NIGERIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS: BURDEN AND BLESSINGS OF GEOGRAPHY

AN INAUGURAL LECTURE

BY

Professor Victor A. O. Adetula

Professor of International Relations & Development Studies
Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Jos
Jos - Nigeria.
NIGERIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS: BURDEN AND BLESSING OF GEOGRAPHY

Victor A.O ADETULA, B.Sc. (Hons), M.Sc, PhD.
Professor of International Relations & Development Studies
Department of Political Science
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Jos, Nigeria.

I. Introduction

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, learned colleagues and friends, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I feel highly honoured and privileged to be called upon to deliver the 60th Inaugural Lecture of our great University on behalf of the Faculty of Social Sciences. This lecture is the 8th from the Faculty of Social Sciences and the 2nd from the Department of Political Science. Professor Sonni G Tyoden gave the first Inaugural Lecture from the Department of Political Science. His Inaugural Lecture, entitled “Of Citizen and Citizens: The Dilemma of Citizenship in Nigeria” was delivered on March 2, 2006. By implication, my lecture is coming eight years after Professor Tyoden’s. I have accepted the honour to deliver this lecture with utmost academic humility, and a profoundly deep sense of appreciation, fully conscious of the humble beginnings of my journey here in this University on June 2, 1988, as a Research Fellow in the Centre for Development Studies (now Office of Research and Development, ORD). I served in the Centre until 2004 when I sought and got lateral transfer to the Department of Political Science. The announcement of my elevation to the rank of full professor (with effect from October 2003) delayed until 2005 when I had already commenced my 'second missionary journey' in this University.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, indeed I had looked forward to presenting my inaugural lecture shortly after the announcement of my chair in accordance with the best practice. I first approached the Chairman of the Committee on Inaugural in 2005. But his body language suggested that I should wait for my time! As a matter of fact, having been promoted to this personal chair since 1st October 2003, I would not, strictly speaking, consider myself a new or “raw professor” to use Professor Baxter's words. But due to the 'force of fate' my Inaugural Lecture is
coming a decade after my elevation. On 26th September 2007, I had a ghastly motor accident just a few minutes' drive away from the Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport, Abuja. I had gone to Accra (Ghana) to participate in the CODESRIA-APISA-CLACSO South-South Tri-continental Programme. This experience evidently affected my life, disrupted my academic programmes and agenda. But more importantly, it helped me to re-appreciate the essence of God in the affairs of men and women, regardless of their social status, academic achievement and material comfort. That I am alive to deliver this lecture today is to the glory of God. Mr. Vice-Chancellor, it is from the depth of my heart that I acknowledge the support that I received from family, friends, the University administration, and indeed the entire University of Jos community.

The culture of inaugural lectures is still largely underdeveloped in this University, unfortunately. Indeed some older colleagues had the unpalatable experience of rushing to deliver their inaugural lectures on the eve of their final exit from the University. Worst still, some never did at all. Two distinguished predecessors of mine in the Department of Political Science retired without delivering their inaugural lectures! Consequently, we missed the opportunity to hear from the 'horse's mouth' the recounts of two eminent intellectual giants of the science of politics. I duly recognize the scholarly contributions of Professor Jonah Isawa Elaigwu whose works on federalism and comparative politics are copiously referred to beyond the shore of this country. In the same manner, I boldly confess the positive influence of the scholarship and social activism of late Professor Aaron Tsado Gana, a thorough revolutionary political economist. Both men helped in the growth and development of the discipline of Political Science not only in Nigeria but also in Africa. In the same sense one laments the exit of Professor Omafume Friday Onoge, a Marxist social anthropologist, who retired without delivering his inaugural lecture. All the three men were in the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Jos!

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, inaugural lectures from the Social Sciences, and also by extension the Humanities, traditionally tend to provide the 'new professor' opportunity to use his/her disciplines to reflect on matters that are both of academic interest and sufficient importance and concern to the wider society. The eminent English economic historian and social critic, Richard Henry Tawney, in 1932, at the London School of Economics, said one of the functions of an Inaugural Lecture is “to vindicate the
claims of the department of knowledge represented by the lecturer against bold, bad men who would question its primacy". Also, the memorable words of Professor W.T Baxter are apt here:

> It is fitting that a new professor should be made to defend his subject, and doubly so when his subject is new... Further, the custom gives a slightly sporting flavour to inaugural lectures; there is always just a chance that the raw professor may fail to make out a case for his subject, and so may feel forced to end his address by handing in his resignation. Unfortunately, academic history does not tell us of many cases in which this happened.

I am not a “new professor” in the above context. Also, it is not likely that there are “bold, bad men” among the audience whose intention is to question the basis of my elevation, or challenge the timeliness and relevance of my scholarly contributions. All the same, I stand on the existing well-celebrated traditions of the purposes of Inaugural Lecture, including the wisdoms of those cited above, to state that the essence of this lecture is to reflect on what I have professed to date and most importantly what I will be professing in the coming years. Up to the time of my elevation to the rank of full professor, my research concentrated mainly on themes associated with two areas of specializations within the discipline of Political Science, namely International Relations and Development Studies. The two areas have remained unfenced areas in Social Science, and have benefitted significantly from interdisciplinary approach.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, a brief reflection on my choice of vocation in teaching and research is apt here. Karl Marx's school-leaving essay, written when he was barely seventeen years old, was for me a useful guide when I made the decision to pursue academic career in the science of politics. The title of Marx's essay is “Reflections of a Young Man on the Choice of a Profession”. The essay is indeed a broader social discussion of the objective and subjective conditions involved in the choice of a profession. Marx, even at that early phase of his life, rejected scholastic science and also challenged the ideal of personal well-being in the following statement: “If he (a person) works only for himself, he may perhaps become a famous man of learning, a great sage, an excellent poet but he can never be a perfect, truly great man”. With these

---

words, Marx draws our attention to the fact that man can attain his own perfection "only by working for perfection, for the good of his fellow men"\(^3\). Therefore, I propose here that the welfare of mankind should be the driving force in the choice of profession. The history of the universe tends to bear this out: people who worked for the common good of others have become the men of repute and greatness to which references are made. Here I found reason to quote Marx again that: "Experience acclaims as happiest the man who has made the greatest number of people happy"\(^4\). Further application of Marx's thesis on the choice of profession helps us to know that it is far more rewarding to be scholars who are committed to promoting development broadly defined. Thus, I have consistently devoted my scholarship to the study of politics and its implications for development processes especially in Nigeria and Africa in general. And central to this is how to better organize political communities in Africa and to help promote development. This I have come to appreciate should be our concern as community of African scholars of politics. Of course, this does not exclude non-political science scholars because the study of politics is not restricted to what is today known as political science.

The study of politics is a genial field which deals with all aspects of human behaviour. The polity inherently holds policy jurisdiction over everything man does. It was in consideration of the above that Professor Harold D Lasswell submitted that all human interactions and behavior is relevant to politics\(^5\). Therefore, students of politics are expected to function as ancient philosophers in their efforts to explain political actions, using whatever knowledge and insights available to them from all fields of human knowledge. The starting-point of politics is the basic social fact that people have wants and needs, which they cannot satisfy by individual efforts. These needs and wants often lead their coming together forming groups of various sizes and scope. In this the persistent patterns of human behavior centering on authority, power, government, and rule emerges.

The scope of the study of politics is immense. Scholars of politics have continued to engage themselves with the primary question about the nature of polity. While some choose to focus on the political institutions as key agencies of social

\(^3\) Karl Marx "Reflections of a Young Man on the Choice of a Profession" in Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels Collected Works Volume 1, New York: International Publishers, 1975, p.8

\(^4\) Ibid.

control and social change, others are putting the emphasis on the influence of extrapoltical factors or conditions on political events and institutions. Today the study of politics has witnessed significant development and progress. Of note is the growth and development in the theories and methods of studying politics. It is, however, unfortunate that many scholars of politics have concentrated on only very few easily recognized areas while neglecting others. Also, some political scientists especially those from the global North hardly take scholarly notice of Africa. Outside the continent of Africa, the region does not exist in the radars of many scholars and students of politics. Admittedly in Europe and North America, few scholars occasionally show academic interest in Africa which they refer to as Area Studies or Comparative Politics. Notwithstanding Africa still matters to the world. If nothing else, people still live in Africa and there are political problems requiring in-depth study for appropriate solutions.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, my generation of social scientists, and indeed political science scholars benefited significantly from the remarkable revolution in knowledge processing generally and in the social science in particular. Be that as it may, it is worth mentioning here that many members of my generation of social scientists in Nigeria started their career in the era of the military rule and other modes of authoritarian regimes in Africa. Although this misfortune constrained us in several respects, the paradox, however, was that the limitations brought about by the unfavourable political climate sharpened our focus and also helped us to pay serious attention to the essence of good governance at all levels. I resumed work in the University of Jos in the middle of a prolonged closure of Nigerian universities following a series of anti-SAP protests. It was also the days of Mass Mobilization for Self Reliance, Social Justice, and Economic Recovery (MAMSER), Directorate of Foods Roads and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI), Better Life for Rural Women and a host of other hegemonic projects and programmes. It was those days when hunting for 'subversives' in the academia was a popular sport of the military. Then, the military would accuse university lecturers of political bias in the classroom; that they were “teaching what they were not paid to teach”! Disappointingly some of our colleagues fell by the roadside, they sold out and became the 'philosopher kings' who provided successive military governments with intellectual lights. They were, in return for their service, compensated with juicy and materially rewarding political appointments. How did
this affect the subject matter of the discipline of Political Science in Nigeria? And what are the legacies of these trends? One clear outcome of these unwieldy developments was the emergence of a generation of political scientists, and indeed social scientists, which seeks not just to interpret the world but also to change it. It is this crop of scholars that I represent.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, it is in this regard that I am here today, on behalf of the Faculty of Social Sciences, to defend my vocation and also justify my elevation. Although the professorial chair that I occupy is hosted by the Department of Political Science, my scholarship, however, is not limited by the arbitrary boundaries erected by the orthodox intellectuals. I recall my early encounters with a host of 'gate-keepers' here at the University of Jos who felt I had no business seeking to be in the Department of Political Science because I trained in International Relations which in their narrow understanding is divorced from Political Science, and distinct from Economics, History or Philosophy. Some other colleagues would even want to know which particular set of political beliefs was central to my academic life! On one particular occasion, one former colleague in the Faculty of Social Sciences asked to see any of my published works to help him place me properly in the imaginary ideological contest. According to him, I seemed to be 'suffering' from the suffocating influence of the Dependency School. None of these constituted serious threats to me because my approach to scholarship exceeds such boundaries and confining categories. Suffice to say here that I read International Relations at the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University) where it was taught as an interdisciplinary subject, seasoned with rigorous debates about the underlying structures and day-to-day processes of world politics. In the wisdom of Professor James Mayall, "international relations were too important for their study to be left to historians, lawyers and economists, each charting their own course, and for the most part sailing past one another like ships in the night". Further training and exposure within and outside Nigeria consolidated the interdisciplinary approach in my career.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, therefore, I make bold to state before this audience that I profess political economy approach to the study of international relations and development studies. My scholarship, in terms of geographical coverage, has concentrated on Africa. I have carried out extensive research on the African

---

6James Mayall 'Forward' to Harry Bauer and Elisabetta Bright (eds.) International Relations at LSE: History of 75 Years London: Millennium Publishing Group, London School of Economics, 2003, p.3.
development process, south-south cooperation, democracy and good governance, peace and security, and Nigeria's external relations. All these bear direct relevance to the theme of 'Nigeria and her neighbours' which I highlight here. I have also collaborated with colleagues from diverse disciplinary backgrounds within and outside Nigeria, which has helped me greatly in the pursuit of my career vision of becoming a well-rounded social scientist that is able to carry out research in neglected areas. My research works on Africa have earned me two prestigious appointments outside Nigeria: I was appointed, in 2011, the Nelson Mandela Chair of African Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. In 2013, I occupied the Claude Ake Visiting Professorial Chair at the University of Uppsala, Sweden. I thank God for giving me the opportunities that I have had in the University of Jos to do what I wanted to do and believed needed doing.

II. Nigeria and her neighbours

Mr. Vice-chancellor, ladies and gentlemen, I desire to use the opportunity of this inaugural lecture to draw attention to my scholarly interest in Nigeria and her neighbours as well as the implications for her economy, external relations and security. It affords me an opportunity to present my scholarly opinion about the link between geography and external relations, and how best Nigeria can manage her external relations in view of her location in West Africa. These concerns are important in many respects. First is the proximity of Nigeria to some of the conflict zones in West and Central Africa. Secondly, there is a growing concern about the activities of insurgent groups in Nigeria that are suspected to have links with terrorist organizations operating in some North, West and Central African countries. Thirdly, Nigeria's geographical endowments – size, population and natural resources – define her external behaviours, which in turn attract both blessings and burden. For example, while Nigeria is experiencing increase in cross-border crimes including illegal oil theft and piracy, its natural resource endowments continue to attract international attention including the new global economic powers, notably China and India.

A fundamental insight from the sub-discipline of international relations, and from which this lecture proceeds is that geography plays a crucial role in defining the behaviour of states in the international system. In this context one refers to a wide range of geographical factors including environment, territory, size, space, location, population, natural resources etc. The effect of location on the international relation of
a state cannot be overemphasized. Regional location, which refers to location with reference to the immediate vicinity is central to this presentation because it determines to a large extent how a state interacts with its neighbours. Nichola J. Spykman, in one of the early works on geography and foreign policy, pointed out that "the full meaning of regional location becomes apparent only after considering both the geography and the historical and political significance of a state's immediate surroundings". The effects of geography is however not limited to external relations. In the words of Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, "the domestic politics of a state cannot be fully understood without reference to the neighbouring environment in which that nation has developed". But while evidence abound both at the national and international levels on the link between geographical facts and politics, most political scientists still pay less attention to the geographical implications of their subject. There is great wisdom Harold Sprout's message that: "The articulation of physical environment with the organization and administration of political authority upon a national or an international scale is a fundamental concern to the student of politics." Events and developments in West Africa that connect Nigeria and her neighbours have increasingly demonstrated that we must learn geography in order to learn international relations.

Nigeria has a population of about 167 million people, and it is located in West Africa which also houses the fifteen members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In 2011 the population of West Africa was estimated to be about 300 million and Nigeria accounts for more than half of the total population of ECOWAS. The present pattern of population distribution and composition in West Africa is an evidence of some pre-colonial population movements across ethnic

---

7Nichola J. Spykman "Geography and Foreign Policy II" American Political Science Review Vol. 32 No. 2 April 1938, p.213.
9Harold H. Sprout "Political Geography as a Political Science Field" American Political Science Review Vol 25, No. 2 May 1931, P.441.
10There are sixteen countries in West Africa, and 15 of them are members of the ECOWAS namely: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Eight countries in the region (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) are members of the West Africa Economy and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and share a common currency, a common central bank, a development bank, a regional stock exchange and a common banking regulator.
boundaries. Nigeria's size, natural resources, and maritime coastline have made her influence on her neighbours a favourite topic of West African international studies. No other country in the sub-region, and very few in Africa as a whole, can compare with Nigeria in terms of military capabilities.

