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APRIL, 2004
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is the product of my own research and has been written by me. It has not been presented for a higher degree in any University. All quotations have been acknowledged and distinguished by endnotes and quotations.

SAMUEL GABRIEL EGWU
CERTIFICATION
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is usual that in accomplishing a task of this nature, one is indebted to a number of individuals whose valuable contributions in one way or the other made it possible. In this situation such individuals are so numerous that all the names cannot be mentioned.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to all the victims of state-induced denial of citizens’ rights and social citizenship in Nigeria
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title Page</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certification</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgement</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Tables</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

1.3 OBJECTIVES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

1.4 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

1.5 REVIEW OF LITERATURE

1.6 METHODOLOGY AND METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

1.6.1 Documentary Analysis

1.6.2 In-depth Interviews

1.6.3 Sampling

1.7 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

1.8 ORGANIZATION OF WORK

## CHAPTER TWO

### CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 CONCEPTUALIZING ETHNICITY AND CITIZENSHIP

2.2 THEORETICAL ISSUES

2.2.1 Class, Ethnicity and Religion

2.2.2 Ethnicity and Socio-Economic Competition

2.2.3 The State and Ethnicity

2.2.4 Ethnicity and Democracy
CHAPTER THREE

URBAN JOS: COLONIAL ORIGIN AND ETHNIC IDENTITY FORMATION

3.0 INTRODUCTION
3.1 JOS CITY: ORIGIN AND COLONIAL CONQUEST
3.2 TIN MINING, MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION IN JOS
3.3 THE COLONIAL STATE AND THE FORMATION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY, 1915-1940
3.4 ANTI-COLONIAL POLITICS AND RISING ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS, 1945-1960

CHAPTER FOUR

ETHNIC ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN JOS METROPOLIS

4.0 INTRODUCTION
4.1 ETHNIC ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND URBAN POLITICS
4.2 ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AND ETHNICITY AMONG THE HAUSA IN JOS
4.3 ETHNIC ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AMONG THE YORUBA
4.4 ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AMONG THE IGBO
4.5 ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE BEROM, ANAGUTA AND AFIZERE

CHAPTER FIVE

POLITICS, RESOURCE COMPETITION AND THE IDENTITY QUESTION IN JOS

5.0 INTRODUCTION
5.1 ETHNIC IDENTITY, POLITICS AND LOCAL POWER IN JOS METROPOLIS
5.1.1 The Context of the Struggle for Local Power
5.1.2 Ethnicity and Power in Jos Local Government Area
5.2 ECONOMIC/RESOURCE COMPETITION AND ETHNIC IDENTITY
5.2.1 The Context
5.2.2 The Case of Jos Main Market
5.2.3 Ethnicity and Resource Competition in the Informal Sector
CHAPTER SIX

PRODUCTION OF HISTORY: INDIGENEITY AND CONTRADICTORY NOTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN JOS

6.0 INTRODUCTION

6.1 THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORY AND THE DISCOURSE ON IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP

6.2 THE POSITION OF THE HAUSA COMMUNITY

6.2 THE CLAIMS OF THE INDIGENES: BEROM, AFIZERE AND ANAGUTA

6.4 THE POSITION OF THE IGBO AND THE YORUBA


CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

7.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

7.2 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

7.3 CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Questionnaire
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: Native Town Population, 1950

Table 1.2: Urban Characteristics, Township African Population

Table 3.1: Ethnic Distribution Of Mines Labour, 1930

Table 3.2: Origin By Province Of Forced Labourers

Table 5.1: Ethnic Distribution Of Chairmen And Sole Administrators In Jos Local Government, 1976-2000

Table 5.2: Ethnic Origins Of Councilors For Selected Years In Jos Local Government

Table 5.3: Ethnic Distribution Of Stalls In The Ultra-Modern Market, Jos

Table 5.4: Ethnic Patterns Of Control Of Selected Informal Economic Activities In Jos
### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Alliance for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Afizere Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Arewa Peoples Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP</td>
<td>All Peoples Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATMN</td>
<td>Almagamated Tin Mining Company of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BECO</td>
<td>Berom Educational and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMWU</td>
<td>Berom Mine Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPU</td>
<td>Berom Progressive Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFCR</td>
<td>Citizens’ Forum for Constitutional Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFRRRI</td>
<td>Directorate for Food and Rural Infrastructures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Igbo Cultural Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Jassawa Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIB</td>
<td>Jos International Breweries</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUMA</td>
<td>Jos Ultra-Modern Market Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>JYA</td>
<td>Jassawa Youth Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBPP</td>
<td>Middle Belt Progressive Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Makeri Smelting Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MZL</td>
<td>Middle Belt Zone League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Native Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMU</td>
<td>Nigerian African Mines’ Workers Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAPEP</td>
<td>National Poverty Eradication Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNC</td>
<td>National Council of Nigerian Citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>Northern Elements Progressive Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMWU</td>
<td>Northern Miners’ Workers’ Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNNL</td>
<td>Northern Nigeria Non-Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>Northern Peoples’ Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>Nigerian Peoples’ Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPN</td>
<td>National Party of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Republican Convention</td>
</tr>
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<td>PDP</td>
<td>Peoples Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Peoples’ Redemption Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P&amp;T</td>
<td>Post and Telecommunications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PYC</td>
<td>Plateau Youth Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PZ</td>
<td>Paterson Zochonis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNC</td>
<td>Royal Niger Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAC</td>
<td>United African Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMBC</td>
<td>United Middle Belt Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAFF</td>
<td>West African Frontier Force</td>
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<td>WAMPCO</td>
<td>West African Milk Production Company</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

The construction of citizenship on the basis of ethnic identity necessarily breeds tension between the universal imperatives of citizenship and rights on the one hand, and the restrictive/exclusive nature of ethnic claims on the other. It is this dilemma set forth by ethnicity-citizenship nexus that is at the root of the numerous cases of communal conflicts in both urban and rural Nigeria.

The research investigates into the way in which urbanism in Jos provides the framework for the playing out of the dynamics of ethnicity and conflicting citizens’ claims fueled by the legal distinction between ‘national’ citizens as members of the Nigerian political community and ‘state’ or ‘local’ citizens defined on the basis of membership of an indigenous ethnic group. The research seeks to show the way in which contestations based on contradictory notions of citizenship by the various socio-ethnic and cultural aggregates in Jos explain the recurrent conflicts and violence which have characterized inter-group relations in recent times, despite the reality of multiplicity of identities of individuals and groups and the co-existence of co-operation and collaboration.

The investigation shows that the tension and conflicts in inter-group relations are a consequence, not of ‘natural’ division between ethnic and cultural groups in the city. Rather, they are direct results of competition for power and resources in which the elites of the various ethnic groups engage in deliberate mobilization and politicization of ethnic and related primordial identities. It is in this context that the indigenous ethnic communities who feel historically disadvantaged invoke ‘indigeneity’ as a strategy to reposition themselves for advantage.

The investigation further shows the tendency for class and ethnic boundaries to coincide, thus reinforcing the latter as the basis for competition, animosity and conflict. In the cause of the competition, ethnic associational life provides the organizational framework for assertion of group position reinforced by the spatial framework which ethnic segmentation in residence provides. Groups at conflict also tend to resort to history to construct their identities and accordingly frame their notions of citizenship and rights.

On the basis of the history of the development of ethnic identity formation in Jos beginning with the colonialism and the colonial state in particular, as well as the role of the post-colonial state in the context of economic decline and the increasing salience of ethnic identity, the research concludes that the citizenship conundrum needs to be frontally confronted. It calls for negotiation, consensus-building and strategic alliance at the level of the elites of the different ethnic groups in Jos, and the need to address the problem at the national level by linking access to citizenship rights to residence, the reform of the constitution through the entrenchment of group/minority rights and the need for the Nigerian state to promote social citizenship.
CHAPTER ONE

1.1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

As is well known, Nigeria is significantly infected with the intractable problem of ethnicity. Violent confrontations between peoples of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds in both urban and rural areas have become a predominant feature of post-colonial ‘encounters’. Urban ethnicity in particular has remained a pronounced feature of Nigeria's social and political processes. Together with the new trends of "rural ethnicity" which has emerged in recent years (Egwu, 1998), the ethnic question constitutes the most potent challenge to public policy. There has been a remarkable upsurge in ethnic conflicts and a remarkable impact of ethnic politics on civil society. Precisely because urban situations are expected to provide a “melting point” or “pot” for people of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, they offer greater possibilities in terms of outcomes of inter-ethnic interactions. And given the tendency for the assertion of primary identity and group competition to acquire ethnic character, one can speak of the "fetishisation” of ethnic identity in post-colonial Nigeria.

In no other sphere is the construction of political identity around ethnicity as problematic to the attainment of the central political objective of nation-building as in the domain of citizenship. Millions of Nigerians who live outside of their states of origin or who cannot claim membership of the local ethnic community on which “local” citizenship is hinged, are effectively denied access to rights which they ought to enjoy as members of the Nigerian state. They are faced with the choice of enduring in silence, the deprivations they are subjected to, or contest their claims against those who seek their exclusion. The
latter choice is the source of festering political conflicts that have turned “strangers” against “natives” and vice versa.

The phenomenon of resurgence of ethnic identity is by no means limited to "transitional" societies, taken for granted by mainstream western social science as the hotbed of ethnic and primordially-based conflicts. The events in Rwanda and Burundi, for example, are bizarre and frightening. But they are not less, compared to the scale of mobilization of ethnic and communal identities, the savagery and the accompanying human tragedy recorded in the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, where massive ethnic cleansing has taken place. Thus, it is no longer a question of the legitimacy or otherwise of individuals and groups seeking to advance or mobilise ethnic identity in the cause of economic and political pursuits; rather, it is a question of trying to come to terms with its real essence or the type of interests it is used to push.

One problematic area of the politicization of ethnic and related identities in present-day Nigeria and a key element of the ‘post-colonial encounter’ relates to contestation over citizenship rights. The key question raised by the phenomenon of ethnicisation of politics centres on which group should control state power and preside over its allocative and distributive functions. In a context in which this question is sharpened by the reality of unequal ethnic relations, the tendency is for the ethnic leadership of the ruling class fraction in control of the state to exclude others. The questions of who should control state power, who should enjoy the protection of the state and who should not are central to the discourse on citizenship. The urban context, marked by a multiplicity of ethno-cultural identities and the fact of acute scarcity and competition for resources and opportunities, provides the most conducive arena for the mobilization and politicization of group identities relevant to the citizenship question.
Ever since humanity learnt to organize politically, the issue of citizenship has remained a major political issue. This is so because citizenship is regarded as the mother of all rights, implying the highest level of reciprocal civic relationship between the state and its members, either as individuals or groups. Citizenship refers to membership of a political community, based on the recognition of man or woman as a “political being”. It also requires a shared set of goals and values in a political community, whether it is a village, a town, local government or a nation. As a result, the tendency to exclude others from enjoying some rights and benefits attached to membership of the political community is considered the highest level of exclusion. For this reason, attempts by those excluded to be included, and to seek to enjoy rights conferred on them as members of the state or political community has always been a part of the interesting history of citizenship. It is no less the case with Nigeria.

Indeed, Nigeria, like any other multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society faces the challenge of developing inclusive citizenship; one which enables Nigerians of all social and ethnic backgrounds to have access to basic rights and freedoms provided for, and guaranteed by the constitution. One major concern which Nigeria has to deal with is the contraction of citizenship as a result of local, ethnic, regional and religious pressures in the era in which thousands of Nigerians and other Africans are conferred with full citizens of the United States and many other European countries. The fact that exclusion on ethnic and related grounds is taking place in the era of “global citizenship” draws attention to the acuteness of the crisis of citizenship in Nigeria, and the difficulty of applying liberal (Western) notion of citizenship which emphasizes the formal rights and duties that are conferred on individuals.
The controversy and debate generated by the issue of citizenship rights in Nigeria, especially in relation to the tension between “national” and “universal” citizenship on the one hand, and “local” citizenship based on ethnic claims should not be surprising. The history of citizenship shows that exclusion of “others” has remained a recurrent decimal. In other words, the history and practice of citizenship is characterised by exclusion of others, or denial of their respect, rights, dignity and even humanity. Although citizenship is characterised by exclusion and the resistance of those excluded, it is not the same in all societies and, in the different stages in the development of the political community. In the Greek city state of Athens, with its celebrated practice of democracy, for example, citizenship was limited to free and native-born men. Slaves and women were excluded as they were limited to productive and reproductive roles respectively.

In the United States of America, between 1787 when the U.S. constitution was enacted and 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, African-Americans as a group were not recognised as citizens of the United States of America. And it was not until 1965 that they began to enjoy voting right. In both Europe and North America, women did not enjoy voting rights until the 20th century. Similarly, the problem of citizenship in Europe today is different from that of African countries that were former colonies. The development of liberal ideas and the modern state emphasized citizenship as individual rights. The issue of rights and struggle for rights were presented in terms of the socio-economic positions. Thus, workers had to struggle for social and economic rights after civil and political rights had been won in the struggle led by the modern men of industry and workers against monarchs and the nobility.

