and Zwedru. In June, a new-armed group, the Congo Defence Force, believed to be close to ULIMO-K, engaged in fighting against ULIMO-J in the area around Tubmanburg.

During the first week of fighting in Monrovia, Charles Julue and six other officers, serving prison sentences for treason (see Amnesty International Reports 1995 and 1996) were freed when the AFL and ULIMO-J stormed the prison. In October, there was an attempt on the life of Charles Taylor, the NPFL leader. All parties to the conflict committed gross human rights abuses. During the fighting in Monrovia in April and May, the mutilated bodies of those killed were openly displayed. Elsewhere, fighters from all the warring factions tortured and deliberately killed unarmed civilians suspected of opposing them, as they seized territory or raided another group's territory. All armed groups were responsible for deliberate and arbitrary killings of civilians, although in many cases it was not possible to establish which group was responsible.

All armed groups detained non-combatants whom they suspected of being supporters of rival factions. Peace-keeping troops, that were detained, as well as civilians, were ill-treated. In January, in the area around Tubmanburg, ULIMO-J detained 130 ECOMOG troops who had been engaged in clearing mines and held them for 10 days as a shield against attacks. During the fighting in Monrovia, members of ECOMOG and other foreign nationals were held at the Barclay Training Centre military barracks by Krahn groups loyal to Roosevelt Johnson.

In February, eight aid workers were held for three days by the LPC in southeastern Liberia. In July, aid workers reported that ULIMO-K was restricting
the movement of civilians in a displaced persons’ camp in Suehn and starving the inhabitants as food supplies were diverted to their troops.

ULIMO-K released some 60 starving children within a few days, but did not permit the evacuation of other inhabitants for a further two weeks. In January, the bodies of five civilians were exhumed in Tubmanburg, together with those of nine ECOMOG soldiers, allegedly killed by ULIMO-J. One of the victims had been decapitated and another had apparently been tied up and then shot. Also in January, there were reports that members of the LPC were killing, raping and harassing members of the Grebo ethnic group in southeast Liberia.

4.4 ECOWAS PEACE PROCESS IN SIERRA LEONE

The ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Five on Sierra Leone met in Abuja on 10 and 11 October 1997 to assess the current situation in Sierra Leone, evaluate the United Nations Security Council Resolution (S/RES/1132 [1997]) of 8 October, 1997 and adopt strategies for achieving the early restoration of constitutional order in Sierra Leone. The meeting was briefed on the current situation in Sierra Leone by the ECOMOG Force Commander. The Committee noted that the sanctions and embargo regime established by Decision A/DEC. 7/8/97 of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government were being observed by ECOWAS Member States. ECOMOG was also, within available resources, monitoring the embargo as provided by the Decision. The Committee noted that despite measures taken by ECOWAS to resolve the crisis in a peaceful manner, the illegal regime continued to attack and harass ECOMOG troops. The Committee therefore called on the illegal regime to put an immediate end to such
attacks, failing which ECOMOG would take appropriate action to defend itself decisively.

The Committee noted with satisfaction and appreciation the United Nations Security Council resolution reiterating support for the ECOWAS effort in the Sierra Leone crisis and the imposition of sanctions on the illegal regime in Sierra Leone. The Committee expressed its appreciation on the Security Council and the Secretary-General for their invaluable support to ECOWAS in finding a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Sierra Leone. The Committee called on the ECOWAS Member States to strengthen ECOMOG's capabilities. The Committee welcomed the appeal made to the international community by the United Nations Security Council as contained in the aforementioned Resolution to provide technical and logistical support to ECOWAS, to enable it carry out its responsibilities in the implementation of its mandate. In this regard, the Committee called on the United Nations Secretary-General to use his good offices to urgently establish a contact group on Sierra Leone.

The Committee noted with concern the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Sierra Leone due to illegal overthrow of the constitutionally elected Government of that country, the intransigence of the illegal regime, the absence of security and the gross violations of human rights by the regime. The Committee therefore directed the ECOWAS Secretary and the ECOMOG Force Commander to work out appropriate modalities for the:

a. creation of safe havens;
b. establishment of humanitarian corridors for delivery of relief materials;
c. registration of NGOs.
The Committee reaffirmed its willingness to resume negotiations with the illegal regime and in that regard, requested its Chairman to make appropriate arrangements. However, negotiations should be subject to the following conditions:

a. representatives of the regime must have requisite mandate to negotiate;

b. the regime must negotiate in good faith;

c. the negotiation should strictly be within the ECOWAS mandate as stipulated in the Conakry Final Communiqué and as endorsed by the United Nations Security Council.

On October 23, 1997, ECOWAS Committee of Five (the committee was enlarged to five with the inclusion of Liberia) on Sierra Leone and a delegation representing Major Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) regime in Sierra Leone, held talks at Conakry and signed a six-month peace plan for Sierra Leone which was to take effect from that date. The Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs as well as a representative of the OAU represented the United Nations at the signing of the Conakry Agreement.

The agreement called, inter alia, for the cessation of hostilities as from 23 October 1997, to be monitored by an ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) verification mechanism to be assisted, subject to the approval of the UNSC, by the United Nations military observers. It also called for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, which is to take place from 1 to 31 December. In addition was the resumption on 14 November of humanitarian assistance to Sierra Leone, to be monitored by ECOMOG and United Nations military observers commencing December 1, 1997. The agreement also included the return of refugees and displaced persons, with the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the provision of
immunities and guarantees for the coup leaders; the restoration of the constitutional government of President Kabbah by 22 April 1998; and the broadening of the government's power base. Under the Agreement, Corporal Foday Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), was expected to return to Sierra Leone to make his contribution to the peace process. The ECOWAS Committee and the junta's representatives also agreed to continue negotiations towards the effective and prompt implementation of the Agreement. Let us elaborate more.

**Cessation of hostilities:** It was considered that cessation of hostilities should come into force immediately. However, this will have to be accompanied by a monitoring and verification regime. Leaders of the various combatant units will be expected to disseminate information concerning these measures and ensure compliance with them. These measures will be supervised by ECOMOG, assisted by UN military observation group. The verification process will continue right up to the termination of the peace plan i.e. 22 April 1998.

**Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of combatants**

It was considered that a minimum of 30 days would be required to conduct an effective disarmament and demobilization of combatants. This should take place from 1 to 30 December, 1997. Given the nation-wide dislocation of infrastructures and administration, a simple and uncomplicated procedure was envisaged. Combatants were to be directed to report at designated centers in order to be engaged in the disarmament process. ECOMOG was to supervise the entire processes of disarmament and demobilization and where necessary, incentives were to be provided to encourage the voluntary participation of combatants in all this process.
Humanitarian assistance

Considering that the threat of sanctions/embargoes was to be strictly enforced throughout the period of the implementation of the Sierra Leone peace plan, the flows of humanitarian assistance beginning from November 14, 1997 was to continue to be monitored by ECOMOG and UN military observers. To this effect, a mechanism was to be established by ECOMOG to facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance. All this was to be worked out within the context of UN Security Council Resolution.

Return of refugees and displaced persons

Recognizing that refugees, particularly those in neighbouring countries might wish to voluntarily return following the cessation of hostilities, UNHCR assistance were to begin from 1st December, 1997.

Restoration of constitutional Government and broadening the power base

The restoration of constitutional order to Sierra Leone was at the heart of the ECOWAS peace plan. Consequently, it considered it necessary that the Government of Tejan Kabbah would be enabled to exercise effective control once he was restored to office on 22 April 1998. Nevertheless, it was recognized that for an enduring peace to be restored that would enjoy the support of the majority of Sierra Leoneans and the confidence of the subregion, efforts should be made to ensure that an all-inclusive government was evolved. In this regard, the goodwill and assistance of the international community, both financial and material, would be necessary. The interest of the various parties in Sierra Leone should be suitably accommodated. Accordingly, it was recommended that the new Cabinet should be a cabinet of inclusion. Furthermore, in order to accommodate the aspirations of
their supporters, Board and Senior Civil Service appointments were to reflect broad national character.

**Reintegration of combatants**

All those who disarmed as a result of the implementation of the peace process, should be provided with either job training to fit them for alternative employment, or given scholarships and grants for further education. Access to education at all levels should be made available to all demobilized persons. Ex-combatants should be provided with assistance to facilitate their re-integration into their communities.

**Donor appeals for emergency humanitarian assistance for reconstruction and rehabilitation**

The United Nations and the OAU in cooperation with ECOWAS were requested to launch these appeals as soon as hostilities ceased.

**Immunities and Guarantees**

It was considered essential that unconditional immunities and guarantees from prosecution be extended to all involved in the events of May 25, 1997 with effect from 22nd April 1998. On November 5, President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah issued a statement indicating his acceptance of the Conakry Agreement, and stated his Government's willingness to cooperate with ECOWAS, ECOMOG, the United Nations and UNHCR in the implementation of their respective roles in accordance with the Agreement.

The ECOMOG Force Commander, Major-General Victor Malu, met with representatives of the junta on November 11, 1997 in Sierra Leone, to discuss the modalities for the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. This meeting was the ice-breaker between ECOMOG and the AFRC and may be considered as one of
the most important in the quest for peace in Sierra Leone. The meeting reportedly resulted in a number of provisional agreements, including those on the deployment of ECOMOG troops throughout Sierra Leone and the cessation of all hostile propaganda. The following is a summary of the outcome of that meeting:

The ECOMOG Force Commander assured the AFRC delegation of the need for ECOMOG to be deployed as soon as possible in order to ensure the cessation of hostilities. ECOMOG troops would act as buffer between the Kamajors militia and the AFRC combatants. As a start, ECOMOG troops and the AFRC soldiers would be jointly deployed to Freetown and its sea and airports in order to facilitate the transition to legitimate rule and to reopen these facilities to domestic and international traffic. It was also agreed that ECOMOG could deploy to vantage positions in Sierra Leone for effective enforcement of the embargo. Subsequent deployment for disarmament purposes would involve all parties concerned namely ECOMOG, the UN military observers and the AFRC. It was also agreed that full details for deployment would be worked out at subsequent meetings.

The creation of safe havens was considered not necessary for the moment, given the near-total absence of hostilities. It was noted however, that internally displaced persons continued to flow into ECOMOG - controlled areas for safety.

The AFRC delegation agreed to remove all the land mines which the junta had laid. The United States were to provide assistance with land mine detectors. Effort was to be made to guarantee free and safe movement throughout Sierra Leone. Ferry services were to be resumed and borders reopened.
ECOMOG had released all prisoners of war in its custody. The AFRC on its part agreed that all equipment belonging to ECOMOG in Bo-Kanema would be handed back to ECOMOG at the appropriate time.

A disarmament committee was established comprising ECOMOG as chair, the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone, the RUF, the Kamajors, UN Military Observers and other UN agencies. The first meeting of this committee that began on December 4, 1997 resumed on 10 December 1997. The leader of the AFRC delegation vehemently opposed the disarmament of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone and requested that the ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of five on Sierra Leone consider the matter.

However, three major points of disagreement—the role of Nigeria within ECOMOG, the modalities for the return of Corporal Sankoh and whether or not disarmament should extend to the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (AFSL)—remained. Unfortunately, the military junta not only continued with its intransigence, but in fact reneged in their commitment to implement the ECOWAS Peace Plan brokered in Conakry, Guinea. They resorted to raising issues, which had already been considered and agreed upon in the process of negotiating the Conakry Agreement.

The ECOWAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Five on Sierra Leone, held their seventh meeting at the ECOWAS Secretariat Headquarters in Abuja on 19 December, 1997 and reviewed the situation in Sierra Leone in the light of reports presented by the ECOMOG Force Commander, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, and the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Envoy to Sierra Leone. The Ministers reaffirmed the central objective of the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Sierra Leone that is the restoration of constitutional order in that country and the reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Ahmed
Tejan Kabbah. The disagreement in the implementation of the Peace Plan became worrisome to the Committee of Five. In this regard, the Ministers emphasized that the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Sierra Leone adopted in Conakry on 23 October 1997 remained the best framework for the restoration of peace and constitutional order to Sierra Leone.

The Ministers reaffirmed the date of 22 April 1998 for the reinstatement of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to office, and emphasized the need to adhere to the time table of the Peace Plan accordingly. In this regard, the Ministers expressed satisfaction at the recent deployment of a Ghanaian naval vessel for ECOMOG to enhance the implementation of the sanctions. They called on other Member States to make available similar contributions to ECOMOG. The Ministers deplored the incessant and unprovoked attacks on ECOMOG peacekeepers. They reaffirmed ECOMOG's right of self-defence. It became clear that if the impasse persisted, the third level of ECOWAS measures would have to be embarked upon.

The ECOWAS Ministerial Committee of Five on Sierra Leone held its eighth meeting in New York, on 5-6 February 1998. Ministers reviewed the situation in Sierra Leone and expressed concern at the impasse that now exists in the implementation of the ECOWAS peace plan. They noted, in particular, the difficulty in the deployment of ECOMOG troops and the United Nations Observer Mission throughout Sierra Leone, due to the intransigence of the junta, who had resorted to reopening issues already agreed upon in the ECOWAS peace plan. The ECOWAS emphasized that its peace plan remained the best framework for the resolution of the situation in Sierra Leone. They reaffirmed the three options available to ECOWAS in this regard. These options were:

a. the pursuit of dialogue;
b. the imposition of sanctions/embargo; and

c. the possible use of force.

The Ministers noted that the junta was now in breach of the ECOWAS Peace Plan and therefore called upon them to comply strictly with its provisions. The Ministers noted that ECOMOG is already effectively deployed in certain parts of Sierra Leone, such as Lungi and Hastings airports, Kossoh barracks and environs, as well as in the territory of Sierra Leone, near the border with Liberia. They suggested that the United Nations Observer Mission should be deployed alongside ECOMOG in the same manner and that the deployment of the UN Mission in Freetown should be done at the same time as that of the ECOMOG forces. The Ministers emphasized that April 22, 1998, remained the terminal date for the restoration of the legitimate Government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. They, therefore, called upon the Security Council to reaffirm its commitment to this date and to take appropriate steps in support of this objective.

It was characteristic of the junta to launch unprovoked attacks against ECOMOG whenever the Committee of Five convened for a meeting, with a grand design to inflict maximum casualty on ECOMOG troops stationed in Sierra Leone. On February 5 1998, just when the Committee of Five were holding there meeting, the junta attacked ECOMOG positions in Kossoh town. Following this sporadic violent and decisive attacks against its positions, ECOMOG reacted in self-defence and in accordance with international regulations. It carried out retaliatory attacks culminating in the occupation of Freetown and the overthrow of the junta, a week after. The battle for Freetown, code-named ‘Operation Sandstorm’, took seven days, with ground and air assaults. By February 1998, the AFRC/RUF was forced out and President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was re-installed on March 10, 1998.
Pursued by ECOMOG the AFRC/RUF returned to the countryside. A broken force, the RUF then began a systematic campaign of murder, mutilation and kidnapping referred to as ‘Operation No Living Thing’, terrorizing the countryside. The AFRC/RUF infiltrated forces into Freetown catching ECOMOG by surprise. The result was another brutal battle in Freetown as ECOMOG and RUF forces fought for control in January of 1999. This produced a peace agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone to be signed in Lome on July 7, 1999, recommitting the parties to the total observance and compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement signed in Lome on 18 May 1999.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Committee of Seven on Sierra Leone met in Freetown, Sierra Leone from 6-7 August 1999 to review the progress in the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed between the Government of Sierra Leone in Lome, Togo, on July 7, 1999. The Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone, the Deputy Force Commander 1 of ECOMOG, and the Chief Military Observer of UNOMSIL on the state of implementation of the Lome Peace Agreement briefed the meeting. The meeting called for the immediate formation of the Government of National Unity in accordance with Article V of the Peace Agreement. In this regard, it noted that the presence of Corporal Foday Sankoh in Freetown would represent a boost to the implementation of the Agreement. It therefore, appealed to the leader of the Revolutionary United Front to immediately relocate to Freetown. The meeting noted that while the Government has released all political prisoners and granted amnesty to the Revolutionary United Front, this gesture had not been fully reciprocated by the RUF. It, therefore, called on the
RUF/AFRC to release, immediately, all prisoners of war, abductees and other non-combatants.

The meeting observed that arising from the ceasefire agreement, a fragile peace now existed in the country, particularly as many ex-combatants had returned to Freetown without their arms. The meeting, therefore, agreed that this fragile peace should be strengthened and consolidated. The meeting further agreed on the immediate commencement of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme. It, therefore, directed ECOMOG, and requested UNOMSIL to commence immediately the DDR Programme.

On July 7, the warring parties in Sierra Leone's eight-year civil war signed a peace agreement. The deal was agreed in Lome, the capital of Togo, following six weeks of intensive negotiations. The main signatories were Foday Sankoh, leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels and Sierra Leone President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. African heads of state from Togo, Liberia, Burkina Faso and Nigeria were witnesses to the deal. The United Nations was represented, as well as the Organization of African Unity and the Economic Commission of West African States.

The RUF were finally granted four full cabinet posts and four deputy ministers. Sankoh, who had been imprisoned and was awaiting execution for treason, was granted a reprieve and pardon. He was to be appointed as Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development with vice-presidential status. This gave him responsibility for diamond mining, Sierra Leone's main mineral resource.

Since the United States and Western European governments had unofficially sanctioned the deal, it represented a remarkable about-turn in accepting
Sankoh and the RUF into the Sierra Leone regime. Before then, the RUF were widely condemned as a criminal gang, responsible for looting the country's resources. There are many well-documented accounts of their brutal methods of intimidating the local population. In the last months, details of thousands of cases of killings, rapes and mutilations they have carried out by them have been collected by aid agencies. Contained in the peace accord was a clause granting ‘an absolute and free pardon and reprieve’ to all participants in the civil war since 1991.

In this chapter, we have examined the subregional security cooperation mechanisms in West Africa. The formation of ECOMOG as well as its command and control were examined in the chapter. In addition, the chapter also looked into the ECOWAS peace process in Liberia and Sierra Leone and concludes that the belligerents do not usually adhere to peace agreements. The next chapter provides an in-dept examination of the ECOMOG experience in conflict management in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE ECOMOG EXPERIENCE IN LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

This section deals with the experience of ECOMOG in peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In both countries, ECOMOG was involved in peace enforcement operations to stem the tide of violence. The section examines how ECOMOG achieved its tasks. It also examines the operational content of the mandates of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as renders an assessment of the impact of the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Chapter further examines the problems faced by ECOMOG and the lessons learned. First, let us examine the ECOMOG experience in Liberia.

5.1 ECOMOG EXPERIENCE IN LIBERIA

At the inception of ECOMOG, the mandate was for peacekeeping. It included the creation of safe corridors for victims of the crisis to escape to safety in neighbouring countries. It also included the evacuation of foreign nationals and the restoration of law and order. Specifically, in accordance with the decisions of the ECOWAS Standing Committee signed in Banjul on August 7, 1990 ECOMOG was to do the following:

i) maintain, enforce and monitor the ceasefire;
ii) protect life and property;
iii) maintain essential services;
iv) provide security to the interim administration in Liberia;
v) observe elections; and
vi) conduct normal policing duties.
ECOMOG was specifically mandated to upon landing, open up routes to allow aid groups and other humanitarian bodies distribute food and drugs as well as clothing to the starving displaced and helpless civilians. ECOMOG was also to provide a safe haven in and around Monrovia to ensure that law and order prevailed in such areas to pave the way for a national conference that would be organized to bring together all interest groups to fashion out a broad-based Interim Government in which the main combatants were not to participate.

It should be noted that there was no pre-existing ceasefire for ECOMOG to maintain. The ECOMOG force that landed in Monrovia on August 24, 1990, was met with Charles Taylor's promise of attack on them, and subsequently, Taylor's NPFL engaged ECOMOG in fierce battle. In these circumstances, it became difficult for ECOMOG to even move out of the free Port of Monrovia, let alone implement its mandate. This action had implications for ECOMOG’s mandate and strategy. The abduction of President Samuel Doe on September 10, 1990, on the premises of ECOMOG Headquarters by Prince Yormie Johnson, in the presence of the ECOMOG Field Commander, and the subsequent brutal murder of President Doe, almost compromised the mission. The situation was blamed on the Ghanaian Force Commander who was immediately withdrawn and replaced by a Nigerian.

On September 22, ECOMOG's mandate was reviewed to include peace enforcement. Part of this mandate included:

a) creating a 30 km free zone around Monrovia, the capital;
b) enforcing a cease-fire amongst the factions and ensure compliance;
c) reporting violations to the ECOWAS Secretariat;
d) separating the warring factions by creating buffer zones between, and
e) disarming and encamping the warring factions to facilitate peaceful resolution of the crisis through elections (Nyambuja : 1997).
5.1.1 ECOMOG: Logistics, Deployment and Force Movements in Liberia

Logistics

About 3,500 troops with their basic equipment were lifted in the first phase of the operation on August 23, 1990 and consisted of two battalion, each from Ghana and Nigeria, while Guinea and Sierra Leone provided a battalion each. Gambia came up with a rifle company (Aderiye 1992:115). Nigeria and Ghana provided the naval and air detachments for close support operations, patrol and transportation purposes.

The agreement reached by ECOWAS was that each contributing nation would provide logistic support for its contingent, which would be sufficient for the first thirty days of the operation. After this, ECOWAS was to take over the supply of logistics support.

ECOMOG contingents were supplied by their own countries in a series of vertical supply structures, with the exception of Nigerian support for the Gambians, which existed from the start of the operation. It was initially intended that ECOWAS would take over logistical responsibilities after the first thirty days of the operation, but when it became clear that the organization simply could not afford to do so, member states continued with the supply of their own troops (Adekeye 2002: 78). The troop strengths of the contributing nations varied as can be seen from Table 2 below.