Nigeria shares a 1,500 kilometers land border with the Republic of Niger and Chad in the North, about 1,000 with Benin Republic in the West, 1,700 with Cameroon in the East and has 700 kilometers of Atlantic coastlines. West Africa geographical area lies within longitude 20° West and 15° East, and latitudes 17° North and 10° South of the Equator (between the Sahara Desert and the Gulf of Guinea). This area is bounded in the north by Rio de Oro, Algeria, Libya, and Chad Republic; on the west by the Atlantic Ocean; on the south by the Gulf of Guinea; and on the east by Gabon Republic, Congo (Brazzaville) and the Central African Republic. West Africa has a number of Plateaux standings at different levels. There is the Futa Jallon Plateau from which rises the Niger, the Senegal and the Gambia Rivers. The Jos Plateau is the source of the Yobe River which flows into Lake Chad. The Adamawa Plateau which gives rise to River Benue has its highest point as Mount Cameroon. With the exemption of Gambia, most of West Africa's rivers are not navigable for ocean-going vessels. The wet and dry seasons are the two main seasons in West Africa. Rainfall is the chief physical determinant of the vegetation. Variation in the length and period of the two seasons from one location to another depends on the amount of rainfall. West Africa is blessed with mineral resources that include: gold, diamond, tin, bauxite, iron-ores, chromite, asbestos, lime stones, marbles, petroleum, bitumen, salt, andalusite, kainite, barite, columbite, lignite, chine clay, lead, zinc, wolfram, tantalite, monazite, pyroch lone, thorite, zircon, fergusonite, silver, felspal, xenotine, talc, beryl, and clementine.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, in the following lecture I will endeavor to show the implications of the above geographical facts and realities for Nigeria's external relations and national security, with in-depth consideration for the ways through which Nigeria has muddled through, amidst the challenges and difficulties associated with her location in West Africa. A characterizing feature of the international system is the contending national interests of states. The neo-realists argue that the absence of a
powerful world government leaves international relations in a state of anarchy and never-ending conflicts as nation-states maximize their power relative to the other states. Only a hegemonic power can temporarily overcome the anarchical power struggle and maintain world peace and an open world economy. A hegemon, in international relations, refers to a power that can dictate the policies of all other powers around it, or one that is able to defeat any other power or combination of powers that it might be at war with. The concept of 'regional hegemony' is relevant to Nigeria's role, status and responsibilities both in West Africa and indeed Africa at large. In this regard it is expected that a regional hegemon should be able to exercise expansive power within the region over which it has hegemonic influence. A regional hegemon should have the capacity to exercise its dominance through relative military/diplomatic superiority and carefully cultivate legitimacy within the region. It is within this framework that I have engaged the concept of 'hegemony' to demonstrate the interests and motives of Nigeria in West Africa which are far from empire-building but entail the use of her power and resources beyond her borders for the provision of international public good which in turn promotes her interests and also guarantees regional peace and security. Nigeria has continued to demonstrate appreciable leadership role in Africa generally, but more visibly in the West Africa.

Balancing security concerns with good neighbourliness

National security in its entire ramifications is a core value that a country's foreign policy serves abroad. In the case of Nigeria, its external relations in West Africa is guided by a policy of good neighborliness. The relationship between Nigeria and other West African countries has always occupied a central place in the consideration of Nigeria's national security and external relations. Shared geography and history with other West African countries no doubt is responsible. The location of a country has implications for its security and external relations. Nigeria's national security is no doubt affected by developments and activities in the neighbouring countries of Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea specifically. For example, the intensity of cross-border crimes like smuggling and illicit drug trade in West Africa has serious implications for Nigeria's economic security. Nigeria's
security relations with her neighbours is intertwined with the prevailing conditions in the contiguous countries. In this regard, the relationship between Nigeria and her neighbouring West Africa countries is vital to her national security.

The magnitude of attention paid to national security may be invariably graduated in concentric circles of proximity, shared interests and like-mindedness. Thus, threats to Nigeria's security from her neighbours have remained a major concern. For example, virtually all the border entry points in Nigeria are being used for drug trafficking, illegal migration, trafficking in persons, and illicit arms transfer into the country. The Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) has on many occasions intercepted and foiled attempts to smuggle arms and ammunition into the country. One of the factors in recent violent conflicts in Nigeria and which has scaled up insecurity in the country is the proliferation of small arms. The free-flow of arms into Nigeria generally has contributed both to the increase in the number of violent conflicts in the country and also their intensity. These arms are sourced from within West Africa and also from world supply of arms through the collaboration of Nigerians and foreigners. Most of the seizure by the Nigerian Customs Service was done on the border with Republic of Benin. Also, the proximity of some of the conflict zones in West and Central Africa to Nigerian land and sea borders has aggravated the illicit flows of small arms and light weapons. Illegal arms smuggling is a common feature in West Africa involving some transnational networks. Other possible sources may include pilfering of weapons by unscrupulous peacekeepers in the conflicts in West Africa.

Illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries pose a perennial security problem. Clandestine, illegal or undocumented migration is rampant in West Africa. Nigeria is a major receptor of labour migrants from neighbouring countries. Media reports have implicated some migrants from neighbouring West African countries in civil disturbance, urban and rural violence, theft, armed robbery and general insecurity of lives and property. Nigeria's porous borders as well as the buoyancy of its economy, relative to the neighbouring countries, are bound to attract migrants from the sub-region especially from the less developed countries.

Available data on cross-border crimes in West Africa such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, and livestock theft show that some transnational social networks can

---

have serious negative effects on national security. In Nigeria, for instance, political leaders and government officials, including law enforcement officials have accused migrants from West African countries of various crimes. For example, in Lagos State criminal activities at different times have been attributed to the influx of migrant labour from the neighbouring countries. Also, in some parts of Oyo and Osun states, some handful numbers of migrants were reported to be involved in illegal mining of solid minerals. Similarly, nationals of Guinea, Niger, Mali and Senegal have been found to be engaged in illegal businesses in some parts of Central Nigeria, notably Plateau, Nassarawa and Taraba States where illegal mining of solid minerals have gained much ground alongside with illegal foreign exchange transactions. Within the Northeast border region of Nigeria, cattle theft, land rights infringement by cattle rearers (from neighbouring countries, notably Niger and Chad) and violent crimes such as armed robbery, car theft and smuggling are reportedly common criminal activities in the region, especially around the northern fringes of Lake Chad Basin. Cases of criminal violence in the cities and urban centres such as Jalingo, Jimeta-Yola, Gashua, Dikwa, Mubi, Gembu, Damaturu, and Maiduguri etc. is increasingly linked with the presence of immigrants in these communities. Initially, criminal activities by the migrants were loudest in the border communities. However, these days their activities have penetrated through the hinterland. The transnational character of some languages and cultures such as Hausa and Fulbe in Northern Nigeria, Yoruba and Egun in South Western Nigeria and Ibiobo and Calabari in Eastern Nigeria has further complicated the problem of illegal migration in West Africa.

More contemporary transnational networks have come up in West Africa whose activities have implications for security at both national and regional levels. For example, new religious movements have come up in West Africa with networks spread all over the sub-region, making use of modern information technology including the internet. The invention of modern means of communication has made the state to lose absolute power over their territories. Countries' territories are easily penetrated these days as ideologies, religious beliefs, and propaganda diffuse easily across geographical boundaries. It is now possible to see cultural and religious loyalty becoming stronger than national loyalty and causing serious concern for the state. Transnational religious movements have become generally more visible in West Africa, promoting the growth of "communities of believers" across national frontiers.
Notably, some Nigeria-based Christian churches, such as Deeper Life Bible Ministries, Living Faith Church (Winners Chapel) and Redeemed Christian Church of God (RCCG) have branches across the West African sub-region. Similarly religious sects like the Niassenes Islamic Brotherhood and the Celestial Church of Christ that have their foundational bases in Senegal and Republic of Benin respectively have continuously exhibited pronounced transnational characteristics in West Africa. For instance, members of Niassenes Islamic brotherhood in Nigeria are far more than the entire population of Senegal - the home base of the religious sect. Similarly, the history of the Celestial Church of Christ (CCC) and those of its early protagonists, especially the late Reverend Pastor S.B.J Oschoffa, made Benin Republic the origin of the faith. The church today represents one of the most popular charismatic religious collectivity in West Africa, and its membership covers the entire West Africa with the concentration of its members in Benin, Nigeria, Togo and Ivory Coast.

The exportation of religious fundamentalism into Nigeria adds another dimension to the challenge of insecurity in the country. Imported religious values and orientations have, at different times, challenged the secular status of the Nigerian state. In Nigeria, the notion that immigrants contribute to religious conflicts is gaining grounds especially in official circles. The trend gained public attention in the 1980s with cases of religious disturbance in Kano, Maiduguri and Kaduna. Unfortunately the trend has continued to date with incredible intensity. It is possible that the involvement of immigrants in internal disorder in Nigeria may have been exaggerated. However, the findings of the various tribunals set up by the Nigeria government to investigate the remote causes of these uprisings indicate that there were traces of external influence and involvement of immigrants from neighbouring countries.

Similarly, it was recently reported in the media that some members of the Ahlan Sunnah Lid Da'waati wal Jihad Yaanaa (otherwise called Boko Haram) received both Islamic and military training from Mauritania, including how to make bombs and other explosives. Also, with the demise of the regime of late Muammar Gaddafi of Libya and the dispersion of his loyalists across Africa and Middle East, it is possible that some of Gaddafi's men will make efforts to get into Nigeria either as mercenaries or part of militant Islamic groups already operating in the country. The dispersed political fanatics and movements are likely to seek new locations to export terror under the cover of fomenting international Islamist revolution. Nigeria with its track records
may be one of the locations of interest to these dispersed fanatics. Already it has been confirmed that some of Gaddafi's loyalists are in Chad and Niger which have borders with Nigeria. Aliens, mainly from Northern hemisphere, have been linked with religious uprising in Nigeria. It should be recalled that Muammar Gaddafi had at one time advocated for the breaking of Nigeria along religious divide. This makes the presence of some of his loyalties in the two neighbouring countries a matter of serious concern to the Nigerian security and intelligence community. There is concern that the conflict in northern Mali may spill over to Nigeria.

Nigeria's policy of good neighbourliness, some may argue, is responsible for its vulnerability to many transnational threats. Security is a condition of freedom from danger and risk of threat that transcends military threat to include other forms of threat. Threats to national security are often assessed in terms of the extent of risk they constitute to the pursuit of a country's national interest, broadly defined. In virtually all cases, the security situation of a country is a function of its ability to initiate, accommodate and effectively respond to threats. In this sense therefore, threat is the basis for any security concern; the 'raison d'être' of any security consideration. Threat analysis must be broad and encompassing enough to accommodate all forms of interference with a country's security in any of its spheres: economic, social, military, and territorial, political, cultural, etc. There is indeed great wisdom in going beyond the minimalist theory of threat. In this regard the fundamental concern of national security is the protection and extension of national values against existing potential adversaries.

Nigeria's security interest covers all the strategic factors that affect the country's development, including law and order, development efforts, political and social stability, etc. Thus, any perceptive appreciation of the implications of threats from Nigeria's neighbours for her external relations and national security should consider the socio-economic systems both at the national and regional levels. These socio-economic systems produce the political culture that provides and, of course, limits the environment for conceptualization as well as the actualization of threats. For instance, the increased involvement of some West African migrants in criminal activities has been attributed to the failure of the state in their home countries. The failure of the state to deliver public goods to the citizenry has led, in several instances, to a "flight from

---

the state”. The people in response have resorted to exercising new forms of sovereignty that bypass and challenge the state system even where they have to resort to unorthodox means of livelihood including crime. One common pattern is the emergence of networks whose activities obliterate national borders. For example, many of the heavily armed gangs of criminals in northeastern Nigeria that have been “attacking road travelers and settlements in Nigeria” are believed to be former rebels in Chad and Niger, “who turned to crime following the collapse of their political cause”. Several instances of this form of “de-territorialisation” abound all over West Africa.

There is a new policy consciousness in Nigeria on how best to manage threats from Nigeria's neighbours. Official policy response ranges between unilateral actions to cooperation enforcement with other West and Central African states. For instance, on 9th August 2003, the Federal Government of Nigeria indefinitely closed Nigeria's land borders with Benin Republic over incessant cross-border crimes. The decision by government to close the borders, according to a statement by the Foreign Affairs Ministry, was to drive home its concern over cross-border crimes. The Nigerian government claimed that many complaints had been made to the Beninois authorities about the threats that cross-border crimes posed for the Nigerian economy as well as the people's lives, property and investments. And also that it discovered that in spite of these complaints “there was an increase in the number of cross border crimes”. Few days later Nigeria and Benin signed an agreement that encouraged Nigeria to reopen her borders after President Matteu Kerekou had pledged to cooperate more actively with the Nigerian authorities. Not long after the signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Benin, the Nigerian government announced her intention to negotiate security pacts with its northern neighbours: Niger and Chad to clamp down on smuggling, human-trafficking and cross border banditry. The closure of Nigeria's border with Benin Republic did not only draw attention to the importance of trans-border cooperation in the fight against transnational threat, that event also served to send a message to Nigeria's neighbours about its readiness to apply, if the situation

---

15 *Africa Today*, October 2003, p. 13
17 The statement issue by Nigeria's Ministry of Foreign Affairs recalled that Benin's President Mathieu Kerekou had previously pledged to take effective measures to curb cross-border crime but that he held back on taking immediate steps to redress the situation.
demands, appropriate pressures to secure its borders and which in turn reinforces public security, economic security, and the security of the Nigerian economy. The recognition of this fact was demonstrated by the Malian government in her quick response to the diplomatic moves by the Nigerian government in early September 2003 to solicit the cooperation of Mali to track down Hammani Tidjani when the latter eventually escaped to Mali. Also, around the same time the Nigerian government threatened to close its border with Chad Republic to ensure the security of lives and property of its citizenry. The threat was in response to perceived uncooperative and non-supportive moves of Nigeria's northeastern neighbours.

Many states in West Africa, including Nigeria, have shown deep concerns for the activities of migrants. Official attitudes in most of these countries have centred on anti-immigration measures to control the influx of immigrants. It is now a common practice in West Africa for migrants-receiving countries to justify anti-immigration measures on ground of security especially. But even at that, the imposition of such measures by states has the tendency to result in the deterioration of relations between countries. This is true for many West African countries where such measures as border closure and expulsion of illegal aliens had led to accusations and counter-accusations. These notwithstanding, movements of people across borders as well as activities in border areas in West Africa have continued to generate security concerns for virtually all the countries in the sub-region, and the capacity of the state to secure its borders is increasingly under pressures in West Africa. Usually the responses of governments have ranged from first-track diplomacy such as bilateral dialogue on the problems of security of border areas to the use of platform for multilateral diplomacy such as the ECOWAS to promote cooperation towards ensuring the security of border territories.

The enactment of anti-immigration measures by the Nigerian authorities traditionally has been motivated using security argumentation mainly. For example, just a week before the closure of the Nigerian–Benin border, on 9th August 2003, the Nigeria Police and immigration officials arrested dozens of bandits along the border.