However, at the core of the crisis of citizenship is Nigeria is the central place of ethnic group identity in the definition of citizenship. It is amply demonstrated in the
The dichotomy between “national” and “local” citizenship in the Nigerian discourse, or the division between “natives” and “settlers”, or between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes”. In the context of scarcity and competition, and the readiness of “ethnic” entrepreneurs to resort to ethnic mobilization as well as the context offered by democratization and political liberalization, communal conflicts and violence have been the consequence. Ethnic and religious violence have torn apart communal groups in both urban and rural locations, with dire consequence for national unity, democracy and development.

To come to terms with the salience of ethnicity, it is important to take cognizance of the different forces at work, both at the domestic and global levels. Some of these forces, either acting alone or in combination, have sharpened the crisis of the nation-state project in post-colonial societies. They include the accelerating processes of globalisation and democratisation, the resurgence of neo-liberal ideology seeking to enforce market reforms and the consequent whittling down of state legitimacy and capacity, all of which have led to the emergence of individuals and groups re-defining and re-inventing their identities. For example, the frustration accompanying market reforms have amounted to profound changes that at once erode the confidence of the people in themselves and a corresponding loss of a sense of identity. It thus produces a situation most congenial for ethnic and cultural “withdrawal” as well as opportunistic mobilization in defence of “culture”.

While recognizing the mutual interaction between global and domestic forces and processes in explaining the resurgence of ethnic identity, the dynamics of domestic processes do exert enormous strains on the ethnic identity question. For instance, the persistent economic decline, the imposition of orthodox structural adjustment programme which has resulted in the rolling back of the state, and the decline of social citizenship
resulting from the failure of the state to meet the social and welfare aspirations of the majority of the citizenry, all impact on the interface between ethnicity and the citizenship question. Indeed, what is generally identified as state failure and pervasive socio-economic insecurity which confront most Nigerian citizens as well as the hardening of ethnic and primordial feelings provide strong evidence that the two most stressful challenges in Nigeria's post-colonial situation - modernisation and nation-building - have come to grief. But more fundamentally, it is the absence of social citizenship and how it tends to sharpen the identity question as well as impact on the discourse of citizenship which constitute the focus of this study.

As a matter of fact, what manifests as the problem of nation-building and the salience of ethnic identity in the construction of citizenship rights is more profound than state failure and the crisis of social citizenship. It touches on the crisis of the liberal nation-state as framed by the project of modernity. In the project of modernity, there were two critical elements in the construction of the state. First and foremost, it sought to create homogeneity of political identity by transferring all forms of allegiance to the ecumenical level of the state. Loyalty to the state or nation-state was expected to take precedence over ethnic and other forms of primordial identities. Second, the individual as an abstract legal entity was privileged in the construction of rights. Political rights and civil and political liberties were then presented as inalienable rights that inhered in the individual and enshrined in the law which the state was tasked to promote and defend.

There is, therefore, a strong sense in which the dynamics of post-modernism appear to deconstruct the notion of the nation-state as the singular most important rallying point of identity. It is the pressure of multiplicity of identities and in particular, the irresistible force of multi-culturalism characteristic of the post-modern era that has provided the major
impetus for interrogating the liberal state in many advanced capitalist countries, including the United States of America once celebrated as the “melting pot” of cultures. The only substantial difference is that the conditions of underdevelopment and the nature of fractional competition within the ruling class have created enormous problems for the management of diversity.

Thus, contrary to the assumption that multi-ethnic political existence and the stresses and strains that accompany it is peculiar to Africa, we have seen sharpening of the national question everywhere and the salience of ethnic and communal identities as the basis of political conflicts. The situation of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity in Africa may be unique in the context of the imperative of colonial capitalism which necessitated the conquest of different ethnic and cultural groups within the same territory as opposed to the situation in much of Western Europe where the nation-state which emerged in the epoch of capitalism was built on a single national identity. However, what has been witnessed is the crisis of the liberal nation-state in the epoch of late capitalism. The demands and constraints imposed by the accumulation process such as the need for cheap labour and expanded markets have encouraged influx of immigrant population which in many cases have not only increased the tendency towards multi-culturalism, but have also given rise to demands for recognition and protection by new ethnic and cultural minorities whose identities cannot be completely dissolved.

Yet, all these do not make meaning or sound intelligible unless the phenomenon of the resurgence of ethnic identity as well as its political mobilization is understood as a part of the prevailing system of seeking power and authority, and as a part of the strategy of attaining material and psychological survival. We must therefore not lose sight of the resource-value which ethnicity represents in the struggle for power and resources. For
Hendricks (1997:105), these identities must be seen as different methods of consolidating statehood and the contradictions generated by the process. In other words, ethnic, regional and religious identities are parts and parcel of the technology of power of the African ruling elite, especially in the context of the strategy to access state power and its allocative and distributive functions.

Not surprisingly, in response to the prevailing trends, there has been a remarkable resurgence, in recent times, of academic interest in the ethnic question. Consequently, much has been done, not only in codifying the numerous incidents of ethnic conflicts in both urban and rural contexts, but also in explaining the dynamics as well as the resilience of antagonistic ethnicity. Although a number of recent works have examined ethnicity in specific urban centres, there is still need to study those that have not been covered because different urban centres display different ethno-linguistic patterns with attendant implications for ethnicity and ethnic conflicts. Indeed, violent confrontations, tension and, sometimes, cooperation in varying degrees are contradictory features of inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria's urban centres. Ethnic-related violence in particular occupies a significant place in the emergent patterns of urban violence in Nigeria. Some of the most recent experiences in major urban centres such as Kano, Kaduna, Jos and other northern cities lend credence to this point.

However, it is not in all cases that conflict and violence characterize the outcome of inter-ethnic relations. Harmony and cooperation, in varying degrees, continue to be part of urban ethnic life as evident in interactions in other social, cultural and religious spheres. There is, therefore, the need to recognize the manifold character of the role played by ethnicity in social and political life. As such, it is not a category that is amenable to static analysis; its Janus-faced character, combining elements of imagination and reality, both
determining and determined, fixed and yet, ever-changing, or simulataneously providing ideology of domination and resistance, has to be recognized. The dialectical trajectories of ethnicity as providing basis for accommodation and compromise on the one hand, and as the basis for conflict and violence on the other, are united in the sense that they are linked as political resources in the armories of ethnic leaders. However, and for understandable reasons, it is the violent expressions of such interactions that is challenging to public policy as they tend to register in the national consciousness the problems of multi-ethnic political existence, especially as it relates to the question of national unity, democratisation and development.

The focus of this research is to examine the whole dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in Jos, traversing the entire spectrum of conflict and cooperation. The dynamics of competing ethnicities is simultaneously marked by cooperation and building of cross-cutting cleavages on the one hand, and conflicts and antagonism on the other. For example, exclusive ethnic claims or consciousness rooted in ethnic identity do not at some level constitute obstacles to participation in religious and social organisations which are multi-ethnic in composition as evident in participation in church and mosque activities or membership of social clubs. They do provide the basis of trans-ethnic solidarities and cross-cutting ties of civic engagements.

Ethnic identity is subject to transformation and transmutations over time, with boundaries constantly shifting in keeping with the changing context of the struggles. It does not only tend to change from mutual collaboration/ cooperation to low intensity conflict, it can as well be transformed to high intensity conflicts. As the Jos evidence tends to also show, transformation and transmutations in ethnic identity can as well occur in respect of marking boundaries for the purposes of exclusion and the definition of
"otherness". For instance, despite the conscious attempts by the colonial state to create separate ethnic awareness between the Hausa and the "indigenous" ethnic groups in Jos, especially the Berom, they all perceived themselves largely as northerners up to the end of the civil war, and were in alliance against the southerners. Plotnicov (1968; 1971) has shown that in the ethnic and communal killings that preceded the civil war in Jos, both in 1945 and in the 1966, northerners perceived the Igbo and southerners as enemies and took part in the hostility against them.

In contemporary Nigeria, however, the situation appears to have dramatically changed as a result of the ethnic processes at the national level which has had the effect of weakening or undermining the larger identity based on regional consciousness. Precisely because new identities have been thrown up, new boundaries are being drawn which have implications for ethnic relations. This explains the situation in Jos in which the ethnic cum cultural differences, and accompanying political interests between the Hausa community, on the one hand, and the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere, on the other, have become more salient. It is precisely as a result of this that the discourse on rights as well as the construction and reconstruction of rights in urban Jos, have to be contextualized within the changing nature of power relations.

Although Jos had experienced a prolonged situation of inter-ethnic harmony, especially from the end of the civil war to the 1990s, for which the whole of Plateau State has been acclaimed as a "land of peace and tourism", latent tension has always characterised the inter-ethnic relations. However, things have rapidly changed in terms of the dominant trends and patterns. For example, on April 12 1994, the seemingly harmonious inter-ethnic relations in Jos was violently interrupted by a confrontation between the Hausa "settlers" on the one hand and the indigenous ethnic groups such as the
Berom, Anaguta and the Afizere on the other. The immediate cause of the conflagration was the appointment of a Hausa man, Alhaji Aminu Mato as the Chairman of the Caretaker Management Committee of Jos North Local Government Council. The appointment was greeted with protest from "indigenes" of Jos, following which action had to be stayed on the swearing-in of the appointee on Monday, April 11, 1994. The counter protest by the Hausa community led to the deadly confrontation of April 12. The orgy of violence and destruction unleashed resulted in the death of five people and loss of properties worth millions of Naira. The Jos modern market and the Gada-Biyu market were burnt.

Earlier in 1991, what used to be the Jos Local Government was split into two: North and South, an action which became a subject matter of serious ethnic contestation. The "indigenous" ethnic groups perceived it as a ploy by the "settler" Hausa who, it was believed, had used their "connections" to carve out Jos North as an exclusive sphere of influence. The grievances had hardly died down when the appointment of Alhaji Mohammed Mato was announced in April 1994.

What is significant about the April 12 incident and the accompanying violence and destruction is the fact that it shattered the "myth" which Jos hitherto presented as an isolated example of an urban centre immune from ethno-religious conflicts. Not only was the paroxysm that characterized it reminiscent of the much earlier Hausa-Igbo riots of October 1945, it further, rather forcefully, draws attention to the present state of antagonistic ethnicity and what the future portends in terms of inter-ethnic relations in the city. Seven years later, the city witnessed yet another explosion of ethno-religious violence that dwarfs the April 12, 1994 episode in terms of the level of ethnic and communal mobilization, level of carnage and human tragedy that followed, and the tremendous impact on national politics.
Although the events of September 7, 2001 falls outside the period covered by the research the issues involved are directly rooted in the contestation over identity and citizens’ rights in Jos. Being a parody of the April 12 events, it re-echoes passages from Marx (1982), who paraphrasing Hegel, remarked that “great events and personages in human history occur twice: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce”. Similar to the previous one, the conflagration which lasted for three days in Jos and its environment resulting in the death of over 1000 persons and large-scale destruction of property, was sparked off by the appointment of Alhaji Muktar Mohammed, an Hausaman, as the Coordinator of the Federal government’s National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) in Jos North Local Government. The appointment generated so much bad blood between the Hausa community and the indigenous ethnic communities. Tension was built by a series of threats and counter-threats and allegations and counter-allegations involving ethnic organizations representing the two contending groups leading to a state of massive ethnic and communal mobilization. All this resulted in the orgy of violence which broke out on September 7.

The process of migration induces mass movement of people from a predominantly rural setting to the cities and provides the basis and framework for extensive contacts between migrants of different ethnic and social backgrounds. This process which is of interest to us here, is the type closely associated with externally (colonial) induced modernisation. Urban centres emerged specifically in response to the new economic and political cum administrative dispensations. In particular, the establishment of commerce notably, import/export trade which was the linchpin of the colonial economy and the expansion of the colonial bureaucracy for law and order served as immediate impetus to the process of urbanisation. The significance of this for Jos is underscored by the impetus
provided by colonial extractive (especially tin mining) activities initially for the growth of the town and much later, its emergence as an important administrative and commercial centre. Migrations into Jos in response to these changes inevitably brought together Nigerians of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

But in order to grasp the dynamics of urban ethnicity there is need to focus on certain objective factors such as the role of ethnic "entrepreneurs" who invoke ethnicity for definite political and economic ends; the ways and manners in which ethnic identification serves the material ends of the rank and file of the membership of an ethnic group (no matter how little such benefits may be), and how the latter weakens the countervailing power of class solidarity. Indeed, it is this last point that makes ethnicity a seemingly salient factor in the social processes of African societies.