In February 1995, the force consisted of 8430 troops organized into ten battalions; Of these troops, 4,908 were Nigerians, 1,028 were from Ghana, 609 from Guinea, 747 from Tanzania, 760 from Uganda, 359 from Sierra Leone, and ten each were provided by Gambia and Mali (UN Reference Paper 1995:18).
Table 2: ECOMOG Strengths in Liberia (JUNE 1994)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contingents</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GAMCON (Gambia)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHANCON (Ghana)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>1048</td>
<td>1121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUCON (Guinea)</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEOCON (Sierra Leone)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALICON (Mali)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGCON (Nigeria)</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>7489</td>
<td>7931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANCON (Tanzania)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGACON (Uganda)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>789</strong></td>
<td><strong>10805</strong></td>
<td><strong>11574</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN Reference Paper (UN Department of Public Information April 995:2)
The force peaked at strength of around 16,000 in 1993 and by early 1997, consisted of around 11,000 troops (UN Reference Paper 1995:18).

Two main vessels: Nigeria's Naval ship NNS AMBE – a Landing Ship Tank-LST and Ghanaian merchant ship MV Tano River. There were also Fast Attack Crafts: NNS SIRI – a Fast Attack Craft (missile) and NNS AGU. There were other support gunboats namely GNS Yogaga and GNS Achimota. Two fast attack crafts: NNS Ekpe and NNS Damisa, contributed by Nigeria. There was an Ocean going Tug – Dolphin Rima and the MT Northern Navigator oil tanker. It is noteworthy that two Inshore Patrol Craft of former Liberian National Coast Guard were also taken as part of the Logistics.


The first ECOMOG's Force Commander was General Arnold Quainoo from Ghana. The Deputy Force Commander, Lt. Colonel Lamine Magasoumba from Guinea. The Chief of Operations was from Sierra Leone. Chief of Personnel and Camp Commandant was from Gambia. The Chief of Staff, Chief of Logistics Officer, Chief Intelligence Officer, and Chief of Communications were from Nigeria.

Deployment and Force Movements in Liberia

ECOMOG commenced deployment of 3,000 troops into Monrovia and set sail from Freetown on August 23, 1990 at 1230 hours. Nearly thirty hours later, it made an amphibious landing in Monrovia's Freeport on August 24 amidst fierce fighting between INPFL and NPFL (Segun 1992). The initial deployment of the
peacekeepers was in three fronts. The mission was to secure Monrovia as a ‘safe haven’- out of the reach of NPFL range of gunfire. A three-pronged strategy was adopted, aimed at establishing a foothold in Monrovia municipality. The city was divided into three sectors of North, Central and Southern Sectors as follows:

i) The task of the Northern Sector was to clear the entire area of NPFL fighters to as far as the St. Paul’s River bridge. This task was given to the Nigerian Battalion (NIBATT), NIBATT 1.

ii) The Central Sector and the Southern sector were given to the Ghanaian Battalion (GHANBATT), GHANBATT 1. They are to be supported by Nigerian Contingent (Nigerian armoured squadron, 221 Tank Battalion, and a battalion of 332 FAR) because GHANBATT 1 came without infantry support weapons. Their task was to clear central Monrovia, including the Presidential mansion and it's suburb up to James Spriggs Payne Airport. The initial objective was to push back the rebels up to the bridge of the Montserrado River.

iii) Eventually NIBATT 3 and 4 were introduced into the scene as the fighting became more intensive than earlier appreciated. The NIBATTS are to clear and take up positions at PO River; Gardnersville; Tolbert Estate; White Plains; Redlight Area; Duport road Area; and Paynsville (see Report of Headquarters NIGCON Monrovia-Liberia 1998:2).

During the period of its deployment in Liberia, ECOMOG engaged in cantonment, mediation, and peace enforcement.

5.1.2 ECOMOG Peace Operations in Liberia

Essentially, ECOMOG was given the mandate to maintain, enforce and monitor the ceasefire agreement among the warring parties in Liberia. In addition, ECOMOG was to protect life and property; maintain essential services; provide security to the interim administration in Liberia, observe elections, and conduct normal policing duties. On September 22, ECOMOG's mandate was reviewed to include peace enforcement. Part of the mandate for peace enforcement included:

a) create a 30 km free zone around Monrovia, the capital;
b) enforce a cease-fire amongst the factions and ensure compliance;
c) report violations to the ECOWAS Secretariat;
d) separate the warring factions by creating buffer zones between; and,
e) disarm and encamp the warring factions to facilitate peaceful resolution of the crisis through elections (Nyambuja : 1997).

**Enforcement and monitoring of ceasefire**

ECOMOG began its peace enforcement action on Thursday, August 23, 1990 from Sierra Leone on a rickety foundation, because a cease-fire agreement was not obtained from the warring parties before ECOMOG's intervention. ECOMOG broke with a cardinal principle of traditional peacekeeping: the necessity of obtaining the agreement of all warring parties to external intervention. While Doe and other Liberian factions accepted the Banjul Accord, the NPFL, led by Charles Taylor, whose forces were at the gates of Monrovia, and who suspected that the intervention was designed to deny them victory, rejected it. In the convoy were two main vessels, Nigeria's Naval ship NNS Ambe, and Ghanaian merchant ship MV Tano River. There were other support gunboats namely GNS Yogaga and GNS Achimota. There were also fast attack crafts, NNS Ekpe and NNS Damisa. In their company also was a Tugboat, Dolphin Mira. All the vessels berthed at Freeport Monrovia, Liberia, by 1700 hrs (see Aderiye 1992). The first Field Commander that led the force into Liberia from Freetown, Sierra Leone, was Lt. General Arnold Quainoo, a Ghanaian Army General.

The landing by ECOMOG was welcomed (and indeed assisted) by Prince Johnson, the leader of INPFL (a breakaway from the NPFL). For instance, Prince Johnson gave up areas he controlled around the Freeport to ECOMOG to enable them establish their Headquarters (see Aderiye 1992: 104; Huband 1998: 183). ECOMOG's initial military tactics changed. Initially, the Ghanaian and the
Nigerian Battalions were to secure Monrovia's Freeport. The Ghanaians were expected to subsequently move eastward to secure Stockton Creek and Mesurado River, while the Nigerians were to go towards the east and north to secure St. Paul’s River, the Guineans were to proceed centrally to capture Gardensville, and the Sierra Leoneans and the Gambians would remain behind at the port (see Iweze 1993: 220).

The opposed landing of ECOMOG in Monrovia on August 24 1990 marked the beginning of Operation Liberty. Operation code named ‘OP Liberty’ was an offensive to flush out the NPFL from Monrovia. On landing, ECOMOG took all-round defence to secure their parameters. Consequently, it was forced to take sides and ally itself with the INPFL, one of the very warlords and political forces that it was designed to restrain. Thus, ECOMOG compromised its neutrality from the very beginning.

ECOMOG's deployment was in three fronts and the mission was to secure Monrovia as a ‘safe haven’, out of the reach of NPFL range of gunfire. The Nigerian Battalion (NIBATT I), was tasked to secure the Northern sector of Monrovia up to St. Paul's Bridge. The Central Sector and the Southern sector were given to Ghanaian Battalion (GHANBATT) I, to be supported by Nigerian Contingent because the GHANBATT did not come with infantry support weapons. Their task was to clear central Monrovia, including the Executive Mansion of the President and its suburb up to James Spriggs Payne Airport.

By December 24, 1990, the NIBATTS had cleared the rebels from the Freeport and took up positions at the PO River; Gardnersville; Tolbert Estate; White Plains; Redlight Area; Duport road area; and, Paynsville. GHANBATT led by a Nigerian armoured squadron (221 Tk Bn) cleared the rebels from Vai town;
Old and new bridges; West point; Central Monrovia and James Spriggs Payne Airfield. The Executive Mansion was secured and kept out of reach of the rebels. This axis was cleared up to Samuel Doe stadium area.

With these developments, the task of making Monrovia a safe haven was achieved. This enabled relief organisations to set up camps for displaced persons and to administer them. ECOMOG then reverted to its peacekeeping roles. It set up roadblocks to intercept rebels who were suspected to be infiltrating Monrovia with arms. In addition, it began Cordon and Search Operations to clear the town of illegal arms.

The ECOMOG operations in Monrovia compelled the NPFL to change tactics. NPFL began to stall for time by initiating peace processes, which it pretended to be interested in. Let us illustrate this point. The NPFL was able to persuade the Ivorian President, Houphet Boigney to set up four peace initiatives, which produced the Yamoussoukro I-IV Accords discussed earlier in Chapter Four of this work. Meanwhile, the NPFL leader stalled all peace initiatives for almost two years while surreptitiously establishing a standing army equipped with modern and sophisticated weapons. The Yamoussoukro accords only provided smokescreen for the NPFL to rebuild its forces for offensive against ECOMOG.

The rebels started a series of probing attacks on ECOMOG positions first at PO River Bridge on August 2 1992, and later at Pono and Kluka on August 15 1992. In compliance with the Yamoussoukro IV accord, ECOMOG deployed into the hinterland for disarmament. In a major move on September 7 1992 at 1330 hours, NPFL disarmed the ECOMOG units deployed to ‘Greater Liberia’ for the exercise and took them hostage. This led to the withdrawal of ECOMOG troops
from NPFL controlled territories. The NPFL launched a ferocious attack on all 
ECOMOG positions in an operation code named ‘OP Octopus’. The objective was 
to capture the whole of Monrovia, as well as the ECOMOG Headquarters, and in 
the process capture the Executive Mansion, from where Charles Taylor would 
declare himself President. The NPFL commenced its attack at PO River. The NPFL 
penetrated down to the Caldwell base (formerly under INPFL of Prince Johnson) 
and a greater portion of Somalia Drive because the Guinean contingent failed to 
secure its position in Gardensville and retreated to the Freeport, the ECOMOG 
Headquarters. Charles Taylor was then within mortar range of the Executive 
Mansion. It was alleged that the Sierra Leonean and the Guinean contingents were 
always fleeing at the sight of the NPFL rebels (Adebajo 2002: 76).

Create a 30 km free zone around Monrovia

With these developments, ECOMOG was given a new mandate, which 
involved peace enforcement. General Joshua Dogonyaro as the new ECOMOG 
Field Commander replaced General Quaino. On his arrival in Monrovia, General 
Dogonyaro told his troops to ‘prepare for a full-scale attack on the NPFL rebels’ 
(Adisa 1992: 242). ECOMOG was reinforced with two extra battalions on 
September 29, 1990 and October 1, 1990. ECOMOG launched a limited 
Ground, Air and Naval operations against the NPFL positions. Let us examine 
these operations.

During the ground operations, ECOMOG’s NIBATT 9 at PO River fought 
and defended their positions as well as repelled the NPFL offensive. NIBATT 11 
recaptured New Georgia Estate, while NIBATT 12 repelled the rebels out of 
Caldwell base and drove them out beyond Louisiana. NIBATT 14 advanced and 
captured Samuka town. Robertsville, Lower White Plains, Crozerville and Bentoil.
NIBATT 15 went into defence at the Samuel Doe Stadium area to reinforce other units that were in contact with the rebels.

ECOMOG's strategy at this point was to pursue the NPFL out of the artillery range of Monrovia by creating a 30 km free zone around Monrovia. To do this, ECOMOG tasked its Brigades to open up the following axis:

a. 7EB – Monrovia – Careysburg – Harbel – Buchanan.

b. 15 ECOMOG Brigade (EB) – Monrovia-Careysburg – 15 Gate- Kakata.

c. 33 FAB – Provide fire SP to the Bdes.


The 7 ECOMOG Brigade had NIBATTS 8, 10 and 13 under the command of Brigadier General Mujakperuo of Nigeria. The Brigade's was ordered to advance to Careysburg. The advance was led by NIBATT 8. The Brigade successfully dislodged the rebels at Gazata, Nowren and Nyovehn towns. The Brigade also cleared rebels at Troyus, Kema and Bassa towns. These areas were opened up by the advancing ECOMOG Battalion and enabled people that were trapped in the conflict to move to safety in Monrovia. The Shilka gun was mobilized and used to route out the rebels up to 15 Gate (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).

The 7 ECOMOG Brigade was further tasked to capture Buchanan with the reinforcement of 7 GHANABATT. The operation was codenamed ‘Thunderbolt’. ECOMOG troops fought their way towards Buchanan, their firepower boosted by Guinean 122 mm multi-barreled rocket launchers and naval gunfire from Nigerian warships standing offshore. Ground attack aircraft were also used to attack Gbarnga. NIBATT 8 provided fire support at German Camp. The Brigade as part of a deception plan to attack Edina village used Michelin area and St. John River. While the rebels thought that the Bde was attacking from the Coast having
deceived them by amassing canoes, they responded by facing the coast anticipating the attack. Indeed, the main attack went over St. John Bridge capturing the bridge intact and clearing Buchanan with minimum resistance. Buchanan fell on April 4, 1993 under the command of Colonel Peter Gyang Sha (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).

The fall of Buchanan forced the remnants of the rebels to continue South of Grand Gedeh, Sinoe and Maryland. Meanwhile, Buchanan, the second largest city in Liberia, became a safe haven. The Port of Buchanan was the route through which the rebels import their arms and ammunitions. A hospital was established and manned by Medicine Sans Frontier (MSF). The Roman Catholic Mission established a Relief Organization called Catholic Relief Services (CRS) for distribution of relief materials to the needy. The people along Harbel – Buchanan road went back to their farmlands and normal life was once more restored. Commercial activities between Buchanan and Monrovia were also restored.

After the capture of Buchanan, another faction emerged on the Liberian conflict landscape - the Liberian Peace Council (LPC). The LPC launched series of attacks on the fleeing NPFL rebels at Greenville, Sinoe, and Zwedru in Grand Gedeh. It later captured part of Grand Bassa, Rivercess, Sinoe and Grand Gedeh. This defeat left the NPFL by December 1994 only with the Nimba County where the rebellion originated. The LPC had its headquarters at Palmo Davies town in Grand County.

15 ECOMOG Brigade (Bde) was tasked to re-open up North Western part of the country to ensure that the rebels did not attack or infiltrate into Monrovia. The pioneer commander was Brigadier General BS Magashi. The first task of the Brigade was to advance to 15 Gate through 7 ECOMOG Bde location. It should be
noted that the two Bdes advance was initially on the same axis after which 7EB wheeled right to Harbel. NIBATT 12 led the Bde advance and 14 while NIBATT 11 was deployed to secure the line of communication as the advance progressed (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998). NIBATT 9 held on to the Po river area and to block the Tubmanburg axis. The 332 FAR provided the fire support while B Coy of the battalion provided fire support. The Brigade moved rapidly and cleared 15 Gate. NIBATT 12 remained at 15 Gate while NIBATT 14 proceeded towards Kakata. By the time NIBATT 14 got to Kakata, it was already secured by ULIMO. The unit took over the town and reverted to peacekeeping. Roadblocks were established and normal patrols were maintained to ensure no infiltration into the town by the rebels. The 15 Brigade established a safe Haven at 15 Gate and Kakata. Displaced persons converged in the towns and were administered by relief agencies from Monrovia (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).

The ECOMOG Task Force (EGTF) was tasked to provide security in Monrovia and environs. The headquarters of the EGTF was 221 Tk Bn. The EGTF cleared RIA and the Firestone rubber plantation of rebels. NIBATT 15 later took over the security of this area and created a displaced camp at the RIA. The EGTF was saddled with the following responsibilities in Monrovia:

a. Provide security for ECOMOG HQ.
b. Protect VIPs, lives and property within Monrovia.
c. Escort duties for VIPs and humanitarian relief materials.
d. Cordon and Search of suspected locations for arms and ammo.
e. Establish checkpoints where appropriate for interception of arms and ammo or any illegal material.
f. Provide security for displaced person's camp.
g. Crowd dispersal and IS duties.
h. Provide security for the Executive Mansion.
i. Any other tasks that may be assigned by ECOMOG HQ (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).
The EGTF maintained vigilance, day and night, to ensure that there was no breach of security in Monrovia.

The impact of the various ECOMOG ground operations on the rebels was that it contributed immensely to breaking the will of the rebels to continue to fight.

Air operations were also used extensively. At the inception of the operation to rid Monrovia of rebels, the Air force provided effective fire support to the ground forces. The renewed hostilities in Liberia, began October 1992 – June 1993, code-named ‘Ops Octopus’ by the NPFL witnessed an extensive deployment by the NPFL of ground based air defences. The Air Defence systems included Anti Aircraft guns of the Shilka ZSU-23-4, Bofor Multi Barrelled anti aircraft guns, Surface to Air Missiles (Sam 7) and early warning radars of the Russian P-12 & P-30 types. These resources were mostly deployed in Gbarnga (the rebel's capital), Buchanan Seaports, Roberts International Airport and other vulnerable points (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).

The air operations were in three phases. The first and shortest was intended to win air superiority over the whole of greater Liberia by attacking known radar locations and anti aircraft gun positions and civil/military airfields. The second phase focused on the NPFL deployed forces by attacking the deployed ground forces, which was their main strength. The third phase focused on strategic targets by attacking the entire logistic infrastructure (such as ammo dumps, petroleum products, tank farms, communication centers) and patrols of the sea-lanes and air space.

The NPFL’s command structure was attacked by the ECOMOG air force when it struck at the command centers (Gbarnga, Kakata, Buchanan and Harbel) and communications network. Although these attacks were not sufficient to bring
down the rebellion, they certainly set the stage for the disruption of the rebellion. Close air support and battle air interdiction missions were flown against the fielded military forces. The approach was the air land battle concept, which stressed the integration of air with the fire and movement plan of the ground forces. These missions were in direct support of Nigerian Battalions, NIBATTS 12, 13 and 14. ECOMOG A-jets during Operation Liberty. One of the most devastating attacks was the Air Task Force’s ‘mixed package coordinated punch’ (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998). This involved a minimum of 3 aircraft with the lead aircraft carrying Beluga Cluster, while the second carried 250kg retarded bomb and the third aircraft carried a full load of 68mm SNEB rockets. It was a devastating package. The Beluga aircraft kept the head of the NPFL rebels down, while the 250kg took care of the main targets and the mop up was undertaken by the rocket aircraft (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).

Weapons employed during ‘Operations Liberty’ were conventional unguided munitions and these included 30mm cannons; 68mm rockets; the Beluga cluster bomb unit; Durandal penetration bomb, 250 kg GP bombs and 125kg fragmentation bombs. A total of 556 close air support missions and a total of 2,693 combat sorties were flown. These attacks were systematic and aimed at the NPFL logistic network and troops massing up areas for the purpose of destroying its military potential. ECOMOG relied on the NAF Air Transport Group’s (ATG) C-130s and other air resources (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).

In seven months of intensive air operations, several of NPFL tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APC), artillery pieces and trucks were either destroyed or damaged. According to General Olurin, attacks on their transportation assets were so successful that the NPFL was unable to provide any substantial re-
enforcement and re-supply transportation to her over 30,000-man rebel army. He noted that 'the disruption of the transportation ring was the decisive blow that eventually forced the NPFL into a ceasefire agreement with the ECOMOG forces’ (Olurin 1993: 33).

The first of these attacks was at the Caldwell Base during the battle for Monrovia. The attacks were coordinated with ground forces such that the enemy positions were illuminated with powerful flares fired by ECOMOG troops at the last minute of weapon delivery. These attacks appeared to have caught the NPFL fighters by surprise. Night attacks were conducted at Gardenersville and Samuka junction in the same manner. Vehicle convoys were attacked at night in Harbel, Buchanan and Gbarnga. ECOMOG made it very difficult for NPFL to operate, especially as their guns became silent (see The Peacemaker 1993).

The Nigerian Navy composed the ECOMOG Naval operations. Almost all the ships and tugs of the Nigerian Navy took part in Operation Liberty. The fleet of NNS Ambe, NNS Enyimiri, NNS Erinnomi, NNS Damisa, NNS Ekpe, NNS Agu, NNS Ayam, NNS Ekun, NN Tug Dolphin Mira Rima, and NN Tug Rudolf Forbes, kept the Liberian water under check. They patrolled from Cape Mount (Northern most boundary of Liberia with Sierra Leone) to Maryland (Harper) ensuring that no unauthorized ships carrying war-like materials for the rebels did so successfully. In the process, NNS Damisa and NNS Ekun arrested 2 on-shore patrol crafts and vessel Sea rose respectively, in 1990, carrying arms and ammunition to supply the warring factions. They were escorted to the Freeport and the arms confiscated (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).

The Navy provided Naval Gunfire Support to ECOMOG ground forces during land operation; sealift of own and friendly troops and logistics items;
provided escorts to merchant vessels bringing logistic items for own troops and friendly forces, including those bringing relief supplies to Liberians; arrest and if necessary, destruction of vessels bringing military supplies to warring factions; and deterrence of sea-board attack on ECOMOG positions by the warring factions. It subsequently took active part in flushing the rebels out of Monrovia during OP ‘Octopus’ (The Peacemaker 1992).

**Enforcement of ceasefire**

ECOMOG troops forcibly separated the fighting groups and ensured that the various groups adhered to the ceasefire agreements. Those that failed were severely punished. A case in point was the violation of the Cotonou Accord by the NPFL, which compelled ECOMOG to repel the NPFL, which precipitated a situation whereby the NPFL that controlled about 90 percent of the entire country lost almost all its areas of control and consequently called for a cease-fire.

On 30\textsuperscript{th} June 1994, the ECOMOG Field Commander, Major General John Mark Inieng invited factional leaders to a meeting and issued very strict guidelines to guide the conduct and activities of all warring factions, their leaders and all those whose activities had security implications. The following guidelines were issued:

- a. No factional leader is allowed to communicate war/military directives to their fighters from Monrovia or any areas under ECOMOG’s control;
- b. No factional leader is allowed to hold factional meetings press statements that may impede the peace process in Monrovia or from any ECOMOG controlled areas;
- c. No faction shall carry arms in Monrovia or in any area controlled by ECOMOG;
- d. Harassment, intimidation and kidnapping of ECOMOG and UNOMIL personnel and indeed defenceless citizens shall cease forthwith by the factions.
e. Henceforth, no communication equipment, vendor or dealer shall sell, repair, and refit any radio communication equipment to or for any of the warring factions or individual without the purchaser presenting an ECOMOG security clearance authorizing such purchase. Dealers of such devices shall submit quarterly listing and reports to ECOMOG in respect thereof. Furthermore, all factional leaders and organizations currently in possession of any form of radio communication devices in ECOMOG controlled areas are directed to surrender such equipment to ECOMOG.

f. Armed robbery by any member of any faction or indeed any person at all shall cease forthwith. Henceforth any person caught committing armed robbery shall be shot at sight (The Peacemaker 1994: 45).