---

18 The modern state system and the political and economic life of the modern territorial state among other things impose new responsibilities on states. These include determining the rights and duties of citizens within the geographical areas they govern. Consequent upon this, states have, out of concern for their security, introduced rules and immigration regulations that inhibit the rights of individuals to settle in any part of the world. See Ebele E. Osieke et al "Aliens in Nigeria: Legal Status, Control and National Security" in Bala J. Takaya (ed.) Security Administration and Human Rights: Prospects for Nigeria's Third Republic and Beyond, Abuja; Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, pp. 2-61.

19 Such responses include the various agreements on internal security between and among ECOWAS.
Security officials had traced their hideout to a location in Benin. After carrying out daring and murderous operations in Nigerian cities, armed robbers usually flee into Benin Republic where they hibernate in preparation for their next escapade. There was a notorious case of one Shina Rambo, a daredevil armed robber who used Cotonou as his base. For several months Shina Rambo and his gang tormented the people of Ogun and Lagos states. Also, the Nigerian security agencies often report incidents of arms smuggling, armed banditry and human trafficking along the country's 773-kilometre (460-mile) Cotonou-Badagry road. For instance, between 2000 and July 2003, no fewer than 2000 vehicles stolen from Nigeria were said to have been taken to Benin Republic through the porous border.

Security reasons were more pronounced as the rationale for enacting strict anti-immigration regulations in Nigeria. However, economic elements can also be connected to Nigeria's official decisions and actions. The closure of the Benin border in 2003 is illustrative in this regard. The Seme border poses serious threat to Nigerian economy. Nigeria's goods, especially, its cheap fuel are frequently and massively smuggled into Benin. The economic element can be connected with the security of the Nigeria oil sector. Oil is the mainstay of Nigerian economy, the exploitation and protection of existing and potential future oil deposits are inextricably linked to national security. Nigeria's recognition of this vulnerability was evident in the deployment of government security forces to curb oil smuggling by sophisticated criminal gangs that divert crude oil from pipelines into vessels for sale abroad. It was quite serious that the Nigerian Navy, with assistance from the US Defence Department, was mobilized to curb oil smuggling especially in the Niger Delta region. Also, whenever Nigeria has imposed protectionist policies banning various imports, the border with Benin Republic has been the preferred route for prohibited goods. Imports at Benin's main port of Cotonou have risen sharply and its border area has become one vast market supplying Nigerian traders. For example, most of the pre-owned or second hand cars sold in Nigeria are procured from the Cotonou port and smuggled into the country through illegal routes. Also, most banned products in countries, as well as the various meetings of internal security officials of ECOWAS countries. Notably, more than ever, the Secretariat of ECOWAS is given serious concern to joint control of criminal activities in West Africa.

10. Africa Today, October 2003, p.13
general find their way into the country through the Seme border.

Nigeria's borders with Chad and Cameroon have witnessed serious hostilities which have implications for national security in Nigeria. Nigeria has in the past had conflicts with Cameroon over contested offshore oil rights. Its border with Cameroon witnessed several clashes. Neither Cameroon nor Chad was a signatory to the ECOWAS protocols on the free movement of community citizens. This partially explains the occurrence of greater border tensions between these countries and Nigeria. In 1981 five Nigerian soldiers were killed and three wounded when a Cameroonian patrol boat fired on a Nigerian vessel off the contested Rio del Rey area, which was thought to be rich in oil, gas, and uranium deposits. In May 1987, Cameroonian gendarmes allegedly occupied sixteen border villages in Borno State until they were repulsed by the Nigerian Army. The Federal Government issued orders to state governors "to take military reprisals against any belligerent neighboring country," and tension remained high until President Babangida's visit to Yaounde, capital of Cameroon, yielded mutual pledges of steps to prevent a recurrence of border clashes, including joint border patrols.

It is worth examining ways in which emigrants from Nigeria into West African countries have contributed to 'disorder' in their host countries. The period of the 1980s was a period of serious economic crisis in Nigeria. Because of economic recession even some members of the dominant classes sought means of accumulation in areas other than the traditional export – imports business, while the less privileged took consolation in crimes and other forms of ritual. In a country where legitimate economic opportunities were far less lucrative criminal activities like drug trafficking, child and women trafficking, female prostitution and child slavery, fraudulent business transaction (otherwise known as '419') presented enormous temptation in time of recession. There has been an upsurge in the number of Nigerians emigrating abroad since the beginning of the 1980s. Today there is a high concentration of Nigerian nationals in other countries including those of West Africa. Immigration frauds, business fraud and illegal drug trade are common criminal activities by some Nigerian nationals in other countries. In recent times, it has been reported that the activities of Nigerian 'drug pushers' have extended beyond Europe to include some African countries. In Chad and Equatorial Guinea arrests were made of some Nigerians alleged to be dealing in drugs.
Movement of children in Benin and Nigeria is one dominant form of increasingly sophisticated regional trend in human trafficking. Traffickers operate an international network that covers most of West and Central Africa and several European cities. Children 'seized' or 'captured' from source countries notably Benin and Togo are brought to Nigeria under inhuman conditions. Traffickers are also active in Burkina Faso and Mali, where children are recruited and taken to Ivory Coast to work in the cocoa farms. In Nigeria 'slave children' from source countries are used as child labourers on construction sites to dig granite, crush gravel or work in cocoa farms in different parts of southwestern Nigeria. Nigeria is also being used as transit country to destinations like Cameroon, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea where the boys are often used as farm labourers and girls as domestic hands or prostitutes. These children are usually moved from the southwest through the southeastern Nigeria states of Imo, Abia, Ebonyi, and Cross River to final destinations in Central Africa. There is another dimension of the trafficking in person which is equally disturbing. This refers to the activities of human traffickers in West Africa which operate criminal networks that specialize in obtaining women and sending them to Europe through some West and North African countries to work as prostitutes. Nigeria harbours a concentration of well-established networks of middle men and racketeers who forge passports and visas and transport or assist the human traffickers and their victims in their journey to Europe through some West and North African countries.  

West Africa and other regions of continental Africa are experiencing new forms of violence whose causes have become associated with contemporary globalization. Arguably violent conflicts in Africa are now increasingly influenced by key elements of globalization which include global expansion of production, trade and finance as well as the less-acknowledged but effectual forms of globalization such as expansion of ideas, culture, religion and norms. Also, the growth of transnational social networks in Africa has contributed to transnational violence in Africa. There is the sense in which it can be said that changes in the general conditions for political and economic development in Africa that are linked to neo-liberal globalization have in turn intensified new forms of violence on the African continent generally. Take for example, ethnic and religious conflicts now occur as part of transnational relations in post-colonial Africa. Similarly, human trafficking, cross-border robbery and other

---

21 It is open secret in Nigeria that forged or stolen traveling documents can be bought at Oluwole Street in Lagos, Nigeria's commercial capital, for up to US$6,000.
cross-border crimes are on the increase all over West Africa in addition to mineral resources-driven conflicts.

The current wave of globalization has generated other forms of violence that are not strictly in the form of conventional war situations. For example, globalization generally has made transnational criminals appear “as pioneers and visionaries in the age of globalization”. Transnational criminal organizations have not only “adopted facilitative and exacting measures to remain competitive” they can also now boast of having “an enviable organizational culture of efficiency and accountability, and maximized the opportunities provided by globalization, courtesy of communications/technology revolution which have made the international system more interactive, integrated, interrelated, and interconnected. Although Africa is still lacking behind other regions of the world in the area of information communication technology (ICT), it has, however, recorded high increase in transnational criminal activities which include car and livestock theft, trafficking in persons (slaves, child labor, and prostitutes), narcotics, and small arms. Some generalization can be made for Africa based on the experience of West Africa. Parallel economic activities notably in the sale of mineral resources, petroleum products, and re-exported products have continued to grow and expand in the region. Cross-border crimes have been on the increase in West Africa especially since the 1990s and several media reports have implicated West Africa migrants. Nationals of Guinea, Niger, Mali and Senegal have been reported to be engaged in illegal businesses in some parts of Central Nigeria.

Apart from the spread of global crime, globalization has also increased global insecurity through the spread of disease such as HIV/AIDS. Sub-Saharan Africa has been more severely affected by AIDS than any part of the world, and increases in conflicts as well as their quick spread within regions have contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS with soldiers as effective agents. In West Africa HIV/AIDS is spreading at an alarming rate. Liberia has one of the highest incidence of HIV/AIDS in West Africa. The inflow of troops from other countries as part of the peace keeping operations in Liberia and other conflict zones in West Africa, either under the auspices of the ECOWAS or the UN also aided the increase in infections in West Africa. This trend as well as others problems that have cross-border dimensions such as pest attack, global warming and environment, drug and human trafficking call for a comprehensive regional approach. However, while, the dominant international relations discourse in the post-Cold War era acknowledges “complex interdependence” as one of the
defining characteristics of global system and tends to favor regionalist approach in the management of inter-state relations, states are still generally protective of their sovereignty despite the overwhelming impact of the globalization process.

**Promoting West African integration**

One way through which Nigeria has managed the demands and pressures arising from her location in West Africa is through the promotion and consolidation of the ideal of a broad West African integration. The evolution, growth and development of West African integration is associated with the commitment of Nigeria to the policy of good neighborliness; to enhance her security, economic development of West Africa, and peace and stability of the region. The history of the pre-colonial West Africa reveals that there were activities that cut across states frontiers. For instance, the movements of people, capital and goods in West Africa dated back to the eleventh century. Also, several West African cities such as Kano, Timbuktu and Jenne were important for their roles in the trans-Saharan trade. These historical antecedents logically presented modern West Africa with necessary background condition for the evolution of modern regional integration. It is important to note that the colonialists exploited this opportunity to their own advantage, especially for the purpose of administrative convenience.

In my previous research on regional integration, I had conceived of regional integration as a dialectical unity of social, economic and political processes in a region. Also, in my application of this conceptualization to West Africa, I argue that the Pan-Africanist consciousness that spread across West Africa in the 1950s served as an integrative force, and provided the necessary background condition for the evolution of modern integration process in the sub-region. As early as 1920s in West Africa some semblance of pan-African consciousness was discernible. Some movements had emerged in West Africa, whose activities were promoting the ideals of pan-Africanism. The period witnessed the formation of a British West African University, a West African Press Union and a British West African Co-operative Association. It was also during this period that the West African Student Union was formed. It was a matter of historical fact that these movements showed strong commitment to the Pan-Africanism and African unity.

However, in spite of the initial success in the 1950s, the evolution of West African integration process suffered a setback in the 1960s. What brought about this
set-back? Pan-Africanism suffered a decline on the continent during this period. This was not without implication for the evolutionary process of regional integration in Africa. There was a retreat from the pan-African consciousness by many African leaders that preferred to pursue separate development plans within the confines of the artificial territorial boundaries. Noticeably, this pattern has been sustained over the years, in spite of rhetoric by African elite about the ideal of regional integration. Essentially, in the past four decades many African countries have pursued development as fragmented projects. In spite of the disappointment with the performance of most regional and sub-regional integration schemes in Africa, regional integration is still very relevant to the developmental needs of the peoples of Africa.

Move by the above wisdom, Nigeria since the early 1960s started working towards West African integration. For example, Nigeria's Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe, in an address delivered to a meeting of the Committee of African Organizations held in London in August 1961, proposed a scheme of a West African Common Market as means of attaining unity in the sub-region. However, this and many other early initiatives did not record much success possibly because of the egocentric attitude of West African leaders to their newly won independence. Besides, the legacies of colonialism such as the reality of division along metropolitan linguistic lines (anglophone and francophone) constituted impediments. Most of the obstacles on the part of African states in the direction of regional cooperation and unity were essentially due to the dynamics of external forces. Such inhibition set in and the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union came to an abrupt end in 1964: Mali drew closer to France and went the way of other non-radical Francophone neighbours, notably Senegal. Guinea's external relations changed character after the deterioration in Guinea's relations with the Soviet Union and the East European States in 1961.22 As Ghana was experiencing depression in its economy in the late 1950s and could not compete with its moderate rivals – Ivory Coast and Nigeria, the latter stepped up diplomatic manoeuvring to woo the poorer West African States. The Ghana-Guinea Union, which for a considerably long period, was the unifying point for the 'radical' states disintegrated and was never able to attain the goals of economic integration.

Despite the daunting challenges, Nigeria was seriously committed to the idea of an all-encompassing West African integration which arguably was in agreement with her good neighbour policy and general economic goals and aspirations. Nigeria had

no option but to promote regional cooperation in West Africa. The authorities in Lagos believed that Nigeria's relations with her neighbours could be promoted mainly through closer economic cooperation by creating a sub-regional economic community, which would comprise Nigeria and her immediate neighbours, albeit without prejudice to the establishment of an Africa-wide common market. Nigeria utilized all the platforms available to her in order to drive the negotiation process toward the establishment of a broader West African economic community that would bring both the Francophone and Anglophone West African countries together. These processes culminated in the establishment of the ECOWAS in 1975 with the signing and ratification of the Treaty of Lagos. Nigeria has nurtured ECOWAS in all aspects in accordance with the stated objectives:

- to promote cooperation and integration leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent (Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, Article 3 (1)).

The ECOWAS is the largest regional integration scheme in West Africa. It's fifteen (sixteen until 1999 when Mauritania withdrew its membership) member countries include seven countries, which belonged to the Communante Economic de l' Afrique de l' Quest (CEAO), and three countries that are in the Mano River Union (MRU). It was set up with the stated objectives: “to promote cooperation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.

Modeled as a custom union, the ECOWAS Treaty and Protocol provide a plethora of integrative instruments in form of several monetary, fiscal, administrative, institutional and legal measures. With its successful intervention in several conflicts in West Africa, ECOWAS has come to be more associated with regional security.

---

ECOWAS was originally conceived as a regional integration scheme to promote economic development and growth in the region among other things. In its almost four decades of existence ECOWAS has emerged as the biggest regional integration scheme in the sub-region. It has also broadened its vision and redefined its mandate and roles to address news realities and developments. For example, ECOWAS is on the lead in Africa promoting a new security consciousness that ascribes more role to 'regionalism' in the prevention and management of conflicts. However, the overall outcomes of the ECOWAS-led integration processes have been less impressive.

The experience of ECOWAS, and also that of other regional and cooperative and integrative schemes in West Africa are necessarily provoking discourse about contents, forms, logic and values of regional integration schemes on the continent. Many development analysts are asking questions about the actual and potential capacities of many of these schemes to accelerate development processes. Arguably, the experience of the ECOWAS is representative of other integrative and cooperative initiatives in Africa, not only in terms of its evolution and dynamics but also its challenges and opportunities as a modern integration scheme. The ECOWAS model is no more than a hybridization of 'laissez faire' and the custom union theory with only scanty attention given to the crisis of dependency and underdevelopment in the sub-region. This, in effect, resulted in the restriction of goals of integration largely to the economic domain with emphasis on purely economic performance as key indicators of integration. This approach was dominant especially in the early days of the ECOWAS, and even up to the time of the approval of the Revised Treaty. It would appear that the Lagos Treaty (1975) in effect was essentially meant to guide trade relations among member-states. With regional integration conceived strictly in terms of economic relations among states, the role of the ECOWAS, as an economic community, for long was not more than creating some infrastructures where commodities can be exchanged at a reasonable cost. But this dream is still far from being realized. The promotion of West African integration through the ECOWAS has been confronted with many challenges which include the proliferation of regional integration schemes, external influence and poor political environment among others. Also, the production structures in member states of the ECOWAS compete with rather than complement each other. This in turn reduces regional exchange. The strategy of reducing customs duties to increase intra-regional trade in West Africa has also shown reduction of
customs duties as necessary, but not sufficient condition for promoting intra-regional trade in West Africa.