However, the contestation over ethnic identity and citizenship as illustrated by the Jos case makes meaning when set in the larger national context. In this sense, it has to be related partly to the ambivalence characteristic of the Nigerian ruling class over the national question (Mustapha, 1986), and partly to the imperative of differentiated citizenship imposed by multi-ethnic political existence. Attempts to deal with the problem in the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the essential provisions of which have been retained in subsequent constitutional changes (including the 1999 Constitution), led to the provision for layers of citizenship. At one level, Nigerian citizens defined by birth and by naturalisation are conferred with fundamental citizenship rights to be defended by the constitution. However, in respect of the component states within the federation, the constitution introduced an "indigeneity" clause and limits the enjoyment of these rights and benefits to those whose parents and forebears belong to a community "indigenous" to a state. This has had the consequence of imposing a binary discourse of
“natives” and “settlers” on matters of citizenship. In practice this has the potentials of excluding Nigerians who reside in states other than "their" own states of origin, and as such can be denied access to employment, promotions, scholarships and even contracts.

Worse still, we have a situation of glaring inadequacy of public policy meant to de-escalate or attenuate the conflict spiral generated by ethnicity. As the Nigerian experience seems to suggest rather tragically, measures adopted for the purpose of de-escalating ethnicity have produced, rather paradoxically, the unintended consequence of exacerbating it. Some of these include measures to promote ethnic representations in key public institutions such as the federal character principle in appointments and promotions in the public bureaucracies as well as key political appointments or the quota system / catchment policies in admissions into tertiary institutions. Such policies based on "ethnic arithmetic" tend to reinforce ethnicity and so it has remained intractable. The frustration with which public policy meant to curb ethnicity has met has forced a shift in attention to a new perspective which seems to suggest that its persistence results from the central role played by the state in the organisation of economic production and political patronage. Consequently, it is suggested that the solution lies in rolling back the state and enforcing market rationality. Yet, as we all do know, this kind of solution has its own problems. But more significantly, it tends to gloss over important issues such as the class character of the state itself, which plays a crucial role in determining the form of state mediation in ethnic conflicts.

This study of inter-ethnic relations in Jos, therefore, aims at revealing the nature and importance of ethno-linguistic configuration in relation to claims over citizenship rights and to draw some theoretical and empirical lessons which can possibly enhance our
knowledge of the ethnic question in general and in relation to its interface with citizenship rights in particular.

1.2: STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Contrary to the dominant tendency to suggest that citizenship is an inclusive category, exclusion of groups and attempts by those excluded to demand inclusion, have often characterized the history of citizenship. However, the diversity and pluralism that constitute the hallmark of Nigeria’s social and political life provides a fairly unique context for framing the question of citizenship. It is even more so in a situation in which group identities, especially those constructed around ethnic, regional and religious identities, are politicized and given social meanings as the basis of identifying the “relevant others”. In relation to the issue of citizenship, ethnicity becomes a crucial variable in determining access and opportunities. The binary discourse of “native” and “settlers”, “indigenes” and “non-indigenes” and the dilemma regarding when does a “native become a settler” or when does a “settler” become a “native”, provide illumination for the link between ethnicity and citizenship. This is precisely the source of the unending chains of violence and fratricidal conflicts that torn asunder many communities. Thus, in both urban and rural situations, we have seen communal groups in nihilistic confrontations over access to citizenship rights.

The examples are legion. Confrontations between communal groups framed by contestations over access to citizenship rights have occurred in many urban centres. The spate of ethno-religious violence and conflicts witnessed in Kano, Kaduna, Lagos, Shagamu, and, more recently, in Jos, pitching one ethno-religious group against another in deadly confrontations are good examples. In several semi-urban and rural locations, similar patterns of political conflicts have been recorded with ruinous impact on inter-group
relations, fostering a sense of social distance among groups in a manner that weakens the quest for national unity and integration. Examples include the recurrent conflicts in Zango-Kataf pitching the Hausa community against the Kataf, the protracted crisis between the Tiv and the Jukun in Wukari, the blood-letting that have separated the Bassa and Ebira in Nasarawa Toto with a heavy impact on lives and property, and several other cases of genocide that have been recorded since the return to civil politics in May, 1999.

However, two facts appear to compound the ethnic question in relation to citizenship in contemporary Nigeria. First, is the pre-colonial pattern of migration and the constant population shifts. Available evidence seems to suggest that the complex process of state formation that prevailed in the pre-colonial period ensured that different groups did not have a fixed identity in relation to definite territories. Consequently, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural existence was a pronounced feature of social and political existence based on flexible rather than fixed and rigid identities. This explains the multi-ethnic character of the various Nigerian communities in the pre-Lugardian era prior to the formal establishment of the colonial state in 1900. Second, is the deliberate political project of creating a new nation-state that was central to the nationalist movement prior to the establishment of Nigerian nationhood in October 1960. Although the National Question has been sharpened by the failure of the nation-state project as suggested by the patterns of political conflicts alluded to earlier, commitment to promote national unity and integration is expressed in successive post-independence constitutions.

Taking the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which is a modification of the 1979 Constitution as the point of departure, this commitment to national unity can be gleaned from the provisions of the Constitution on Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy which prohibits discrimination on
grounds of group identity such as sex, ethnicity and religion, among others. Although not justiciable, it recognizes the need for state protection for individuals and groups. It is further reflected in the provisions which encourage Nigerians to live in any part of their choice in pursuit of happiness and good life and the right to acquire property in any part of the country. This is reinforced by encouragement of inter-ethnic marriages and other forms of civic engagement. To these must be added the “federal character” provision in the Constitution which is to promote national unity and integration by ensuring that no particular section, region or state dominates in the distribution of important government appointments and allocation of resources.

Although the “ethnicization of politics” or the “politicization of ethnicity” is at the heart of the intractable National Question in Nigeria, the dynamics of resource competition and politics which frame differential system of citizenship appears to be most significant in the urban context. The existence of a multiplicity of ethnic and cultural groups, as in all urban situations, is a prominent feature of urban life in Jos. This results largely from different waves of migrations in response to the economic and administrative activities associated with colonialism, especially tin mining which started in the early part of the 20th century. As a result, migrant populations from the different parts of Nigeria and the West African coast are found in Jos. Plotnicov underscores this fact by noting that "the extreme heterogeneity of Jos reflects the variety of peoples of Nigeria, of whom almost all are present" (1967:17). For example, the three dominant ethnic groups that have remained the "recurring decimals" of Nigerian politics - the Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo- are well represented in Jos as shown in the table below. Besides, other people of diverse ethnic backgrounds from the South and the Middle Belt such as the Urhobo, Ijaw, Ibibio, Tiv, Idoma and Igala are found in large numbers. Of course, Jos is home to the various ethnic
minorities from Plateau State for whom the town has served as administrative centre over
the years. For our purpose, the most important are the Beroms, Afizere and the Anaguta
who have laid historical claims to the "ownership" of Jos.

Extant literature on ethnicity suggests that the colonial urban context provides the
cradle for ethnicity, and hence accounts for the emergence, sustenance and persistence of
ethnicity (See Nnoli 1978, 1989; Chazan et al, 1988; Otite, 1990). Among other possible
ones, three explanations are advanced in this respect. One, multi-ethnic existence
occasioned by urbanisation provides the framework for ethnicism. However, such a
plurality of ethnic existence merely provides the necessary but not a sufficient condition for
the expression of negative ethnicity. Two, pervasive socio-economic scarcity transformed
competition for the available public goods into inter-ethnic competition, while ethnic
associational life blossomed to fill the existing gap in the delivery of such socio-economic
benefits and consequently, the provision of alternative sources of socio-economic security.
Third and finally, in some urban situations, especially in northern Nigeria, the colonial
authorities pushed certain divisive policies, the most significant of which was the
segregation of settlements along ethnic and communal lines. Perhaps, as a result of these,
urban centres have remained the commonest sites of antagonistic ethnicity. This is so for
Abner Cohen because “here the division of labour is usually highly advanced and the
struggle for resources, like employment, wages, housing, education and political following
are intense” (1967: xi).

Abner Cohen’s point here comes close to Nnoli's assertion that in the urban areas,
"contact on the basis of equality together with the limited nature of basic necessities,
generates divisive competition that breeds ethnicity" (1989:34). Not only was this true of
the colonial period, it has become more pronounced in the post-colonial period for reasons
that will be made clear later. It is therefore not surprising that ethnic-based conflicts have become more pronounced in urban Nigeria as the experience of Jos and other centres such as Kano, Kaduna, Lagos and Shagamu tend to show.

One obvious feature of urbanisation in Jos, not untypical of colonially-induced growth, is the ethnic segmentation of settlement. And it is a pattern whose origin though, colonial has been retained and sustained into the present period. A deliberate colonial policy was to demarcate the settlement of the native population along ethnic cum cultural lines. The Hausa population, which, from the beginning, was in the majority was confined to the Native Town. The pre-eminence of the Hausa in the Native Town became the basis of establishing the Native Authority System and the Indirect Rule. It was therefore administered separately from the Township which was predominantly inhabited by the non-Hausa speaking groups and the "indigenous" population. This process has been well documented by Plotnicov (1969), and should not detain us here. Thus, following the tradition established by colonialism, subsequent influx of people into Jos and their settlement reflected ethnic patterns such that one can talk of the emergence of ethnic neighbourhood in several parts of Jos. For instance, Gangare, Bauchi Road and Ungwar Rogo have grown predominantly as Hausa ethnic ‘enclaves’ in the way Bussa Bujji, Apat and a substantial portion of Ali Kazaure have become dominated by the Igbo. Nassarawa Gwom is similarly associated with Yoruba dominance, while pockets of Beroms and Anaguta appear to be concentrated around Kabong and Hwolse. Afizere settlement can be found in the neighbourhood of Reccos and Ungwar Rukuba.

It may be difficult to suggest a direct relationship between economic well-being and ethnic differentiation in settlement patterns. This would require the generation of data and studied inference which is not impossible. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that even
though ethnic segmentation in settlement may not be the basis for delineating unequal economic status, it does provide some kind of spatial framework of ethnicity. The existence of this pattern of settlement in Jos, therefore, is relevant to the discourse on ethnicity and its implication for the contestation over citizenship rights.

The crisis of citizenship as manifested in patterns of inter-group competition for power and resources in Jos is immersed in the wider dimension in which political discourse is impacted by ethnicity in Nigeria. Very often, we are not sure whether rights should be ascribed to the individual or the group. It is unique in a situation where notions of rights, justice and equality that have been constitutionalised for the Nigerian people over time are understood in ethnic terms, and not as rights attached to the individual as an abstract legal entity. The debate over citizenship is thus closely tied to the national question, democracy and development.

As suggested already, the most problematic aspect of the issue derives from the way in which 'indigeneity' clause in the 1979 constitution has tended to legitimize discriminatory practices against Nigerians of certain ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, especially in the context in which they reside within a state which is "not their own". What exists is a multiple system of citizenship (Nnoli, 1989; Bach, 1989). In one sense, a common citizenship is conferred on all Nigerians, backed by the provisions on fundamental human rights as well as the granting of full residency rights for all citizens and the encouragement of marriages across ethnic, linguistic and religious divide. It is, therefore, contradictory to define opportunities available in a particular state in exclusive terms as being limited to "indigenes". Thus, the notion of "state of origin" ensures that Nigerians who reside outside the states where they cannot lay claims to 'indigeneity' are deprived of their rights as citizens.
This multi-layered system of citizenship breeds confusion and controversy, and precludes the development of national unity and the evolution of a harmonious political community. As Nnoli has noted, this kind of arrangement "inevitably engenders discrimination in jobs, land purchase, housing, admission into educational institutions, marriages, business transactions, and the distribution of social welfare services" (1989:184). More seriously, it ignores the historical processes of integration of various communal groups that were in place before the intrusion of colonialism and contemporary tendency towards integration (Mustapha, 1992; 1997).

Despite attempts to consciously play down the issue of 'indigeneity' in the constitution-making exercises that followed the 1979 Constitution, the practices of the ruling elites have tended to amplify the phenomenon of "statism". It is a very common practice, for example, for Nigerians of southern origin to be given contract employment in the northern states where they are considered "strangers". In one bizarre situation, following the creation of Enugu State out of the old Anambra State, people of Igbo origin in the new Anambra State who remained in Enugu State were urged to leave, and not to continue with their economic and other related pursuits. Indigenes of Nasarawa State, created out of Plateau State in 1996 who had expressed the wish to continue to work in Plateau were given similar "hot" pursuit, while Plateau indigenes with similar situation in Nasarawa suffered the same fate. In such situations, women who are married to men from another state suffer the worse dilemma as they can lay claim neither to the state in which they ought to claim "indigeneity" nor that of their husbands.

Thus, legitimized by constitutional provisions the Nigerian political elites or the different fractions of the ruling class have entrenched discriminatory practices which have had the effect of limiting the economic and political horizons of Nigerians. This, coupled
with the failure of the modernization project has effectively limited the capacity of the central state to meet the minimum needs of the people has meant increasing withdrawal into primordial/primary levels of identity. And it cannot be other wise in a context in which a Nigerian who lives in a state other than the one in which he can lay claims to "indigeneity" is treated as an alien, "enduring self-imposed passivity as a strategy of survival (Ifidon, 1996:103).