ECOMOG Commanders at all levels were directed to ensure strict compliance. Consequently, foot and mobile patrol were carried out day and night. During the patrols, criminals were arrested along with curfew breakers. Cordon and search operations were also carried out in search of arms and ammo dumps. Checkpoints were set up and manned by ECOMOG forces.

In addition, close support artillery and light tanks were stationed at strategic positions in Monrovia where urban security was the primary role. The ECOMOG Naval Task Force (ENTF) provided Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) in support of ground troops during land operations in enforcement of ceasefire. The ENTF also carried out extensive Naval patrol and surveillance of the entire Liberian territorial waters, denying the warring factions the use of the sea for arms trafficking, and preventing infringement and violation of the custom laws and regulations of Liberia.
Disarm and encamp the warring factions to facilitate peaceful resolution of the crisis through elections.

ECOMOG, in line with its mandate, began preparation for the disarming of about ten warring factions. ECOMOG's preparation for the disarmament included the following:

a. Selection of disarmament centers;
b. Visits to the various camps to sensitize the fighters and prepare them for disarmament;
c. Provision of incentives for the combatants to disarm;
d. Joint training for officials of UNOMIL, the government of Liberia and ECOMOG on the conduct of disarmament;
e. Provision of logistic requirements for officials, as well as for former combatants; and
f. Provision of transportation for the arms and ammunition that were to be collected (Dowyaro 2000:6).

The ECOMOG Force Commander, Major-General Victor Malu declared the commencement of the disarmament operation on November 22 1996. This declaration came after final disarmament missions were carried out to all the selected disarmament centers between November 15 and 17, 1996. These centers were created in territories controlled by the factions. These were Voinjama and Bo waterside for ULIMO K, Tubmanburg for ULIMO-J and LDF fighters. Camp Naama, Kakata and Buchanan for NPFL. Zwedru and Greenville (BTC) were selected for the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). Several other disarmament centers were established in Monrovia to enhance the disarmament of ex-combatants and non-combatants in possession of arms and ammunition in the city and its environs. After some preliminary delays, on November 21, 1996 ECOMOG completed its preparations with the deployment of troops to all disarmament centers (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).
The whole country was divided into three sectors for the purpose of the disarmament programme. These were A sector, comprising of Buchanan, Harbel, Greenville, Zwedru and Harper. Sector A was supervised by 7 ECOMOG Bde. Sector B comprised Voinjama; Tubmanburg; Bo Waterside; Camp Naama and Kakata under Commander 15 Bde and Sector C comprised Monrovia and environ under ECOMOG Grand Task Force. The disarmament of the warring factions was monitored and verified by UNOMIL. Disarmament of the warring factions started simultaneously and was supervised by Sector Commanders.

Due to the lack of Liberia-wide security and the failure of ECOMOG's infantry companies to reach all their agreed locations, disarmament and demobilization sites were not opened in all of the areas originally proposed. The disarmament initiative, which was started on 22 November 1996, had the goal of disarming 50,000 combatants from all factions by 31 January 1997. Faction leaders inflated the figures of troop numbers in attempts to gain advantage in negotiations. For example, UNOMIL sources in both Monrovia and New York put the total number of combatants in the civil war at about 33,000, of whom 4,306 were child soldiers (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).

In addition to the voluntary disarmament, ECOMOG troops actively sought out arms caches. In December 1996, ECOMOG forces recovered a large cache of arms including assault rifles and pistols. Despite criticism, ECOMOG was successful in discovering additional weapons caches following the initial voluntary demobilization period. A cache seized at the residence of Alhaji Koromah, leader of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) faction and a candidate in the presidential elections, included an anti-aircraft gun, two mortars, 660 bombs, 80 grenades, 86 rifles, and 40,613 rounds of ammunition. The
exercise was concluded on February 7, 1997. According to Dowyaro, of the Office of the Chief of Army Staff, Nigerian Army, by February 7, 1997 ‘a total of 28,819 fighters out of the estimated 33,000 were disarmed’ (Dowyaro 2000:6). The following arms and ammunition were recovered:

a. 13,167 small arms (serviceable and unserviceable);
b. 1,628,584 rounds of ammunition (mixed);
c. 6 field guns; and
d. 4,145 bombs/explosive ordnance (Dowyaro 2000:6).

The disarmament process recorded minimal success. The reluctance to demobilize seemed to be motivated by a complex web of local conditions in which no single cause could be isolated. Individual fighters who demobilized seemed to have planned for the next stage of their life and had aspirations for employment or resettlement. The corollary may be that the majority did not have such prospects, and it was more secure for them to remain in the factions. It is not clear to what extent the failure to provide for a ‘new national army’ in the Liberian reconstruction plans added to the fear that demobilizing the factions would lead to greater anarchy.

Creation of an enabling environment for elections

The next phase of ECOMOG task for the implementation of the Revised Abuja Accord was to create an enabling environment in the whole country before the Liberian elections. To ensure security across the country, the peacekeeping force deployed tactically to cover the whole of Liberia. This created the necessary confidence to move freely to any part of the country. Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) of a coy strength was established in all the existing Bdes. ECOMOG undertook the additional task of patrolling the city of
Monrovia and the environ to curtail cases of armed robbery following the disarmament. Cases of constant demonstration and confrontation between former warring factions were suppressed. Roadblocks were established in Monrovia and it’s environ to check on the illegal movement of arms and armed bandits.

The seven years of ECOMOG's peace operations in Liberia finally brought about the conduct of elections. The ECOMOG High Command, in its plan for the election, divided the country into 5 sectors namely: Western, Eastern, Southern Central and Montserrado Sectors. The outline of its operation was conducted in 4 phases. Phase 1 was to deploy troops to all registration/polling centers; phase 2 dealt with registration of voters; while phase 3 concentrated on the elections process and the final phase entailed the withdrawal of troops from polling centers. A total of 1761 centers were finally certified for the election (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).

The task given to ECOMOG on the day of the election, July 19, 1997, was to enforce election guidelines. The results were collated and independently confirmed by ECOMOG. The total valid votes cast was six hundred and twenty one thousand, eight hundred and eighty (621,880). Charles Taylor, the leader of the NPFL, polled the highest votes cast, with a total figure of 468,443 representing 75.3% to clinch victory. All the parties accepted the result. ECOMOG also ensured a successful inauguration ceremony (NIGCON Headquarters Monrovia, 1998).

5.1.3 Impact of ECOMOG’s Peace Operation on Liberia

ECOMOG, undoubtedly, has left an indelible mark on the sands of the history of peace operations in Liberia. Although the peace operations proved to be
a difficult experience for ECOMOG, it was able to stabilize Liberia to some extent. ECOMOG halted the carnage in Liberia.

Following its arrival in Monrovia, ECOMOG reduced hostilities and atrocities and, by establishing order in greater Monrovia, set up a safe haven for thousands of Liberians. By securing the port and airport, it also assisted relief operations. In this phase, ECOMOG functioned as a police force within its security zone and a defence force against the NPFL on the perimeter. The re-establishment of peace in Monrovia was a practical precondition for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

Before the intervention of ECOMOG in the Liberian conflict, the level of atrocities perpetrated, especially by the NPFL and the INPFL was to say the least, most barbaric. There was brutal and indiscriminate murder of innocent civilians, while about half of the total population of 2.2 million was displaced. Citizens of foreign countries were also not spared. Women and children some of whom had sought sanctuary in the churches, mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals and under Red Cross protection were massacred. The situation was such that it was impossible for humanitarian aid organizations to operate within Liberia.

ECOMOG intervened in the conflict and engaged in a variety of missions, which include the creation of a humanitarian corridor and protection of humanitarian aid, disarming of factions, cantonment, mediation, and peace enforcement. Through ECOMOG enforcement, a measure of stability was established with ECOMOG in control of Monrovia and the NPFL controlling close to 95 percent of Liberia, especially areas that have the wealth of the country. This situation lasted until October 1992. Although the sporadic violence continued, especially with the murder of the Senegalese soldiers and the American nuns in
NPFL held territory, Prince Johnson’s periodic practice of summary executions, and the June 5th 1993 massacre of some 400 refugees by AFL elements in Monrovia, ECOWAS was still able to provide security to an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). However, attempts by ECOMOG to establish buffer zones and police the UN arms blockade were complicated by continued conflict between the militias. Indeed the early cease-fire did not represent any significant change in the NPFL’s opposition to ECOMOG and was instead a tactical decision designed to consolidate the NPFL’s position before returning to the offensive.

The issue of whether or not the ECOMOG deployment prolonged the war is a controversial one. Eight years on, Taylor occupied the position that he might have occupied in 1989. Did ECOMOG intervention delay Taylor's victory? Could he have won militarily what he won politically? Perhaps, given that Liberia had antagonistic neighbours that may well have been willing to provide support to anti-Taylor factions in continuing the struggle; the answers might be far fetched. Why did ECOMOG refuse to finish Charles Taylor's NPFL when it began an offensive in 1993 and almost defeated him militarily? Military sources said if ECOMOG under the leadership of General Dogonyaro had pounded, the rebel strongholds for another three days, Taylor would have run away. Selly Thompson, a former representative to Samuel Doe concurred to this in an interview, when he pointed out that ‘All ECOMOG needed was two or three more days. They would have reached Gbarnga. Taylor would have fled and his supporters would have dropped their guns and surrendered’ (Thompson, 1992:14).

Thompson argued further that ‘it was when Dogonyaro got there that the Liberians felt the presence of a peacekeeping mission’. According to him ‘the carnage became minimized, the devastation reduced and the fighting ceased
because Taylor issued a testament of truce and asked for a roundtable conference’ (Thompson 1992:16). General Dogonyaro, the ECOMOG Field Commander, in a similar vein, pointed out that ‘the only thing I thought I should do was to use a minimum force to make him realize that there is superiority of fire power on ECOMOG’s side. If we had pursued him, we would have knocked him out’ (Dogonyaro 1992:16). The bombardment was halted and soon after that, Dogonyaro ended his tour of duty.

General Dogonyaro, while relieving his experience as ECOMOG Field Commander, observed that ECOMOG established a buffer zone which enabled mediation between the warring factions, and the mediation committee of ECOWAS continued. It was through this that a technical committee was set up to see to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. Dogonyaro argued that ‘it is not the question of making a situation worse. The whole thing could have been finished a long time ago but the political considerations are naturally superior to military decisions’ (Dogonyaro 1992:17).

Perhaps if Charles Taylors NPFL was dealt with decisively, the conflict might not have spilled over into Sierra Leone the way it did. In March 1991, the war spilled over into Sierra Leone when NPFL elements made incursions in collaboration with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a Sierra Leone rebel group sponsored by Charles Taylor. The NPFL took around 25% of Sierra Leone and disrupted the areas that provided most of Sierra Leone’s export earnings.

5.2 **ECOMOG EXPERIENCE IN SIERRA LEONE**

Unlike in Liberia, ECOMOG’s mandate in Sierra Leone was to reverse the military coup and restore the legitimate government to power. ECOMOG, right
from the start, was not expected to serve as a neutral force between the disputants. A military coup d’état on May 25, 1997 led by Major Johnny Paul Koromah, of the Sierra Leone Army, overthrew the government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), with Major Koromah at its head assumed control of Freetown. They extended invitation to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Sergeant Foday Sankoh to join them, giving the RUF free access to the capital. Images and reports of widespread looting, rape, and murder soon revealed the horror of the situation to the world. The period of AFRC/RUF control of Freetown resulted in chaos, referred to by the RUF as ‘Operation Pay Yourself’. The coup and its aftermath were very violent, characterized by generalized looting of both public and private property.

Before the Military struck on May 25, 1997, a small contingent of Nigerian troops were stationed at the Presidential lodge under a bilateral agreement between the Nigerian government and the government of Sierra Leone called ‘The Status of Forces and Security Agreement’ (Francis 2001:113). Under the bilateral agreement, the Nigerian military enjoys right of self defence, which sovereign governments have always enjoyed in international law, including under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Despite the seriousness of the crisis in Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, the highest decision making organ of the community, was not immediately summoned in extraordinary session as happened in the case of the Liberian crisis.

The first organ of ECOWAS to consider the crisis was the ECOWAS Foreign Ministers but then a whole month passed before they could meet in
Conakry on 26 June 1997. At the end of the meeting, three objectives to be pursued by ECOWAS were recommended:

i) the early reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Kabbah;

ii) the return of peace and security; and,

iii) resolution of the issues of refugees and displaced persons (Bundy 1997:151).

To achieve the first objective, they proposed ‘a combination of three measures’, namely: dialogue; imposition of sanctions and enforcement of an embargo, and the use of military force. A Committee of Four was then set up ‘to ensure the implementation of these decisions’.

The Committee of Four met with a delegation of AFRC in Abidjan in July 17-18, 1997 and reached the following conclusions:

i) to resolve peacefully all the issues relating to the crisis in the best interest of the people of Sierra Leone and the international community;

ii) to establish a ceasefire throughout the country while deploying efforts towards the peaceful resolution of the crisis;

iii) to work towards the early restoration of constitutional order; and,

iv) to allow the AFRC time to prepare detailed modalities for the return to constitutional order

The first time ECOWAS leaders met to consider the crisis in Sierra Leone was at their twentieth ordinary summit held in Abuja from August 28-29, 1997. The Authority of Heads of State and Government considered the fact that the continued situation in Sierra Leone may raise the number of Sierra Leonean refugees in neighbouring Member States; thus threatening international peace and security in the sub-region. The Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, therefore decide as follows:
i) The Community and its Member States reaffirm its position to spare no effort to restore constitutional order to Sierra Leone as soon as possible (Article 1).

ii) Member states shall place immediately a general and total embargo on all supplies of Petroleum products, arms and military equipment of Sierra Leone and abstain from transacting any business with that country (Article 2).

iii) Member States shall freeze funds held by members of the illegal regime, military officers and civilians directly or indirectly connected with the regime as well as their families (Article 3).

iv) The sub-regional forces shall employ all necessary means to impose the implementation of this decision. They shall monitor closely the coastal areas, land borders and airspace of the Republic of Sierra Leone, and shall inspect, guard and seize any ship, vehicle or aircraft violating the embargo imposed by this decision (Article 7).

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), at its 3822nd meeting of October 8, 1997, adopted Resolution 1132 (1997), in which it took note of the communiqué issued at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Economic Community of West African States on Sierra Leone, held in Conakry, Guinea on 26 June 1997; the Declaration of the ECOWAS Committee of Four Foreign Ministers on Sierra Leone of 30 July 1997; and the final Communiqué of the summit of ECOWAS held at Abuja on 28 and 29 August 1997 and the Decision on sanctions against the military junta in Sierra Leone issued at the summit. It expressed its full support and appreciation for the mediation efforts of the ECOWAS Committee and reaffirmed its view that the Abidjan Agreement continues to serve as a viable framework for peace, stability and reconciliation in Sierra Leone (UNSC Resolution 1132, 1997).

The UN Security Council deplored the fact that the military junta has not taken steps to allow the restoration of the democratically elected Government and a return to constitutional order. Gravely concerned at the continued violence and loss of life in Sierra Leone following the military coup of 25 May 1997, the deteriorating humanitarian conditions in that country, and the consequences for
neighbouring countries, the UNSC demanded that the military junta take immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of the democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order (UNSC Resolution 1132, 1997).

The UNSC expressed its strong support for the efforts of the ECOWAS Committee to resolve the crisis in Sierra Leone and encouraged it to continue to work for the peaceful resolution of the crisis and, to that end, to work for a resumption of discussions with all parties to the crisis. Acting under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the UNSC authorized ECOWAS, cooperating with the democratically-elected Government of Sierra Leone, to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of the resolution. The UNSC, in addition, urged all States to provide technical and logistical support to assist ECOWAS to carry out its responsibilities in the implementation of the resolution (UNSC Resolution 1132, 1997).

In a nutshell, ECOMOG was mandated under the Peace Plan; the decision of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government A/DEC.8/8/97 on sanctions against the illegal regime in Sierra Leone; and the UN Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997; to take certain military actions in collaboration with the junta, the legitimate government and the UN, to bring an end to the crisis. Such military action included monitoring the ceasefire, disarmament and demobilization of combatants, enforcement of the sanctions among others.
5.2.1 ECOMOG: Logistics, Deployment and Force Movements in Sierra Leone

ECOMOG began deploying its forces in Sierra Leone in the midnight of May 26 1997 at Hastings and Lungi Airports, which were secured by the Nigerian and Guinean forces respectively. ECOMOG was tipped off to the coup a day in advance. It thus claimed that it was landing troops and heavy equipments in Sierra Leone only to support Nigerian troops in the country under the military cooperation agreement – The Status of Forces and Security Agreement. As a result of this agreement, Nigeria had always maintained 7,000 troops in Sierra Leone. However, with the coup and the potential threat posed, especially by the RUF, the troop strength of the Nigerian military increased to 12,000. At its peak between December 1998 and January 1999, ECOMOG’s strength was about 20,000 troops largely composed of troops from Nigeria. ECOMOG was composed of troops from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Togo. ECOMOG initially concentrated its forces in Freetown in the face of constant rebel threat to the capital. ECOMOG troops launched artillery attacks on rebel positions in Sumbuya and Sango. ECOMOG also deployed troops to Masiaka, Malama, Lunsar, Yilleh, and Magbere.

Essentially, ECOMOG was mandated, among others, to see to the early reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Tejan Kabbah as well as return peace and security to the war torn country.

5.2.2 Impact of ECOMOG Peace Operations

We shall examine the impact of ECOMOG peace operations based on their experience in the implementation of their mandate.
Early re-instatement of the legitimate government of President Kabbah

The overthrow of the government of President Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone on May 25, 1997, by Major Paul Koromah - led dissidents, was met with a response from ECOWAS. The mandate of ECOMOG in Liberia was also extended to cover Sierra Leone. On May 31, 1997, two military transport planes from Ghana and Guinea landed in Freetown, carrying troops along with rocket-propelled grenade launchers, bombs, automatic rifles, and tanks. Guinea also sent three battalions of troops to Sierra Leone where they joined the ECOMOG forces (Sierra Leone News Achieves 1997).

A Nigerian Air Force plane brought fresh troops and armoured personnel carriers to Hastings Airport, near a Nigerian military base. Nigerian Alpha fighter jets flew over Freetown, intensifying the pressure on the AFRC. The Ghanaian troops were assigned the task of securing the airports at Lungi and Hastings, freeing Nigerian troops for military action. Three Nigerian frigates docked at Government Wharf in Freetown carrying hundreds of soldiers, fueling speculation that Nigeria led ECOMOG was ready to intervene in Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone News Achieves 1997). The RUF rebels, who had joined the coup leaders, rejected any mediation to restore the civilian government. RUF had taken control.

Charles Taylor appeared to be actively involved in fuelling the violence in Sierra Leone. It was alleged that the RUF was supplied by helicopter from Liberia on a sporadic basis before 1997 and on a regular basis since then. Helicopters originating in Liberia, made stop - over at Buedu, Kailahun, Makeni, Yengema, Tumbudu and in Kono District. The AFRC/RUF began launching probing attacks on ECOMOG designed to frustrate and cripple ECOMOG. The attacks became persistent and climaxed on February 5, 1998 at Kossoh town, when ECOMOG
position was heavily attacked. Indeed, a portion of ECOMOG personnel was cut off from its base because of this attack. This attack signaled the commencement of ‘Operation Sandstorm’. This was a swift and decisive operation launched by ECOMOG against the AFRC/RUF. ECOMOG began a swift advance towards Freetown and the State House with a combination of ground and air assaults. The battle for Freetown took only seven days. ECOMOG forces fought their way, marched into the capital and the State House, and sacked the AFRC rebels. This paved the way for the eventual return of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The first ECOMOG mandate was accomplished.

**Restoration of peace and security**

Following the 1997 coup, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called on ECOWAS to restore constitutional order to Sierra Leone. When their negotiations with the AFRC/RUF failed to achieve progress, ECOWAS imposed an economic embargo, which was later reinforced by an October 1997 U.N. Security Council global arms and oil embargo and restrictions on international travel by AFRC/RUF members and their families. ECOMOG enforced these sanctions with the permission of ECOWAS and the Security Council.

With the failure of diplomatic efforts and the escalation of tension, ECOMOG's mandate was upgraded from sanction enforcement to actual military intervention to oust the AFRC/RUF. The ECOMOG contingent in Sierra Leone was led by Nigerian Commander Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe and composed of approximately 9,000 troops, predominately Nigerian with several Guinean support battalions. As part of bilateral security accords, Nigerian forces and Guinean forces have been in Sierra Leone since 1995 to help the NPRC and, later, the Kabbah government to fight the RUF. The Nigerian and Guinean forces that were
in Sierra Leone at the time of the May 25, 1997 coup formed the nucleus of the ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. Gambia, Ghana and Niger had all promised to send troops to reinforce ECOMOG. ECOMOG had the key responsibilities of disarming and demobilizing combatants as well as forming and training the new Sierra Leonean army. ECOMOG commander Maxwell Khobe has stated that the new army will be ethnically and regionally balanced.