Since 2006 ECOWAS institutions have been undergoing transformations in response to the demands and challenges of fast globalizing era. As part of this process, there has been a transition of the ECOWAS Secretariat into a Commission, as well as the realignment of the Community Parliament, the Community Court of Justice and other specialized agencies to their core objectives. Although the Court of Justice was created in 1991, it did not officially begin operations until 1996. The jurisdiction of the court is outlined in Article 9 and Article 76 of the Revised Treaty and allows rulings on disputes between states over interpretations of the Revised Treaty. It also provides the ECOWAS Council with advisory opinions on legal issues (Article 10). The 115-member ECOWAS Parliament was inaugurated in 2001 as a consultative platform essentially to provide advice in specific areas as part of the process of citizen involvement in the regional integration process. In 2006, the role of the institution was further strengthened. Not long ago there was election of new parliamentarians by direct universal suffrage to succeed the previous ones whose tenure expired in 2010. There is a proposal to enhance the powers of the ECOWAS Parliament and there is already a draft supplementary act and a road map for that purpose. There is also the ECOWAS Court of Justice which functions as the supranational court of last resort in the region in human rights cases. In 2010 the Court recorded eighteen (18) new cases, held 67 sittings and delivered seventeen (17) judgments.

The transformation of the Secretariat into a Commission was also accompanied by a fundamental measure to make the principle of supranational become preeminent. This was achieved with the adoption of a new legal regime for Community acts. Under the old arrangement obligations of member states were captured principally in protocols and conventions which are subject to lengthy parliamentary ratification processes. These processes delayed the entry into force of the legal texts thereby delaying or sometimes paralyzing the integration process. Decisions of the Authority were however immediately applicable and binding on member states, whilst those emanating from the Council of Ministers were only applicable and binding on the Community institutions. Under the new legal regime the adoption of conventions and protocols is de-emphasized. Also, Community acts are now supplementary acts, regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. Thus, whenever the Authority passes supplementary acts, they become binding on member states and all the institutions of the Community. The Council of Ministers has powers to enact
regulations and directives and makes decisions and recommendations that are enforceable and directly applicable in member states as well in the institutions of the Community. Directives and their objectives are binding on all member states, and the modalities for attaining such objectives are left to their individual discretions. The Commission now adopts the rules for the implementation of acts enacted by the Council. These rules have the same legal force as acts enacted by the Council. The Commission makes recommendations and gives advice. Recommendations and advice are not enforceable. Recently a decision was taken by the leadership of the Community to enlarge the membership of the Commission from the nine to fifteen, in line with the agreement taken in Yamoussoukro in February 2013 and the ongoing institutional reform. The expansion "seeks to ensure equity and sense of belonging among the 15 Member States of the Community set up in 1975 to facilitate regional economic development and integration as well as promote greater efficiency."

The 2012 Annual Report of the President of ECOWAS Commission highlights a number of initiatives of ECOWAS that are aimed at improving and growing the volume of intra-community trade. These include the drafting of the ECOWAS Policy Framework for Private Sector Development and Enterprise Promotion by the ECOWAS Commission. It is also good to note that both ECOWAS and the West African Monetary and Economic Union (UEMOA) Commissions are collaborating to have a consensus agreement that protects the region's best interests, especially its young industries from developed countries' imports and at the same time in line with the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) objectives. There is an overwhelming fear among the ECOWAS countries about the effects of unrestricted access into their markets for products from the developed countries. For instance, trade liberalization components of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) are not the same as those of ECOWAS in terms of goals, orientation and focus. Under the EPA trade liberalization is expected to move ECOWAS towards a WTO-compatible trade regime in its relationship with the EU. The establishment of a CET which is a key integration instrument is antithetical to WTO-compatible trade regime with emphasis on reciprocity.

While these concerns are legitimate, the ECOWAS Commission has also revived the EPA negotiations with the EU to reconcile the differences between both parties mainly over the opening of the West African market to European products and the financing of the development dimension of the EPA. Although ECOWAS has indicated that the interim agreements signed by Ghana and Ivory Coast will be superseded by a regional EPA. However, the question to ask is whether or not the future EU – ECOWAS negotiations for EPA will be based on the text of the interim deal of Ivory Coast, or the one of Ghana, or even on some of the previously agreed drafts at the regional level. 26 The ECOWAS-CET when fully operational should lead to the establishment of a customs union and the pursuit of efforts towards the realization of financial and monetary integration. So far there has been some progress especially with the effective take-off of the ECOWAS Multilateral Surveillance Mechanism, and the adoption, in 2009, of the Road Map for the introduction of an ECOWAS Single Currency by 2020. However, there are some conditions that must have to be fulfilled. One of the critical factors militating against the introduction of the common currency includes the single-digit inflation bill and low budget deficiency among member states of the ECOWAS.

The ECOWAS recognizes the need to maintain and encourage intra-regional migration as a way of rationalizing and optimizing resources used at the regional level, toward the liberalization of trade and improved competition. The ECOWAS Agenda for Action was put in place to further ease the procedures at entry and exit points and facilitate free movement. It involves the use of ECOWAS Travel Certificate to facilitate and simplify formalities for cross-border movement. Part of the ECOWAS migration rules is that ECOWAS citizens holding a Travel Certificate or Passport should be exempted from filling out migration and emigration forms for the ECOWAS Member States. The harmonized immigration and emigration forms were introduced, and to be used in only exceptional cases. But member-states have been reluctant to introduce these forms for use. There is also the ECOWAS Brown Card Motor vehicle Insurance Scheme that was introduced as an accompanying measure to the other programmes on free movements of persons and goods. But the problem is that two motor vehicle insurance systems are coexisting in the sub-region; the ECOWAS

---

Brown card and the CIMA code. The non-implementation of most of the ECOWAS migration rules is often the rule than exception. In spite of the lofty provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty and protocols, the continuous initiation and application of discriminating economic policies against non-citizens (including Community citizens) by the various ECOWAS countries, at best, has ridiculed the claims on the liberalization of movement of persons in the ECOWAS sub-region. The above notwithstanding, ECOWAS has the first and only visa-free travel regime on the continent of Africa. Also, worthy of note is the unanimous adoption by member states of the ECOWAS Passport scheme is further testimony to member states' determination to create a single Community space where citizens can move, settle and trade freely in any country without let or hindrance.

In spite of these achievements by the ECOWAS, regional integration in West Africa is not yet a huge success. This raises the question about what should be the appropriate theory for West African integration. It is interesting to note that a new awareness is growing in Africa generally that is seeking for explanation on the performance of regional integration schemes beyond the allegiance to the theories of European integration, especially those that accord prominence to the gradualist strategy that takes social and economic cooperation as the necessary first step towards regional integration. It has been observed that there are defects in the application of such Western theoretical constructs to the African setting. For instance, there are political factors which are critical to the evolution and operation of regional integration in Africa, and which these western models - functionalism, neo-functionalism, market integration theory and the customs union theory - conceal, in the bid to neutralize the political and ideological aspects of regional integration process. Such considerations include the question of power relations (national and regional), nature and orientation of the state, control over foreign capital, the dominant ideology, and the direction of class struggle and social conflicts (national, regional and global levels). All these are essential in determining the outcomes of integrative and cooperative initiatives in Africa. The reduction of the goals of regional integration to strictly economic matters defeats the purpose of regional integration in Africa. With regional integration conceived strictly in terms of economic relations among the states involved, the role of regional schemes in most cases are not more
than creating some platforms for the exchange of goods at a reasonable cost. In this regard, exchange and markets are set up to facilitate movements of goods and people, and special attention is also paid to tariff matters! Beyond trade and tariff matters, regional integration should be conceived of as a dialectical unity of social, economic and political processes. This is partly what the introduction of some elements of supranationalism into the ECOWAS has done.

However, in spite of the remarkable progress made so far, there are still some challenges that need to be addressed in order to realize the vision of transforming ECOWAS into an 'ECOWAS of People'. The actualization of the new vision must necessarily consider redefining regional integration in a way that moves the process beyond state-centered approaches to include, among other things, the increased participation of civil society - the people and their representatives in associations, professional societies, farmers' groups, and women's groups, as well as political parties - in regional integration processes. Regional integration represents a much more formal arrangement which requires states to make certain political and economic sacrifices and commitments as well as concessions that demonstrate strong political will towards a redefinition of their individual and collective participation in the international economy. Also, the ECOWAS institutions must work towards correct analyses of the challenges of development in the region, and thereafter embark on sound prognoses. In order to do this successfully the ECOWAS Commission needs the support of all stakeholders including the civil society, organized private sector and development partners. They all have roles in the ongoing institutional reforms to enable ECOWAS deliver effectively on its mandate of regional development and integration.

**Ensuring regional peace, security and good governance**

I have undertaken a couple of studies on the new political response to issue of regional security and its links with democratic governance for the purpose of enriching our understanding of the relationship between regionalism and collective security in West Africa. In these works I adopted a perspective that redefines regional integration, in addition to the traditional purpose of regional integration, to include collective concerns for issues of good governance, security, peace and order. The idea of collective security is rooted in the concern about how to prevent the abuse of power by powerful states in the international system. Thus, the League of Nations was
established with the expectation that it would transcend 'politics' in its operations, and that its establishment would mark the birth of a new world order. The League however failed to prevent the outbreak of the Second World War. But that in itself could not end the obsession of many statesmen with collective security. In 1945 the United Nations Organization was formed, still around the concept of collective security, with deference to the position of the realist on power politics.

During the discussions preceding the formation of the United Nations, there was question on whether the new security system should be oriented toward regionalism as advocated by Moscow and London, or toward universalism as Washington favoured. A proposal was made by the Great Powers for the San Francisco Conference in June 1945 to create an international collective security organization. However, changes were made to allow regional organizations manage conflicts between their members. Whatever the strength of these concerns, they provided, in some sense, the justification for the UN provisions in Articles 51-54. It was partly in response to this provision that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created in 1963 as the collective regional security apparatus for Africa. In 2002 the AU replaced the OAU. Between the OAU and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) many sub-regional integration schemes were 'midwifed' into existence but initially for economic purposes.

The regionalist approach of the OAU found easy accommodation within the assumptions of the idealist school. However, besides lacking the political courage, the institutional capacity of the OAU for managing conflicts was largely inadequate. Although the OAU Charter provided for the organization to settle African disputes and conflicts, its performance in this area was hardly impressive. Similarly, the UN had not much of success stories. The influence and effects of the Cold War as well as the power game by the powerful nations had its impact on the capacity of the UN to effectively manage conflicts. Throughout the period of the Cold War the world's hegemonic powers were in effect determining the directions of conflicts and cooperation in the international system. Clearly, by the end of the Cold War the OAU had still not emerged as a regional organization with sufficient clout to manage African conflicts. This couple with other developments in the post-Cold-War international relations provided the justification for a rethinking on the quest for peace and development in Africa, and what should be the role of regional organizations. Since the end of the
Cold-War it has become abundantly clear that Africa has to rely less on the generosity of the North to manage its conflicts. Since 'Operation Restore Hope' in Somalia in 1992, the Western countries have become less enthusiastic to get involved in Africa's intractable conflicts. It is significant to note that Africa on its own has accepted this reality and has adjusted accordingly, beginning from the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993. The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the AU are two related regional initiatives deep rooted in the philosophy of self-reliance. These developments made regional approach to the resolution of African conflicts an imperative. Added to the above was the growing awareness in Africa that the pursuit of economic development by regional integration schemes is only possible under a peaceful atmosphere. These logics were applied to the roles played by the ECOWAS in conflicts in, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Togo, and Mali.

Although the ECOWAS Treaty (1975) was silent on conflict management and prevention, it was appreciated very early in the life of ECOWAS that no meaningful cooperation could take place within West Africa without peace and security. The Protocol on Non-Aggression and the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence were incorporated into ECOWAS Treaty in 1978 and 1981 respectively to address this concern. Unfortunately, this did not prevent internal dissensions, conflicts and large-scale violence in the sub-region. The Liberian civil war broke out in December 1989. In August 1990 ECOWAS sent a peace enforcement force – the ECOMOG – to Liberia. When the Liberian civil war broke out it was reckoned as an internal problem. To the major sections of the international community, it was still an internal problem for which no other state or the United Nations should intervene. As at the time the ECOMOG force moved into Liberia it was almost certain that neither the United Nations nor the United States was going to intervene in Liberia to bring about peace. When the UN eventually came in, its involvement was limited to sending some observers and providing some cash to fund the operations of ECOMOG in Liberia.27 Amadu Sesay notes that ECOWAS “rose creditably to the challenges of conflict management and peace keeping in West Africa at a time when the great powers had literally abandoned West Africa, and indeed the continent as a whole, and focused their attention on Bosnia in Europe” (2002). As most sections of the international community delayed and appeared confused, Liberia's neighbours and other countries

in West Africa were grappling with the inflow of refuges. This development no doubt affected the perceptions of the ECOWAS members-state that identified the Liberian crisis as threat to peace and economic well-being of the sub-region. The engagement of ECOWAS with conflict prevention and management enterprises in Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone had its lessons which eventually led to the adoption and of the establishment, in December 1999, of an ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security. Together with the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence, the Mechanism provides the foundation for ECOWAS collective security system. ECOWAS/ECOMOG has recorded appreciable success in West Africa. It is arguably the results of paying regard to issues of good governance and democratization. Amadu Sesay observed and argued that the sub-regional groupings with success stories have always stressed the central role of democratization and good governance in effective conflict management and resolution. Some of the principles espoused in the Revised Treaty and other major declarations on the various conflicts in West Africa underline the notion that democratization coupled with responsive and responsible governance are the most effective conflict management tools. In contrast, where it has been difficult to get members of sub-regional schemes to agree to operate sub-regional conflict management mechanism with due consideration to issues of good governance and democracy, the returns on investment on collective security system have been expectedly low.

The success stories of the ECOWAS' interventions are well sung, and so are their criticisms. Compared with other parts of Africa, West Africa has done considerably very well in the areas of ensuring regional peace and security as well as promoting democracy and good governance. Interestingly this has earned ECOWAS a measure of international recognition. Since its intervention in the Liberia crisis, ECOWAS has successfully intervened in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and most recently Mali. The development of a supranational security mechanism for conflict management and peace-keeping has progressed far more in West Africa under the Revised Treaty. ECOWAS has scaled up its normative instruments and institutional arrangements to anticipate and confront challenges to peace and security in the region, particularly with regard to conflicts and political governance. The security mechanism

of ECOWAS consists of Mediation and Security Council, a Defence and Security Commission, and a Council of Elders. The Mediation and Security Council is made up of ten members, and decisions are made by a two-thirds majority of six members. It is important to note that the security mechanism of ECOWAS recognises the role of the civil society in peace process and accords it opportunity to contribute to the organisation's early warning system mechanism. In 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was adopted to guide the organisation's preventive diplomacy which has further been strengthened by the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, with the provision on zero-tolerance for ascension to power through unconstitutional means. In Guinea Bissau there is an ECOWAS peace keeping mission in Guinea Bissau, ECOMIB. Also, ECOWAS is implementing a multi-million dollar defence and security sector reform programme in the country as part of the efforts to restore peace and democracy in the country. The recent intervention of ECOWAS in the Malian crisis benefitted from the efficiency of the ECOWAS institutions that came with the on-going reforms. The success of the intervention by ECOWAS paved the way for the transformation of the African-led International Support Mission into the UN mission.