Against this background of fractured and differentiated notion of citizenship, the central focus of this research is to examine three inter-related dimensions of the ethnic question and how they relate to the question of citizenship in Jos. The first has to do with the struggle for power and the associated privileges and opportunities in Jos which pitches the "settler" Hausas on the one hand with the 'indigenous' ethnic groups especially, the Beroms, Anaguta and Afizere. To a large extent, this is at the vortex of the spate of ethnic tension and conflict that have transformed latent conflicts into open antagonism and violent confrontations in recent times. A critical issue in the structuring of ethnic relations and the determination of citizenship question in the city is the salience of Hausa ethnicity, fostered historically by the semantic and 'colonizing' power of the Hausa language and Islam (Adamu, 1978; Lovejoy, 1980). But this must be seen as part of colonially imposed patterns of hegemony in the search for an answer to the native question.

This then, brings into bolder relief, the complexity of the ethnic question in Jos. First, colonialism imposed and fostered the political hegemony of the “Hausa/Fulani” community in Jos. Second, the Hausa language is a lingua franca in Plateau state, including the Jos metropolis. For many of ethnic minorities on the Plateau that are predominantly Christians, the Bible and many Christian pamphlets are in Hausa. As will be pointed out later, the adoption of Hausa language in the adminisration of many non-Hausa groups in
the erstwhile northern Nigeria was a deliberate policy. In addition, it is common place to find elites of the ethnic minorities on the Plateau, especially those seeking power, to adopt popular Hausa titles such as *Dan Masani, Sardauna, Wakilin* and so on, while at the same time rejecting what is perceived as “Hausa/Fulani” political hegemony. Yet, what defines “Hausa/Fulani” identity which is allegedly being resisted is immersed in controversy given its colonial origin. For as Kazah-Toure (2001) has suggested, the notion of “Hausa/Fulani” was used first by the British in reference to the aristocracies of the Northern Emirates, and much later, to designate the power bloc dominated by Hausa and Fulbe (Fulani) elements.

The wide adoption of Hausa ethnicity in language, mode of dressing and titles in Jos in a sense points to the character of urbanisation in areas originally inhabited by ethnic minority groups and the implications for ethnic relations. This tendency for the 'indigenous' ethnic communities to be 'swallowed' by the immigrant ethnic groups (see tables I.1 and I.2) is not replicated in cities such as Ibadan, Sokoto, Kano and Onitsha, to mention but a few examples. This is accounted for by the size of the population of the indigenous groups resident in Jos metropolis, and their level of socio-economic development. According to Table I.2, whereas the Berom account for 1% of the total population of residents, the Hausa, Yoruba and Benin account for 51%, 23% and 20% respectively in 1950. Other indigenous groups such as the Afizere and Anaguta are not even represented according to the information contained in the table. Table I.2 based on the 1952 did
### Table 1.1: Native Town Population, 1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>WARD</th>
<th>( A )</th>
<th>( B )</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>( a )</th>
<th>( b )</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>( a )</th>
<th>( b )</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>( a )</th>
<th>( b )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>( A )</td>
<td>( B )</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>( a )</td>
<td>( b )</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>( a )</td>
<td>( b )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birom</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>2,122</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4,631</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nupe</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,175</td>
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<td>Ibo</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,175</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>2,137</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>114</td>
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<td>Itsekri</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>114</td>
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<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urhobo</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Pop</td>
<td>4,606</td>
<td>6,663</td>
<td>4,393</td>
<td>4,16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ward pop. of Native Town total:</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Colum “a” indicates percentage within ward. Column “b” indicates percentage of the tribe within the ward to its total in the town. *

*Less than 1%

### Table 1.2

**URBAN CHARACTERISTICS**

**TOWNSHIP AFRICAN POPULATION, 1952**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Northern</th>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Southern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birom</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>Ibibio</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>Ibo</td>
<td>3,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nupe</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiv</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanuri</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>Non-Nigerians</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>83.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


not show any dramatic improvement in the population of the indigenous groups. It shows a total of 125 (1.8%) for the Berom, while the Hausa maintained a dominance of 436 (53.8%) of the population of Jos. The Yoruba account for 11.8% of the total population. On the whole, the table shows the preponderance of southerners who numbered 5,867 (83.0%) out a total of 7,097 population, while people of northern origin numbered 1,230 (17.0%) of the total population.

While acculturation is a basic fact of urbanizing experience everywhere, what happens in respect of most urban centres, is the tendency for the identities of immigrants from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds to either dissolve into the identity of the
hosts, or for the latter to remain culturally and politically dominant. In the case of Jos, however, ethnic groups such as the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta, who can be described as “host” communities are dominated by the immigrant ethnic groups. This is most noticeable in the spheres of language and mode of dressing, furthered by the acculturating influence of the Hausa.

The historical basis of this was partly laid by the colonial authorities, as in most northern cities, by enforcing the policy of ethnic segmentation in residences among other measures. For example, they made the infamous distinction, for the purpose of indirect rule, between the Native Town and the Township for the Hausa and immigrants of southern Nigerian origins respectively. The imposition of a modified form of indirect rule in the former with the intention to preserve Hausa cultures and traditions has had the unfortunate consequence of giving Hausa residents a possessive attitude towards Jos (Plotnicov, 1971). Indeed, this is the root of Hausa ethnicity in Jos and the underlying cause of tension and violence between the Hausa "settlers" on the one hand and the "indigenous" ethnic groups on the other, as colonial authorities were initially silent on the future of the latter. This provided the basis of tensions and skirmishes that characterised much of the relationships between the two in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. While it may be true, as suggested by Plotnicov, that these "indigenous" ethnic communities "look upon their native villages in the vicinity as their true homes" (1967:3), they are, understandably, more likely to develop a higher stake in the public affairs of the city.

This is most obvious in respect of the pervasive use of the Hausa language in Jos and Plateau state in general. The importance of language does not only stem from the fact that it forms a very important component in the definition of ethnic identity, but language occupies a very important position in the life of a community beyond providing the
vehicle of communication and the perpetuation of the peoples’ cultural heritage. It is also the emblem of cultural independence as well as the social identity of the people. The culture of the people, their sense of identity and notions of group worth can only be sustained through language. Indeed, it is now widely recognised that the wide adoption of Hausa language has endangered several other ‘indigenous’ languages on the Plateau. A survey by Miri (1998) shows that there exist about thirty-seven of such languages in Plateau state with many of them on the verge of disappearing, because of substantial decline in the number of native speakers and the inability to resist the linguistic and semantic pressure of the Hausa language.

The cumulative effect of this historical process on the relationship between the Hausa community on the one hand, and the “indigenous” groups on the other, is most graphically reflected in the struggle over who qualifies to be conferred with the status of “indigene” of Jos and the politics of exclusion associated with it. The government appointed commission that inquired into the April 12, 1994 captured the matter rather succinctly when it noted:

The Commission has considered the argument about who is an “indigene” or a “non-indigene”, a “settler” or a “non-settler”. The argument is not one of mere verbal dispute, sometimes it degenerates into struggle. The distinction between an indigene and a non-indigene is not a mere matter of sentiment, it is a fundamental issue”(Plateau State Government, 1994:25).

The second but related issue in this research is the pattern of ethnic interactions and competition which pitches the 'indigenous' ethnic groups of minority status against those of majority status, especially the Hausa, Yoruba and Ibos. It is fairly settled in the literature that ethnicity is distinguished by its situational and boundary-changing character such that groups that face one another across an ethnic divide line marked by conflict and violence in one situation may act in solidarity and cooperation in another. The determining factor is the
changing context and content of interaction. As demonstrated above, the three dominant ethnic groups in the national polity - the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba - essentially, do not only constitute the majority of the urban population but play a leading role in the economic and social life of Jos. Sha (1998) draws attention to the dominance of these groups in commerce and business, aided by larger ethnic networks to sources of credit and political power. However, in recognition of the constant shift in the definition of ethnic boundaries, there is a tendency for inter-ethnic competition and alliances to occur along the North/South divide, especially uniting "northerners" against the Igbos from the East or Yorubas from the South-West.

Third and finally, there is the question of the competing ethnic claims and schisms among the three "indigenous" ethnic minorities in Jos - the Beroms, Afizere and Anaguta - in respect of the "ownership" of Jos. At once, it involves issues of identity and claims to rights. It is a form of contestation that takes place in the context of the struggles for access to local power, and has been played out most graphically in the demand for local governments and access to the institutions of local governance. Thus, in the context of Jos, which either takes for granted the distinction between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes”, politics of exclusion tends to generate much tension, animosity and violence. It is marked by attempts to exclude the “relevant others”, and the tendency for excluded individuals and groups to seek inclusion. A common feature of this contestation is intense “production of history” as each group resorts to history as the basis for construction of identity and claims. This process of production of history is characterized by espousal of group positions, selective deployment of historical facts and the desperate search to legitimize claims through account of history of migration. In addition, competition for scarce resources and
the control of the institutions of local power provides the arena for contestation over citizenship rights in the city.

The formation of strong ethnic associations and networks are closely related to the struggles of the various groups in the city for scarce resources and opportunities. A few examples include the Berom Educational and Cultural Organization (BECO), the JASSAWA Development Association which is "Hausa-Fulani"- whose membership is largely drawn from the “Huasa/Fulani” community, the Ibo Cultural Union, and the Yoruba community. Pan-ethnic cultural associations exist for virtually all the ethnic groups in the Jos metropolis. As Sha (1998) has suggested, there has been a particular pattern of political party identification and affiliation associated with these ethnic and cultural associations.

Apart from the Hausa-Ibo riots of 1945, the spate of ethnic violence that swept northern cities between 1966 and 1967, provides a good example of how all other ethnic groups, especially of northern origin came together in the massacre of Igbo (Plotnicov 1971; Dudley 1967; Kirk-Green 1970). If one were to isolate the numerous instances of ethnic tension built around anti-southern (ethnic) elements, the April 12, 1994 carnage in which Igbo shops and commercial interests were targeted for looting and destruction (The Nigeria Standard April 13, 1994) may be cited as yet another evidence that a latent animosity exists against Igbo as a part of the general dynamics of the competition for scarce resources. Such a conclusion may be more tempting when it is understood that as a group they were not a party to the conflict. It does, however, draw attention to the fact that grievances and animosity tend to be directed against more prosperous and successful groups irrespective of their ethnicities.

In 1976, the military government in Plateau State attempted what in the Nigerian context amounted to the most radical legislation on the issue of citizenship. The then
Plateau State Military Governor, Colonel Dan Sulaiman sought an amendment to the Plateau state General Order by which "settlers" in the state who had stayed for twenty (20) years would qualify to enjoy all the rights and privileges of Plateau indigenes. This landmark public policy was, however, greeted with opposition and resentment, especially from Plateau State elites and subsequently had to be withdrawn. All this shows that a strong link exists between ethnicity and citizenship in the sense that the notion of indigeneity which limits access to citizenship rights in specific local context is defined in such a way that membership of a particular ethnic community is required to affirm one’s indigeneity.

This kind of inquiry has become imperative considering recent rends in associational ethnicity. For example, Osaghae (1994) points to the phenomenon of "migrant ethnic empires," characterized by "permanance" in the domicility of migrants to the city as opposed to the "impermanence" that was previously the case. Jos is particularly characterised by such ethnic "empire building" as can be seen in the institution of “Eze Igbo” among the Ibo, and the invention of the “Oba” titles for the Yoruba in Jos, to mention a few examples. Although this trend in the process of ethnic identity formation retains essential elements of continuity in terms of the welfare and material functions associated with ethnic associations in urban centres, it nevertheless presents new challenges and possibilities in terms of conflicting ethnic claims with direct implications for citizenship rights.

Thus, considering the fact of ethnic diversity and the identifiable patterns of interaction observed over time, Jos does provide an ample opportunity for (re)examining some of the theoretical and empirical issues raised in the study of ethnicity and citizenship. But in order to grasp the dynamics of the problem, an examination of the wider socio-
economic, cultural and religious context is required. This would involve the examination of the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations in the competition for public goods, power and accumulation. In doing this, however, it is always useful to examine the dynamics of ethnic politics at the national level as well as the dynamics of ethnic relations within the "geopolitics" of northern Nigeria, all of which have shaped and sharpened the character of the national question.

The convergence of the three levels of inter-group relations referred to above, and how inter-group competition for power and resources relate to the issue of citizenship, partly came to a head in the ethno-religious violence which ravaged the city in September, 2001. Not only did it reduce the significance of April 12 carnage, it finally shattered the illusion that had pervaded the consciousness of the residents that Jos was immuned from the deadly patterns of inter-communal violence witnessed in other northern cities such as Kaduna and Kano. What was needed as a trigger was a minor incident which happened at Congo Russia, a part of the city with both “Hausa/Fulani” and “indigenes” forming a substantial size of residents. One version of the story was that a young Christian lady, Rhoda Nyam, was said to have protested the blockage of a major road leading to her residence shortly before the Friday Juma’at prayer. The other version was that the lady in question who was in the habit of disrupting the Juma’at prayer was challenged on this fateful day by a Muslim youth brigade. The important point is that disagreements following this minor encounter resulted in one of the most deadly ethno-religious conflagrations in the city (See Human Rights Watch, 2001).