In February 1998, ECOMOG forced the AFRC/RUF out of Freetown in a fierce battle that took the lives of many civilians. During this period, the AFRC/RUF forces conducted a violent rampage throughout the country, chased from one place to another without great success by ECOMOG forces. For most of 1998, however, the RUF/AFRC continued its campaign against the Kabbah Government and the people of Sierra Leone. They broke their commitment to implement the Abidjan Accord that called for disarmament and demobilization, and the RUF's transformation into a political party. Instead, they attempted to regain control of Sierra Leone's rich diamond fields. Even more chilling, they embarked on ‘Operation No Living Thing,’ a campaign of terror that inflicted grave suffering on the Sierra Leonean people. Whole villages, cities and towns fled into refugee camps across borders to escape the violence. The atrocities further galvanized Sierra Leone's people against the RUF/AFRC and heightened public support for the Kabbah Government. However, the rebels regrouped over the June-October 1998 rainy season and launched a new offensive that threatened, again, to overthrow the legitimate government.

In December 1998, the RUF/AFRC rebel forces, with external reinforcement, marched across Sierra Leone, capturing several key towns and villages, including the northern provincial capital, Makeni. With fewer than 10,000 troops on
the ground, ECOMOG was unable to defend all fronts. ECOMOG spokesperson, Lieutenant-Colonel Jimoh Okunlola said on 16 December 1998 that ECOMOG forces were ‘on top of the situation’ in Masiaka and Malama, where ECOMOG troops and rebels clashed. ‘We have succeeded in blocking them from regrouping and posing any threat,’ especially as the rebels were uprooted from their bases ((Sierra Leone News Achieves December 1998).

On 21 December 1998, ECOMOG troops launched an artillery attack on rebel positions at Sumbuya and Songo, 30 to 40 miles east of Freetown. Liberians believed to be members of Liberian President Charles Taylor's former NPFL militia along with AFRC/RUF fighters launched attacks on the towns of Karima, Alikalia, and Kambia (Sierra Leone News Achieves 1998). ECOMOG troops carried out air raids in Kailahun District, killing ‘a large number of rebels,’ ECOMOG reportedly began air surveillance of the eastern border area in mid-November, followed by air strikes. ECOMOG bombardment killed a large but unspecified number of rebels in Kissi Teng, Kissi Kama, and Kissi Bendu Chiefdoms. (Sierra Leone News Achieves 1998).

However, the RUF/AFRC rebels still control much of the Kailahun District on the Liberian border, the Kono diamond mining district, and Makeni. RUF forces continue to victimize innocent civilians throughout the country. On Christmas Eve, the rebels approached the outskirts of Freetown, attacked key facilities of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG peacekeeping force, and briefly occupied the State House.

The RUF caught both the government and ECOMOG off guard. Using women and children as a human shield, some RUF troops were able to bypass ECOMOG troops and join comrades who had already infiltrated the city. Among
their number were Liberians and a small number of European mercenaries. In the fighting that ensued, rebels from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) captured Freetown from government troops and soldiers from the Nigerian-led peacekeeping troops of ECOMOG.

It barely escaped a disastrous defeat and ejection from Freetown in January 1999, a fact that has seriously affected the morale of the organization. The January offensive brought along with it attendant atrocities as the RUF murdered at least two thousand civilians. Victims were usually chosen at random, though there was some targeting of particular groups, such as Nigerian nationals, unarmed police officers, journalists, and church workers. The horrific practice of mutilation and, in particular amputation of hands, arms, lips, legs and other parts of the body was widespread. The battle for Freetown and ensuing three-week rebel occupation of the capital was characterized by the systematic and widespread perpetration of all classes of atrocities against the civilian population.

ECOMOG regained control of the capital by mid-January, but continued to find isolated pockets of rebels in and around Freetown. By March, Freetown and the Western Area enjoyed a security at pre-invasion levels. Since then, ECOMOG continued to push inward, recapturing some of the territory it lost during the rebel onslaught.

Much of the north and east of the country however, including Makeni, was still under AFRC/RUF control. After withdrawing from the capital in January, the RUF continued to commit large-scale violations as they moved eastward, particularly in the villages around the towns of Masiaka and Port Loko. The massive displacement of civilians fleeing the fighting and the continued attacks by the RUF led to severe shortages in food and medicines.
After withdrawing from the capital in January, the RUF continued to commit large-scale violations as they moved eastward, particularly in the villages around the towns of Masiaka and Port Loko. In the months following the offensive, and because of intense international pressure, the government and RUF rebels entered into a dialogue that resulted in a ceasefire on May 18, and on July 7 the signing of a peace accord in Lome, Togo. The ceasefire agreement was not respected by the RUF as they continued with their atrocities.

After eight years of fighting, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF met in Lome, Togo, from the 25 May 1999, to 7 July 1999 and recommitted themselves to the total observance and compliance with the Cease-fire Agreement signed in Lome on 18 May 1999. They agreed that the armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL was thereby ended with immediate effect. Accordingly, the two sides would ensure a total and permanent cessation of hostilities was observed forthwith. A Cease-fire Monitoring Committee (hereinafter termed the CMC) to be chaired by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (hereinafter termed UNOMSIL) with representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF/SL, the Civil Defence Forces (hereinafter termed the CDF) and ECOMOG shall be established at provincial and district levels with immediate effect to monitor, verify and report all violations of the cease-fire. The Ceasefire agreement did not translate into cessation of hostilities on the ground. This means that peace has to be enforced.

ECOMOG, in line with its mandate of returning peace and security to Sierra Leone, continued conducting operations to rid the country of the atrocities of the RUF. ECOMOG Commander Major-General Timothy Shelpidi said on May 26 1999 that ECOMOG aircraft have been conducting daily bombing raids on rebel
strongholds ‘for some time’ to flush out junta supporters. The areas targeted were primarily between Makeni and Kabala. Shelpidi ‘implicated Liberia in providing military support to the rebels,’ Shelpidi, in an interview, said arms for the rebels ‘are coming from Liberia and through Liberia,’ and accused Liberia of supporting the rebel insurgency. ‘I maintain my position that Liberia is aiding the rebels,’ he said. ‘We have a destabilizing situation in the sub-region, and if it's allowed to continue, it's going to be very, very serious. It won't end in Sierra Leone; it's going to spill over and affect every country in the sub-region’ (see Sierra Leone News Achieves, May 1999).

ECOMOG troops raided Wilberforce army barracks on May 30, 1999 at 5:00 a.m., arresting 50 people and seizing a large cache of arms and ammunition (Sierra Leone News Achieves 1999). Most of the 50 men and women caught rebel soldiers of the former Sierra Leone army who had surrendered to ECOMOG when Freetown was captured. (Sierra Leone News Achieves 1999).

About 48 AFRC/RUF rebels were killed after ECOMOG bombarded rebel hideouts around the town of Gbaray, in northeastern Sierra Leone. About 60 rebels gave themselves up at Camp Charlie, a RUF base on the Freetown-Bo highway. ECOMOG sent 300 ‘crack troops’ to the east ‘to flush out retreating junta forces (Sierra Leone News Achieves 1999).

Rebels holding out in Kono District completely devastated the city of Koidu, Every single structure were reduced to rubble by the RUF/AFRC forces as they withdrew ahead of the Nigerian-led advance. They burned down every single building. ECOMOG troops in Kailahun District moved swiftly and captured the town of Koidu. ECOMOG units, backed by the Civil Defence Forces, launched a full-scale offensive into Kailahun District from across the Guinean border on April
30, 1999 and defeated the rebels after a week-long battle in which more than 130 people died (Sierra Leone News Achieves 1999). ECOMOG officers said most of the dead were rebels, but also included were civilians caught in the fighting. ‘So far we have found about 130 bodies, including those of women and children,’ an ECOMOG commander said in Freetown (Sierra Leone News Achieves 1999). He said about 30 rebels had been captured, including a number of Liberian fighters from President Charles Taylor's former NPFL militia (Sierra Leone News Achieves 1999).

Instability and various skirmishes nevertheless continued in various regions throughout the country inspite of the Lome agreement. With the conflict, unending and peace elusive, Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana decided to withdraw their troops from the ECOMOG contingents in Sierra Leone. Following Nigeria's decision to withdraw its troops from Sierra Leone, ECOMOG was unable to continue to perform the vital functions of providing security, in particular in Freetown and at the international airport at Lungi, and the Government of Sierra Leone.

It was at this point that the UN Security Council authorized the creation of UNAMSIL in October 1999 to assist with the implementation of the Lomé agreement. The UN Security Council advised on the importance of a smooth transition between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL for the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement and the stability of Sierra Leone and in that regard urged all those concerned to consult over the timing of troop movements and withdrawals.

In November 1999, the first UN peacekeepers of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) arrived to replace ECOMOG. The UN force was tasked with enforcing the peace agreement, the Lome accord, signed between the Sierra Leone government and the RUF on July 7. UNAMSIL immediately ran into problems.
Contingents of UN soldiers were ambushed and captured, providing the RUF with more weapons and equipment. The RUF was again on the move and looked like it could be back in Freetown. The UK deployed several hundred troops, an aircraft carrier, a helicopter carrier and a number of frigates in May of 2000 to Freetown. The situation stabilized, UNAMSIL with significant UK support controlled the western portion of Sierra Leone, while the RUF controlled the eastern half. The RUF portion contained many of the most important mining centers in the country. These mines were the source of revenue for the RUF. UNAMSIL was beset with problems, which was compounded by the decision of the Jordanian and Indian contingents that provided half of the peacekeepers, to withdraw from Sierra Leone.

On 7 December 1999, the Force Commander, Major General Vijay Kumar Jetley, assumed command of the military component of UNAMSIL. The military strength was 4,819, with five of the six authorized battalions now deployed in Sierra Leone. At present UNAMSIL is deployed in the Freetown peninsula, at Lungi airport and its vicinity and in Port Loko, Lunsar, Masiaka, Makeni, Magburaka, Kenema and Daru.

On 23 December 1999, the Secretariat held discussions at United Nations Headquarters with a high-level Nigerian delegation on the incorporation of Nigerian units in UNAMSIL as well as on the modalities of withdrawing Nigerian troops from ECOMOG. The discussions resulted in an understanding that Nigeria and the United Nations would work together closely to avoid any security gap in Sierra Leone and that Nigeria and the Secretariat would coordinate the deployment of troops to and the repatriation of troops from Sierra Leone and would discuss, in due course, the participation of Nigeria in an expanded UNAMSIL.
Table 3. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone: contributions as at 10 January 2000

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* Plus four civilian police observers from Namibia (Chief), Ghana, Kenya and Norway.
The UN Security Council, at its 4099th meeting on 7 February 2000, took note of the decision of the Governments of Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana to withdraw their remaining contingents from ECOMOG in Sierra Leone.

The UN Security Council expressed its appreciation to ECOMOG for its indispensable contribution towards the restoration of democracy and the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Sierra Leone.

The Council commended highly the forces and the Governments of its contributing States for their courage and sacrifice. It encouraged all States to assist the contributing States further in meeting the costs they had incurred in making possible the deployment of ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone. The Council noted with concern the continuing human rights violations against the civilian population of Sierra Leone and called upon the parties and all others involved, taking steps to ensure that the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme was fully implemented throughout the country.

It urged in particular, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Civil Defence Forces, the former Sierra Leone Armed Forces/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and all other armed groups to participate fully in the programme and cooperate with all those responsible for its implementation (The UN Security Council 2000).

The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided that the mandate of UNAMSIL should be revised to include the following additional tasks, to be performed by UNAMSIL within its capabilities and areas of deployment and in the light of conditions on the ground:

(a) To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including Lungi airport.
(b) To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares.

(c) To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

(d) To coordinate with and assist, in common areas of deployment, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities.

(e) To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction, authorizes UNAMSIL to take the necessary action to fulfill the additional tasks set out above, and affirms that, in the discharge of its mandate, UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of Sierra Leone (The UN Security Council 2000:2).

On February 7, 2000, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to adopt a British-sponsored resolution to increase the authorized strength of UNAMSIL from 6,000 to 11,100 troops. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for the increase, after Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo told the United Nations that his government would pull all Nigerian troops out of Sierra Leone by the end of February. Nigeria later extended the deadline by 90 days. The United Nations peacekeeping force has also been given a more ‘robust’ mandate, and will assume some of the security functions currently carried out by ECOMOG.

UNAMSIL will provide security at key locations and government buildings including Lungi International Airport and sites being used in the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme, and will coordinate with and assist local law enforcement agencies. The Council’s resolution also invoked Article VII of the United Nations charter to affirm that U.N. peacekeepers ‘may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and…to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical
violence.’ U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Hédi Annabi, said his delegation had started talks with a high-level Nigerian delegation to discuss incorporation of Nigerian troops and equipment into the UNAMSIL force.

The Council also extended UNAMSIL’s mandate, as revised, by an additional six months. Fred Eckhard, the spokesman for the U.N. secretary-general, told reporters that UNAMSIL’s expanded mandate meant there was not expected to be a repeat of recent incidents in which rebels seized arms and equipment from UNAMSIL troops.

In his address to the Security Council, Sierra Leone's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ibrahim M. Kamara, said the government of Sierra Leone had been ‘seriously concerned’ about the possibility of a security vacuum in the country following the withdrawal of ECOMOG before the deployment of a restructured Sierra Leone Armed Forces. ‘The new timetable for the withdrawal of the remaining Nigerian contingent of ECOMOG, as well as the Security Council’s decision to expand the military component of UNAMSIL to a maximum of 11,100 personnel, should allay some of our fears about the security of the state,’ Kamara said. He added that the Sierra Leone government welcomed the fact that Chapter VII of the United Nations charter backed UNAMSIL’s revised mandate and additional responsibilities. ‘No one who has seen evidence of, or has read about the conflict in Sierra Leone should be surprised by our elation over the fact that the Security Council is again authorizing UNAMSIL to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,’ Kamara said. ‘We consider this one of the most significant provisions of the new resolution.’ As of 11 January, UNAMSIL had deployed 4,562 troops, 37 staff officers, and 220 military observers in Sierra Leone. By January 2002, the disarmament and demobilization
of 55,000 ex-combatants were concluded, bringing about the formal end of the war and the lifting of the state of emergency on March 1, 2002 (UN Security Council 2002: para. 20).

Reinstatement of President Tejan Kabbah

ECOWAS and ECOMOG have played key roles in recent political negotiations and military interventions respectively in Sierra Leone. As part of bilateral security accords, Nigerian forces and Guinean forces have been in Sierra Leone since 1995 to help the NPRC and, later, the Kabbah government to fight the RUF. The Nigerian and Guinean forces were in Sierra Leone at the time of the May 25, 1997 coup, and later reinforced ECOMOG’s efforts to oust the AFRC/RUF.

Following the 1997 coup, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) called on ECOWAS to restore constitutional order to Sierra Leone. When their negotiations with the AFRC/RUF failed to achieve its objectives, ECOWAS imposed an economic embargo, which was later reinforced by an October 1997 U.N. Security Council arms and oil embargo and restrictions on international travel by AFRC/RUF members and their families. ECOMOG enforced these sanctions with the permission of ECOWAS and the Security Council. With the failure of diplomatic efforts and the escalation of tension, ECOMOG's mandate was upgraded from sanction enforcement to actual military intervention to oust the AFRC/RUF. The ECOMOG contingent in Sierra Leone was led by Nigerian Commander Brigadier General Maxwell Khobe and composed of approximately 9,000 predominately-Nigerian troops, with several Guinean support battalions.

ECOMOG held the key responsibilities of disarming and demobilizing combatants as well as forming and training the new Sierra Leonean army. The destruction and mayhem would have been even greater were it not for the valiant
efforts of ECOMOG forces, which managed to check the rebel advance. The fact that a measure of order had now been restored spoke volumes about the vital impact of ECOMOG for the maintenance of peace and security in Sierra Leone.

5.3 PROBLEMS

ECOMOG encountered a number of problems during the execution of its mandate in Liberia and Sierra Leone peace operations. It is important to examine some of these problems at this point.

5.3.1 Doctrine

Most of the countries that participated in the ECOMOG peace operations did not have a doctrine to guide their military operations. Nigeria and Ghana are notable exceptions. None of the other countries had a doctrine of peace operations. The absence of a common doctrine among ECOMOG participants was particularly obvious in the differences between the Nigerians' and the Ghanaians' approaches to peacekeeping. Whereas the Ghanaians are trained in peacekeeping and emphasize diplomacy over enforcement, the Nigerians demonstrated a preference for a more activist, combat approach to the operation. In addition, there were differences in the fighting capability of the troops in ECOMOG. The deployment of troops with diverse background and experience also occurred at contingent levels.

There were also initial problems with integrating the various contingents into ECOMOG. Upon deployment into Sierra Leone, the Ghanaian contingent, guarding Lungi Airport, apparently had some difficulties with the initial ECOMOG attempt to employ the contingent piecemeal throughout Freetown and vicinity. They observed with concern that the entire command structure of ECOMOG was Nigerian. Standardization of military ordinance and equipment also presented problems. Since member states of ECOWAS have limited capacity to manufacture
military ordinance and equipment, it will remain difficult to standardize equipment, arms and ammunition. A possible solution is for member states to earmark specific units of their armed forces for ECOMOG service. Such units could be equipped with similar equipment, arms and ammunition. The training standards, doctrine and staff procedure of these ECOMOG earmarked units could be harmonized by an ECOMOG standing command staff whose headquarters would have to be designated and manned permanently. However, these innovations would require more political will than what is currently in existence among member states.

5.3.2 Logistics and Transportation

Supply of troops deployed for peace operations with the paraphernalia of the requirements of modern military operations is very vital to mission success, especially if it involves peace enforcement operations. The success of any logistic plan depends on resources available and the maintenance of efficient and secure supply lines. For efficient logistics to be maintained it must be carefully planned to the minutest detail and necessary data must be made available. ECOWAS failed to meet the logistics requirements of the force, thus making a centralized distribution impossible. The agreement reached by ECOWAS was that each contributing nation would provide logistic support for its contingent, which would be self-sufficient for the first thirty days of the operation. After this, ECOWAS was to take over the supply of logistics support, but the take over was not accomplished because of financial constraints. Consequently, the contributing states had to continue to supply their troops, despite the strain on their economies. Not all the ECOMOG countries were able successfully to launch and sustain their troops in peace operations. This was certainly a crucial factor in Senegal's decision to pull out of ECOMOG in 1992.
Nigeria remains the only member state of ECOWAS that has the capacity for heavy military air and sealift. The country was thus in a position to support its troops effectively, but other member states often lacked such capability. This was partly responsible for their reluctance to contribute troops for ECOMOG operations. There is need for the creation of an ECOMOG support command that would have ships and aircraft capable of lifting heavy materials. In addition, the command would maintain logistic depots all over the ECOWAS subregion, which ECOMOG troops could draw on during emergencies.

The geographic terrain of most parts of West Africa favours insurgency warfare and guerrilla operations. Experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone has proved that helicopters are crucial to operations in these areas. Unfortunately, West African armed forces have very few helicopters for combat and support operations. The Nigerian Air Force, which displayed exemplary gallantry in ECOMOG operations, seems to have learned this lesson and is addressing the problem. Other member states need to do the same so that there will be improved air support in future operations. The absence of centralized logistic system meant lack of uniformity in almost all aspects of logistics, and the effects were profound, showing huge gaps between logistics capability of the different contingents. ECOMOG officers were particularly concerned about the effects on command, control and morale.

5.3.3 Equipment

The equipment mobilized by some of the contingents was obviously obsolete. Contingents from some countries brought in equipments such as Saladin reconnaissance vehicles, T-34 main battle tanks, Type 62 light tanks, Panhard M-3
armoured personnel carriers, and Shanghai II inshore patrol craft. Although some of the equipments were relevant to military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) they were hardly operational (see IISS, Military Balance 1993-1994: 207-209, 211-212, 214-217, and 220-221).

In the Liberian operation, ECOMOG lacked much of the equipment and maintenance capability; manpower and administration; and the essential intelligence required for counterinsurgency. ECOMOG's Order of Battle was not suited for counterinsurgency. Initially, ECOMOG was equipped and organized for peacekeeping operations and not for peace enforcement operations. They had no artillery or air support. It was much later that Nigeria provided Alpha jets, multiple rocket launcher system (MRLS), wheeled armoured vehicles, and light tanks into the theatre of operations. Modern counterinsurgency warfare invariably requires the sufficient use of helicopter and spotter aircraft. These were not available. Other equipment was often costly and ill suited for Liberia's heavily fostered interior.

5.3.4 Command and control

The need for a unity of objectives and a unity of command overseeing ECOMOG intervention cannot be underestimated. The organization of each operation must be integrated exclusively under the orders of the High Command. Separating lines of command through different pillars within an operation or across military and civilian lines causes confusion, is often counter-productive, and puts the overall goals of any operation at risk. ECOMOG attempts to interdict NPFL supply lines also led to a number of abuses. After fighting began around Monrovia in October 1992, ECOMOG Alpha jets hit a number of targets in NPFL territory, causing an undetermined number of civilian casualties and considerable collateral damage. Perhaps most notably, a major site for the distribution of food and relief
materials, the Catholic Relief Service warehouse in the Buchanan area, was hit by ECOMOG bombs. In February 1993 ECOMOG aircraft strafed near the Ivory Coast border, injuring some civilians. In September of that year, Nigerian airplanes supporting both ECOMOG and the counter insurrection in Sierra Leone killed six and injured nearly forty people in a strafing run on a refugee camp at the border.

ECOMOG was made up of Anglophone and Francophone countries. These presented some problems, especially as the major languages spoken were English and French. Unfortunately, the training of most contingents did not put much emphasis on bilingual knowledge. This made communication very difficult during joint operations. Very few ECOMOG troops could speak and write French and English. There were instances where assistance through the control station were needed by one of the Francophone countries from the Nigerian contingent and they thought it sounded like ‘enemy interference’ (see The Peacemaker 1993:60)

The conduct of ECOMOG personnel is also very important. There was no clear code of conduct for ECOMOG personnel and those who demonstrated inappropriate conduct were not punished instantly. Disciplinary actions were often long delayed or quietly hidden. This not only frustrated the mission’s efforts to ensure that its members were accountable for their actions, but also left the local population in the mission area under the impression that ECOMOG staff were somehow above the law. Some ECOMOG contingents were accused of being actively involved in looting and black marketeering.