Arguably, the success story in the area of conflict management and peace keeping can be linked to the commitment of the ECOWAS to good governance and democratization. It suffices to say that ECOWAS worked closely with the AU and the United Nations to restore order and legality in the member states Guinea, Niger and Ivory Coast. Similarly, the same principles of ECOWAS with respect to democracy and good governance guided the stand it took on the presidential elections in Guinea, Niger, Benin, and Nigeria. The concern about the implications of the 'Boko Haram' for regional security in West Africa has been expressed by the ECOWAS at different levels. The ECOWAS parliament discussed the issue in one of its plenary, noting that the ECOWAS and other countries within the region were already finding ways of assisting Nigeria.

**Burden and Blessings of Geography**

Nigeria's relationship with her West African neighbours has created more burden than opportunities to advance her self-interests is most likely the conclusion from any rational consideration. The truth, however, is that Nigeria's security needs is
such that she cannot afford to ignore her West African neighbours or even any development in the sub-region. It is plausible, for instance, to argue that Nigeria's membership of the ECOWAS has brought very minimal gains despite the fact that Nigeria is the major power in the group. The question whether Nigeria would not have done better without the burden of ECOWAS is a hypothetical one and should not detain us here. The fact, however, is that Nigeria has always felt that West African unity is paramount and should always be taken into account in her relations with her West African neighbours. Even when Nigeria negotiated the Lagos Convention in 1966, she felt that the agreement was a step towards the creation of an African common market. Also, Nigeria's decision to spearhead a joint African negotiation with Europe in 1973 was a political decision consciously taken in the interest of Africa. One direct gain of Nigeria's commitment to West African unity and cooperation was the boost that the Brussels negotiation gave to the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Before the Brussels negotiation, it was generally felt that there was no meeting ground between the Anglophone and Francophone countries of West Africa. The different colonial heritage of the two groups created such a cleavage that it was felt that the two groups could never agree on a set of principles that would permit any joint negotiations with Europe. Nigeria worked hard to achieve both the unity of African states, and a successful negotiation that resulted in the signing of Lomé I in 1975. It was the same success that spilled over and made the establishment of ECOWAS a reality.

In discussing the future of Nigeria's relations with her West African neighbours, one must necessarily consider the Nigeria's national interests alongside with her commitment to pan-Africanist stand. It is in this regard that I hypothesize that the future of Nigeria's external relations in West Africa will always weigh the implications of all policy options on national security imperative and other core national interests. Some recent foreign policy actions of Nigeria are illustrative of this trend. The stand of Nigeria on the on-going negotiation between the ECOWAS and the EU for the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) is one major development that is likely to affect the future of Nigeria's external relations in West Africa. Nigeria has continued to protest against some provisions of the EPA that are considered harmful to her economy. Nigeria has also spoken against the fast-track liberalization agenda of the EU which the EPA represents. Although the ECOWAS gave its blessing for its member states to sign interim trade deals, it however urged them to move forward as a bloc to the signing of a regional EPA. Nigeria had expressed concerns over the actions of the
two West African countries - Ghana and Ivory Coast – that signed interim agreements with the EU. The implications of the interim agreements for ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) is of special concern to Nigeria that feels that the interim agreements could become a conduit pipe for channeling goods originating from Europe to its markets under the guise of regional integration, and which might affect the future of up-growing industries.

The role of Nigeria has not been duly acknowledged in the rich literature on ECOWAS' success stories in conflict management in West Africa in spite of Nigeria's generous contributions and investments in peace and security in the sub-region. Also, at home a section of the Nigerian foreign policy community feels that Nigeria has not been duly rewarded for its roles in restoring peace and stability in war-torn Liberia, Togo, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome & Principe. They argued that despite Nigeria's laudable contributions and investments in external relations especially its relations with African countries, its external image has continued to suffer greatly in the West African sub-region Nigeria has worked hard to restore. The recent Nigeria-led ECOWAS intervention in the Malian crisis was not favourably received by many Nigerians that felt the government of President Goodluck Jonathan had no business sending troops abroad to fight while it was facing serious national security threats courtesy of the Boko Haram insurgency, Niger Delta youth militancy and the sectarian violence on the Jos Plateau. The drastic reduction in Nigeria's force level in the Mali operations may not be unconnected with domestic pressures on the Nigerian government over its involvement in the Malian intervention.

Several countries in West Africa have continued to enjoy Nigeria's generosity including the benefits of the technical assistance through the Technical Aid Corp (TAC) programme. These laudable contributions and investments notwithstanding, Nigeria's external image suffer greatly. On several instances Nigeria's capacity to represent African regional interests in international fora have been questioned by countries that benefitted from Nigeria's generosity and goodwill. Also, Nigerians have been subjected to humiliation and indignity in some African countries. Take for example, in Gabon, Nigerians were subjected to torture by Gabonese security agents. Also, how does one explains Sierra Leone's declared interest to contest the permanent seat of the UN Security Council with Nigeria after the latter had sought the block support of the ECOWAS countries for its candidacy? It was gathered that officials of
the Sierra Leonean government demanded for up to 300 million US dollar financial assistance from the Nigerian government to stop Sierra Leone from contesting the UN permanent seat with Nigeria. It should be recalled that Nigeria made substantial human and material sacrifice to restore peace and stability to Sierra Leone. Unfortunately these kind gestures never resulted in the resolution of the issue of the seizure of Nigerian Airways' property in Sierra Leone over thirty years ago.

Nigeria and Ghana enjoy very cordial and friendly relations. Ghana is one of Nigeria's foremost business partners in the West African sub-region. Nigeria supplies electricity to Ghana and under the Obasanjo administration Ghana got over one hundred million dollar loans from Nigeria. Nigerian businessmen in Ghana have significant investment in real estate, textile and garments, electronics, banking and telecommunication and tourism. However, in the recent times there have been reports about hostile business practices against Nigerians in Ghana. For example, the Ghanaian government was reported to have imposed high tariff on Nigerian movies and restricted Nigerian actors from shooting films in Ghana. Nigeria's telecommunication giant, Globacom was said to be caught up with the high cost of doing business in Ghana which caused it to delay some crucial aspects of its operations. Also, in 2012 many Nigerian businessmen operating in Ghana had their shops closed by the Ghanaians for allegedly operating illegally. The Ghanaian government was enforcing its policy which requires every foreigner who wants start business in Ghana to have an initial capital of $300,000 and must employ 10 Ghanaians to work with him regardless of the size of the business. The lamentation of a frustrated Nigerian businessman living in Ghana is reproduced below:

There are nationals of other West African countries like Mali, Cote D'Ivoire, Niger, Cameroon who operate shops in Ghana like us but the Ghanaian authorities would not touch them. They target only Nigerians and I don't know why. In spite of all we do to boost their economy and contribute to raise their standard of living, they don't care, they just hate Nigerians and discriminate against us.

---

29 Alaba Ogunsanwo, "Reciprocity in International Relations: Nigeria and the Economic Community of West African States" in Osita C. Eze (ed.) Reciprocity in International Relations, Lagos; Nigerian Institute of International Affairs NIIA, p.45.

As many are instances of Nigeria's unrequited kind gestures towards her West African neighbours. African governments tend to justify protectionist measures just as other governments worldwide do. They advance economic reasons, such as the protection of local jobs and industries from foreign competition, as well as security motives. At least, some portions of the host countries usually agree with the protectionist policies issued by their governments. It does not seem to matter much if those discriminated against are ECOWAS citizens! Why has Nigeria's diplomacy of cooperation, partnership and goodwill on the continent generally and in West Africa in particular not be adequately reciprocated and rewarded?

While it is possible to say that “diffuse reciprocity” is generally assumed in the conduct and management of the foreign relations of the African states, there have been only few instances of where Nigeria has demanded for specific reciprocity from other states or groups of states in the international system. For example, at the end of the Nigerian civil war, Nigeria under General Yakubu Gowon pursued a non-retaliatory policy vis-à-vis the countries that assisted the Biafran secessionists including four African countries namely Tanzania, Gambia, Ivory Coast and Gabon. Like many other African countries, these countries have continued to enjoy significant political, economic and diplomatic largesse from Nigeria. The argument that Nigeria has not received commensurate rewards from its generosity towards other African countries has been further substantiated with reference to some recent developments. For example, Nigerians were subjected to xenophobic attacks in South Africa. In Libya they were regularly brutalized by officials of the Libyan Government. Disappointed with the low level of gains and rewards from Nigeria's investments in its relations with other countries, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, suggested that the acts of Nigeria towards other countries, and vice versa, be determined by reciprocal niceness such that, in his words, "if you are nice to us, we will be nice to you; if you are hostile to us, we will also be hostile to you".

The responses and reactions of the Federal Government of Nigeria to the maltreatment of Nigerian migrants by some South African officials best demonstrated elements of the new thinking on the essence of reciprocity in the conduct of Nigeria's foreign relations. On one hand, some have argued that Nigeria “have no right to gripe
over unequal reciprocal treatment from other nations”. According to Ambassador Ignatius C. Olisemeka, “Our problem is, essentially, one of lack of management, lack of capacity, lack of proper and effective coordination, and, above all, failure of our institutions.” Added to this are the problems of legitimacy, absence of unfavourable political environment, domestic support for foreign policy process and a host of numerous domestic problems. No doubt that all these constitute major challenges with serious implications for the conduct of Nigeria's external relations on the basis of reciprocity. It is Ambassador Olisemeka's advice that rather than "be unduly worried over unequal reciprocal treatment", Nigeria should be concerned with how best to organize its resources and institutions while remaining essentially liberal. However, on the other hand, others feel that while Nigeria has her own challenges like other countries that should not prevent her from aspiring and concentrating efforts at creating a nation that commands respect. Thus, a new awareness is already setting in among the Nigerian foreign policy elites on the need for Nigeria to get appropriate recognition and rewards for its investments in the external relations. There is the sense in which it can be said that the 1986 National Foreign Policy Conference in Kuru provided opportunity to raise questions on the essence of reciprocity in Nigeria's foreign relations and whether Nigeria has the capacity to pursue a foreign policy that would be based on the principle of reciprocity.

There is no doubt that there is a huge gap between Nigeria's investments in its relations and the extent of diplomatic influence it commands in its relations with African countries. What accounts for this gap? A good starting point in any analysis of the challenges of Nigeria's foreign policy process generally and in particular the lack of inadequate attention to the reciprocity in the conduct of its external relations is the overwhelming influence of sentiments at the expense of Nigeria-centred interests and her core values. It is plausible to argue that Nigeria over the years has conducted her external relations mostly in accordance with the principle of altruism. Because of her foreign policy behavior, Nigeria has been tagged 'Father Christmas' by several writers.

31 Ignatius C. Olisemeka, “Opening Remarks” in Osita C. Eze (ed.) Reciprocity in International Relations, Lagos;
32 Nigerian Institute of International Affairs NIIA, p. 6.
33 Ibid.
in critique of her unbridled generosity which has been less acknowledged and rewarded by the beneficiaries.

The confusion about the context and contents of Nigeria's national interests as well as the appropriate strategies for conducting her diplomacy constitute serious limitation on the capacity of Nigeria to demand reciprocity in its interactions with other players in the international system. Nigeria is seemingly lacking well-articulated national interest. Under such circumstance the conduct of Nigerian foreign relations is dominated by flamboyant and arrogant display of 'pax - Nigeriana' and post-hunting diplomacy. The national interests of a country are not unaffected by change of time and context. Thus many developments and changes in the international system especially since the end of the Cold War have not only shown the dynamic character of national interests, they have also drawn attention to the need to put in place effective diplomatic strategies.

It is a concern in some circles that globalization processes may hinder the potential and actual influence of Nigeria as a regional power. On the one hand the erosion of autonomy and sovereignty in the management of national economies that comes with globalization create fears in some respects. One may want to ask for instance if globalization and national development processes are mutually rewarding. There is an extreme form of this tendency that presents national development as one of the possible logical outcomes of economic globalization. In societies where such wisdom is dominant, governments have embraced the ideals of globalization as part of their national development objectives and aspirations. The rationale is that it is possible to achieve national development through globalization which in turn would contribute to further globalization and so the circle continues! However, some see the relationship between globalization and national development as symbiotic, suggesting a mutually benefiting interaction between the national development process and globalization.

Different dimensions of globalization have different impacts. Notwithstanding, it is plausible to argue that Nigeria's development process under the regime of liberal economic globalization has not progressed well especially when it brings to our mind many direct and indirect threats to the means of livelihood of many Nigerians. For example, the massive retrenchment of workers in the manufacturing industries that
have been forced out of business because of their non-competitiveness, courtesy of the shameless over-subscription of the Nigerian power elite to the logic of neo-liberalism. In response to the pressures of economic globalization, the Nigerian state inaugurated poorly conceived and badly managed economic reform programmes. While the relationship between national development and globalization may not be a perfect zero-sum relationship, the erosion of autonomy and sovereignty in the management of national economies by the state, occasioned by the globalizing effects of capital makes globalization to be treated with awesome suspicion in many circles. There is also the concern that the relationship between globalization and regional integration is not quite clear. Thus, on one hand integration units are encouraged to embrace the ideals of globalization as part of the regional integration agenda. The rationale is that it is possible to achieve regional integration through globalization, which in turn would contribute to further regional integration and so the circle continues! On the other hand, there is the pertinent question: to what extent is the new wave of globalization impacting on the processes and outcomes of regional integration in Africa? Three key assumptions are advanced in this lecture to aid our understanding of the relationship between globalization and regional integration in West Africa. First is that, historically, regional integration has always been influenced by the process of globalization. Secondly, that the globalization-induced regional integration is beyond the regulatory and control frameworks of the territorial state. Thirdly, that the growth of transnational social networks has implications for the relationship between globalization and regional integration.

III. Future projections and recommendations

I have taken due cognizance of the new trends in Nigeria's external relations since the return to civil rule in 1999 which, in my opinion, has received adequate attention in the literature. However, in concluding my thoughts on Nigeria's relations with her neighbours, it is necessary to briefly reflect on the essence of domestic political environment on Nigeria's external relations generally. In doing this, I align my thoughts with those of Richard Haass that a good foreign policy needs to begin at home. The relationship between domestic politics and external relations is of especial

---

import to Nigeria. It is however important to acknowledge that there have been many recent developments and changes in the international system that have significant influence on domestic politics, capacity of governments, and the way these developments affect foreign relations.