Fueled largely by rumours about the supposed death of the lady on the one hand, and the supposed loss of lives on the part of the “Hausa/Fulani” community following alleged revenge attack, spontaneous violence gripped the city of Jos. An orgy of violence
and destruction followed for the next five days, sending shock waves across the country given the massive destruction of lives and property as well as the physical displacement of the population. The targeting of places of worship by both Christian and Muslim rioters gave a religious coloration to the conflict. Yet, for several others, it came to be interpreted as a battle between the “Hausa/Fulani” community and northern ethnic minorities. Other cleavages such as north and south divide crept into the equation as the conflict assumed a protracted character.

These multiple layers of identities and the complex nature of the cleavages that came to be played out in the course of the violence brought the city to standstill for more than one week. The incident brought to the fore a number of issues that are at the heart of the discourse of this research. It brought into clear relief, for example, the role of ethnic associations and network in the contestations over citizenship rights, considering the level of ethnic mobilization undertaken by ethnic-based associations. It also brought out the severe limitations placed on citizenship of the Nigerian state in the context of “ethnicization of politics”, or the “ politicization of ethnicity”, not only on the “Hausa/Fulani” residents in Jos, but for all “non-indigenes” domiciled in the city. Finally, it drew attention to the danger of ethnic and religious mobilization in the context of multiple identities and cross-cutting networks of civic engagements. As it turned out, the aftermath of the violence reinforced the ethnic segmentation in settlement which had been a hallmark of the city from inception. What followed is a re-drawing of the ethnic map of Jos as Hausa/Fulani Muslims who had previously lived in areas predominantly populated by indigenes and non-Muslim groups relocated to areas they consider safe, while indigenes and other non-Muslim groups reacted in a similar manner.
The crisis of citizenship as illustrated by the case under investigation raises a fundamental question regarding the African discourse on citizenship. For while it is true that Africans have the greatest attachment to the land, and that it is central to their definition of group identity as suggested by the “sons/daughters of the soil” syndrome, it is also true that most Africans have favourable disposition to “stranger” elements. Consequently, multi-ethnic co-existence devoid of considerable tension characterized several pre-colonial Nigerian societies. It raises the question of what constitutes the African perspective that can be brought to bear on the discourse of citizenship in the light of the negative impact on nation-building brought forth by political conflicts generated by group contestations over citizenship rights in contemporary Nigeria.

In specific terms, the questions which the research seeks to answer are as follows:

What is the nature of ethno-linguistic configuration in Jos? What is the dominant trend in the relationships between the "indigenous" ethnic groups and the three dominant ethnic groups at the national level in Jos? What patterns of interaction exists between the Hausa and the indigenous communal groups in Jos? What is the relationship between exclusive ethnic claims and demands on the one hand, and the citizenship question in Nigeria as illustrated by the Jos case on the other? What should be the role of the state? In attempting to answer these questions in respect of the experience of Jos, it is hoped that findings and relevant conclusions drawn can be useful in the understanding of the larger Nigerian situation.

1.3: OBJECTIVES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

In broad terms, the objective of this research is to identify and explain the dynamics of the patterns of inter-ethnic relations and competition among different ethnic groups in Jos for
power and resources, as well as patterns of exclusion. It focuses on how the ethnic groups at conflict deploy history in the assertion of identity and particular exclusive practices. In specific terms, the objectives of the research are as follow:

i. To study the dynamics and patterns of inter-ethnic relationships in Jos in the post-colonial period, particularly as it relates to the conflict spiral generated by ethnicity, although cooperation and harmony are not totally excluded;

ii. To examine how contemporary (re)definition of ethnic identity in Jos city is related to the question of citizenship and the struggles for material benefits and political power;

iii. To examine the extent to which ethnic origin in general and claims to "indigeneity" in particular determine access to existing opportunity structure, especially where such is consequent upon decision by the state or agencies of the state;

iv. To examine existing mechanisms for the management of contradictions which are ethnically-based, and explore alternative ways for addressing the problems of multi-ethnic existence in situations of economic scarcity and social fluidity.

Besides, the study has academic, political and social significance. The contestation over the "ownership" of Jos for example, touches on the nerve of academic debate generated by the complex inter-relationships between ethnicity and citizenship in a multi-ethnic society of the Nigerian-type. A survey of the extant literature on the subject matter show that any analysis that accepts the label "Hausa-Fulani" as "settlers" as the point of departure raises a lot of doubt in terms of the academic utility of existing contributions. Against this
background, it is necessary that a scientific inquiry into the problems of inter-ethnic relations be carried out to explore the historical basis of contemporary conflicts, as well as the wider economic, religious and cultural context of inter-ethnic relations. Academic and analytical discourses will enable us to explore the national context and the way in which the material interests of specific actors provide the key to the understanding of the basis, form and content of inter-ethnic relations in Jos city.

The social significance of the study follows the attempt to capture first, not only the complexity and internal dynamics of ethnic relations in Jos, but also to discern what patterns are new or unique. From this therefore, emerges a conception of public policy to deal with the intractable nature of the ethnic question. It is expected that the accelerating forces of globalisation, and the need for a constant redefinition and reconstruction of ethnic identity as a means of adapting to a world order that provides neither security nor comfort brings forth the relevance of designing a policy framework capable of managing and de-escalating urban ethnicity. This has become urgent given the increasing consensus about the legitimacy of ethnic identity.

1.4 : SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

This study of the interface between ethnicity and citizenship in urban Jos primarily focuses on the post-independence period from 1960 to the year 2000. The research examines the patterns of inter-group relations and identity formation within the period, and they relate to the question of citizenship. A dominant issue is the study, therefore, is the way in which ethnic identity constitutes an obstacle to the realization of citizenship in the context of the distinction between “national” and “local” citizenship, or between “indigenes” and “non-indigenes”. As it has been proved by the study, contradictory claims
and exclusion on the basis of this distinction has the tendency to result in conflicts and violence.

However, the study has limitation in the sense that could not capture the outbreak of a major ethno-religious violence in Jos in September, 2001, which was a logical consequence of the patterns of inter-group relations and contestations over citizenship rights that have been covered by the research. Indeed, the ethno-religious violence of September 2001 did not overshadow the political significance of the April 12, 1994 events which has been covered in the research, it has unleashed a chain of conflicts around the Jos Metropolis and Plateau State in general, based on the same dynamics. Coverage of these series of conflicts would have strengthened the data-base of the research as well as driving home more tellingly, the political significance of the conundrum of citizenship in Nigeria.

1.5: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The literature on ethnicity in general and urban ethnicity in particular is legion. There is a wide consensus on the colonial origin of ethnicity, including the specific urban context for the emergence and sustenance of ethnicity. Factors commonly identified include the conscious manipulation of communal identities, and the socio-economic scarcity and insecurity in the colonial urban centres which gave competition for jobs, housing and commercial opportunities a purely ethnic character. Colonialism did so much to be credited with the invention of ethnicity to the extent that groups who previously lacked such awareness acquired it (Nnoli 1978, 1989; Otite 1990; Chazan et. al. 1988). Colonialism was essentially a cheap form of rule and in its effort to pre-empt a united opposition of all the colonized nationalities, it reinforced existing differences, both real and imagined, the most important of which was the various ethnic identities. It is this
emergence of ethnic awareness out of the colonial experience that has been described as "enforced ethnicity" (Chazan et. al. 1988:103). The emergence of Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo and other identities are all to a large extent, inventions from the colonial experience.

In the post-colonial period, the ruling elites and the politicians have continued with the invention and re-invention of ethnicity. They have continued to manipulate ethnic and cultural differences among the masses in order to sustain their leading position in the political economy. In this sense, there is a relationship between class interest and ethnicity, in which the latter becomes a form of "false consciousness" (Nnoli 1978,1989a 1989b).

There are specific research works on urban ethnicity in Nigeria. A pioneering work in this regard is Abner Cohen's (1966) study of the Hausa in Ibadan, particularly their attempts to create a monopoly in kolanut and cattle trade by warding off threatening incursions from "outsiders" or non-Hausa elements. This classic on associational ethnicity describes the activities of the Hausa in terms of "retribalisation" relying essentially on "manipulation of customs, values, myths, symbols and ceremonials from their cultural tradition in order to articulate an informal political organisation as a weapon in that struggle" (1966:2). Thus, a high level of ethnic solidarity is forged and sustained among the Hausa by ties of religion, politics and residence. At the same time, relationship with outsiders precludes strong bonds of solidarity. Similar studies were carried out in urban centres such as Warri and Sapele in the 1960s, focusing on attempts by ethnic immigrants to adapt to the urban situations (Imoagene, 1967).

Like the work of Cohen on the Hausa in Ibadan, Albert (1993) and Osaghae (1994) have studied Igbo immigrants in Kano. Albert adequately captures the diverse origins and sources - historical, religious and cultural - of Hausa-Igbo conflicts in Kano, traversing the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial epochs. The discourse explores the complex and
changing dynamics of the political, economic, cultural and religious factors that have sustained antagonistic relationships between the two over time. However, the question of citizenship as a part of contestation over identity receives no attention. Osaghae's discussion of trends in Igbo migrant political organisations in Kano represents a unique contribution to our knowledge of associational ethnicity in questioning extant theories which have become inadequate in capturing the phenomenon of "migrant ethnic empire" building in urban areas which appears to be new. In studying new trends in Igbo migrant empire building in the cosmopolitan city of Kano, he attempts to shed light on how "permanent migrants usually in distant cities from their homelands decide to pursue their constuitive interests through the (re)creation of centralised political authority" (1994:20) with features of traditional royalties and ties with a King or Chief at the centre.

The conclusion here is entirely new and revealing, in the sense that most Igbo migrants appear to assume permanent residency, with the resolve to stay and defend their life-time investments in Kano. Yet, as revealing as the study is, of the historical trends in Igbo migrant experience in the northern city of Kano, the question of citizenship claims by the Igbo on the different levels of government within the host communities is neglected, partly because this was not a part of the research objectives.

However, there is a dearth, relatively speaking, of scholarly works on ethnic relations in urban Jos. The availability of a few which are reviewed here shows how grossly under-researched is the issue under investigation. Plotnicov (1967) provides the first and perhaps, most illuminating study of inter-ethnic relations in Jos. The real motif of his anthropological research was to examine the responses of individuals to the changing social and cultural conditions in an emergent urban setting. This study, conducted against the background of a scenario painted by Western social science to the effect that change
processes in the "new world" were profoundly disorientating to the people producing no less effect than "social pathology," sought to establish the existence of a parallel or otherwise between the developed world on the one hand, and the "new world" on the other. Nevertheless, he does provide an important insight into the issue of inter-ethnic relations covering the first three decades of the twentieth century.

Plotnicov discusses early colonial policies and their adverse effect on inter-ethnic relations in Jos. These include the enforcement of segregated residential policies, the establishment of different administrative systems for different ethnic groups and the inconsistency and, sometimes, indecision on the part of the colonial administration. With respect to the last point, for example, while the colonial authorities acknowledged the distinct identity of the indigenous "pagan tribes" of the Plateau, it still promoted and protected Hausa political and cultural interests. The book also discusses the emergence of various ethnic and cultural associations as part of the attempts by the immigrants to adapt to the urban situation. However, the work must be taken for what it is: a pioneering effort. The historical period is confined to the period before independence and thus merely provides a useful starting point.

Plotnicov (1971) specifically focuses on the Hausa-Ibo riots of October 1945. He discusses the socio-economic context of this historic inter-ethnic hostility which lasted for two days leaving two people dead while severe damage was done to properties. Three factors, namely, the threat posed to Hausa dominance in commerce resulting from stiff competition from the Ibos, the economic decline and frustration which followed the war and the rising political profile of the Ibos at this point in time as reflected in the popularity of the leading nationalist, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), were identified as the underlying causes of this violent eruption. The
first factor pitched the Hausa against the Igbo; the second describes the general atmosphere of disposition to violence, while the third explains why the Igbo became easy targets of the embattled colonial authorities and the more conservative nationalists of Northern origin, led by the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). Indeed, Plotnicov suggests very strongly that the Resident in Jos gave a tacit approval to the massive attack on Igbo properties and persons. Thus, given this background of anxiety and tension and the more than passing interest of the colonial regime, what could have passed for an ordinary disagreement between two traders (one Igbo, the other Hausa) quickly degenerated into a free for all fighting. However, like his earlier work, Plotnicov's analysis is concerned with the pre-independence period.