5.3.5 Irregular warfare

ECOMOG had to contend with confronting groups like the NPFL in Liberia and the RUF in Sierra Leone that relied largely on hit and run tactics. They used
terror and mutilation as a weapon, and did not hesitate to use women and children as human shields in their operations. ECOMOG's frustration was also increased by their inability to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, especially as the rebel groups had no uniforms, and often employed children as soldiers or informants.

5.3.6 Intelligence

ECOMOG operations did not give intelligence the kind of importance it deserves. Troops were launched into the theatre of operation without much intelligence. The absence of intelligence seriously affected ECOMOG's tactical capabilities.

5.3.7 ECOMOG's manpower

ECOMOG did not have sufficient forces in Liberia to maintain a reasonable level of security. ECOMOG's requirement for peace enforcement ought not to be below 20,000. Some of ECOMOG's checkpoints were as much as twenty-two kilometers apart. ECOMOG's size was not large enough to persuade the rebels into peace talks. Even the disarmament programme was affected by inadequate manpower. ECOMOG envisaged that seven hundred and fifty (750) battalions would be required for deployment for border protection alone. The cost of maintaining an ECOMOG contingent of this size for one year was estimated to be about US$ 90 million. Very few countries were able to sustain their troops in the operational theatre, thus affecting the number of troops deployed.
5.3.8 Communications

ECOMOG lacked lateral (within national contingents) and horizontal (between contingents) communication capability. ECOMOG's forward checkpoints in October 1992 lacked radios to inform ECOMOG headquarters of Taylor's start of 'operation Octopus' (see Iweze 1992). Communication posed a serious problem. Incompatibility of equipment hampered ECOMOG. National contingents arrived in 1990 with various mixtures of Western and Eastern bloc equipment. Although Nigeria provided compatible radio equipment at the battalion level, companies in different contingents could not communicate with each other, often because of different frequencies.

5.3.9 Foreign troops and mercenaries

The presence of troops from neighbouring countries of the sub-region in support of the rebels as well as foreign mercenaries had a significant impact on the nature of ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone. These provided the rebels with experienced fighters as well as logistical support. There is ample evidence that Liberian fighters were an integral part of the rebel force and that the rebels had been receiving substantial support from Liberia and President Charles Taylor. There are no accurate numbers, but they appear to comprise a significant part of RUF field commander Sam Bockarie's forces that were operating in the south of Sierra Leone. The Liberian Government at first denied the involvement of its nationals in the Sierra Leone conflict, but later admitted that Liberians were fighting on the side of the RUF, albeit without official Liberian government support or backing. All information indicates that they were involved both in combat operations as well as in the provision of logistical support and the trafficking of small arms.
There were also widespread allegations of the involvement of troops from Burkina Faso in rebel operations, but these allegations have proven somewhat difficult to substantiate. Sources from ECOMOG vary drastically in their views on Burkinabè involvement, with some saying that two of every ten captured rebels are Burkinabè, whereas others claim that no Burkinabè troops were captured. There seems to be strong evidence of Burkinabè complicity in the shipment of small arms to the rebels, and it is therefore possible to speculate that in support of this operation there may have been Burkinabè military personnel deployed in Sierra Leone. To date, however, there is little hard evidence of the involvement of Burkinabè combat troops in the Sierra Leone conflict.

There is also compelling evidence that there are foreign mercenaries operating with the rebels. Since the return to power of the Kabbah government, most foreign mercenary involvement was limited to the provision and delivery of small arms both into and within Sierra Leone, using small planes and helicopters. Nationals from the Ukraine were apparently the most active in this area. There were also uncorroborated reports of nationals from France and Angola being seen in the country connected with shipments of small arms. Foreign mercenaries were involved in limited training of rebel forces, and again the Ukrainians were part of this effort.

5.3.10 Refugees

In the course of their operations, ECOMOG troops have repeatedly encountered the problem of civilian refugees fleeing towards their positions. In most cases, the forward units with whom they came in contact did not have the necessary food and medicine to take care of the large number of refugees. They were consequently forced to share their operational rations and medicines with
civilians. Efforts to get relief agencies to take over the management of these refugees always proved difficult. Relief agencies did not want to go to the frontline and ECOMOG usually lacked the transport facilities to move such large numbers of civilians to sites that were acceptable to relief agencies. In addition, relief agencies were reluctant to hand over their food and medicines to ECOMOG to administer to the refugees. This problem persisted without a solution being found by ECOMOG high command.

Relief providers and peace-process supervisors in a complex emergency now face challenges which no longer respond to tried UN peace formulas. There are now so many disparate elements in international, regional and local response packages that unless they can be coordinated towards the same strategic concept for recovery, individually they may act against each other in the long term. Although there is a widely recognised need for coordination that overrides the parochial interests of individual agencies, there is depressingly little evidence in the recent history of Liberia that any effective institution is, or will be, vested with the authority to coordinate efforts in the field or that directors in far away Geneva, Paris and New York are willing to subordinate their assets in the field to any form of local control. A major obstacle to achieving coordination is that the international community has no proven strategy for success in these circumstances. Donors have developed funding campaigns, which are geared to respond to short-term, high-drama humanitarian emergencies, but there is no evidence of the change of funding tactics that would be needed to sustain a conflict resolution process in a strategically less important area that could take decades to achieve success. In view of these universal problems, now re-emphasized by the Liberian experience, it must be concluded that although the international community may still be willing to
respond to complex emergencies, albeit with varying degrees of conviction and generosity, it has no successful strategy for response.

5.3.11 ECOMOG air strikes

ECOMOG conducted a series of bombing and strafing raids using Nigeria's Alpha jets on Taylor territory. A total of 556 close air support missions were flown. This formed 21% of the total offensive air task conducted under Operation Liberty. Forty-two of these missions were aborted due to prevailing weather, twelve sorties were cancelled due to weapon system malfunction and thirty – six missions were aborted due to damages sustained through enemy anti aircraft activities.

ECOMOG planes easily reached targets all over the country because the NPFL was without an air force. As a result of lack of aerial opposition, Counter Air Operations sorties were flown in the counter air role. Targets included the port of Buchanan and areas around Gbarnga, Kakata, Harbel and Greenville. Few, if any, of ECOMOG's pilots had previously flown in combat situations. The Air Task Force lacked any dedicated air reconnaissance (recce) aircraft. The A-Jet was never enhanced for the challenges of Operation Liberty. All recce efforts with the A-Jets were therefore visual. Too often, ECOMOG planes accidentally hit relief convoys and medical facilities. A particularly serious charge involves violations of medical neutrality, such as attacks on hospitals. One foreign relief worker noted that the manner in which ECOMOG conducted its air strike was indiscriminate:

There is evidence that civilian targets have been hit, like the CRS warehouse in Buchanan, the hospital in Harbel and an ambulance near the hospital, although it is not clear who was in the ambulance. ECOMOG is trying to squeeze Taylor at all costs, and human rights questions then arise. They are using indiscriminate attacks, shooting from canons without clear targets. The strategy is to push the NPFL as far out as possible and to regain territory. It is a pax Nigeriana - in order to get peace, they must neutralize Taylor. Their mandate is to guarantee peace, and they are going beyond the spirit of the text (African Watch 1993).
ECOMOG contends that any civilian casualties are unintentional and the result of collateral damage. General Olurin stated that ECOMOG conducts air strikes aimed at supply routes and arms caches in NPFL territory, but denied reports that ECOMOG planes intentionally hit civilian targets. He claimed that the air strikes were ‘very, very carefully limited to strategic locations (Mosher 1993). In an interview with Africa Watch, General Olurin went so far as to accuse the NPFL of putting their own explosives in certain locations, like Phoebes Hospital outside Gbarnga, and then blaming ECOMOG for bombing.

5.3.12 Working with humanitarian aid agencies

There were problems between ECOMOG and some relief agencies, namely the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that was expelled from Sierra Leone in mid-January. ECOMOG claimed that the careless use of two-way radios by the ICRC gave away the positions of some of their soldiers and resulted in 20 Nigerian casualties. The ICRC denied the accusation. As a result of the ICRC controversy, the Government placed restrictions on the use of communications equipment which NGO’s insisted they need for logistic and security reasons. Furthermore, ECOMOG did not facilitate access to the interior by relief agencies. There was thus a considerable amount of distrust between the Government authorities, ECOMOG and the NGO community.

As a result of the adverse security environment in rebel held areas, assistance provided by non-governmental organizations appeared to be diverted or stolen by the rebels. This had led to Government concerns that food and medicine were not reaching those in need, and had unfortunately added to the Government’s suspicion of NGO efforts. While there were problems between the Government,
ECOMOG and the NGO community with respect to the delivery of relief assistance, RUF and their supporters had the primary responsibility for the humanitarian disaster. The complete and utter disregard by the rebel forces of any of the most basic rules of warfare or humanitarian law left the civilian population in the interior of the country, especially those in the north and the east, completely vulnerable.

5.3.13 Splintering of militia's

Peace operations in domestic conflicts were indeed a very difficult experience. It was even more difficult in domestic conflicts with strong ethnic components where various groups with uncertain interests emerged on a regular basis as actors on the conflict scene. Creating buffer zones was extremely difficult. Ceasefires were used in a calculated fashion to provide breathing spaces during which to consolidate and re-arm. At the beginning of the conflict, there were only the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) as adversaries. NPFL split into two; Prince Johnson broke away to form his own faction and named it the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). As soon as ECOMOG intervened, another group called the United Movement for Democracy and Liberation in Liberia (ULIMO) emerged on the scene in 1991. It soon fragmented into a Krahn faction, ULIMO-J, under Roosevelt Johnson, and a Mandingo faction, ULIMO-K under Alhaji Kromah. By 1995, ECOMOG had to contend with at least eight major factions as well as many minor ones. Some of the militia groups had very weak central control and were led by warlords that were driven by greed rather than grievance, especially the control of diamond mining and rubber plantations. This splintering of militias created a lot of confusion, which prolonged the conflict as well as the stay of ECOMOG in the conflict zone.
5.3.14 Child soldiers

One of the most disturbing features of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone was the use of Child Soldiers. Thousands of children under the age of 15 were said to have fought with the warring factions, and were among the victims of the conflicts (Whitman and Fleischman 1994: 64). ECOMOG had to contend with the problems of confronting Child Soldiers in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Liberia, according to a data collected during disarmament/demobilization in 1996-97, 18 per cent of the NPLF soldiers were children (Horeman, B. & Stolwijk, M. 1998). The majority, (69 per cent) were 15 to 17 years old, and had served an average of four years; 27 per cent of the remaining fighters under seventeen were between the ages of twelve and fourteen years old (Research Bulletin, 1-31 July 1998). ‘About one per cent of the demobilized child soldiers were girls or young women. But many more took part in one form or another in the war. Like many males, females joined one of the factions for their own protection. Willingly or unwillingly, they became the girlfriends or wives of rebel leaders or members: ‘wartime women’ is the term they themselves use’ (Fofana 1997). In addition, according to the United States Department of State, many youths remain traumatized and some became addicted to drugs. The number of street children in Monrovia and the number of abandoned infants increased significantly following disarmament (U. S. Department of State, Liberia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, February 1999).

Sierra Leone has one of the world’s worst records for recruiting children as soldiers. Between 1992 and 1996, the period of the worst fighting between the Government forces and the RUF [Revolutionary United Front], an estimated 4,500 children were forced to fight on both sides. According to one weekly newspaper
report in Sierra Leone, ‘more than 60 per cent of [a group] of 1,000 fighters’
screened by the Disarmament, Demobilization and Resettlement Committee before
the military coup of 25 May 1997 were children (Fofana 1997). The rebels have
systematically committed massive human rights abuses including forced
recruitment of child soldiers to wage a desperate and senseless campaign of terror
on rural civilians. Reports have clearly detailed the fact that AFRC/RUF recruit
many children below 18 years of age and assert that children as young as seven are
enrolled. People who were captured by the AFRC/RUF forces reported that they
had seen these forces abducting and holding young men and boys to use as child
soldiers, and that child soldiers have been among their AFRC/RUF attackers. It is
estimated by one source that 3,000 children are living in the bush with the RUF
(Roberts 1998).

On 2 February 1999, ECOMOG soldiers handed over to UNICEF seven
child soldiers they had captured during fighting. These children were aged between
six and 10 years and were abducted by rebel forces in December 1998. By the
all together 34 child soldiers and street children to UNICEF. Spokesperson for
UNICEF said that ‘Three were females. The children ranged in age from six to
seventeen years. Two of the seven-year old children claimed to have the rank of
corporal and captain. They had been involved in the RUF attack of Freetown’ (See
Amnesty International 1998: 42). A reporter for the Herald Guardian, who was
captured by the ARFC/RUF in Koidu town, also testified to the role of child
soldiers. Some of his captors were under ten year’s old and wielded guns. He said,

There were little kids, boys, around seven, nine, twelve years old who
were among the soldiers. They had guns and felt they had power.... I saw
girls held in vehicles ready to be transported. The last group of kids I saw
was held at the Branch Energy mining group office in Koidu town. They had 1,500-2,000 of them there. I saw them. In Koidu, the junta forces shouted for kids and gathered them. A soldier told me they are holding these kids as a shield in the event of an ECOMOG attack. They also use them as soldiers, for labour, and for sexual purposes.’ (Human Rights Watch 1998).

ECOMOG went through a lot of difficulty in differentiating Child Soldiers from innocent soldiers. The Soldiers in Sierra Leone were very atrocious and barbaric. They shot and killed a number of ECOMOG soldiers, as well as amputated the hands and legs of a number of innocent civilians.

5.3.15 Trafficking in small arms

A number of nations in the sub-region appeared to have been involved in the procurement and transfer of small arms and ammunition to the conflict in Sierra Leone, and this trade might have been closely linked to the diamond mining industry in Sierra Leone.

It appeared that arms were procured in Eastern Europe (either Bulgaria or Ukraine) and moved to Tripoli, Libya where they were transferred to ships or charter aircraft for shipment into the region. Air shipments seemed to have been staged through Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso and then continued on to Liberia, where they were transferred to smaller aircraft or trucks for delivery into rebel-held territory in Sierra Leone.

Both Liberia and Burkina Faso have denied any involvement in the trafficking of small arms, but solid evidence exists that firmly implicates both nations (see Africa Confidential 1999). In late March, 1999 there was an air shipment (in a Ukrainian chartered aircraft) of over 68 tones of small arms that was recently delivered to Sam Bockarie in southeastern Sierra Leone. This shipment was flown to Ouagadougou, where the aircraft sat for several days on the
presidential tarmac, as the Ukrainian crew refused to fly to Monrovia, saying their job was to simply deliver the arms to Burkina Faso. The shipment was transferred to another aircraft and flown to Monrovia, where it was subsequently delivered to Bockarie in Sierra Leone. This shipment was announced by ECOMOG on April 8, 1999 (see Africa Confidential 1999).

Libyan involvement seems to be more as a conduit as opposed to a source of small arms. Both Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh were trained in Libya, but given the fact that there was a ready source of income, it was unlikely that Libya provided their services for free.

5.4 LESSONS LEARNED

This section examines the lessons learned from the ECOMOG experience in peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

5.4.1 Clear and achievable mandates

The importance of establishing a clear, credible, and achievable mandate cannot be overemphasized. A confusing mandate only leads to confusion on the ground. The mandate must ensure unity of effort, of vision, and of political control. The mandate for a peacekeeping operation should be clear, realistic and practicable and provide for the necessary means for implementation. ECOMOG should be actively involved in the negotiations of peace accords, cease-fire agreements or other accords that define its role in a conflict situation. Before the Organization takes on a peacekeeping task, the parties must demonstrate a commitment to implementing the accords. The mandate of an ongoing operation should be adjusted to take account of changing circumstances and conditions in the mission area. In order for an operation to achieve its goals, the mandate of the force needs
to be agreed upon. This avoids confusion in the interpretation or implementation of the mandate as perceived by member states. Political objectives must be held distinct from operations in the field as a necessary pre-condition for creating a viable mission mandate. Mission mandates should be developed in close consultation with experts from the field and must make use of lessons learned to ensure the establishment of realistic operational goals.

In addition, the relationship between the intervening force and the belligerent parties needs to be clearly defined and whenever possible the consent of those parties obtained. ECOWAS Member States, collectively and individually, should provide a peace operation with adequate means and resources to implement the mandate. If a mandate is changed or adjusted, the mission must be provided with the necessary resources to implement the modified objectives.

5.4.2 Planning

Planning for an operation should begin with the collection of all information about the country of deployment. In addition to traditional sources of information, brainstorming sessions should be conducted with all elements of ECOWAS that may have some relevant knowledge about the situation. Elements to be consulted as a rule are the military, political, humanitarian, specialized agencies, information, human rights and legal affairs. The experience of non-governmental and local bodies of the situation on the ground is invaluable to the planning process and consultations with these parties should be held. Other sources of information include Governments, regional organizations, academic institutions and human rights monitoring groups.
The survey/reconnaissance technical mission should include representatives of all substantive components of the proposed mission. The team should propose an operational concept; the team's report will form the basis of the plan for the mission. The report should include strategic options and courses of action. When the mission's mandate has been approved by ECOWAS, the mandate should be translated into an operational plan with detailed and specific activities for each component. This will also assist in the determination of budgets, logistical requirements, and other administrative back up required for the mission. The operational plan for the mission should be as complete as possible, including integrated military, political, humanitarian, demining, police, human rights, and information issues. Issues that are ignored at this stage will have a negative impact on mission activities later on.

Whenever possible an advance team should be sent to prepare the ground for the deployment of the operation. Planning is a dynamic process and contingency plans should be developed, keeping in mind the changing situation in the field.

5.4.3 Status of forces agreement (SOFA)

Although ECOMOG had a SOFA in Sierra Leone, the same cannot be said of Liberia. It is a conventional practice in peace operations, prior to deployment for a SOFA to be agreed upon with the host nation. SOFA establishes the legal position of a peacekeeping force and its members with the government and citizens of the host country. If a SOFA has not been concluded, the peacekeepers cannot be covered by the UN convention on Privileges and Immunities. The formal invitation to the Standing Mediation Committee of ECOWAS to send a peacekeeping force to Liberia was extended by President Doe in July 1990. The Doe government had by this time virtually collapsed and the NPFL exercised defacto control over more
than 60% of Liberian territory. Intensive diplomatic efforts ought to have been undertaken to secure the consent of the NPFL leadership for the entry of ECOMOG into Liberia.

Consultations could have helped to bridge the gap between the Taylor and Doe camps. There was a general failure to involve Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, known as firm supporters of the Taylor-led NPFL in the decision on sending in the intervention force. This might have enhanced the status of ECOMOG as a neutral force. ECOMOG did not secure a SOFA. Instead, it intervened militarily before a ceasefire was agreed. ECOMOG almost became part of the problem it was there to resolve. The deliberate targeting of the NPFL and the arming of some factions, especially ULIMO, by ECOMOG, compromised the neutrality of ECOMOG.

5.4.4 Logistics

Operational and logistics plans should be fully integrated and developed together. As soon as a concept of operations is formulated, a logistics concept should be developed, followed by a comprehensive operational plan and a logistics plan to support it. Mission specific guidelines to troop-contributing countries should clearly include all stores and equipment required to be brought by each contingent and the period for which contingents are required to be self-sufficient.

The missions’ logistics infrastructure should be set up at the earliest to ensure smooth induction of troops and personnel and the early establishment of all components of the mission. This requires early budgetary allocation; selection, recruitment and positioning of essential logistics staff; finalization of service and supply contracts; and early procurement action. Standard operating procedures to minimize delays should be adopted. Efforts should be made to improve material management and inventory control through the establishment of an electronic
inventory, which could provide easily accessible information on available equipment and stores.

Mission start-up kits containing critical operational material could be readied and warehoused centrally to offset procurement delays during the initial deployment phase. Vehicles should be in a serviceable condition before being dispatched to missions. In view of the fact that military logistics units are not readily provided by troop-contributing countries, it may be necessary to provide logistics support through commercial contractors. Another option may be to use military logistics units during the initial deployment phase and, thereafter, civilian contractors. The Organization must strengthen its ability to administer such contracts efficiently.

The status-of-mission agreement must be finalized at the earliest and should provide for certain facilities for contractors providing services to ECOWAS missions, including the prompt issuance of visas; freedom of movement; and the right to import, for the use of ECOWAS, supplies, equipment and material, free of tax or duties.

Standard operating procedures are a valuable tool in the execution of administrative/logistic activities and should be prepared in advance whenever possible. Mission liquidation planning should start once the deployment phase has ended. A detailed plan should be prepared to ensure a smooth exit. Based on the liquidation guidelines, detailed instructions for the disposal of assets should be included in the liquidation plan.

The importance of a powerful nation that is committed to the attainment of goals within a coalition has been further illustrated by the ECOMOG operations. Nigeria shouldered the bulk of the logistic requirement of ECOMOG throughout
the operation in Liberia. Nigeria had more than 70% of the work force in ECOMOG, maintained the largest number of vehicles and equipment and above all supplied all petroleum oil and lubricants requirement for all contingents in ECOMOG from the beginning to the end of the operation. Nigeria also shouldered the responsibility of logistics and operational allowances of contingents from Sierra Leone and the Niger Republic. Without Nigeria's involvement in ECOMOG, perhaps there would have been no ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The assistance by the United States eased some of the logistic difficulties. U.S. State Department provided $3.9 million for logistical support to ECOMOG through Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE); a U.S.-based military logistics firm contracted to provide transportation, communication, and other support to ECOMOG.