The complex nature of the international system necessary disposes states towards devising appropriate strategies to enhance cooperation with other players in the international arena in the pursuit of their individual and collective interests. In this regard national interest constitutes the basis of the national strategy for development in a country; it is the springboard for all national policies and strategies. In this regard, national interest serves to guide the governing elites in the task of policy formulation and implementation. Also, where the public is articulate and well-informed, national interest can serve as appropriate framework for the evaluation of the performance of the leadership by the citizens. Thus, in principle, both the leaders and followers are expected to not only understand the national interest but to be involved in its conceptualization. Genuine democratization opens the space for political participation including the involvement of the people in defining and articulating national interests. However, in practice, the national interest discourse is mostly dominated by the political elites. The exclusion of the masses from the conceptualization of national interest is a major deficiency in the foreign relations process of Nigeria.

The national interests of Nigeria, in principle, are primarily associated with the provisions on "fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy", which are contained in Chapter Two of Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). While Article 14 (1-2) presents the philosophical or ideological justification of the Nigerian State, Article 19 states the foreign policy objectives of Nigeria to be: (a) promotion and protection of the national interest; (b) promotion of African integration and support for African unity; (c) promotion of international co-operation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations; (d) respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and (e) promotion of a just world economic order. Many have debated the extent to which the above stated foreign policy objectives are realizable in view of the capacity of the Nigerian
state. Also, there is a section of the Nigerian foreign policy elites that is advocating for a more Nigeria-centred national interest rather than the present seemingly outward foreign policy. However, some feel that these concerns have been adequately addressed with the application of the 'three concentric circles' framework in the conceptualization of Nigeria's national interest and diplomacy. This framework prioritizes Nigeria's interests and emphasized the Africa region in the conduct of Nigeria's foreign relations. While this is useful for understanding the prominent role of Nigeria in African regional blocs, notably the ECOWAS, AU and the ACP group of countries, the argument by some is that with the end of the Apartheid and the establishment of majority rule in South Africa, coupled with changes in the international system, Nigeria needs to review its foreign policy to address new global developments.

Some questions arise from the above. First, to what extent is Nigeria's core interests advanced by its membership of the ECOWAS and ACP especially in view of the developments around the EPA negotiations. Second, how can a regional 'giant' like Nigeria be ignored or humiliated by her neighbours? Answers to these questions should be considered along with a broader question on whether Nigeria should remain within the ECOWAS. Closely related to that also is whether Nigeria should continue to relate with the EU within the framework of EU-ACP cooperation. Although geo-political realism dictates that Nigeria should remain within the ECOWAS and the ACP group, using the platforms in addition to bilateral diplomacy to conduct its policy of good neighbourliness in West Africa. However, if Nigeria is to remain committed to carrying the burden of her West Africa neighbours, efforts must be made to accommodate her special interests and long-term needs. It is obvious that the issue of Nigeria's national security must be treated as a special case and related to the security of West Africa. Also, in view of the new developments in the relationship between the EU and the ACP, one option may be for Nigeria to consider a separate agreement with the EU while remaining within the ACP fold.

The old argument that new states in the international system are unable to carve out for themselves established interests in the international arena can no longer hold. We now know better that the lack of adequate attention to their national interests and the absence of consistent pattern of external behaviour in many developing countries are associated with their weak structures and institutions of governance rather than their newness in the international system. Lack of strong institutions presents extraordinarily high opportunities for 'personal rule' and the domination of external
relations by extremely powerful leaders. The situation in Nigeria especially during the Obasanjo's administration was very illustrative of this defect in foreign policy process. Between 1999 and 2007 the National Assembly was not able to make significant input into the conduct of Nigeria's external relations. A highly centralized federal structure, with much of the authority concentrated in the executive arm of government diminished the role of the national legislature. Similarly, while the Nigerian media is generally said to be active and has made significant contribution to the country's struggle for democracy, however, in the area of foreign affairs, both the media and civil society are weak. They lack the capacity to make effective demands on the state. Thus, against the backdrop of underdeveloped structures and institutions, the construction and deployment of Nigeria's diplomacy has been with the overwhelming influence of the leaders of government business. Thus leadership personality rather than institutions has played dominant role in the foreign relations of the country.

The measure of success recorded in Nigeria's external relations mainly indicates the challenges ahead in the task of strategizing for effective formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy in the 21st century and beyond. This task requires deep reflection on a number of issues. First is the issue of enhancing the political capacity of the Nigerian government to act successfully abroad. It should bother policy analysts and foreign policy managers how political capacities of governments affect ability to effectively manage foreign relations. Good governance in Nigeria generally, and by extension noticeable success in the management of its external relations, depends on improved political capacity of government. Secondly, it is important to reflect on how to invest in better political conditions in the country in other to facilitate successful external relations that will result in outcomes that will benefit the people at home. Of course, this is connected to the need to strengthen the relevant political institutions and structures. Because of the apparent weakness of these structures and institutions, many foreign policy decisions and actions are handled outside the formal structures and institutions and are not bounded by them, hence the poor level of accountability and transparency in foreign policy process.

Closely related to the above is the need to guarantee an appropriate domestic environment for democratic foreign-policy making – one that, for instance, promotes the public side of foreign policy making. The current situation where the foreign
formulation and implementation take place at the Presidency with minimal inputs from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) needs to be reviewed. One tragic fundamental consequence of the prolong military rule is the near neglect of inputs into foreign policy-making process from what we can call public-opinion institutions, such as the press, interest groups, civil society groups etc. The military elites and their cohorts in the academia and bureaucracy dominated foreign policy process in the country. Arguably, the degree of public participation in foreign policy process in a country is to a large extent a function of the nature of the political system in the country. Generally democratic political systems are expected to be more inclusive and responsive to the public mass than authoritarian and dictatorial regimes.

The implications of current global trends and developments for Nigeria's external relations should be factored into the formulation and implementation of Nigeria's foreign policy strategy. In this regard it is imperative to identify and analyse the character, contents and dynamics of the current post-Cold World neoliberal global order to be able to come up with appropriate coping strategies and response mechanisms. Within this context it is important for Nigeria to re-examine her national interests, align and re-align them with the realities of post-Cold War international relations. For instance, is the old ideal of south-south cooperation consistent with the realities of post-Cold War international relations? What should be Nigeria's response to the claim by some of the emergent global economic powers especially China that their growing interests in Africa represent a declaration in support of South-South cooperation and an affront on Western 'hegemonism'? The question to ask first is whether the present trends in the relationship between these emergent powers and Nigeria and other Africa countries are indicators of progressive movements towards the restructuring of the international division of labour.

In the same breath, the expanded interests of the Asian powers in Africa have serious implications for regional order in Africa and Nigeria must not ignore this. For example, the increased presence of the Chinese and Indian foreign capital West Africa calls for concerns. How are the regional and sub-regional schemes in Africa responding to this? Beyond the cosmetics and appearance of commitment and support for African collective goals such as the building of the Headquarters of the AU in Addis Ababa by the Chinese government, there is need for a strategy of engagement that take into consideration the status and essence of regional integration and collective self-reliance in the African development. Nigeria should support initiatives towards the development of such a strategy.
In view of rapid changes at both global and domestic levels, it is recommended that Nigeria's foreign policy be urgently re-conceptualized to primarily promote national security, and also to address developmental needs of the country. The task here requires re-examining a number of conceptual, theoretical and definitional issues around foreign policy and globalization which is a characterizing feature of the 21st century international relations. Such a foreign policy must identify, protect and promote realistic, achievable and sustainable national interest goals both in the short, medium and long term. Beyond the cosmetics of liberal democracy, the nature of the Nigerian State and other related concerns including the issues of the so-called "National Question" and the principle of federal character need to be addressed. There is need for a constitutional process that will promote national integration and forge good sense of national identity. Such constitutional process must necessarily address the citizenship question, guarantee increasing expectations of gains for each group, and ensures that the basic needs of each group are identified and harmonized within the national needs. This in turn will in part guarantee conducive environment and the domestic support base for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Also, the complexities and challenges of modern diplomacy necessarily require effective foreign policy machinery. This calls for a serious reorganization of Nigeria's foreign policy bureaucracy that transcends reshuffling the staff and renaming the little boxes on the organizational chart of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

IV. Reflections on Political Science

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, ladies and gentlemen, let me briefly share with this audience my reflections on the discipline of Political Science in Nigeria. It is appropriate for me to talk about the "state of the discipline" to further meet one of the purposes of inaugural lectures. Constraints of time and space will not allow me to discuss in greater details the current state of ill-health of the science of politics in Nigeria. Therefore, I will highlight some aspects of the intellectual characteristics of the discipline of political science in Nigeria, and also draw attention to some of the challenges of the discipline. By pointing out some perceived flaws in the discipline of political science in our universities, I am on the side of self-correction which I consider necessary for the development of any discipline.

Political science is a post-independence disciplinary creation in many African
countries including Nigeria. The success of the 'behavioral revolution' in Europe and North America led to the increased urge to 'export' European social science. It was in this context that some European countries, notably the United States initiated programmes of assistance towards promoting social science disciplines in the newly independent countries. This was the beginning of the establishment of most social science disciplines in many newly independent states including Nigeria. The first Department of Political Science in Nigeria was probably established in 1961/62 at the University of Ibadan. Professor James O'Connel was the founding father of the department and Ibadan was home to other distinguished academics such as Ken Post, David Murray, John Ballad, Ronald Wrath, Joseph E. Black who had at various times taught in the department. And the first generation of Nigerian political science teachers at Ibadan included Essien Udom, Billy Dudley, Ukpabi Asika to mention but a few. The character of Political Science introduced in the early 1960s just like other social science disciplines that were established in Nigeria then reflected "imperial origin of the colonizers" The main concern of that Political Science discipline was how to legitimize the existing social order. This was evident in the curricula of the Political Science programmes of the early universities in Nigeria.

Since its introduction in Nigeria as an academic discipline, over five decades ago, Political Science has become well established in the country that nearly all the existing universities (aside from a few universities of technology and agriculture) in the country have Department of Political Science. In spite of the on-going brain-drain in the country, only very few Departments of Political Science are in any way experiencing serious shortage of political science teachers, compared to other social science disciplines such as economics, sociology and psychology. It is interesting to note that some universities in the country have started offering B. Sc degree programmes in the sub-disciplines of International Relations, Public Administration etc. Hopefully these developments are addressing the country's manpower needs. This understanding underscores my hesitation when as Head of Political Science Department I was approached with a proposal for a combined honours B.Ed programme in Political Science and Education. The argument by the sponsors of the proposed programme was that the future graduates of the B.Ed Political Science/Education would be recruited to teach Government and Social Studies in
secondary schools. Dependable statistics shows that Nigeria has more than enough graduate teachers to teach these two subjects and other related ones in the country's secondary schools. The point being made is that the expansion of our academic programmes should be driven primarily by the country's present and future needs.

The academic history of Nigeria reveals several instances of enlightened discussions on the social use of the various social sciences disciplines in Nigeria. The prolonged military rule in Nigeria provided a veritable environment for the political science community in Nigeria to demonstrate the essence of social responsibility of political scientists. At different times political scientists in Nigeria, and indeed their umbrella organization, the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) have expressed concerns for the "responsibility of political scientists in Nigeria". I recall here the many 'reminders', 'warnings and 'rejoinder's by successive Presidents of the NPSA especially since the 1980s on the social responsibility of political scientists in and outside government. Unfortunately these Presidential Addresses never gave serious consideration to methodological issues as they affect the field of political study in Nigeria. Unfortunately, in spite of its popularity in the country, the discipline of political science lacks behind in methodological development.

Arguably the theme of social responsibility dominated political science discourse in the late 1970s; however, questions on methods and techniques of political analysis also attracted some attention. Of particular interest is the proceeding of the 1979 Conference of The Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) which was later published as Political Science in Africa: Critical Review. This anthology reflects a host of diverse opinions on the teaching of Political Science as well as modes of inquiry and analysis in political research. The various contributors to the book raise questions on the study and teaching of Political Science in Nigeria, and Africa in general. However, most of the questions on methods and techniques have remained unattended to largely to date. For instance, it is disappointing to know that many Nigerian universities do not have specialists in core subject areas such as political inquiry, political theory, political thoughts, and most do not have provision for training programmes in statistical skills and quantitative methods. A brief survey of political science researches in Nigerian universities and other related institutions reveal
remarkable deficiency in the use of statistical methods.

Although introduced during the behavioral revolution, in terms of disciplinary development and scientific progress, it was a Political Science of traditional normative concerns of the classic writing about politics that was introduced to Nigeria. Political Science, as an academic field, was no more than what we now call Policy Science. That is, the application of knowledge to the concerns of the rulers, of those who seek to foster good governance in the society. The dominant methods were those fashioned after the tradition of the ancient philosophers. And students of politics were not concerned with how to create empirically verifiable propositions that derived from theoretical system. Teachers and students of Political Science never were involved in the efforts at systematic generalization like other social science disciplines.

The world today is undergoing greater changes than it ever has before. This has implications for political research. These changes which are at different levels - global, regional and national - are giving birth to pressing issues that are today key problems for political research. On the experience of Nigeria, the themes of nationalism, nation-building, modernization, ethnicity etc. that dominated political discourses in Nigeria up to the 1970s have been replaced by more pressing issues of today e.g. governance, globalization, geopolitics, global and regional peace, accountability etc. To be able to answer the questions that surround the new issues in political research, there is need to transcend a Political Science of mere "description of how things are", to include in our systematic study of politics and political life, "a political science of design". Failure to develop appropriate methodologies for conducting research leave the country at the mercy of diviners and other media of the celestial bodies (the sun, moon and stars) to address and resolve political questions around 'who gets what and how'. Without any prejudice against the use of qualitative techniques (where applicable, especially as complimentary techniques), if appropriate theories of public life are to be developed, one must be able to make broad claims, based on large, generalizable, quantities of data. Political Science such as can identify with the development and application of statistical investigation and mathematical modeling techniques should be encouraged our universities and other institutions of higher education.
The interrelationship of Political Science with its neighbouring social science disciplines has complicated the task of scholars and students in the field. Most modern political scientists often incorporate theories and findings from other academic disciplines into their research. As a matter of fact, many research questions posed by political scientists can only be answered with references to works, concepts, and methods which come from other social science disciplines where knowledge of statistics and quantitative techniques has advanced so well. Contemporary research in political science calls for inter-disciplinary collaboration. This however requires the development of a common language. The way to create a common language is through being tolerant of other disciplines' data and methods, regardless of their level of sophistication. It is within such framework that political sociology as a sub-discipline can apply sociological generalizations to the analysis of political institutions, and political psychologists would draw intellectual sustenance from psychology, applying it to investigate political attitudes and behaviour. It is certainly not my argument that interpretative and critical theory approach to political research be replaced with "mindless number crunching". To the contrary, I see quantitative and qualitative methods as mutually reinforcing programmes of research. However, future progress is likely to depend on the way we encourage and assist our students to apply a wide range of both qualitative and quantitative methods in the research.