Bill Freund (1981) represents a brilliant account of the historical development of capital-wage labour relations in the tin mining industry on the Plateau. It is therefore useful in advancing our knowledge of the issue under investigation in addition to a discourse on the colonial conquest of the Jos Plateau. For example, his discussion of the process of labour recruitment for the mines gives useful hints on the ethnic composition of immigrants in Jos. He points out that the colonial state and the mining companies were still pre-occupied with "pacifying" the "indigenous population" who had put up stiff resistance to the assault on their autonomy, the other areas started providing labour for the minefields. Between 1906 and 1914 Yoruba, Hausa and Nupe provided the bulk of the labour supplies. Hausa-speaking provinces of Kano, Zaria, Bauchi and Sokoto contributed substantially that by 1914, of the 9,570 floating labour, 2,250 were Hausa (Plotnicov 1981:51). The bulk of Jos residents particularly after the end of the Second World War came from retrenched labour from the mines. Freund also discusses the attempt by the colonial authorities and the
mining companies to undermine the unity of the labour movement in the mines through a campaign of ethnic divide.

A refreshing insight into the simultaneous processes of ethnic and class formation in Jos is provided by Mangwvat (1984) study of the colonial history of Jos. The study is essentially concerned with the process of class formation on the Jos Plateau, especially how colonial economic activities centred around mining impacted on the establishment, growth and the nature and structuring of economic differentiation of its population. In this way his work throws light on the simultaneous processes of class and ethnic identity formation. Three important aspects of his contribution are worth recapturing here. First, is the dispossession of the Berom of their agricultural land, their basic means of livelihood and their forcible conversion into a large army of unskilled labourers on the tin mines. Second, there was the influx of a huge population of immigrants, especially of Yoruba, Hausa, and Kanuri peasants, some of whom came seasonally in search of cash to meet colonial taxes and other obligations. Within immigrant population are the category of princes, traders, clerks and contractors who supplied the necessary services and provisions of Jos city and the surrounding mining settlements.

The third salient issue in the process of class formation on the Jos Plateau relates to the establishment of Jos as an administrative headquarters in addition to its strategic location and communication networks. He concludes that the first problem raised by the mining industry is that since it is a negation of agriculture, its most ruinous effect was on the “indigenous” ethnic communities who depended on agriculture. Second and perhaps more important, is the fact that the dynamics of the colonial economy and the process of urbanization led to the pauperization of the “indigenous” ethnic communities, while the commercial life is dominated by immigrants such as the Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani and Igbo.
Thus, while the Berom and the adjoining groups lost their farmlands and became labourers of the unskilled category, the skilled and semi-skilled who were better paid were the Hausawa and southerners. In this sense class and ethnic boundaries tended to coincide.

This, no doubt, represents a useful contribution, providing the historical basis for contestation over identity and rights in contemporary Jos. However, its main focus is not the identity issue as is currently being debated. The contributions of Mangwvat and Gonyok (1981) as part of the series of exchanges on “The Hausa-Fulani and their Lots” in Jos relates more directly to the discourses on citizenship and identity in Jos. But its point is merely to justify the exclusive claims of the Berom and indigenous ethnic communities, rather than the concern with engaging the discourse on citizenship that is more inclusive within the framework of the Nigerian state.

The works of Gwom (1983a, 1983b) discuss the evolution of Jos and makes several allusions to inter-ethnic relations in the city. The primary task of his rather polemical writings is the reconstruction of the history of the Berom as the "authentic" owners of Jos based on being the first ethnic nationality to have physically occupied much of what is now urban Jos. Other ethnic minorities such as the Afizere and Anaguta are portrayed as good neighbours who at different points collaborated with the Beroms against common enemies such as the Jihadists and the British imperialist forces, but whose claims to "ownership" of Jos is comparatively weak. As useful as some of the insights he provides are, the two contributions are generally lacking in rigour precisely because of the emotive and polemical nature of his assertions. For instance, they tend to be directed against the "Hausa-Fulani settlers" who are portrayed as having unbriddled ambition in dominating the economic and political opportunities in Jos to the exclusion of the indigenous minority ethnic groups.
Sha (1998) draws attention to the dominance of the ethnic majorities in commerce and business, aided by larger ethnic networks to sources of credit and political power. However, in recognition of the constant shift in the definition of ethnic boundaries, he points to the tendency for inter-ethnic competition and alliances to occur along the North/South divide, especially uniting "northerners" against the Igbo from the East or the Yoruba from the South-West. Another important issue raised in this work is a particular pattern of political party identification and affiliation associated with the various ethnic and cultural associations.

Consequent upon this, there exists in Jos a vibrant ethnic associational life. A few examples include the Berom Educational and Cultural Organization (BECO), the JASSAWA Development Association which draws the bulk of its membership from "Hausa-Fulani" community, the Ibo Cultural Union (ICU), and several other forms of associational life among the Yoruba, Jarawa and Anaguta, to mention but a few examples. Indeed, pan-ethnic cultural associations exist for virtually all the ethnic groups in the Jos metropolis.

It should be clear from this brief review of the extant literature which specifically focuses on inter-ethnic relations in Jos that the issue under investigation is yet to be adequately explored. Much of it is either dated, exploratory or have not been carried out in the tradition of academic rigour. It is therefore necessary that a scientific inquiry be carried out to explore the historical basis of the wider political, economic and cultural context of inter-ethnic relations in contemporary Jos. The goal of this kind of academic exercise is to demonstrate how this impact of the question of identity and contestation over citizenship rights. It will therefore be possible to discern patterns that are new or unique on the basis of our investigation.
1. 6: METHODOLOGY AND METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

Given the complex character of the issues being proposed for investigation, the political economy approach appears to be the most useful, both as a theory that guides the research and the interpretation of data. This is precisely because this perspective, largely derived from the contributions of Marx and Engels in the nineteenth century, takes as its point of departure the production and reproduction of material means of existence. As Ake (1981) has noted, this approach is different from others precisely because it examines reality characterised by dynamism arising from the contradictions of social existence and treats social life and material existence in their relatedness. Furthermore, rather than merely focusing on the surface appearance of a particular reality, this variant of the political economy approach pays attention to the inner dialectical connections and internal contradictions of the reality.

However, what makes this approach particularly relevant to our study of ethnic relations in urban Jos is the comprehensive and holistic character of the Marxian paradigm. For example, while it takes production of material existence as primary, it does not discount the social and political significance of other aspects of human existence such as the role of culture and religion, which, of course, have to be related to the economic foundation of society. As a deeper reflection will lay bare, what often appears as ethnic and religious conflicts may have their roots in the struggles for material existence. Specifically for our purpose, this approach makes historical investigation a necessary component of this research.

Social scientific representations of social life, as we all know, begin with taking cognisance of the central canons of science. A high premium is therefore placed on the
generation of relevant data which can aid in the construction of theories or the reconstruction of existing ones. Social Science research, therefore, in following the precepts of science, often uses certain methods of generating data in the course of description or explanation of social reality. In order to accomplish the objectives of this research, three major approaches in data collection will be utilized. These include documentary analysis, in-depth interview and the use of questionnaires.

This is necessitated by two factors. First, it has to be recognised that the nature of the research problem is not amenable to one single method of carrying out research. Second, the recognition that scientific enterprise, in so far as it is aimed at the search for the truth, must seek to combine the different approaches which could enhance the collation of relevant data so as to bring us closest to the truth. For example, survey research and the use of questionnaire, which in the positivist tradition, has been privileged as approximating the rigour of science has been found to have its own problems different from the extreme post-modernist reductionism which denies a distinctive status to scientific explanations. Thus, it has been suggested that survey research hardly measures up to the requirement of positivist science because of such problems as interview, respondent, field and situation effects. These shortcomings call for a hermeneutic science which seeks understanding arrived at through social interaction with others. The simultaneous use of other approaches, as we shall see, helps us to bridge the gap inherent in survey research.

1.6.1: Documentary Analysis: The necessity to trace the historical development of inter-ethnic (group) relations in Jos made it imperative for us to examine some relevant documents and correspondences. These included colonial records relating to inter-ethnic relations available in the archives at Jos and Kaduna, and petitions and memoranda of
government officials and individuals available in Jos archives. Records kept by the various ethnic associations connected with our study as well as reports of government appointed commissions of inquiry and white papers on them were equally examined. For example, we examined the constitutions of ethnic organizations like the ICU, BECO, AYDA and JASAWA as well as letters and correspondences undertaken by these organizations.

Apart from colonial records obtained from the archives, relevant publications of government were consulted. The pamphlet, *This is Jos*, published by the Directorate of Information of Plateau State Government was consulted. Memoranda submitted by the various interest groups to the government commission of inquiry that looked into the April 12, 1994 riots were widely consulted as were press statements and paid advertisements stating the positions of the different groups at conflict. In a similar vein, the white paper on the report of the inquiry into the 1994 by the Plateau State Government was also consulted.

1.6.2: In-depth Interview: The use of in-depth interview was quite critical to this study. The advantage lay in the fact that actors had the opportunity to freely express their opinions on different aspects of the phenomena once mutual confidence was established. Not only did this approach permit for elaboration, the interaction that took place between the researcher on the one hand and the interviewee on the other allowed the former, to be socially involved and perhaps, be committed to the social phenomena under investigation.

For this purpose, our knowledge of the key actors in Jos politics as well as of the leadership of the various ethnic groups and associations was of immense assistance. The most important ethnic unions and associations identified for this purpose were those of the Hausa, Berom, Afizere, Anaguta, Ibo and the Yoruba. Specifically such interviews were conducted with officials of BECO, AYDM, ICU and notable community leaders such as Pa...
Adeshina, Chief Sab Okoye, the Oba Yoruba, Chief Olugbodi, the Sarkin Jarawa, Yakubu Kankani and Joel Nsofor, among others.

1.6.3: Sampling: For the purpose of obtaining data regarding the character of ethnic segmentation of the market and the pattern of ethnic monopolies in certain businesses and trade which were critical in the framing of the identity question in Jos and ultimately the contestation over rights and access to resources, questionnaires were administered. Sampling for this purpose was based largely on non-probability or judgemental sampling. This was so because, considering the nature of the research problem and the study universe, purposive sampling fitted in best. Thus, as Babbie (1975) has underscored, this sampling method is most appropriate in research situations where precise representativeness is not necessary and the researcher has adequate knowledge of the population, its elements and research aims.

Questionnaires were used in carrying out a survey on some major economic activities that existed outside of government control. Since Jos is predominantly a commercial capitalist economy, the samples involved privately-owned commercial ventures that were both visible and fairly organized. Only such business ventures were amenable to easy documentation. The trades and businesses surveyed include dealerships in automobile spare parts, patent medicine, building materials and timber. A total of 200 businesses within the Jos metropolis were randomly selected for the survey. For the spare parts dealership market, 42 were sampled; hotels and restaurants, 29; building materials, 46; patent medicine, 29; timber, 21; and textiles, 33.

1. 7: RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
As Charles Ragin (1994) reminds us, social scientific investigation is essentially about social construction of reality on the basis of a productive dialogue between theory and data, it is then important that research should be guided by a set of statements tentatively establishing cause and effect relationships between variables. The analysis of data collected was guided by the following hypotheses:

i. Inter-ethnic hostility and conflicts appear to be rooted in historical, economic and cultural factors.

ii. Inter-ethnic conflicts are related to the degree of socio-economic and political imbalance between and among different ethnic groups.

iii. Economic decline and mass poverty exacerbate inter-ethnic and urban violence.

iv. The possibilities of ethnic violence and conflicts are related to the degree of state involvement in the control of the economy, structure of opportunities, and the framing of identity and citizenship.

v. The absence of a democratic framework in the context of politicized ethnicity has implication for the sharpening of the identity question and citizenship.

1.8: ORGANISATION OF WORK

Chapter one introduces the entire work. It consists the general introduction, the statement of the research problematique and review of extant literature. The chapter attempts to establish the basis of the study by identifying the central issues and questions raised by the research. The survey of literature is to provide insight into the amount of ground so far covered in the study of the dynamics of urban ethnicity, and the interaction between ethnicity and the question of citizenship in Jos. Similarly, the chapter attempts to formulate the specific research issues to be investigated and the methodology that informs
the study. While the Marxist methodology provides the framework for the interpretation of
data, a number of strategies will be employed in gathering the relevant data in which
historicized discourse will be relied upon.

Chapter two deals with conceptual issues and the theoretical framework of the
study. It surveys the conceptual meaning of ethnicity, and how the exclusive claims of
ethnic demands impact on the citizenship question. The basic issues explored in the
theoretical discourse centres on the relationship between pluralism, ethnicity and
citizenship; the state and citizenship; and democracy, democratization and citizenship.

Chapter three is titled "Urban Jos: Colonial Origin and Ethnic Identity Formation". This chapter discusses the origin, growth and development of Jos as an urban centre. This
history is tied to colonial tin mining activity. More importantly, the chapter discusses the
role of the colonial state in the process of ethnic identity formation. The colonial context of
the development of Jos is particularly germane in the shaping of its ethnic question.