5.4.5 Intelligence

ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone have illustrated the significance of a detailed appreciation of the operational theater before deployment of peacekeepers. ECOMOG suffered from a serious problem of insufficient intelligence. In Sierra Leone, the RUF marched into Freetown in January 1999, catching both the government and ECOMOG forces off guard. Using women and children as human shield, some RUF troops were able to bypass ECOMOG troops and joined their comrades who had already infiltrated the city. Among their number were Liberians and a small number of European mercenaries. In the fighting that ensued, an estimated five thousand people died, including cabinet ministers, journalists and lawyers who were specifically targeted. Before the rebels were beaten back, large parts of the city were burned and 3,000 children were abducted as they retreated. ECOMOG never expected such an invasion. ECOMOG barely
escaped a disastrous defeat and ejection from Freetown in January 1999, a fact that seriously affected the morale of the organization.

A well-managed intelligence and information analysis programme can greatly assist a peacekeeping operation. This should be taken into account in future operations, despite the Organization's traditional reluctance in this area. A detailed intelligence management plan should be completed in advance of deployment. Such a plan should cover in as much detail as possible the mission area, the collection efforts, analysis and fusion of information, dissemination and sharing procedures, operational security and the acquisition/maintenance of intelligence products, including maps. Standard procedures must be in place to assure the timely sharing of intelligence information, both among contingents in the field and between mission headquarters. A combined civilian-military information analysis cell may be established for political and military analysis. Ensuring security of information gathered and protecting the confidentiality of sources is essential. Missions must develop standard operating procedures for these.

5.4.6 Sectorization

Sectorization, a strategy of assigning a certain area of the operation to a national contingent, proved to be a very useful lesson from the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Troop-contributing countries must ensure that their contingents are properly equipped to perform assigned tasks and are deployed to the mission area as expeditiously as possible. Problems of interoperability were easily overcome when each contingent was responsible for an assigned geographic area, instead of having to work side-by-side with differently equipped contingents.
5.4.7 Standard operating procedure (SOPs)

SOPs may also be referred to as the force commander’s directive, or force standing orders. SOPs are developed for each operation, since each PO is unique. Detailed standard operating procedures for all functions of the military component should be developed. These are a valuable tool for the planning process, as well as operational and administrative/logistics activities. Units should arrive in the mission area well balanced in composition and capable of accomplishing their envisaged tasks. In providing troops for peacekeeping operations, Member States with known capabilities in specific areas of expertise should contribute troops for those purposes. Emphasis should be put on capability rather than numbers.

To avoid problems arising from mismatching troops and equipment, all contingents must arrive with their own equipment. When this is not possible, troops should be given some time to train with the new and unfamiliar equipment, prior to deployment. There is a need for flexibility in allowing overlap of incoming and outgoing contingents, even if it results in exceeding the mandated troop strength for a limited time, as long as the ECOWAS and budgetary authorities are kept fully informed.

Good and reliable communications are essential for operational efficiency. Adequate communications equipment and facilities must be provided for in the initial mission plan and the necessary budgetary requests made. Unity of command and purpose is a critical element if a peacekeeping operation is to succeed. Individual contingents must respond consistently to the direction of the Force Commander and not to national imperatives and agendas.

Rules of engagement should be sufficiently detailed to eliminate doubt as to individual and unit behaviour under various contingencies, and should include
guidance concerning mutual support by personnel and units of the force as a whole.

Unilateral withdrawal of national contingents, as was done by Senegal in Sierra Leone after they have been deployed in an operation, should be discouraged, as such, actions dampen morale and jeopardizes the safety of the remaining force. Any withdrawal must be carried out in consultation with the Executive Secretary and must be implemented in the field under the authority of the Force Commander.

When deciding on the use of commercial service contractors in support of military elements, the ECOMOG must recognize that such contractors are not capable of providing for their own security, and place an added burden on the military. This should be factored into the planning of troop requirements.

5.4.8 Finance and budget

Early approval of the budget for a peace operation is an important factor in minimizing delays in deployment as contractual and procurement actions can only be initiated only after budgetary approval. Therefore, preparation of a budget should begin simultaneously with the operational plan for the proposed mission. Requirements for each planned activity of the mission should be provided for in the budget. Budgets for peace operations should be as comprehensive as possible, with all substantive components providing input, especially when a peacekeeping mandate is being renewed or modified.

To minimize lead-time, procurement procedures should be streamlined and simplified. A list of approved vendors, arranged by commodity, should be maintained to facilitate procurement of goods and services. Field staff that has the authority to make procurement requests should be made aware of each step of the procurement process. Consideration should be given to further delegation of financial authority to the field. There should be greater decentralization of spending
authority, with regional offices of the mission being allowed to maintain petty cash accounts. Simplified procedures for reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment should be implemented.

5.4.9 Negotiating a peace accord

The pitfall of negotiating with warring parties to deliver a favourable outcome at any cost, as was done in the case of the Cotonou Accord especially, was once again highlighted. It seemed that the ECOWAS negotiators had repeated the mistakes of past UN experiences. The talks were characterized by a collective desire to deliver a favourable outcome at any cost that seemed to outweigh the more important need to address practical details on the ground. Too much credibility was given to respected figures that, in the changed circumstances of civil war, no longer controlled events on the ground and consequently could not deliver vital elements of the agreement. There was too much willingness to believe that a new Liberian government would be vastly different from the previous manifestations of interim leadership, and that somehow venality and partisan attitudes that had degraded previous administrations would somehow disappear in favour of strong leadership.

There was a lack of attention to details regarding the election, the methodology of demobilization and arrangements for security in the new Liberian government. The drafters of the Cotonou Agreement assumed too much about the strength and deployment intentions of ECOMOG, the mechanisms whereby ECOMOG would protect UNOMIL and above all the preconditions needed to achieve successful disarmament. These omissions have been noted in previous negotiating experience and are not peculiar to Liberia.
It must be concluded that ECOWAS and respected diplomats concerned approached this particular problem with a narrowly exclusive view of recent history. The officials involved should have had the vision and experience to see that they were crafting an agreement that could not be successfully translated on the ground. They should have been able to see that even the logistics to support the agreement could not be deployed in time. There must be a point in every negotiating process when the desire for a successful outcome is subordinated to guaranteeing a basic framework for success. Cotonou did not seem to have that framework. The lesson must be that it is better to renegotiate a workable agreement than to launch one that will surely fail.

5.4.10 Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration

Demobilization in a peacekeeping environment is the downsizing or complete disbanding of armed forces of parties to a conflict. Generally, demobilization is accompanied by the disarmament, retraining and integration into civilian society of some of the former combatants, and others into a restructured national army, police or other paramilitary force. In the context of peacekeeping, demobilization can be most effectively pursued if it is explicitly agreed to in the peace agreement. The peace agreement should also establish the institutional framework for the demobilization exercise, including the schedule for downsizing of forces and the establishment of the restructured national army.

The disarmament-demobilization-reintegration process requires a commitment in terms of political will and considerable resources on the part of the international community and the parties to the conflict. This commitment is a prerequisite for the success of demobilization and reintegration efforts. Demobilization is only possible when there is some level of disarmament.
Similarly, the success of demobilization efforts is contingent upon effective rehabilitation of the former combatants and their integration into civilian life or the restructured army.

Demobilization must be specifically included as an element in the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. Planning for demobilization and reintegration must be done in tandem. This requires the combined and coordinated efforts of several players: the parties to the conflict, the local governmental authorities, the UN specialized agencies, donors, non-governmental groups and the humanitarian community, as well as the peacekeeping operation. The efforts of all should be properly coordinated and should form part of an integrated approach. The demobilization plan should include operating procedures for standard activities to be performed during the entire process, such as weapons classification, storage and destruction; registration and identification of ex-combatants; and site selection and basic requirements for assembly areas; among others. The plan should also define the incentive package to be provided to former combatants to encourage demobilization. This could include staggered cash payments, food aid, clothing, household utensils, and implements and tools that would help former combatants become as self-reliant as possible.

There should be an information strategy to accompany the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. The strategy should include general information about the entire process as well as specific information, such as locations of assembly areas; who is responsible for what element of the process; what a former combatant can expect at an assembly area; and what are the options following demobilization. To guard against a backlash caused by unrealistic expectations of what the ECOMOG is going to provide, the public information
campaign should present a clear and realistic picture of what the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process entails and the limits and constraints of ECOMOG in it. The responsibilities of other actors, especially, the local authorities, the parties concerned, the non-governmental community, must also be clearly spelt out to the public.

Designated assembly points for the combatants are useful at the early stage of demobilization. At these assembly points, weapons can be collected and registered. The security of assembly areas must be ensured and infrastructure and amenities to house former combatants for a determinate period must be in place. In some situations, it may be necessary to have some infrastructure in place to support families of former combatants. An effort must be made to discourage the assembly areas from becoming satellite towns or permanent settlements dependent on UN support and supplies for their survival. Transparency of the arms collection process is vital. Weapons storage areas should be situated at some distance from the assembly areas. It is preferable that ECOMOG forces guard the storage sites.

The turning in of poor quality or obsolete weapons could be indicative of a lack of a genuine commitment to the disarmament process by the parties to the conflict. Final disposal of weapons and ordinance should also be planned, in consultation with the parties. Some weapons are likely to be needed by the new, restructured army; others could be destroyed. The destruction of weapons and munitions must be accompanied by an effort to inform the local population of the reasons for those actions. The registration and documentation of ex-combatants should be performed at the assembly areas.

The registration process should be able to indicate the preferences and future plan of each ex-combatant, his or her skills and level of education, as well as
other information required for reintegration. Following a preliminary health examination, reorientation for civilian life and counseling can also begin at this stage. Reintegration projects located within existing communities have the advantage of an easier transition to civilian life and of sharing much of the burden of retraining and socialization of ex-combatants with the community and the local authorities. The local communities would also benefit from these projects. The impartiality of the monitors of the process must be beyond question. This is necessary to ensure that disarmament and demobilization is evenly matched on both sides. This perceived impartiality is also essential if ECOMOG is to monitor cease-fire violations or to mediate disputes.

The successful example of Sierra Leone can be used to draw important general lessons for future engagements in disarmament and demobilization programs, with reference to the peace process, the institutional framework, and the disarmament and demobilization operations. The overriding lesson is that Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) can complement a peace agreement, but it cannot lead the political process. While designing programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), technical considerations should be integrated into peace agreements. Flexibility is needed to avoid unrealistic timetables, commitments and expectations. Issues of amnesty, truth and reconciliation proceedings, and/or war crime tribunals should be discussed early in the peace process. Treating all fighting factions equally reinforces the peace policies of negotiated settlement, neutrality of the disarmament and demobilization process, and reconciliation. Peace, disarmament, and demobilization cannot be implemented in the absence of security for the disarming parties and international personnel. Mass information campaigns are essential in disseminating the details of
the peace agreements and sensitizing the rank and file of the rebel groups. Peacekeeping operations are not, in themselves, a solution to conflict.

The Government of Sierra Leone, all the parties to the conflict, and the international community demonstrated firm political will and readiness to coordinate efforts. The cornerstone features of the institutional framework were government ownership and co-ordination between international and local partners. National coordinating institutions, capable of planning, implementing and overseeing a nationally driven disarmament and demobilization program, can provide local ownership and leadership.

Outside support is needed in the form of technical advice and, above all, substantial donor funding. Constant contact and communication with the fighting factions at the political and military commander level is imperative to the effective implementation of disarmament and demobilization. Eligibility criteria for disarmament should be clearly defined at the beginning of the process. While a ‘one person-one gun’ criterion can lure single soldiers away from rebel groups, it can be considered aggressive and unfriendly by rebel commanders. Although ‘Group disarmament’ is faster and more efficient, it allows commanders to falsify the number of combatants and/or weapons being turned in.

The improvement of security conditions helped to bring disarmament sites closer to the rebels and to make them more ‘user-friendly’ both to staff and beneficiaries. Decentralized and secure disarmament sites proved much more effective and speeded up the process. Improved security also allowed for a quicker return of ex-combatants to their areas of origin. A ‘fast track’ procedure could be adopted, limited to distribution of IDs and repatriation of the soldiers. ‘Fast track’ procedures are much cheaper and simpler and can be taken in charge by local
authorities. On the other hand, they limit the opportunities for fundamental pre-discharge orientation, medical screening and education. Rapid reinsertion can swamp reintegration programs, thus compromising their effectiveness. The distribution of reinsertion allowances proved controversial but helpful. To avoid allowances being regarded as ‘cash for weapons’, they should be distributed to ex-combatants on their return home. Civilian organizations should participate in the disarmament phase to assist with specific programs catering to the needs of children and dependants. Child-soldiers should be separated from the rest of the demobilizing groups.

More effort must therefore be made to develop exit strategies that promote the peace-building process. The key to this objective is the Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) process. Future peacekeeping operations must incorporate DDR into the long-term mission plan or risk former areas of conflict falling back into chaos. It is essential to involve the international community and the various components of the UN system at the earliest possible moment in all peacekeeping and peace-building processes. In Liberia, it was demonstrated that disarmament could not take place in isolation to prevailing conditions in the area. Unless faction fighters have reasonable expectations of employment, shelter, a community structure and personal security, they will probably retain their weapons and remain as part of a local gang. As a rule, disarmament planners should not attempt to disarm factions until they have organized effective statewide security or at least the guarantee of achieving it. In the uncertain period after the reduction of hostilities, a failed or half-successful disarmament can encourage a proliferation of smaller groups at local level as was experienced in Liberia. These lawless gangs become harder to bring back into the
disarmament process than their parent factions, however despotic do and inhumane their leaders may be.

5.4.11 Medical and health

Each peace operation must contain a medical element and this must be included in the initial plan for the operation. The composition of the medical element should be tailored to suit the mission's environment and requirements. Pre-deployment medical briefing of staff, including medical staff, is essential. All personnel must be well informed, through briefings and guidelines, about health and hygiene issues in the mission area. All mission staff should observe preventive measures and medications prescribed by the Medical Unit. Contingents must maintain a 90-day supply of medical consumables when entering the mission area. To improve coordination between headquarters, medical branch and the field medical units, which are attached to different national contingents, standard operating procedures and treatment protocols, should be developed for all medical units of the mission. Reporting procedures should also be developed to share experiences on disease incidence and treatment success.

Medical evacuation procedures should be clearly defined and emergency evacuation authority should be delegated to the Force Medical Officer. Stress is often a consequence of working in a difficult and conflict-ridden environment and stress management for staff must be regarded as a priority for peacekeeping operations. Education on how to manage stress, stress intervention and stress debriefing after service should be carried out.

5.4.12 Public awareness/ local ownership

Another lesson learned is the importance of developing a comprehensive
public information strategy. A successful information campaign requires a comprehensive and integrated strategy from the inception of the mission. The overall operational plan of the mission should be monitored from Headquarters to ensure political coherence so that there is a consistent public information voice and message from ECOMOG as a whole. Public information specialists must be part of the mission from its inception.

Good media relations are a long-term proposition and should not be viewed as a one-time activity. Press relations and trust have to be developed over a period. When something goes wrong, it is generally best to acknowledge that, explain why it happened and what is being done to avoid the problem in the future. Good media relations in the field include providing journalists with basic information about ECOWAS, its structure, aims and objectives in a mission area, nature and constraints of the mandate, as well as the political, social and other conditions in the host country. The briefing materials prepared for mission staff and national contingents could be shared with journalists to good effect.

Journalists’ safety concerns may also affect their coverage of events in a mission area. To the extent possible, they should be provided with some measure of security. Journalists tend to concentrate on dramatic events, such as military actions, ignoring soft news stories on other positive ECOWAS activities because they are not dramatic enough. It is up to the field operation's information section to make such stories easily accessible to the media.

There are four target audiences for ECOWAS public information efforts in the field: the international audience; the parties; the local population and the local media; and the mission personnel themselves. Effective international media coverage depends on the optimal use of television, while local populations in many
countries can be best reached through radio. Information strategy should therefore be designed with the potential of each medium in mind from the very outset and resourced accordingly.

Effective communication and interaction with the local population is essential for the mission to achieve its objectives. The mission must be able to explain its mandate to the local population, to articulate what is expected of persons living in the mission area, and to counter false expectations of the United Nations role.

Mission personnel also need to be continuously informed about the goals and activities of the mission; changes in its mandate if any; changes in the political or security situation in the country; and all other relevant developments. Mechanisms such as briefing sessions for staff, periodic newsletters, including relevant developments at the ECOWAS Headquarters, and a staff hotline are some ways to keep mission personnel aware and informed. The diplomatic community in a country is another important target group for information activities. Diplomatic representatives can exercise political influence on the parties involved in a conflict. They also serve as important sources of information for the media. The diplomatic community, therefore, should be kept abreast of developments in the mission area and the assistance of diplomats should be solicited in helping the Executive Secretary carry out diplomatic functions.

Pre-packaged public information material on ECOWAS, the mission and its mandate can be prepared in advance of the mission’s deployment and can be sent with the advance party so that some information activities can be started before the public information component is fully functional. The designated spokesperson for the mission must be among the first to arrive in the mission area and must have
strong journalism or public relations credentials. Under the guidance of the Executive Secretary, the spokesperson must be the voice of the mission in the mission area should work in coordination with the spokesperson. To ensure the integrity and quality of its information products, the mission must be supplied with all necessary equipment and staff to allow it to produce its media programmes free from dependence on Government facilities. ECOWAS information must be kept strictly independent from the information activities of all the other actors present in the area, including the parties, as well as representatives of governments that may have their own agendas to pursue.

The local population cannot be expected to support a process that they do not understand. The variety of cultural conditions and traditions encountered in peacekeeping operations require innovative and professional approaches to information policies. Even the most well intentioned and well-designed mandates are doomed to failure if the local population does not support them. Information sharing within the ECOWAS remains an area of great concern.

5.4.13 Increased coordination between headquarters and missions

The lines of communication between the field and HQ were not adequate and were frustrating to both sides. A lot of frustration was experienced with the lack of communication between field missions and ECOWAS headquarters. It was noted that Headquarters does not seem to be equipped to effectively coordinate information coming from the field.

5.4.14 Security sector reform

There is need for increased focus on security sector reform, rule of law strategies, and improved civil-military cooperation in peacekeeping. Better
coordination, both at headquarters and in the field, is necessary, and the Secretariat’s strategic guidance and support in this area is crucial. Success in peace operations can be achieved through a collective effort on the part of a broad range of actors, including regional organizations, NGOs, and UN agencies. As a political process, peacekeeping takes time and requires the constant support of the corps of Member States. However, the UN has the legitimacy and, arguably, the duty to take care of failed states and crises, especially in Africa, a military capacity equal to the task must back this legitimacy. If the Member States truly wish to support an effective peacekeeping capability, they must be prepared to supply adequately equipped soldiers.

5.4.15 Rule of law

Rule of law is a key to the future development of successful peacekeeping operations. Rule of law must be placed as the centerpiece of practically every peacekeeping mission. Without it, a credible exit strategy is inconceivable—international military forces cannot leave. Today, maintaining international peace and security cannot be separated from protecting the individual security of civilians. ECOMOG must put the protection of civilians at the center of its peacekeeping and peace-building activities. The fact that civilians have become primary targets of hostilities needs to be fully reflected in current peacekeeping doctrine. Protection of civilians is a matter of upholding respect for human rights and humanitarian law. Failure to do this could seriously undermine the credibility of ECOMOG’s peacekeeping efforts. ECOMOG must be in a position to protect all civilians located in their immediate environment, and must avoid making the mistake of attempting to create safe areas for civilians without an adequate means
for doing so.

Understandable and achievable mandates, good leadership, clear organizational structures, modern strategic planning, and the political will of all Member States are necessary for success in subregional peace operations. Complex crises cannot be the affair of the subregion alone, but must involve, in a methodical way and under UN leadership, the set of actors in the international system. With the Security Council serving as the orchestra conductor, peacekeeping, now more than ever, must be a collective effort.

5.4.16 Demilitarization and destruction

The post-conflict demilitarization processes in Liberia and Sierra Leone were not carried to their conclusion. To fully succeed, demilitarization during peacekeeping operations should dismantle the physical instruments of violence, and as such must include from cease-fire monitoring, disarming of combatants, disbanding of informal armed groups, and the collection and destruction of weapons. In peacekeeping missions, collection and destruction of weapons, particularly vital for sustainable peace, has often been overlooked or carried out unsystematically. Factors inhibiting the effectiveness of these disarmament efforts include:

a) Inadequate mandate and/or insufficient resources for operations (e.g. Liberia).

b) Absence of an inclusive atmosphere (a multi-track approach) before the deployment of peacekeeping forces.

c) Lack of impartiality, fairness and firmness of peace brokers.

d) Failure to adopt a so-called ‘Security First’ approach in which demilitarisation is accompanied by a socio-economic package to assist societal reintegration and address the root causes of conflict.

5.4.17 Massive human rights abuses

ECOMOG succeeded in stopping the bloodshed and ethnic violence in
Liberia on several occasions, and human rights benefits clearly flowed from the intervention. However, ECOMOG did not integrate human rights into its activities, which has been a serious shortcoming. ECOMOG allied itself with other warring factions, which clearly undermined its credibility. It was responsible for extensive looting, harassment and detention of civilians. There were also serious concerns about the civilian toll and violations of medical neutrality by ECOMOG air strikes in Liberia. Massive human rights abuses were inflicted on Liberia's 2.8 million people during its bloody civil war, lasting from 1989 to 1997. About 200,000 Liberian people were killed, over 700,000 became refugees, and an estimated 1.4 million people were internally displaced. All the armed opposition groups were responsible for deliberately and arbitrarily killing civilians and non-combatants.

5.4.18 The regional dimension of the conflict

It was clear that a sustainable peace could not be achieved in Sierra Leone without the involvement of the countries in the subregion, both those that supported President Kabbah (Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea) and those that supported the rebels (Liberia and Burkina Faso). In fact, without Liberia collaborating actively with the RUF, the rebels would have undoubtedly faltered after the ECOMOG offensive in February 1998, which resulted in the restoration of the Kabbah government. The rebellion certainly benefited from important outside support, and the peace process would have to take into account the regional dimension of the conflict.