V. Concluding remarks, appreciation and acknowledgement

Mr. Vice-chancellor, I should publicly express the profound debt to my wife, Olubukola and our two girls, Oluwaseun and Ifeoluwa, for sharing in the joy and frustrations of my chosen career. I thank my parents, Pa Gbadebo Adetula and Mrs. Eunice Oyebimbe Asake Adetula, my siblings other relatives and friends that contributed to my career advancement. Also, I owe to late Professor Ralph Onwuka and Ambassador Olu Sanu, who first discovered the potentials in me and awakened my interest in the study of regionalism. While I was a student at the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University) in the early 1980s, both Professor Onwuka and Ambassador Sanu took an early and uplifting interest in my work, and the support, encouragement, and mentorship they offered so generously throughout my career helped to establish my scholarship. I recall with sense of gratitude the congratulatory
message I received from 'Baba Sanu' when he was informed of my elevation. He was pleased to know that his wish for me was coming true. It is worth mentioning here that my academic discipleship under Ambassador Sanu culminated in the production of a journal article in 1989. It is, however, sad that the cruel hands of death did not allow Professor Onwuka to be alive when “my boy” eventually became a professor.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, when I joined the University of Jos as a young academic in 1988, I had no idea of the strange journey I would encounter in the course of my academic career. My request for sponsorship to the University of Ife for PhD degree was not granted by the University of Jos on the sound, reasonable and justifiable ground that the University had competent hands to supervise my proposed research for PhD dissertation in Political Economy & Development Studies. That was how I first met my dissertation supervisor, Professor Warisu. O Alli, who, in addition to tolerating my youthful exuberance, carried me on his shoulder and helped me to see afar! I recall his regular warning to me that “PhD degree is for those who are humble and disciplined, and not necessarily the brightest brains”! These words of Professor Alli have remained with me; I have kept them close to my heart, and they have continued to guide me even as I traverse the universe. 'Oga' (as I fondly call him), I am grateful for being both a teacher and a friend.

My movement to the Department of Political Science cannot be regarded as career progression but largely as a consequence of frustration with lack of interest in the development of University-based research centres in Nigeria generally. This was evident in the acute shortage of money for research, and the lack of interest in the development of University-based research centres that made successive governments in Nigeria to earmark more money for teaching at the expense of research in the universities. Consequently many Nigerian universities experienced drop-off in research quality and quantity. Research was at risk in many universities in the country, and the research fellows became almost like endangered species as they struggle for recognition and acceptance. As young research fellows at the Centre for Development Studies, we faced unwarranted discrimination in the reward system put in place by the

---

university administration. Also, many of our colleagues in the teaching departments saw no reasons for the existence of the Centre; repeatedly they would ask us what we were doing in the Centre! The pressure to close down the Centre came mostly from some of our colleagues from two Faculties—Law and Social Sciences. Our response at the Centre was simply a persistent campaign on the need for an interdisciplinary research centre that can help improve the quality of teaching and research in the University. This unpleasantness notwithstanding, the period that I spent in the Centre was a unique opportunity for my academic career. I offer my most humble thanks to the past and present leadership of the University for supporting my career advancement including the opportunity to provide leadership at the Centre between 1998 and 2001, and also at the Department of Political Science between 2006 and 2008. Mr. Vice-Chancellor, it gladdens my heart that the present administration has demonstrated its commitment to quality research by revitalizing and transforming the Centre which is now the Office of Research and Development, and also given it an expanded mandate.

For me, the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University) was where it all started in 1982! For all intents and purposes, the Department of International Relations at Ife University was unique in many respects. Our lecturers had to engage their colleagues from other departments especially those from the Department of Political Science to justify why Ife needed a separate Department of International Relations. While the latter had been running the M.Sc programme in International Relations for some years then, the idea of a B.Sc programme in International Relations did not sound logical and economically reasonable to some who thought that students in the pursuit of social science knowledge should not 'specialize' so early in their career. However, the emerging Ife School of International Relations that was prominently led by the late Professor Olajide Aluko was evidently adamant on running a B.Sc programme. Thus, twelve other students and my humble self were given 'direct admission' into the Department. We were under the mentorship of several lecturers from various backgrounds and ideological preferences: the indomitable LSE (London School of Economics)-trained group made up of Olajide Aluko, Sola Ojo and Amadu Sesay; the firebrand socialists Amechi Okolo and Julius Ihonvbere; the 'warlike' defence and strategic studies expert Jimi Adisa, who was originally mentored by late
Professor Billy Dudley but later trained at Kings College, London; the soft-spoken but extremely sharp Emeka Nwokedi, who specialized in international politics and well versed in the politics and economy of the Francophone countries; the gentle and calm Olayiwola Abegunrin who served as my academic advisor came in from United States along with Yinka Bamiduro, Michael A Ojo (Baba Ojo); and finally our friends Kayode Soremekun, Alade Fawole, and Jide Owoeye, who as our tutorial lecturers, made themselves easily accessible and ever ready to help us adjust to the complex realities of the Ife School. As you can see from this list of staff members, Ife was really an 'international' academic institution from which many from Africa and beyond came to learn, teach and do research.

The genesis of a scholar can be traced in part to the books that had an impact on him/her early in his/her career. As an undergraduate at Ife, some books and journal articles by my teachers had shaped the way I looked at Nigeria's external relations and propelled me on. They were Segun Osoba's “Economic Foundations of Nigerian Foreign Policy (1960-66)” published as a book chapter, Olajide Aluko's Foreign Relations of African States and Essays in Nigeria's Foreign Policy, Ralph Onwuka's Development and Integration in West Africa: The Case of ECOWAS and Africa and the New World Order, and Amadu Sesay and Ralph Onwuka's edited volume on Regionalism in Africa. Strangely, I still have these books in my library because they are so much a part of my intellectual upbringing. Early in my career at the University of Jos, one of the books that had a similar transformative impact on my thinking was the edited volume by Bala Takaya and Sonni Tyoden - Kaduna Mafia, which remains to this day one of the most intellectually significant works on the Nigerian political elites and the challenge of governance. This early encounter stimulated and influenced my scholarly interest in the theme of good governance, beginning with my research on the dynamics of urban politics in the Jos metropolis. I later expanded the scope of my interests in the study of good governance, and conducted studies on the 'abiku' political transition programmes anchored by the Nigerian military. Further researches on the prospect and challenges of democratic transition, Nigerian electoral system,

36. 'Abiku' is a Yoruba general name for a child that is born to die. The Yoruba believe that an 'abiku' is a child who is born only to die.

party finance etc. were consolidated into various forms of publication. There is a way to understand all of this, and it drives to the central thesis that issues of good governance, human rights, peace and security, social and political inclusion are important drivers for positive changes in 21st century international relations.

I have paid scholarly attention to investigating the above thesis and my findings have reiterated the importance of the intrinsic link between democratic governance and global peace and security. This path hopefully will be illuminated by my on-going and further research engagements. Not long ago, while in India as the Nelson Mandela Visiting Chair at the Jawahralah Nehru University, New Delhi, I took time to deepen my research interest in the study of the African Diaspora understandably with particular interest in the Nigerian Diaspora. Transnational networking is a dominant form of interaction in the era of globalization. Transnational actors are increasingly active in development process around the world. It's worthwhile to note that recently the AU formally recognized the African Diaspora as the sixth region of Africa. There is a growing awareness about the positive contributions of the African Diaspora to political and economic developments in the homeland. Many African Diasporas are now involved in transnational networking to secure the commitments of state and non-state actors to support development processes in Africa. While this represents a positive development, there are other dimensions of transnational relations that threaten development processes in Africa including regional integration.


Also, while on sabbatical leave at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) in 2012, I had the responsibility to provide leadership for the Institute's Division of Africa and Regional Integration among other things. This opportunity rekindled my interest in the dynamics of regional integration and other related themes. In my recent reflections on the theme of regional integration, I have underscored the essence of developing performance framework for regional integration schemes in relation to their capacity to help promote equity, peace and stability through effective delivery of regional public goods. Challenges of development today no longer respect national sovereignty and boundaries, and neither do they consider sanctity of the territorial state. The negative effects of climate change, cross-border crimes, global terrorism, piracy and other new forms of violence are increasingly beyond the capacity of individual states which makes collective regional initiatives imperative. The establishments of the AU and to some extent the NEPAD reflect this thinking. A systematic study of these new responses at both regional and global levels will continue to receive my intellectual devotion. It was in this regard that I used the opportunity of my academic engagements as the 2013 Claude Ake Visiting Chair at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden to conduct a research project on Africa's regional organizations and the challenge of global peace and security. On 30 January 2014 I delivered the Claude Ake Memorial Lecture at the University of Uppsala in Sweden with the kind support of the Nordic Africa Institute. On that occasion I spoke on “African Conflicts, Development and Regional Organizations in the Post-Cold War International System”.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, at the beginning of my lecture I told you and this audience about the emergence of my generation of political science scholars and also about our dream to change the world. My journey into the world of scholarship started at 'Great Ife' where I recorded my “commencement”. Providence brought me to stay and live in another academic community made up essentially of the Great Josites. Of course, Jos provided me with the opportunity to grow my career beyond the shores of this country. These processes, no doubt, equipped me and other members of my generation with adequate tools and relevant experiences. Indeed we were convinced that we had the

---

knowledge, courage, and determination that can change the world. However, several years after I make bold to admit that we have found it difficult to change the world. At this point permit me to reflect on the reason (and not justification) for our failure, using the words of Professor Naeem Inayatullah:

.....first, one has to diagnose the problems of the world and this takes a lifetime. The more you study the less sure you become in your ability to make an accurate diagnosis. This is not because we become stupider as we study. Rather, sustained analysis brings out the world's complexity and the monumental size of our problems. Appalachian hills turn out to be Himalayan walls. Suppose we somehow get the diagnosis correct. We still face a number of problems. We are not the only ones trying to cure the world. Others are identifying different problems and arriving at different diagnoses: Environmentalists claim that global warming and peak oil doom us; the feminists point to patriarchy as the root of hierarchy; the Marxist insist on the relevance of class; anarchists focus on the violence of the state; post-modernists undermine the logic of western thinking; post-colonial scholars demand an end to global inequality; and spiritualists bemoan materialist culture. Everyone points to an emergency but they are all different fires. Even if we could agree on a problem and then on a diagnosis, the law of unintended consequences the keystone of the social sciences suggests that implementing a policy is simply unlikely to produce the result for which we aim. The world is too complex and our tools too crude to produce the desired change.42

The purpose of this unusual confession is not to paint a grim picture that may probably discourage others from following in our steps and going through the 'holy' path of those that have not desecrated themselves with the 'milk and honey flowing from the royal palaces'! Rather the blunt confession is meant to help us see through the murky clouds, to understand correctly the challenges of our struggles and thereby fill us with renewed energy to forge ahead, noting more than ever that “the weapons of our warfare”, in addition to social science concepts and theories, should include a new

42 Naeem Inayatullah, “Caring for the Moment” Commencement Address to the Interdisciplinary Studies Program, College of Humanities and Social Science, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC, USA, Friday May 10, 2013.
orientation. I find it relevant to quote Professor Inayatullah once again:

Life is always fuller than theory; theory is a thimble by which we try to capture an ocean wave. Still, that thimble is useful; interpreting is theorizing whether we like it or not, whether we recognize it or not. If theory pales against life's richness, still it is indispensable in understanding, appreciating, and changing life.⁴³

This is to say we will always need the theories for understanding ourselves, for understanding the country and for understanding the world, and indeed the entire society which is the laboratory of social scientists – a critical part of the intellectual community that nurtured me, and to which I owe much and will always belong.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, sir, in the memory of my late mother, Mrs. Eunice Oyebimpe Asake Adetula, and in your presence, ladies and gentlemen, I hereby pledge before you, my commitment to maintain the highest standards of academic discipline, integrity and scholarship; to positively impact on the discipline of political science; to give the best of my ability towards the qualitative development of the University of Jos, with the object of making it a university for today and tomorrow. So help me God!

Finally, Mr. Vice-Chancellor, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to close by thanking you all for listening to my story, which is indeed a brief summary of the intellectual component of my life history.

⁴³ Ibid.
Curriculum Vitae

PROFESSOR VICTOR A. O. ADETULA

Department of Political Science, University of Jos

NATIONALITY: NIGERIA
GENDER: MALE

PRESENT EMPLOYMENT & APPOINTMENT: PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND UNIVERSITY OF JOS.

SUMMARY
is currently a Professor of International Relations & Development Studies at the University of Jos (Nigeria). He has Also, he Dr. Adetula was Claude Ake Visiting Professor in the Department of Peace & Conflict Research, Uppsala University (2013), Head of Africa & Regional Integration at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos (2012), Nelson Mandela Visiting Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, new Delhi (2011), , Department University of Jos,

EDUCATION:
Ph.D. Political Science, University of Jos, 1996.
B.Sc. (Hons.) Int'l Relations, Uni. of Ife, 1985.

PROFESSIONAL IN-SERVICE TRAINING
i. 2006: Afro-barometer Summer School, Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU)/ Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR), University of Cape Town, South-Africa, 16 January-9 February 2006.
iii. 2003: USAID CTO Certification Course in Acquisition Mngt, USAID Learning Support Division, 2-6 June, 2003
v. 2002: USAID Democracy and Governance Officers Introductory Workshop on Strategic Assessment, Rule of Law, Civil Society, Elections and Political Processes, and Governance,


viii. USAID: CTO Certification Course in Introduction to Acquisition and Assistance, USAID Learning Support Division, 7-10 October, 2002

FELLOWSHIPS & RECOGNITION

i. 2013: University of Uppsala, Uppsala, Sweden & Nordic Africa Institute, Sweden: Award of the 2013 Claude Ake Visiting Professorial Chair.

ii. 2011: Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) & Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi: Award of the 2011 Nelson Mandela Visiting Professorial Chair at School of International Studies, Centre for African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

iii. 1997: Award of USIS Fellowship to attend Institute for the Making of United States Foreign Policy, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1997


v. 1992: Award of Junior Fulbright Fellowship to Ohio State University, Ohio (The Award was however not utilized)

EXTERNAL RESEARCH GRANTS:

(i) 2012: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal: Award of Research Grant for 'Citizenship and Equity Question in Nigeria' to be executed by a National Working Group with Victor A.O Adetula as Grantee & Coordinator.


(iii) 2010: French Institute of Research in Africa (IFRA) French Embassy in Nigeria: Grant for Field Research in the Social Sciences and the Humanities for a research on “Uses and Abuse of Yoruba Myths, Rituals and Symbols in the Struggles for Independence”

(iv) 2009: World Movement for Democracy & Fundacion par alas Relationes Internationales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE), Spain, and September: Research Grant for the Mapping of Democracy Assistance in Nigeria (With Professor Daren Kew,
2009: Coalition for Change C4C/Centre for Public Private Cooperation, Abuja: Research Grant to do a study on “Nigerian Extractive Industry – International Dimension and Comparison – Solid Minerals”

2008: Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, South Africa: Award of Research Grant to do a study on “Measuring democracy and good governance in Africa: a critique of assumptions and method”

2007: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal: Award of Research Grant for research on "Impact of Post-Colonial African Diasporas on Development Processes in Africa with Special focus on Pan-African Cooperation and Regional Integration" within the CODESRIA Transnational Working Group on 'African Diaspora'

2006: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, Dakar, Senegal: Award of Research Grant for research on “Environmental Degradation, Land Shortage and Identity Conflicts on the Jos Plateau” within the CODESRIA Multinational Working Group on 'Land in the Struggles for Citizenship in Africa'


2002: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, Dakar, Senegal: Award of Research Grant for a research on “Ethnicity and the Dynamics of City Politics: The Case of Jos” within the CODESRIA Multinational Working Group on 'Urban Processes in Africa'

2000: World Bank & USAID Grant to a Consortium of Nigerian Universities & Research Centre (Served as Coordinator for Central Nigeria with University of Jos, Centre for Development Studies as a member of the consortium to conduct a diagnostic study of corruption and governance in Nigeria.