The fourth chapter titled, "Ethnicity, Civil Society and Associational Life in
Jos", focuses on ethnic associational life and its contribution to the reproduction of
ethnicity in Jos. More often than not, urban migrants, in reaction to the prevailing socio-
economic situations in which they find themselves, devise their coping mechanisms or
mode of adaptation. The formation of ethnic and "tribal" unions or associations is the most
common and the most viable, not the only one. This chapter examines the role of these
associations in mobilizing the sentiments of members of the various ethnic groups as well
as reinforcing their sense of solidarity. More critically, it examines ethnic associational life
in the context of civil society and their increasing role in negotiating power relations
among the different socio-ethnic aggregates. This organizational form of interaction among
members of the same communal group plays an important role in the explanation of contemporary urban ethnicity.

The title of chapter five is "Politics, Resource Competition and the Citizenship Question in Jos". This chapter examines the dynamics of ethnicity in the context of electoral and party politics as well as competition for resources and economic opportunities in Jos. The first aspect focuses on the difficulty associated with competitive politics in urban situations in which there are different ethnic groups struggling for hegemony in public affairs. It thus tries to document and evaluate the impact of party and competitive politics on ethnic relations in Jos. While the second examines the ways in which competition for scarce resources and values contributes to the problem of ethnicity and vice-versa. It thus attempts to bring out the ethnic character of the ownership structure of the businesses and economic activities. The import of this chapter is that a major issue in the contest over identity and citizens rights in Jos is related to the alleged domination of "strangers" of economic and commercial opportunities to the disadvantage of “indigenes”. However, it is always a very dynamic situation in which the economic balance/imbalance between different ethnic groups changes from time to time. Such a situation in which the dominance exercised by a particular group is challenged by the rising power of another tends to generate tension and even conflict.

The sixth chapter titled "Production of History: Contradictory Notions of Citizenship and Indigeneity in Jos", discusses the contradictory claims and assertions based on history to authenticate claims to identity and "indigeneity" in Jos by the Hausa community on the one hand, and the ethnic minorities such as the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta on the other. The central political question here is the "ownership" of Jos. This
appears to be at the vortex of the ethnic animosity and tension as exemplified by the April 12, 1994 carnage which for two days brought the city of Jos to a standstill. And it is not simply a question of the tussle over who "owns" Jos in the abstract sense of the word. Strongly implicated in this is the contestation over identity, access to power and resources, all of which raise the issue of citizenship and "indigeneity". Very germane to this contestation is the issue of “production of history” which is the result of such competing historical claims.

Chapter seven is the concluding chapter. The chapter presents the summary of research findings and the policy recommendations. In so doing, the chapter will attempt to relate the experience to the debate on the wider national question in Nigeria. It examines the way the issue of citizenship has been posed by the Nigerian state and its implications for national unity and integration.
CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0: INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the conceptual issues raised by the study and attempts to establish a theoretical foundation for the research. As in all academic studies there is need to be clear as to the meaning of the concepts used and the sense in which such concepts are deployed. For the purpose of this study, the key concepts are those of ethnicity and citizenship. In addition to clarifying their meanings, it is also important to suggest the way in which they are related in terms of the problematics of the study.

The importance of laying the theoretical foundation of the study is easy to decipher. According to Charles Ragin (1994), social scientific representation of social life involves more than addressing social theory, and includes a clear dialogue between social theory on the one hand and empirical data on the other, as an essential part of the research process. The reconstruction of social theory is only feasible on the basis of this. It is for this crucial reason that we require to explore the conceptual and theoretical issues surrounding ethnicity and citizenship.

2.1.1 On Ethnicity
As a concept ethnicity has come to occupy a centre stage in both our consciousness and in discourses. This is not surprising in a world that has come to be marked by constant search for, and (re)definition of identity. It is thus a world characterised by the phenomenon of political ethnicity. There are two compelling reasons why we must clarify the meaning of ethnicity. One, we often take for granted, the meaning of the concept. A common source of error arises from the tendency to simplify the concept merely as a derivative from an ethnic group even though this etymological link can never be denied. There is the problem of the tendency to conflate ethnicity with other social phenomena that share similar features with ethnicity, especially those that fall within the categories of primordial and communal identities. There is a recent concern regarding the elusive nature of the concept, precisely because of the "phantom-like" quality of the phenomenon or the fact that, like any other portmanteau word, "ethnic" or "ethnicity" can serve as a euphemistic substitute for other appellations (See Szeftel, 1994).

What then is ethnicity? Ethnicity is often associated with multi-ethnic political existence. But that would not mean that once you have ethnic pluralism, the outcome is automatically ethnicity. As Mafeje (1977) has suggested, ethnicity is not merely an abstract noun but an ideologically loaded concept which is not a natural outcome of ethnic existence in any objective sense. Mafeje's point is that despite its etymological derivation, ethnicity is not an abstraction from any "ethnic group", precisely because it has no independent existence of its own, being always driven either by class interests or the quest for power. Nevertheless, ethnic pluralism provides a framework, or to use another phrase, the necessary but not sufficient condition for ethnicity. As instructive as Mafeje's point is, it may sound too abstract or unreal if our attempt to understand ethnicity does not begin
from an initial effort at clarifying what an ethnic group stands for. It might, therefore, be useful to begin by attempting to specify the meaning of an ethnic group.

There are as many definitions as there are writers on the subject. The problem is not the definition but the political discourses to which the concept is put. Nnoli (1978:5) suggests that ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries, language and culture being the most important attributes. For Otite, ethnic groups are "categories of people characterised by cultural criteria of symbols including language, value systems, and normative behaviour and whose members are anchored in a particular part of a new state territory" (1990:17). Three important attributes of ethnic group are of significance here: language, culture, and territory or spatial location. Like language and culture, the territorial dimension of ethnic distribution makes ethnicity a problematic issue in African politics. Barth (1970) had earlier suggested that two factors namely, overt signals represented by language and style of life and basic value orientations such as standard of morality are important in the delineation of ethnic boundaries. Although the definition of an ethnic group draws heavily on cultural criteria, ethnic groups are separate from cultural groups (Otite 1990:18).

However, in Africa, as important as all these elements are, the question of territoriality and spatial location makes ethnicity a problematic issue in political and social relations. And this is so because of the tendency for ethnic groups to cluster in space, a situation that was given additional fillip by colonial policies meant to foster the emergence of separate ethnic and cultural identities. In particular, the notion of territoriality supplies the ideological legitimation for ethnic groups who struggle to protect their economic and political interests, and to ward off competitors. It is in this sense that ethnicity and
citizenship have a meeting point in the politics of African people. The ideological basis of territoriarity is expressed in the “sons” or “daughters” of the soil syndrome.

Ethnicity is a product of interactions between and among people of different ethnic groups. According to Chazan et. al. (1988:102), it is "the subjective perceptions of common origins, historical ties and memories". It is not important that claims of a common origin or any other basis for individual and collective self-identification are real. What is important is the imagined community that supplies a sense of group solidarity and the framework for delineating the relevant others. Nnoli (1978) and Otite (1990) have also added contextual discrimination by members of one ethnic group against others on the basis of some exclusive criteria as a critical dimension of ethnicity. These criteria of exclusion are the defining elements of an ethnic group earlier mentioned.

It is important to mention at the outset three important facts related to the discourse on ethnicity. First, as Osaghae (1994) reminds us it is necessary to make a distinction between ethnicity at the level of the individual (micro) and at the level of the group (macro). But while the latter is the aggregated form of the former it is the shared identity at the group level that is more important. Never the less, what we confront most of the time is the continuity between micro and macro levels of ethnicity, especially in the African context where the individual acquires meaning as a member of the larger community. Second, the criteria used to decipher the phenomenon referred to as ethnicity can be objective as well as subjective. Third and relatedly, ethnicity is constituted by both static and dynamic elements. The static elements are those purely objective factors that are essentially innocuous and not harmful to the social process. On their own they do not impair social interaction. What this suggests is that ethnicity is an integral part of the social
process and that multi-ethnic existence, is after all, a necessary but not a sufficient condition for ethnicity.

Moreover, ethnicity is about mobilization and politicization of ethnic group identity drawing on those elements that mark out the group such as language, culture, territory, mode of dressing and sharing jokes. It takes on greater meaning in competitive situations, and where available resources are scarce in relation to the interests which grow around them. According to Nnoli (1978, 1989), its main characteristics are: exclusiveness manifested in inter-group competition, conflict in relation to stiff competition, and the consciousness of being one in relation to others.

Three elements of ethnicity identified by Mare (1993) are particularly useful to our understanding of the phenomenon and the discursive genres to which ethnicity is amenable. One, it is a culturally specific practice and a unique set of symbols and beliefs, especially the way in which an ascribed identity is given contemporary construction through socialization and mobilization in cultural and political movements. Two, it is a belief in common origin involving sometimes, the existence or imagination of a common past. Third and finally, it involves a sense of belonging to a group defined in opposition to others. A critical examination of these main elements on which ethnicity rests shows an attempt to close the gap in the literature between those who, on the one hand, take ethnicity as an expression of primordial inheritance, and those who understand it as something historically or socially constructed (See for example, Geertz, 1963; Keyes, 1981; Ranger, 1983, 1994; Vail, 1989). In addition, Mare's position appears to take into account the role of 'cultural brokers', 'ethnic entrepreneurs' and 'organic intellectuals' whose roles are critical in the process of ethnic identity formation.
The most significant element of ethnicity in relation to our discussion here is the phenomenon of politicized ethnicity. More often than not, ethnicity is invoked by interests which are not necessarily described in "ethnic" terms, for it could be mobilized in pursuit of perceived 'ethnic interest' or not related to ethnic interests at all (Szeftel, 1994). As Ake (1993) puts it, conflicts arising from the construction of ethnicity to conceal exploitation by building solidarity across class lines, conflicts arising from appeals to ethnic support in the face of vanishing legitimacy, and from the manipulation of ethnicity for obvious political gains are not ethnic problems, but problems of particular political dynamics which are pinned on ethnicity. Relatedly, Mamdani (1996), tracing the problem of African ethnicity to the bifurcated nature of the colonial state which organized rural and urban power differently, concludes that it is a mode of organizing power and fragmenting resistance with the state playing a crucial role in its reproduction. The politicization of ethnicity in Nigeria, therefore, has to be understood ultimately in the context of intra-class struggles for hegemony within a highly fractionalized ruling class or the political class. However, it should be added that ethnicity nevertheless remains a problem because its appeals are more heeded to than say, class.

Furthermore, following from the works of Cohen (1969), Nnoli (1978,1989), Otite (1990) and Osaghae (1992), the critical points raised in the elaboration of ethnicity can be summarised as follows. First, it exists in a polity in which there is a variety of ethnic groups. Second, it is characterised by exclusiveness, the common consciousness of being one in relation to others. Third, it is a tool of competition for individuals and groups for scarce public goods such as contracts, employment, political appointments, scholarships, access to land as well opportunities for lucrative trade and commerce. It is, ipso facto, both competitive and conflictual. Fourth, it is primarily a political phenomenon in so far as it
has much to do with the allocation of values. As a matter of fact, it is a state-linked category rather than an archaic survival mechanism of the African people as it is often presented. The state, accordingly, responds promptly to ethnic-based demands and agitation, bearing in mind the far-reaching consequences of choosing to ignore them. Fifth, it exists alongside, and interacts with other cleavages such as class and religion. Finally, it is not a fixed form of consciousness, and therefore situational as "it alters its form, place and role in the social process" (Nnoli 1978:8).

Recent trends in the literature, in contradistinction to the perspective rooted in the modernisation tradition, reflect an attempt to "retrieve" ethnicity from the traditional "prejudice" of Western sociology and anthropology which had represented it as something unique to primitive or underdeveloped societies (Ake 1994:49). Using 'tribalism' as the conceptual frame, it was uncritically assumed that behaviours which fit into these categories were essentially associated with the African. It is now difficult to continue to hold this kind of view given the salience of ethnic-based conflicts among the so-called developed societies such as Belgium, Canada and the former communist countries of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. As Mafeje correctly concludes, not only is "tribe" a misleading label for all pre-colonial societies, it has become most absurd in the post-colonial period. As he has remarked:

The new division of labour, the new modes of production, and the system of distribution of material goods and political power give modern African societies a fundamentally different material and social base (1971:258).

This useful intervention notwithstanding, Western writers and commentators continue to use “tribe” to denigrate African peoples and cultures by presenting most of the political
conflicts as tribal conflicts. It is difficult to ponder what label writers of the modernisation genres would give to similar ethnic-based conflicts in many European nations particularly in Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union today.

The real task is to ground the phenomenon of ethnicity, especially its urban form, in the complex dynamics of daily human experiences and struggles of urban migrants to produce and reproduce their means of livelihood. But more importantly, the way in which lived experience shapes and contributes to the construction of ethnic group identity needs to be related to the question of citizenship, or the ways in which patterns of exclusion generated has direct implication for individual and group access to resources and power. This particularly calls for anchoring our analysis on the wider political and socio-economic context as well as discourses which give the ethnic question its real meaning and significance.