There is undoubtedly a francophone-anglophone dimension, and malaise, to this conflict. The francophone countries as a whole are uncomfortable with Nigeria; a regional power that they claim tends to act unilaterally. They criticize Nigeria for doing whatever it pleases, with no dialogue with the other players. They criticize it in particular for having transformed ECOMOG from a neutral response
force into a partisan occupying force. Nigeria and Ghana, on the other hand, are suspicious of former sympathies that some francophone countries had for Charles Taylor at the time of the civil war in Liberia.

Politically, it would be desirable for other francophone countries in the region to supply troops for ECOMOG. For instance, France could be asked to use its influence to convince Senegal and/or Benin to send troops to Sierra Leone. This may require that a western country (e.g. Canada) provide logistical support. It was suggested that France might also be convinced to use its influence with both President Taylor and Compaoré to curb Liberia and Burkina Faso's assistance to the rebels.

5.4.19 Relations with local population

The support of the local population is essential to the success of a peace operation. Effective communication and interaction with the local population is important for the mission to achieve its objectives. The mission must be able to explain its mandate to the local population, to articulate what is expected of persons living in the mission area, and to counter false expectations of ECOMOG's role. Lack of local support not only hinders the operation in the implementation of its mandate and the conduct of daily activities, but can also pose a physical danger to the mission's personnel.

The local population should perceive the mission and its staff as being impartial. When the parties to a conflict attempt to use the mission or some of its staff to their own advantage, as they often do, the mission and its information component must be able to maintain and project its image of impartiality and neutrality. The effort to maintain impartiality, however, must not promote inaction. On the contrary, peacekeepers must discharge their tasks firmly and objectively,
without fear or favour.

ECOWAS peacekeepers must also demonstrate a commitment to the principles of transparency and accountability in its activities. It must not be perceived as being ‘above the law’. Designating an ombudsman, or a focal point, to consider the grievances of the local population against the mission or its staff could be considered.

Respect for the cultural traditions and social mores of the local population is an important part of maintaining good relations with the local population. Briefings on history, culture, and other aspects of life of the host country should be conducted for all staff. Efforts at peace building, such as assistance in the restoration of basic civic services and support in rehabilitation and reconstruction of a devastated country, can be an effective way of winning over the local population and increasing grass-roots support for the operation.

In its peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, ECOWAS is best advised to work through existing local authorities and community elders and its peace initiatives must be closely tailored to indigenous practices of conflict management, provided these do not contradict accepted international standards of human rights and humanitarian law. However, in areas of recent and ongoing conflict, the operation must exercise great caution in identifying local community leaders, since it is often unclear as to who actually represents the community. Due to strife, population displacements and other extenuating circumstances, traditional societal patterns and roles may have become blurred or have submerged under new, often militaristic, hierarchies.

As peacekeeping missions become more multi-faceted, peace building is becoming an integral part of their activities. Emphasis should be placed on support
of processes and institutions that reinforce reconciliation between warring parties and reconstruction of economic and social infrastructure, so that once the mission pulls out it does not leave behind a vacuum, but a foundation of peace and development that the country can build on.

ECOWAS must gear the composition of its peacekeeping forces to the new and changing role they are expected to play. The force could consist of mainly fighting troops when the imperative is maintenance of peace and security. This can be changed gradually, when the emphasis of the mission has changed to peace support and peace building, to include more engineering or other units that could assist in the reconstruction of the country.

5.4.20 Training for peace operations

The absence of national-level training in peace operations as well as multinational training exercises based on a common doctrine affected ECOMOG peace operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. National contingents of some countries that were deployed in the ECOMOG operations never had serious training in peace operations. They relied essentially on their training orientation in military operations, especially counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, noncombat evacuation and support in aid of civil authority. It is important that ECOMOG establish a common doctrine for the training of units earmarked by member states for peace operations.
CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This study has, in the process of examining the experience of ECOMOG in conflict management in West Africa, made major findings, which are summarized in line with the objective of the study as follows:

6.1.1 The ECOMOG experience illustrates the importance of getting the consent of the warring factions to the success of peace operations. The failure to get this, led to widespread and unrestrained violence, heavy civilian and military casualties that endangered the mission.

6.1.2 The study has shown that subregional security initiatives run the risk of being dominated by a single country or two. Nigeria, the largest single contributor to ECOMOG, was fundamentally suspected of hegemonic or expansionist proclivities and this affected the political legitimacy of the mission.

6.1.3 Regional political rivalries have very serious negative influence on the effectiveness of peace operations.

6.1.4 The success of peace operations is dependent on the extent to which mission mandates are translated into operational plans with detailed and specific activities for each component.

6.1.5 The study has shown that ECOMOG did not have a flexible and clearly defined mission mandate. ECOMOG’s lack of strategic direction from the beginning contributed to the prolongation of the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
6.1.6 ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone have illustrated the significance of a detailed appreciation of the operational theater before deployment of peacekeepers.

6.1.7 The ECOMOG experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone have revealed that ECOWAS still lacks critically important foundational documents and standard procedures to guide the effective mobilization, planning, preparation, deployment, employment sustainment and transition phases of peace operations.

6.1.8 The ECOMOG experience in Liberia has underscored the importance of peace operations being followed immediately by credible and sustainable peace-building measures.

6.1.9 The research also discovered that the success of any disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process depends on the political will and mutual trust of the parties in conflict.

6.1.10 The research findings have also shown that there were marked differences in the logistical capabilities of the different contingents. ECOMOG did not operate a common or central logistic administration system.

6.1.11 The demobilization and reintegration of combatants is critical to any peace process.

6.1.12 Mission mandates, when developed in close consultation with experts from the field, are very effective and efficient in the attainment of the mission objective.

6.2 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE

This study has contributed to the expansion of knowledge in peace operations, especially in the performance of sub-regional security co-operation in
peace operations. These contributions are summarized as follows:

1. This study confirms previous claims that intra-state conflicts do not lend themselves to interventions that are premised on ‘traditional peacekeeping.’ Any strategy that is weak in capability will not be taken seriously as a credible deterrent and is more likely to fail under extreme and hostile conditions like those that existed in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

2. Peace operations must enjoy political acceptance both in terms of its mission and in terms of its composition.

3. In the context of peacekeeping, demobilization can be most effectively pursued if it is explicitly agreed to in the peace agreement. The peace agreement should also establish the institutional framework for the demobilization exercise, including the schedule for downsizing of forces and the establishment of the restructured national army.

4. Early planning and coordination of disarmament, demobilization and re-integration components in peacekeeping operations is very important. This was even truer in Liberia where the violence engulfed the whole society.

5. Peace operations enjoy greater success when there is a broader membership of forces deployed on the mission by a number of countries. However, the usual problem of compatibility of doctrine, strategy, tactics, equipment, training and protection of intelligence would occur.

6. A robust force is necessary when peacekeeping intervention is without a ceasefire agreement or consent of the belligerents in the conflict zone.

7. UN support has the effect of neutralizing the perception that ‘regional hegemons’ are at the forefront of local peace initiatives.
8. Changes in mandate are on a thorough and timely reassessment of the conflict zone as guidance on the use of force is linked to the attainment of the operations wider strategic objectives.

9. While it is appropriate to ensure that the mandate of any peace operation is clarified, peace-keeping and peace enforcement is not mutually exclusive. The specific situation determines the relative value of peacekeeping versus peace enforcement.

10. ECOWAS will not be able to conduct successful peace operations if the concept, doctrine and procedures for PSO are not in place. Procedures, tactics and techniques emanate from doctrine; hence, doctrine is the most important priority. The choice of military tactics employed in peacekeeping operations is informed by doctrine.

11. The ECOMOG Experience in West Africa shows that problems of interoperability were easily overcome through sectorization of contingents, especially when each contingent was responsible for an assigned geographic area, instead of having to work side-by-side with differently equipped contingents.

12. ECOMOG experience in peace operations also highlights the importance of resource availability, especially as it affects the morale and effectiveness of the force. ECOMOG's lack of resources had important implications for the effectiveness and morale of the troops.

6.3 CONCLUSION

The ECOMOG experience in peace operations, especially in the Liberian and Sierra Leone conflicts, have exposed most of the classical problems of
peacekeeping operations, especially in intra-state security situations. The study provided an illustration about what happens when a peacekeeping force itself becomes a party to the conflict and assumes a combative role. This study examined, among others, the nature of sub-regional security cooperation in West Africa by rendering an evaluation of the experience of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It also examined the lessons learned from the ECOMOG experience in peace operations, which provides the basis for drawing some conclusions. ECOMOG's deployment in Liberia raised significant questions about its legitimacy, neutrality, and effectiveness.

ECOWAS was not envisioned at its inception as a collective security institution. Regional security had not yet emerged as an urgent priority, and ECOWAS was seen purely as a mechanism for promoting regional economic integration. This explains why the issue of regional security, which was initially considered in military terms, found little expression in the ECOWAS treaty. Two protocols by which ECOWAS ventured into the field of security arose out of a later realization that, for regional economic co-operation and development to flourish, an atmosphere of peace and stability should prevail. These were the Protocol on Non-Aggression (1978) and the 1981 Protocol Relating to the Mutual Assistance on Defence with its curious acronym (MAD). The Protocol on Non-Aggression was signed in Lagos on 22nd April 1978 by ECOWAS Member States. It was an attempt to prevent or avoid the use of force among Member States in resolving conflicts, and to create an atmosphere free of acts of aggression by one Member State against another. The Protocol, however, overlooked the issues of the incidence of aggression from non-Member States and externally supported domestic insurrection within the region. The MAD Protocol provided the outlines
for dealing with internal armed conflicts if they were engineered and actively supported by other actors in the region. The Protocol, however, did not make provision for any intervention in case of a purely internal conflict. Fifteen years after the formation of ECOWAS, the Community was confronted with its major security challenge. The Liberian civil war, which broke out in December 1989, had degenerated into a veritable mayhem by early 1990. To kick-start a mechanism for the management and resolution of the Liberian conflict, ECOWAS set up a five-member consultative group on Liberian conflict, designated as the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) on 30th May 1990. It was this committee that decided on the establishment of ECOMOG at its meeting in Banjul, Gambia, on 6th and 7th August 1990. ECOMOG was empowered to monitor the cease-fire, restore law and order and create the necessary conditions free and fair elections. It was also given the mandate to extend its stay in Liberia, if necessary, until a successful election was held and an elected government installed. ECOWAS justified the intervention based on four interrelated factors, namely: humanitarian; the provisions of the MAD Protocol; regional security; and response to the request of the then government in Liberia.

To adapt to the changes that had taken place within the Community since the Treaty was signed in May 1975, and to address the new challenges that those changes posed, some of which were undoubtedly shaped by the process of political and military intervention in Liberia, the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in May, 1990 requested a review of the Treaty. The review was endorsed and adopted by the Authority in Cotonou, Benin, in July 1993. The most fundamental provision for regional security was enshrined in Article 58 of the Revised Treaty, which mandated Member States to work to consolidate and
maintain peace, stability and security within the region. In pursuit of these objectives, Member States undertook to cooperate with the Community in establishing and strengthening appropriate mechanisms for the timely prevention and resolution of conflicts. This undertaking culminated in the signing, in Lomé on 10th December 1999, of the Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.

Recent experiences in West Africa have underscored the need to pursue the ECOWAS security agenda. ECOWAS has emerged as a pioneer regional economic institution in regional peacekeeping. Peace operation was outside the original objectives of ECOWAS that was essentially, a body for promoting economic integration. Circumstances of instability and near humanitarian catastrophe in Liberia compelled ECOWAS to intervene in the Liberian conflict using the umbrella of ECOMOG. ECOMOG was set up by ECOWAS in August 1990. Its formal mandate was to keep the peace, restore law and order, and monitor the cease-fire in Liberia. It was given no formal humanitarian tasks, although ECOWAS statements cited humanitarian concerns. The formation of ECOMOG was the first major test of the subregion’s military capability to solve an intra-state conflict. Overall, ECOWAS justifications stressed the threat to regional peace and security, including the attacks from Liberia on Sierra Leone and weapons flowing from the outside to insurgents’ forces.

This action rekindled old rivalries between the Anglophone and Francophone countries in the subregion. Many of the francophone countries actively supported the Taylor revolt. The Protocols on Mutual Assistance on Defence adopted in 1981 by member states of ECOWAS empowers ECOWAS to respond to military conflicts between member states, and to those internal conflicts
‘engineered and supported actively from outside’ and ‘likely to endanger the security and peace in the entire community’ (Article IV). ECOMOG proponents invoked Article IV to justify intervention, pointing to the considerable support given the Taylor insurgency by Libya, Burkina Faso, and Ivory Coast, and the widely shared fears of spillover effects. The UN also sanctions intervention on humanitarian grounds, even in internal affairs by the unanimous resolution 788 adopted in November 1992.

The main problem affecting the early ECOMOG, however, was the lack of clear consensus among the region’s political leaders about the role and mandate of the force. Some Member States supported with arms, and in some cases even personnel, the recalcitrant Charles Taylor-led rebel group, the NPFL, even as ECOMOG was battling to contain it and force it to the negotiating table. This severely undermined the force’s effectiveness, and badly splintered ECOWAS itself. Relationships between ECOMOG and the UN were also less than coherent and fully cooperative. This partly resulted from a tradition of the UN not to be intimate with military operations by regional bodies. ECOMOG, on its part, resented the fact that it was doing the dirty work while the UN, which was not supporting it with its incomparably vast resources, was in effect playing a supervisory role after it set up its mission in Monrovia. This problem could now no longer arise since the recent UN report has recommended support for regional organizations like ECOWAS that are involved in peace support operations. Indeed, it was noted that after 1999 there was a change in the international political climate and a much greater willingness by the international community to assist ECOWAS with PSO.
The Liberian and Sierra Leone’s interventions produced various perspectives on the legality and legitimacy of the intervention, especially in Sierra Leone where the ECOWAS intervention took a different trajectory, which polarized member states. In examining the two interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, based on the two laws that currently govern regional action (Chapter VII and ECOWAS Protocol), no enforcement action can be taken by a regional body. Although Article 52 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allows for regional mechanisms for peace support operations, this must be seen to have been done within a regional framework in which the United Nations delegates regional action. Unilateral, precipitate and unauthorized action by individual states cannot be seen as a legitimate basis for military intervention. ECOWAS presented the intervention as a legitimate regional initiative in its own right, not requiring Security Council approval. Indeed the Security Council did not discuss Liberia until January 22, 1991, when it affirmed ECOWAS efforts. It backed ECOWAS again on May 7, 1992, endorsing the Yamoussoukro IV peace process. Only on November 19, 1992 in Resolution 788 did it invoke Chapter VII to back ECOWAS ECOMOG.

The ECOMOG intervention could not be described as illegal especially as customary international law, which also regulates the conduct of states, is made by the practice of states and by convention, rather than by laid down guidelines. At least in four cases – unilateral interventions had received retroactive endorsement from the United Nations. The interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone could be justified as a military assistance package, a humanitarian intervention or in the current context a threat to regional security.

There is the possibility of ECOMOG serving as a basis for a new collective security arrangement in Africa since it was time for Africans to take responsibility
for African security. The regional body should not be modest about its trail blazing efforts at ensuring a paradigmatic shift in international law, especially now that regional intervention is becoming the norm in the world. Consequently, the recently ratified ECOWAS mechanism is perhaps the most comprehensive in contemporary international law, not only because it takes internal security issues as legitimate cause(s) of intervention, but also in spawning new forms of international law for collective regional security. The trajectory of ECOWAS’s role in regional security is an evolving one. The original ECOWAS that de-emphasized security issues is the ‘first generation’ ECOWAS, the one that has conducted intervention by ad-hoc arrangements is the ‘second generation’ ECOWAS and the ‘third generation’ ECOWAS is one in which ECOMOG operates under the clear mandate of the regional body, not outside of it. The newly produced protocol offers the opportunity for this type of regional security mechanism with a legal basis.

ECOMOG reduced hostilities and atrocities by establishing order in greater Monrovia as well as set up a safe haven for thousands of Liberians. By securing the port and airport, it also assisted relief operations. ECOMOG prevented the type of all-out slaughter witnessed between April and July 1994 in Rwanda. ECOMOG functioned as a police within its security zone and a defence force against the NPFL on the perimeter. The re-establishment of peace in Monrovia was a practical precondition for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Speculations exist as to whether ECOMOG prolonged the conflict. Liberia's history of factionalism belies such an outcome. An NPFL takeover most likely would have exacerbated humanitarian conditions in Monrovia.

From the ECOMOG experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Force Commander was actually everything rolled into one – military director, political
leader, and ambassador on the ground. Although the command structure makes the Force Commander directly responsible/accountable to the Chairman of ECOWAS through the Executive Secretary, this did not work as effectively as envisaged, given the treacherous terrain that the Force Commander had to operate under and the tensions between various wings of the operations. With hindsight, a permanent structure would have been more appropriate, but at inception, the founding fathers saw ECOMOG as a one-off affair.

Despite the numerous setbacks that have been experienced by ECOWAS, this intervention should be seen as a possible first attempt by regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. To enable ECOWAS develop an effective peace support operation therefore, the regional body must move away from current ad-hoc arrangements to a more permanent structure for sustained military co-operation. This should include among other things: joint training and field exercises and an agreement on common equipment and doctrine. A more permanent structure will however require greater regional rather than single country influence. The challenge that this poses is one of sustainability. Will Nigeria, for instance, be as willing to fund a future ECOMOG if it has less control? Another area of difficulty that ECOMOG encountered at the early stages was the lack of clarity in the chain of command. The idea of a Peace support operations commander not having a clue as to where final authority lay affects the direction and effectiveness of the force. To this end, mandate should be very clear, the force should be balanced and rules of engagement crystal clear.

Pre-1999 ECOMOG operations were run almost entirely by the military, and were set up largely by military governments. This led to some major difficulties for the Force’s operations, among which was its inability to ‘market’ or
‘sell’ its achievements. There was little public understanding of the Force’s mandate; and ECOMOG received much bad press while the chief villain of the Liberian tragedy, Charles Taylor, effectively utilized the international media to undermine ECOMOG and project himself as something of a victorious liberator. ECOMOG’s effectiveness was undermined because of a lack of public information capability. As one former Force Commander remarked, ‘we had no business engaging in a propaganda war – ECOWAS did not even supply us with stationery’!

It was also pointed out that mainly the international media provided coverage of ECOMOG operations, as regional media simply do not have the financial capacity to deploy reporters to conflict zones.

The early ECOMOG operations also faced serious problems with respect to command and control, especially after the unceremonious replacement of the force’s first commander, General Quainoo, with a Nigerian commander, General Dogonyaro. This followed the capture, at ECOMOG’s headquarters, of the beleaguered Liberian President Samuel Doe and his murder by the rebel forces of Prince Yormie Johnson. The Ghanaian government was riled about the fact that it was not consulted before the decision was made to replace Quainoo; they claimed they first heard of it on the BBC. Ghana briefly considered withdrawing its contingent, but the matter was resolved after intense diplomacy between the two countries and within the broader ECOWAS. Subsequently, there were far fewer problems with command and control on the ground.

In, Liberia, especially, none of the conditions for the deployment of peacekeepers had been met; there was no peace agreement – not even a functioning ceasefire – there was no clear will to peace and there was no clear consent by the belligerents. There was the problem of inter-contingent differences in terms of
training, capability, and equipment. Troops came from various backgrounds, and while some troop-contributing countries had reasonably trained and equipped soldiers in the Liberia mission, some contingents were far less prepared. Some West African states, for political or economic reasons, lacked coherent militaries; and what they had amounted to little more than ‘militias’ or gendarmes.

There was thus clearly a need for standardized training and equipment for troops contributed to ECOWAS operations. It was in this context that the idea of an ECOWAS Standby Force, which would be an integrated force undergoing joint training, with quotas set for each Member State, was discussed. It was agreed that this is an imperative step forward. Also providing the context for the recommendation of a Standby Force was the fact that contingent commanders of ECOMOG reported directly to their home governments, rather to the leadership of ECOWAS. It was suggested that this undermined the ECOWAS Secretariat’s ability to properly coordinate the activities of the force. The force’s relationship with relief organizations operating in Liberia was also not optimal. This may be partly ascribed to ECOMOG’s total military composition, and partly to the fact that ECOWAS did not draw up guidelines for civil-military interaction and coordination with the operations of relief organizations. At times, ECOMOG quickly mutated from a peacekeeping force into a peace-enforcement force. In fact, it was engaged in actual combat right from its insertion in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The force was therefore more concerned about where relief organizations operated than the need to provide emergency relief for civilians, since their activities would interfere with ECOMOG’s military activities. This led to a tense relationship with the NGOs, some of which were over-enthusiastic about conducting activities in ways that ECOMOG commanders felt would only support
the rebel forces and hamper their efforts to subdue them. The need for ECOMOG to issue guidelines for operating alongside relief agencies in areas of its operations was therefore emphasized.

Finally, ECOMOG’s mandate should retain enough flexibility and dynamism to enable enough room to shift from peacekeeping or enforcement to transformation especially when parties are agreed to cease-fire. ECOMOG should, under these circumstances, play significant roles in reconstruction and development activities, disarmament, demobilization, full integration of the citizenry, training of a disciplined and loyal force and general confidence building measures. In enhancing cooperative regional security, there is need for the adoption of peacebuilding approach to national and sub-regional security, which should result in an assessment of each country’s security environment and an evaluation of the structures, roles and missions of the different security forces.