2000: African Centre for Democratic Governance (AFRIGOV), Abuja: Grant Award for a research project on “Historical and Cultural Context of Political Activism Among the Yoruba in the South Western Nigeria” as Ford Foundation -sponsored national research project on Traditional Political Values and the Struggle for Democracy in Nigeria.

1996: French Institute of Research in Africa (IFRA) French Embassy in Nigeria: Grants for Field Research in the Social Sciences and the Humanities for a research on “Oil and the People of Niger Delta: A Study of Economic, Social and Cultural Impacts of Oil Pollution”, (With Late Professor Omafume F. Onoge)


1991 CODESRIA Small Grants for Thesis Writing on "The Role of ECOWAS in the Industrialization of West Africa"

PUBLICATIONS:
Books and Monographs

(ii) The Impact of 'New' Global Trade Regimes on Regional Integration Processes in the South : A Study of ECOWAS South-South Comparative Programme/CODESRIA-APISA-CLACSO Occasional Paper Series, COD No.16, 2008

(iii) Perspectives on the 2003 Election in Nigeria IDASA- Nigeria/Stirling-Horden Publishers Ltd. 2007 (with Isaac Olawale Albert and Derrick Marco)

(iv) Border Crime and Community Insecurity in Nigeria (eds) Jos; Centre for Development Studies/University of Jos (with Sam O.Smah)


Journal Articles and Book Chapters (Published and in Circulation)


iv. "Measuring democracy and 'good governance' in Africa: A critique of assumptions and methods" in Africa in Focus Governance in the 21st Century by Kwandiwe Kondlo,
Chinenyengozi Ejiogu (Human Science Research Council, HSRC) 2011) pp. 10 - 25


xiii. Social pressures to drink or drink a little more than intended - the Nigerian experience”. Contemporary Drug Problems, 36 (Nos 1 & 2) 2009, pp. 111-136 (with Ibanga, A.J and Dagona, Z)


xli. "The Lome Regime and Small-Scale Industries in the ACPs - The Case of Nigeria", in Bashir, I.B. and Ode Ojowu (eds.), *Small-Scale Industrial Development in Nigeria*, (Jos Centre for Development Studies, University of Jos, 1990, pp. 75-85


xliii. “The Lome Growth and Hindrances to ECOWAS”, *Economic Quarterly-Institute for


Book Reviews (Published in Academic Journals and in Circulation)


Technical Reports/Research Reports


(x) Contributing Author: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Nigeria Conflict Mitigation and Management (CALM) United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under Contract No. DFD-I-00-05-00248-00, Task Order No. 8, June 2009.

(xi) Lead Author: Conflict Assessment for Nigeria's 2007 National Elections, Final Report for UNDP Nigeria, August 2006, (with Marie Pace)

(xii) Lead Author: Evaluation of IDASA-Nigeria's Activities Under the DFID's 'Roadmap to the 2007 Election' Program, July 2006

(xiii) Contributing Author: Nigeria: Civil Society Assessment. USAID, Contract No. AEI- 1- 00 99-00041-00 Task Order 829, March 2004

64

(xv) Main Author/Researcher to: EU Sanctions and its Impacts on Nigeria, Research Funded by Senate Research Committee, University of Jos, Jos. 2001.


(xvii) Contributing Author: Attitude to Alternative Health Care Delivery Systems in Plateau State, A Research Report Submitted to the Centre for Development Studies, University of Jos, September 1990 (with Heberta I. Ayu)

(xviii) Contributing Author to: Technical Summary on the National Seminar on Security Administration and Human Rights, Abuja: Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, November 1988

SELECTED CONSULTANCY EXPERIENCES:

i. Consultant, Partnerships Initiative in the Niger Delta (PIND) and Crown Agents (CA), June 2013. Evaluation of First Phase of Capacity Building for Local Empowerment (CAPABLE) Project


iii. Team Member/ Consultant, DFID/The Policy Practice/DFID-ESSPIN Project January/February 2012 “Study of Low-Cost Education in Lagos State”.


vi. Consultant/expert for International Foundation for Election System (IFES), March, 2010: Sudan Election Conflict Triggers Assessment funded by USAID.


viii. Consultant, ARD/United States Agency for International Development
USAID), March-May 2009, Mid-Term Evaluation of the USAID's CALM Project:
Part of the three-man team for the mid-term evaluation of the USAID/IFESH ARD Mid-
term Evaluation of USAID's Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM) Program

ix. Consultant, International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES), July/August 2008:
Working on reports of the Electoral Violence Education & Resolution (EVER) Project, and consolidating the synthesized report into a manuscript to be titled Money and Politics in Nigeria.


(xxi) Consultant, IDASA-Nigeria, June 2008: Short-term consultancy to evaluate the IDASA-Nigeria's activities funded under the DFID's 'Roadmap to the 2007 Election' Program.


(xxiii) Consultant/Team Leader, National Orientation Agency (NOA), July, 2006: Led a team of consultants to develop a civic education manual for Nigeria through the support of International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES), and PACT


June 28 2006, and a draft program design for the implementation of the EVER project in Nigeria.

(xxvii) Consultant/Senior Social Scientist, January 2004. Worked as a members of the ARD/USAID Assessment team to produce 'Nigeria: Civil Society Assessment' IQC, No AEP-1-00-99-00041-00, USAID Task Order 823.

SELECTED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOP PAPERS (2008 - 2014)

(i) “Women's Protest Actions and Peace Building in Nigeria” paper Presented at the e Thomas Ohlson Memorial Conference on the theme of 'From Civil War to Strong Peace in Africa' Department of Peace and Conflict Research, University of Uppsala, Sweden. 18 -20, April 2013.


MEMBERSHIP OF SCHOLARLY ASSOCIATIONS

i. Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA)
ii. Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA)
iii. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA)
iv. Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CDSSRA)
v. American Political Science Association (APSA)
vi. Society for International Relations Awareness (SIRA)
SHORT BIOGRAPHY

Victor Adebola Olubunmi Adetula was born on 26th March 1960 in Gusau (then Sokoto Province) to Mr. Roland Samuel Adetula and Mrs. Eunice Oyebimpe Adetula. His early life was disrupted by the outbreak of the civil war. Victor eventually completed his primary and post primary education in South Western and later proceeded to the University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University). At Ife he read International Relations, graduated in 1985, and returned to Northern Nigeria courtesy of the NYSC scheme. In 1987 he returned to Ife for an M.Sc programme, and also worked as research assistant on a research project on EU under Professor Ralph Onwuka and Ambassador Olu Sanu. He completed the M.Sc programme in 1987.

Victor Adetula joined the service of the University of Jos in June 1988 as Junior Research Fellow in the Centre for Development Studies. (now Office for Research and Development). He completed his PhD degree in 1996 and was promoted Senior Research Fellow 1997. It was around the same time that he was appointed Senior Lecturer with teaching and thesis supervision responsibilities in the Department of Political Science. In 1998 he was appointed Acting Director of the Centre for Development Studies. He served in this capacity until 2001. In 2003 he was elevated to the rank of a full research professor.

Professor Adetula was transferred to the Department of Political Science, and in 2006 he was appointed Head of the Department of Political Science. In 2006 he was elected to serve as a member of the Governing Council of the University. As a member of the Governing Council, he served on the Board of the University of Jos Consultancy Services Limited (UCL), Council's Committee on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), and also chaired an ad hoc committee set up by the Council to conduct investigation into the affairs of the Institute of Education. He has also served on ad hoc committees and panels set up by the University management.

Apart from career in the University system, he has worked as Senior Program Manager in the Democracy and Governance Office of the United States International Agency for Development (on Sabbatical Leave). In 2011 he was selected for deputation to the ICCR's Nelson Mandela Chair in Jawaharlal Nehru University following his nomination by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He sought and obtained Sabbatical Leave to take up the chair at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and also complete a research project at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos.

Professor Adetula has carried out several research activities on Nigeria's international
relations, sub-regional and continental organizations in Africa, notably ECOWAS, ECA, AU, ACP. He is member of such professional and academic bodies as the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA), and Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), American Political Science Association (APSA), and International Studies Association (ISA). Outside the University of Jos Victor Adetula has participates in the National University Commission (NUC)'s university accreditation exercise, and also provides professional guidance to a number of national-level civil society organizations on strategic planning, performance monitoring plans and impact assessing.

FELLOWSHIPS & RECOGNITION

i. 2013: University of Uppsala, Uppsala, Sweden & Nordic Africa Institute, Sweden: Award of the 2013 Claude Ake Visiting Professorial Chair.

ii. 2011: Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) & Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi: Award of the 2011 Nelson Mandela Visiting Professorial Chair at School of International Studies, Centre for African Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

iii. 1997: Award of USIS Fellowship to attend Institute for the Making of United States Foreign Policy, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1997


v. 1992: Award of Junior Fulbright Fellowship to Ohio State University, Ohio (The Award was however not utilized)

Professor Adetula is married to Mrs. Olubukola Adetula and the marriage is blessed with two girls, Oluwaseun and Ifeoluwa.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LECTURE SERIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Prof. E. Isichei</td>
<td>Towards A History of Plateau State</td>
<td>21st January, 1983</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Prof. P.N. Lassa</td>
<td>The Sorry State of Mathematics Education in Nigeria</td>
<td>20th January, 1984</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Prof. G.O.M. Tasie</td>
<td>The Vernacular Church and Nigeria Society</td>
<td>2nd July, 1997</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Prof. L.S.O. Liverpool</td>
<td>Paradoxes of the Complex</td>
<td>17th September, 1997</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Prof. Shamsudeen O.O.</td>
<td>The Amalian two Theories on Amali Cultural Creativity and Change</td>
<td>8th December, 1998</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Prof. Ardo C. Ezeomah</td>
<td>Educating Normadic Fulbe Pastoralists for Integration and Development</td>
<td>1st March, 1999</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Prof. Ibrahim James</td>
<td>Central Nigeria: What we do know, What We ought to know, What we do not know</td>
<td>22nd June, 2000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Prof. A. Adewole</td>
<td>The Poverty of Philosophy as a Factor in Nigeria’s Educational Failure</td>
<td>24th August, 2000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Prof. (Rev.) Sister Abang Theresa</td>
<td>the Education of the Exceptional Child in Nigeria: Challenges for the 21st Century</td>
<td>12th December, 2000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Prof. V. O. Aire</td>
<td>Thenatos and Eros: Death in Life and in French Literature</td>
<td>26th August, 2004</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Prof. P. Onumanyi</td>
<td>Progress in the Numerical Treatment of Stiffness</td>
<td>30th September, 2004</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Prof. J. A. Idoko</td>
<td>The Plague Among us: Where is the Cure?</td>
<td>28th October, 2004</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Prof. Tseaa Shembe</td>
<td>Macro Molecules (Protein &amp; Carbohydrate): Their Everyday Use animals</td>
<td>24th February, 2005</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Prof. Z. S. C., Okoye</td>
<td>Food Borne Chemical Poisons: Not by Energy Alone</td>
<td>31st March, 2005</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Prof. G. E. Anekwe</td>
<td>From Microbes to Biochemical Breakthroughs</td>
<td>28th April, 2005</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Prof. E. B. C. Ufodike</td>
<td>Fry Fingerlings and Results: Availability to Finger for Frying or Breeding</td>
<td>26th May, 2005</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Prof. C. I. Ogbonna</td>
<td>The Impact of Industrial Microbiology And Biotechnology on a Developing Economy</td>
<td>31st August, 2005</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Prof. Efiong Udo Utah</td>
<td>Atmospheric Phenomena and Associated Electrical Processes</td>
<td>10th October, 2005</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Prof. Emmanuel Bayode Ajulo</td>
<td>The English Language A Pragmatic Means to an End</td>
<td>25th May, 2006</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Prof. Etannibi E. O. Alemika</td>
<td>Disorders and transformation of the Nigerian Criminal Justice System</td>
<td>27th July, 2006</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Prof. M. T. Yahya</td>
<td>Kith and Kin and Distant Relations: Correlation of Arabic Studies and other Academic Disciplines</td>
<td>21st September, 2006</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Prof. S. E. Agina</td>
<td>Foods, Food Microbiology and Wholesome Feeding for a Hungry Nation</td>
<td>30th November, 2006</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Prof. Ihenacho I. John</td>
<td>Index of Consistently Present/Absent/Excess/Low Trace Elements Status among Hyperactive Children with Learning Disabilities: Its Implications in Special Education in Africa</td>
<td>28th September, 2007</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Prof. Cyril O. Imo</td>
<td>Religion, Morality and Globalization</td>
<td>26th October, 2007</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Prof. (Sir) John O. Ogunranti, KOJ (UK)</td>
<td>8th Day of creation: Test Tubes, Genes and Baby Tubes</td>
<td>29th February, 2008</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
37. Prof. Agbaji Emmanuel Geology, Time, Resources, Environment and Man 25th April, 2008
38. Prof. Augustine Ufua Enahoro Discourse on Women and the Nigerian Home Video: A Villa of Mysteries 4th June, 2009
41. Prof. Ogoh Alubo In Sickness and in Health: Issues in the Sociology of Health in Nigeria 19th March, 2010
42. Prof. Janet O. M. Ande, FCNA Non-Accountants Accounting Versus Accountants Accounting 30th April, 2010
43. Prof. Emeka E. Ike Ionizing Radiation, Man and the Environment 30th July, 2010
44. Prof. Atiene S. Sagay Facing the Challenges of Motherhood; that these Little Ones May Live 27th August, 2010
45. Prof. Hayward Babale Mafuyai Female Vampires and Public Health in Nigeria 30th September, 2010
46. Prof. Gladys Asabe Oduah Bozimo Of Terrorism and Terrorism; the Nigerian Typology: A Challenge to Social Studies Education 29th October, 2010
47. Prof. Kanchana Ugbabe, Feminism and ecriture feminine: PhD (Australia)'Mark on the Wall' Trajectories, Gains, and Advances 28th January, 2011
52. Prof. Yilkur Nandul Lohdip The Insolvency of the Universal Solvent: That All May Have Enough to Drink 29th July, 2011
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Prof. Jacob A. Kolawole</td>
<td>Tollgates to Effectiveness and Safety of Medicines in Drug Therapy</td>
<td>28th March, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Prof. James Nnamdi Aduba</td>
<td>Inquiries on Human Rights Practice in Nigeria Past, Present and the Future</td>
<td>29th June, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Prof. Mayen Adiuku-Brown</td>
<td>Concealed in the Scriptures and Revealed in Geology: The Purpose of God for Man</td>
<td>13th December, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Prof. Ishmael Ogboru</td>
<td>Episiotomy of Nigeria’s Economic Malady: Its Depth and the Way Out</td>
<td>30th January, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Prof. Kemakolam Amadi</td>
<td>Thyroid Hormones: Gate Keepers of Life and Death</td>
<td>27th March, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Prof. Basil N. Okeahialam</td>
<td>Rural to Urban Drift: A Migration to Cardiovascular Disease</td>
<td>24th April, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Prof. Victor A.O. Adetula</td>
<td>Nigeria and Her Neighbours: Burden and Blessings of Geography</td>
<td>22nd May, 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>