6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

This research provides policy recommendations as well as their implications for regional peace operations. ECOWAS and other regional bodies recommend the following policy measures for a more effective and efficient peace operations:

6.4.1 When peacekeeping operations are deployed to implement peace agreements, contingency plans for responding to hostile opposition should be an integral part of the mission design; missions that do not have the troop strength to resist aggression will invite it. In order to improve the rapid deployment capacity of the military, civilian police and civilian components of peacekeeping operations, the Secretariat must have the capacity to act in
a timely manner on the three critical and interdependent aspects of rapid
deployment — personnel, materiel readiness and funding — once it be-
comes clear that a peacekeeping operation is likely to be established. The
Secretariat must develop additional modalities for information sharing with
troop-contributing countries and other personnel contributors. Troop-
contributing countries and other personnel contributors should be informed
of new developments by the fastest and most efficient means, particularly in
crisis situations, when the security situation in the field changes or when
casualties have occurred. A well-managed intelligence and information
analysis programme can greatly assist a peacekeeping operation. This
should be taken into account in future operations, despite the Organization's
traditional reluctance in this area. A detailed intelligence management plan
should be completed in advance of deployment. Such a plan should cover in
as much detail as possible the mission area, the collection efforts, analysis
and fusion of information, dissemination and sharing procedures, opera-
tional security and the acquisition/maintenance of intelligence products, in-
cluding maps. Standard procedures must be in place to assure the timely
sharing of intelligence information, both among contingents in the field and
between mission headquarters and the ECOWAS Secretariat.

6.4.2 For joint subregional operations at the level of ECOWAS, Standard Opera-
tional Procedures (SOPs) are needed to cover elements that are unique to
regional peace operations - for example, issues of standardization of equip-
ment, interoperability, and operational control arrangements.

6.4.3 To ensure that the lessons of all ECOWAS PSO are noted, and learned
through feedback into doctrine, SOPs and training plans, the conduct of Af-
ter Action Reviews (AAR) is recommended. AARs are important exercises, and the process needs to be formalized. Lessons learnt should be recycled into future operations and training – specifically that provided by the three ECOWAS training and education centers of excellence. Basic tenets of African doctrine for peace operations also emerged from ECOMOG in Liberia, viz operations involving peacekeeping, counter insurgency, and peace enforcement and that the principles of internal security operations were applied in varying degrees, according to their relevance to particular phases in operations. Lessons learned from the ECOMOG provide a practical articulation of principles and guidelines for the conduct of peace operations in Africa. Each operation is unique and no standard solutions are available. They require flexibility, creativity and initiative that still need to be captured in a doctrine without being dogmatic. The absence of a common doctrine among participants in peace operations in West Africa has led to different approaches to peace operations in Africa. The initial problem of integration among the various contingents has always occurred. Standardization of military ordinance and equipment also presented problems. Since member states of the ECOWAS have limited capacity to manufacture military ordinance and equipment, it will remain difficult to standardize equipment, arms and ammunition.

6.4.4 There is a clear need to strengthen ECOWAS Mission Planning and Management Capabilities (MPMC). This is already work in progress. ECOWAS has set up a staff of ten officers, with Canadian support, to deal with strategic and operational planning. The ten officers have apparently been trained for this purpose. The intention is for the MPMC to operate on a permanent
basis. Its task will be to plan for mission deployments, and after that, to oversee their management from the perspective of the ECOWAS’ Secretariat. Appointments to the MPMC have been made based on individual officer’s experience and proven capability. Nigeria, because of its long experience and resources, has been tasked with Mission Planning, Niger with Information Technology, The Gambia with Logistics, Mali with Strategic Assessment and Benin with Financial Management. Officers should have the capacity to coordinate across Member States, and procedures for this coordination should be set out clearly.

6.4.5 Continue the build up of an efficient operations centre at the Secretariat. The Operations Centre should be charged with monitoring the situation in the sub-region and managing active peace support operations. Obviously, the Operations Centre and the MPMC should be linked to the Early Warning and Response System. It is suggested that the Centre should not be wholly military but would take on a range of duties, which would require a strong civilian component. Ideally, the operations centre should reflect the same civilian and military capabilities required of the Standby Force (as specified in Articles 21, 28, and 30 of the 1999 Protocol). Careful consideration should be given to how the cell is manned. Staffing numbers and personnel qualifications should be appropriate to the tasks the operations centre is assigned.

6.4.6 Mission logistics infrastructure should be set up at the earliest, to ensure smooth induction of troops and personnel and the early establishment of all components of the mission. There were insufficient technical equipment such as binoculars, compasses, girded maps of the area, as well as arms and
munition used in the operational area. The Naval ships were not serviceable and never had enough spare parts before casting off for operations. Standard operating procedures to minimize delays should be adopted. Mission specific guidelines to troop-contributing countries should clearly include all stores and equipment required to be brought by each contingent and the period for which contingents are required to be self-sufficient. Efforts should be made to improve material management and inventory control through the establishment of an electronic inventory, which could provide easily accessible information on available equipment and stores. Mission start-up kits containing critical operational material could be readied and warehoused centrally to offset procurement delays during the initial deployment phase. Vehicles and stores should be in a serviceable condition before being dispatched to missions. Adequate resources should be provided for this. In view of the fact that military logistics units are not readily provided by troop-contributing countries, it may be necessary to provide logistics support through commercial contractors. Another option may be to use military logistics units during the initial deployment phase and, thereafter, civilian contractors. The Organization must strengthen its ability to administer such contracts efficiently. Standard operating procedures are a valuable tool in the execution of administrative/logistics activities and should be prepared in advance whenever possible. Mission liquidation planning should start once the deployment phase has ended. A detailed plan should be prepared to ensure a smooth exit. Based on the liquidation guidelines, detailed instructions for the disposal of assets should be included in the liquidation plan.
Develop procedures for quick access to strategic transportation capabilities. ECOWAS should develop procedures for accessing strategic transportation capabilities. Through procurement or arrangements with partners, ECOWAS should know in advance where to seek strategic air, land, and sea deployment assets.

Develop a force structure considerations list. The availability of an agreed force structure considerations will make the pledging process more thorough and effective. Although the concept document on the ESF includes detail on the force structure, there may be a need to generate an ECOWAS force before the ESF is operationalise. Based on past PSO missions, ECOWAS can develop a comprehensive listing of (a) types of units, (b) staff sections, (c) special skills personnel, and (d) other capabilities that PSO missions normally require. Planners to ensure that all requirements are presented at the DSC pledging sessions can use this.

Mission objectives as well as scope should be as clearly articulated as possible right from the onset. Vision, concepts, doctrine, and procedures should not be limited to only peacekeeping. It must focus on the broader issue of peace support operations. Strategy and tactics must also be considered in this regard. Concepts, doctrines and procedures should factor in issues of human security (related primarily to the rights of civilians) as a key component. The issue of articulating an ECOWAS vision is the responsibility of the various ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, but they will depend largely on the technical expertise of the MPMC for the drafting process. Concepts relate to the manner in which one wants to achieve visions or objectives. There is a need for an overarching ECOWAS PSO concept.
This is qualitatively different from the operational level requirement for a concept of operations (CONOPS) which will differ from mission to mission, and indeed during different phases of a single mission. At this level, there should be joint planning by troop contributing countries, and the ability to assess threats based on information on the operational environment. The concept of operations for specific missions must consider the issues of threats, weaknesses and capabilities – including the strengths and weaknesses of the ECOWAS mission. ECOWAS should avoid launching a ‘peacekeeping’ operation where there is no peace to keep. Thus, the mandate and concept of operations should be clear from the outset. Proper planning and a greater consensus should be sought prior to embarking on peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions.

6.4.10 Develop a multifunctional stand-by capability. The ECOWAS mission readiness plans are currently focused on the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF). The Force should be well balanced, and not consist of only infantry units. The term ‘force’ has an unfortunate military connotation, but it should not be interpreted too narrowly. The ESF should comprise of a civilian component and a military component. Deploying a force without a substantive civilian component may repeat past mistakes. For example, a standby roster of selected and trained personnel might be developed, to include: financial managers; Political Affairs officers; Humanitarian Affairs officers; Civil Affairs officers; administrative and logistical support personnel; among others.

6.4.11 Strengthen the Secretariat and mission-level financial management systems. Greater financial visibility is needed. Future missions should have one fi-
finance cell, (including finance officers from ECOWAS and donor countries) to plan, coordinate, and manage the financial matters associated with peace support operations. During pre- and post- PSO periods, this cell can, among other duties, maintain a prioritized list of peace support operations related personnel and materiel requirements for which funding is still being sought (an unfinanced requirements list). This will be of great help to partners seeking to assist ECOWAS. Additionally, this cell can be responsible for tracking the materiel and resources donated by partners to peace support operations forces. Having a capable financial management team will significantly expedite partner support of PSOs. There is the need to reiterate the importance of timely funding for the planning and early stages of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, when necessary through the assessed budgets of peacekeeping operations. Further efforts should be undertaken to identify ways to secure financing for all components of the programmes throughout the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, including special commitments from the donor community. The challenge of moving from one phase through to the other lies in the availability of resources. The biggest failure in Liberia was the tendency of planners to grossly under-resource these phases. Reintegration requires the establishment of baselines through a preliminary assessment of the needs of ex-combatants in order to be regarded as a successful reintegration programme. The sheer breadth of the expertise required and the funding to underpin it makes the resource challenge an extremely difficult one to address adequately. In this regard, funding should be provided as soon as possible to meet the essential needs, including food, of former
armed combatants after they have signed an agreement and before they assemble at disarmament, demobilization and reintegration points. There is the need for all disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes to take into account the special needs of child and women soldiers, as well as of children and women who are dependants of ex-combatants. To fully succeed, demilitarization during peacekeeping operations should dismantle the physical instruments of violence, and as such must include cease-fire monitoring, disarming of combatants, disbanding of informal armed groups, and the collection and destruction of weapons. The collection and destruction of weapons, which is particularly vital for sustainable peace, was carried out unsystematically by ECOMOG in Liberia.

6.4.12 Appoint a Chief of Staff and increase Secretariat staffing. There is a need for a Chief of Staff to co-ordinate the Secretariat’s peace support operations activities - someone who is empowered to make decisions in the absence of his/her Principal Officer. A Chief of Staff who is needed to ensure the day-to-day integration of ECOWAS should have a situation map classifying ECOWAS countries in accordance with their level of stability, and based on agreed early warning indicators.

6.4.13 Develop intra-Secretariat Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for peace support operations. There are many routine tasks associated with the Secretariat’s peace support activities. The Protocol gives the broad outlines for the conduct of these activities. It would be of great value to capture the processes, procedures, details, memorandum formats and considerations, etc. developed since the Protocol was signed, and to assemble them into SOP.
ECOWAS already has a framework for this, but there are funding and staffing constraints to moving the process forward.

6.4.14 Develop enhanced systems for information exchange and communications. There is a wide community of partners with a legitimate need-to-know of information concerning the planning, coordination, and execution of ECOWAS PSO. Available information should be routinely and systematically shared. It must also be emphasized that the technical aspects of information exchange and the medium of transmission should not be confused with the different and fundamental need for effective public information.

6.4.15 Budgets for peace operations should be as comprehensive as possible, with all substantive components providing input, especially when a peacekeeping mandate is being renewed or modified. Early approval of the budget for a peace operation is an important factor in minimizing delays in deployment as contractual and procurement actions can only be initiated only after budgetary approval. Therefore, preparation of a budget should begin simultaneously with the operational plan for the proposed mission. Requirements for each planned activity of the mission should be provided for in the budget. Budgets for peacekeeping operations should be as comprehensive as possible, with all substantive components providing input, especially when a peacekeeping mandate is being renewed or modified. To minimize lead-time, procurement procedures should be streamlined and simplified. A list of approved vendors, arranged by commodity, should be maintained to facilitate procurement of goods and services. Field staff that has the authority to make procurement requests should be made aware of each step of the
procurement process. Consideration should be given to further delegation of financial authority to the field.

6.4.16 In providing troops for peacekeeping operations, Member States with known capabilities in specific areas of expertise should contribute troops for those purposes. Emphasis should be put on capability rather than numbers. Troop contingents that arrive late and are not fully equipped detract from the overall effectiveness of the mission. Troop-contributing countries (TCC) must ensure that their contingents are properly equipped to perform assigned tasks and are deployed to the mission area as expeditiously as possible. TCC should deploy ready to operate. ECOWAS should encourage TCCs to deploy with their own contingent-owned equipment (COE) by signing an MOU with scales of equipment, serviceability standards, and reimbursement rates. West African UN TCCs should be familiar with the UN’s COE Manual, which provides detailed guidelines on this aspect and could be used as a basis for an ECOWAS COE manual. To avoid problems arising from mismatching troops and equipment, all contingents must arrive with their own equipment. When this is not possible, troops should be given some time to train with the new and unfamiliar equipment, prior to deployment. There is a need for flexibility in allowing overlap of incoming and outgoing contingents, even if it results in exceeding the mandated troop strength for a limited time, as long as the funds permit. Good and reliable communications are essential for operational efficiency. Adequate communications equipment and facilities must be provided for in the initial mission plan and the necessary budgetary requests made. Unity of command and purpose is a critical element if a peacekeeping operation is to succeed. Indi-
vidual contingents must respond consistently to the direction of the Force
Commander and not to national imperatives and agendas.

6.4.17 ECOWAS member states should make haste to ratify the 1999 ECOWAS
Protocol as well as show more commitment to implementing the Protocol,
which has in place a common comprehensive conflict prevention policy.
Only seven ECOWAS Member States have so far ratified the ECOWAS
Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping
and Security. The other Member States must be encouraged to do likewise
for the effective operationalizing of the conflict mechanism. Member States
should remain within the provisions of the Protocol, which provides an ade-
quate and comprehensive framework for addressing conflicts in the sub-
region. Technically, the Protocol needs nine countries to ratify it before it
comes into effect. At the time of signing, the security situation in the sub
region was so precarious that it was regarded as having come into immedi-
ate effect. Consequently, ECOWAS reserves the right to intervene in any
country whose activities endanger security in the sub region. However,
where the Protocol places obligations on Member States to contribute to the
full implementation of the Mechanism – including PSO capacity – ratifica-
tion and translation into domestic law is very necessary.

6.4.18 Provision of supplemental salary for peacekeepers: International donors
should consider underwriting a supplemental salary for ECOMOG troops,
administered by a third party such as the U.N., as a way to improve morale,
avert corruption, motivate increased participation by governments in the re-
region, and increase international leverage over ECOMOG.
6.4.19 Ensure that ECOWAS forces fully abide by international humanitarian law, particularly with respect to the protection of civilians and civilian objects. In this regard, all soldiers and officers to be deployed by ECOWAS should be provided with appropriate training in international human rights and humanitarian law before they are sent on a mission. A disciplinary unit should be set up to oversee the imposition of military discipline within the various ECOWAS contingents and to address violations of international humanitarian law and other serious abuses by ECOWAS troops.

6.4.20 Regular joint exercises should be organized for the services in peacekeeping and in conventional operations. Sufficient technical equipment such as binoculars, compasses, girded maps of the area should be made available to all participating units. Each formation should be made to equip and train a unit at all times in readiness to move at short notice. In addition, Rocket Propelled Grenades should be included as support weapon up to platoon level.

6.4.21 In the context of peacekeeping, demobilization can be most effectively pursued if it is explicitly agreed to in the peace agreement. The peace agreement should also establish the institutional framework for the demobilization exercise, including the schedule for downsizing of forces and the establishment of the restructured national army. There is the need for the parties to reach an agreement on broad disarmament, demobilization and reintegration issues and, during the negotiation of those issues, to take into consideration, when possible, technical advice from the United Nations regarding the implementation of the agreement. Early planning and coordination of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration components in peacekeeping
operations is very important. The demobilization and reintegration of combatants is critical to any peace process. This was even truer in Liberia where the violence engulfed the whole society. Yet, the nature of the war (numerous factions, no standing armies, ‘casual’ fighters, porous borders, external support) and the nature of the peace (no clear winner, a weak peace accord coupled with an unrealistic schedule, regional meddling, and international skepticism), made Liberia a difficult candidate for a successful DDR process. Not only was Liberia a difficult environment for DDR, but the international community's lack of engagement further undermined the DDR process.

6.4.22 The DDR acronym is often used to describe the post-conflict processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. This underestimates the complexity of the post-demobilization process. When designing demobilization and reintegration programs, it is important to recognize that the development goal is DDRRRRD:

- **Disarmament**—Taking weapons out of circulation.
- **Demobilization**—Reducing the number of combatants.
- **Reinsertion** or **Reunification**—Transporting the ex-combatants to their civilian homes.
- **Reconciliation**—Encouraging people to forgive past conflict.
- **Reconstruction**—Rebuilding necessary infrastructure.
- **Reintegration**—Knitting together a ripped social fabric.
- **Demilitarization**—Reorienting society and culture from violence to peace.
- **Planning for reintegration** should occur in coordination with plans for disarmament and demobilization in order to establish smooth transitions. Reintegration programs should be in place and operative before demobilization begins.
- **Accurate information** about what to expect at the DDR sites should be provided to the members of the fighting forces (especially to the children) before they arrive at the sites.

Too often, combatants will have received inaccurate information from their commanders. Learning the truth at the disarmament site can lead
to violence and the disruption of the DDR process. Reinsertion is the soldier-centered process of identifying an ex-soldier’s family or community and transporting the soldier there. Family reunification and reinsertion may be accomplished quickly. Dropping a child or woman back into his or her community is important but only the beginning of reintegration. Returning children to insecure environments in attempts to reintegrate them back into their communities may result in some children being re-abducted or killed, as was the case in Sierra Leone.

6.5 RECOMMENDATIONS ON AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH

6.5.1 There is need for additional research and analysis on the interrelated areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform and the strengthening of the rule of law in post-conflict environments.

6.5.2 A systematic study of the experience of the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) is recommended to enable us compare the experiences with those of ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

6.5.3 As intra-state conflicts proliferate, so also is the danger posed by armed insurgents and criminals, and so does the number of sophisticated ‘private’ armies. In the past, they were simply called mercenaries. Today, they want to be called contract soldiers. They are business executives that undertake a variety of specialized services – training, intelligence gathering, acting as arms purchasing agents and merchants of violence. Their impact on intra-state conflicts is hereby recommended for further research.

6.5.4 There is need for further research in post conflict democratization. It is generally a priority, in post-conflict countries, to try to reinforce the
legitimacy of the transitional government, and of international assistance to it, through early elections and democratization efforts. However, this process can intensify violence as well as reduce it, and can be misused as an exit strategy by the intervening force. ECOMOG’s exit strategy in Liberia in 1997 and its implication for the 2001 conflicts in Liberia deserve a systematic study.

6.5.5 There is need for a systematic study of the impact of small arms and light weapons on post conflict societies. Why do small arms and light weapons make post conflict societies very atrocious? They inflict enormous damage, both because of their large numbers and because of their destructiveness. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the ready availability and uninhibited use of small of small arms make criminal and political violence more frequent, more destructive, and more difficult to end.

6.5.6 Efforts to prevent and contain internal conflicts in Africa have recently moved beyond governments and intergovernmental organizations. While intervention in Africa’s conflicts has traditionally been the realm of official diplomacy, NGOs are beginning to become important actors. In part, this derives from the increasing reluctance of foreign governments to assume the burdens of peace operations. Nevertheless, it also reflects a recognition that NGOs have special competence and access that can supplement the capabilities of governments and intergovernmental organizations. This calls for a further research into the role of NGO’s in conflict management.

6.5.7 In post conflict peace building support efforts, large number of combatants are demobilized (male and female ex-combatants; ex-child soldiers; ex-government soldiers and ex-guerrillas). These groups are released into the
society to begin a new life. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, the entire armed forces were overhauled and the police are undergoing reforms. Policy makers have to deal with a complex set of demobilization. Further research could be carried out to examine the experiences of Liberia and Sierra Leone in the processes of demobilizing and reintegrating former combatants.

6.5.8 Demobilization and reintegration in Liberia and Sierra Leone occurred officially, locally, and “spontaneously” (self-directed). Although the focus of ECOMOG planning was the national DDR program, which includes a formal process for demobilizing soldiers, in reality, many combatants directed their own demobilization (or desertion) and reintegration. The great majority of combatants self-demobilized before the formal demobilization program. Localized demobilization of some combatants, including children and women, occurred sporadically at different times because of decisions by local commanders or negotiations between local commanders and leaders. All these deserve to be studied further as they have implications for future conflicts and peace operations.

6.5.9 The use of children in intra-state conflicts present a very serious problem – far greater problem than suggested by the scant attention it has received. The problem defies gender boundaries. The children serve as combatants or as cooks, informants, porters, bodyguards, sentries, and spies. Sexual victimization is part of soldiering for girls, many of whom are forced to become “soldiers’ wives.” Children who have been taught to kill often contribute to further militarization, lawlessness and violence. The Sierra Leonean and Liberian experience provides illustration. The use of child soldiers often threatens peace and reconciliation. It will be useful if a research
on the impact of child soldiers on conflict resolution is given greater more 
attention than it is currently receiving.

6.5.10 Child and women soldiers and women associated with the fighting forces 
(WAFFs) are not all the same and will not respond to programs that treat 
them the same. They vary by age, sex, temperament, prior education and 
skills, wartime experiences, etc. Many carried guns; some killed and tort-
tured; others were porters and servants. Many were sexually abused. Some 
were abducted; others volunteered. Some are violent and vicious; others are 
victims. Some of the violent ones respond well to re-education programs; 
others remain violent and a threat to society and to others in their program. 
Some victims are willing to be in the same reintegration program with their 
victimizers; others want to be separated. Reintegration programs need to 
take the ages of child and woman soldiers and WAFFs into consideration as 
well as their wartime experience and length of service. Some are young 
enough to re-enter the formal school system; others require special alterna-
tive (non-formal or “bridging”) schools; and others have outgrown the pos-
sibility of re-entering the normal school system, but may respond to voca-
tional education or apprenticeships. Some are healthy; some have physical 
wounds, and some are disabled. Some have sexually transmitted diseases, 
including HIV/AIDS. Some are pregnant or have babies. Most had traumat-
ic experiences with which they are coping more or less successfully. Some 
are willing to discuss their experiences; others hide their pasts. Some of the 
ex-soldiers come directly from their armed groups; others have been living 
on the street or in the bush. Most still have family members in civil society, 
but the hospitality and willingness of families and communities to accept
these children and women vary. The experience of Child and women soldiers and women associated with the fighting forces (WAFFs) in Liberia and Sierra Leone require a close and systematic study.
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