2.1.2 On Citizenship

Citizenship in very broad and in general terms relates to reciprocity of rights and obligations between the state on the one hand, and members of the political community on the other. The rights of a citizen are conferred on a person endowed with full political and civil rights in a state. It therefore has much to do with the political, civil and social rights attributable to the individual as a member of a state (See Whitaker, 1964; Ofoegbu and Nwosu, 1986). As Marshall (1965: 95) simply puts it, citizenship is a status bestowed on the individual who has full membership of the political community. The qualifications for it and the rights that are its entitlements are specified in the constitution. For example, acquisition of citizenship can be through birth (the law of blood), law of place, and through
naturalization. The notion of citizenship was developed in the context of bourgeois revolution and the ascendancy of liberalism.

Liberalism as it emerged rested among others, on two main foundations: belief in the abstract individual in opposition to the state, the sanctification of private property based on the interest of the atomistic individual. The political correlates of the atomistic individual under the 'invisible' hands were the ideals embodied in the French and American revolutions and expanded as the western ruling class gained more confidence with the consolidation and generalization of commodity relations. The liberal democratic state emerged in this context, with the guarantees of individual constitutional rights that ensured the transformation of "subjects" into "citizens". Citizenship is thus defined in terms of the special status granted by the state to its members and expresses at the formal level, the equality of all before the state. The essence of the bourgeois revolution, therefore, was that it succeeded in whittling down communal ties and identities, and equally sounded the death knell of feudal ties and obligation as well privileges associated with birth and status. The economic inequality institutionalized in private property alongside this represents the other side of capitalism.

The rights of citizens essentially include political, civil and social rights. More often than not, the rights of citizens are limited to right to life, freedom of religion, peaceable assembly and freedom from discrimination to mention just a few. Ordinarily, the rights of a citizen should include socio-economic rights such as the right to employment, education and to economic well-being. But it also entails obligations which the individual owes the state which implies that sanctions are invoked should the individual fail to live up to expectation. Citizenship is therefore one of the most central values of the modern state.
As Laski (1982: 92) reminds us, both citizenship and equality provide the organizing ideas on which the modern state is hinged. On citizenship, he makes the following perceptive observation:

In any state, the demands of each citizen for the fulfillment of his best self must be taken as of equal worth and the utility of a right is therefore its value to all members of the state…. (Every right is) either equally applicable to all citizens without distinction or not applicable at all.

The prevalence of the phenomenon of political ethnicity and the exclusive practices associated with it, however, tend to impede access of millions to citizenship rights in many African countries. Rather than being based on residency as in many federal systems, citizenship in much of Africa, is defined in terms of the membership of an ethnic group such that one who is supposed to be a citizen is first and foremost required to affirm and authenticate his membership of the ethnic group as the basis for enjoying the rights conferred on the citizen.

Mamdani (1996) has attempted to explain the crisis of citizenship in contemporary Africa in terms of how the colonial authorities organized power to deal with the problem of law and order as well as political legitimacy associated with alien rule. In other words, the problem of citizenship has to be understood in the context of the mode of organizing state power in Africa, rather than some inherited notions derived from the Anglo-American historical experience. According to Mamdani, colonialism was confronted with the ‘native question’ to which the adoption of “indirect rule” by the British, for example, became an ingenious response. The consequence of this strategy was the emergence of a bifurcated state structure: one civic; the other customary. While civic law and power obtained in the urban areas and in the central state, the natives were subjected to Native Authority and
hence, customary laws. The consequence was the tendency for the bifurcated state to reproduce bifurcated political identity in the form of differentiated citizenship.

Mamdani, no doubt, provides a useful insight into the problem of contemporary Africa as it relates to the question of citizenship and the political conflicts it has generated for the African state. The crises in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in several parts of Nigeria provide support for the illuminating power of his analysis. The additional problem in the Nigerian case, however, is that it was not the custom of the various ethnic communities that were enforced as ‘customary’ by the colonial authorities. Rather, as the evidence in northern Nigeria tends to show, Native Authority was an attempt in most cases to enforce “Hausa-Fulani” system of rule on peoples whose history, culture and traditions were completely different.

2.2: THEORETICAL DISCOURSE

There are a number of theoretical issues that are very central to the understanding of the problematics of ethnicity and citizenship in Nigeria which are discussed in this section. In what follows, we attempt to engage the discourse around three main issues: pluralism, ethnicity and citizenship; the state and citizenship; and democracy, democratization and citizenship.

2.2.1: Pluralism, Ethnicity and Citizenship

Differentiated notion as well as practice of citizenship is not an anathema to a plural political setting. Ethnic heterogeneity is a central attribute of this type of political pluralism. As employed in this discourse, pluralism is not used to describe the distribution of power and authority in a democratic society or the existence of groups and institutions
mediating between state and individuals. This kind of pluralism approximates the form of free and democratic society replete with institutions of civil society, in which the political market place provides an arena of group claims and competition with the state playing an “umpire” role is the type described as a ‘polyarchy’ (Dahl, 1956).

Instead, as used in the context of this research, pluralism refers to the existence of multiple ethnic, cultural, regional and religious identities. These identities are not just passive identities, suggesting that the problem is not just the reality of pluralism and multicultural existence. They are politically activated and mobilized. In other words, the relevance derives from the fact that they are useful in the context of the search for meanings for individuals and groups under conditions of pervasive scarcity and competition for resources. In reality, class, gender, religious and racial identities impact on citizenship differently and the frame the issue in specific ways. The relevant questions are: How does pluralism, or ethnic pluralism to be specific, impact on citizenship? Or differently phrased, what is the theoretical linkage between ethnic pluralism and forms of contestations over citizenship rights? And in what specific ways are the challenges of a multi-ethnic or multi-national society framed for individual notions of rights inherent in a liberal democratic tradition?

The ethnic phenomenon provides an overarching form of identity that has some implication on how other identities are framed. Infact, as it has been suggested the sphere of ethnicity is wide and nebulous. Not only does it encompass and interpenetrate all social formations and constituting a spatial framework for class relations and contradictions (Nnoli, 1978:20), it could, as Leroy Vail (1989:10) has argued:
co-exist with other types of consciousness without apparent unease because it was cultural and hence based on involuntary ascription, not on personal choice. Ethnic identity could inhere in both petty bourgeois and worker, in both peasant farmer and striving politicians.

Thus, the all-inclusive character of ethnicity must be recognized if its role in the social process is to be correctly codified. At the same time, the fact that it exists side by side with other types of consciousness must be registered. Most importantly, the limits and possibilities of the ethnic factor as an explanatory category on the basis of this must be clearly borne in mind by the analyst. It is therefore important to explore the discourses on ethnicity and how it links to the question of citizenship which is the focus of our investigation.

Ethnicity is simply obstinate; difficult to wish away because of its pervasiveness as underlined above. The illusion that the ethnic phenomenon can be wished away is reflected in the early formulation of the modernization school which, consigning ethnicity to the realm of a backward society had hoped that it would wither away with the progress of western civilization in the form of urbanization, education and other western values, including exposure to the media. Such tendency to wish away the ethnic factor is as much reflected in the early response of Marxist scholars to the ethnic question. For Marxist scholars, the tendency for excessive economic reductionism led to the neglect of the non-economic factors, particularly of the ethnic question and nationalism for a very long time. This led many to conclude, albeit correctly, that Marxism lacks a theory of the national question (Debray 1977, Poulantzas, 1980, Munck, 1986). As Debray (1977: 30) frankly puts it: "Marxism has no concept of nature" as it "has only concepts of what we do not determine- that is, not of what we produce, but that which produces us".
Ethnicity is a contested terrain of scholarship. Consequently, academic discourses on ethnicity have thrown up a number of contending perspectives that attempt to illuminate the nature and dynamics of ethnicity. However, categorizing these perspectives depends on the arbitrariness of the scholar. For the purpose of this discourse, five major perspectives – the primordialist, modernization, constructionist, elitist and the Marxist perspectives – have been identified. The essential arguments of each of these perspectives are discussed below.

The primordialist view of ethnicity which is perhaps the oldest is popularly associated with cultural anthropology. Geertz (1963, 1973) and Keyes (1981) who have made substantial contribution to this perspective present ethnicity as a “primordial given”, emphasizing the emotional and affective dimension of the ethnic phenomenon. Taking as its point of departure the culture creating capacity of humanity, Geertz (1963) argued that culture which man creates furnishes humanity with cognitive, aesthetic and moral standards which, not only constitute the major elements of his transformation, but also the “primordial given” of social existence. This perspective raises two important points that set it apart from other perspectives in the understanding of the ethnic question. In the first place, it presents ethnicity as direct outcome of biological, cultural and kinship relations. Second, it sees the strength of ethnicity in the emotional anchorage, the sense of passion and solidarity that constitute the underlying elements of ethnic and cultural ties.

There are a number of problems with this perspective which accounts for its relative decline as an explanatory framework of the contemporary manifestation of ethnicity. To begin with, it is not clear from the perspective, the boundary between ethnicity and culture as if the two can be used interchangeably. While ethnicity and culture are inter-related in the construction of meaning to existence, the concepts hardly can be
said to have the same political and sociological meanings. Second, it reduces ethnicity to some thing that is ‘natural’ to African people and, by so doing, ignoring the history of the African people and the transformation which ethnic identity passed through at the various stages, colonialism being the most important one.

The modernization perspective which appeared later as a more elegant refinement of this approach has two variants. Using 'tribalism' as the conceptual frame, one variant of modernization school assumes that ethnicity is an attribute of backwardness and that behaviours associated with their chosen categories are essentially associated with the African. Barth (1969) for example, depict this attitude among Africans as fixed and static; always there, even when not relevant to behaviour. In line with this understanding, it was further suggested, values associated with modernization - education, mass media, communication and higher income - with their implications for increased contacts, would weaken, if not altogether eliminate "tribal" consciousness (Morrison and Stevenson, 1972; Epstein, 1958; Gluckman, 1966). Nothing more tellingly brings out the fallacy of this position than the intractable and persistent character of ethnic identity and conflicts generated on the basis of the politicization of this identity. This persistence in many countries including Nigeria that have made considerable advance in terms of the categories of modernization appear to rubbish the basic tenet of the argument. So has the continued survival of ethnic- based conflicts among the so-called developed societies such as Belgium, Canada and the former communist countries of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

Indeed, Nnoli (1978), Magubane (1976) and Mafeje (1971) are quite on target in their trenchant critique of the modernization argument. The invocation of "tribe", they argue, suited the colonial ideology in the desperate bid to reconstruct African reality as a
part of the search for ‘order’ and ‘good’ government. Mafeje (1971) in a sustained argument demonstrated the ideological character as well as the uselessness of "tribe" as an analytical category based on the distinction between cephalous and acephalous societies. The latter which approximates the concept of tribe, according to him, could not have adequately described most of pre-colonial African societies. Mafeje thus concludes that not only was "tribe" a misleading label for all pre-colonial societies, it has become most absurd in the post-colonial period.

The other variant argues that ethnicity is the consequence of the struggle for the benefits of modernization which are represented by scarce public goods. Bates (1972, 1983), argues that this competition takes organizational forms as ethnic groups compete against one another. The formation of ethnic and welfare association, for instance, tends to provide group and collective identity to competition for employment, housing, contracts and other aspects of public good. It has been suggested further that ethnicity acquires more salience in situations in which competition takes place under conditions of structural inequality among the different ethnic groups (Bonacich, 1972; Young, 1976). Horowitz (1971) and Barrows (1976) have also suggested that inequality in access to power, wealth and education among the different ethnic groups is both a potential and real source of ethnic tension and conflict. The tendency of such competition for resources to take inter-ethnic forms in urban situations, reinforced by prevailing conditions of underdevelopment tends to lend credence to the view which sees ethnicity as an interest group phenomenon (Bates, 1972, Cohen 1969, Rabushka and Shepsle 1972), pursuing a common goal and seeking to influence the course of public policy on behalf of the ethnic group members.

Although this perspective has flaws, the least not being the tendency to reduce ethnicity to interest group organizations (Osaghae, 1994b), it is important to make two
remarks regarding the usefulness of the modernization school in coming to terms with the phenomenon of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in contemporary Nigeria. The first relates to the link between structural inequality and ethnicity. Structural inequality as exemplified in unequal access to economic resources and political power is central to the conflict dynamics of ethnicity. In such situations, it is the attempt by one or more ethnic groups to close existing or perceived socio-economic gaps that often leads to conflict with the ethnic group whose hegemony, so to say, is being challenged. This comes close to explaining the situations in most Northern cities where initial Hausa dominance in trade and commerce came to be challenged by large-scale entrance of Igbo migrants first, after the end of the Second World War and recently, after the end of the Nigerian civil war. A similar pattern of challenge to the dominant positions of groups in commerce, administration and share of the market continues to be the source of persistent conflicts in many parts of Nigeria today.

Second, the point regarding the usefulness of ethnic platform in inter-ethnic competition brings to mind the significant arguments raised by Cohen (1969) in his study of Hausa (community) ethnicity in Ibadan. He shows that urban ethnic groups are interest groups engaged in the struggle with others for resources in the public arena. He shows also that in this struggle, ethnicity provides an idiom which promotes solidarity as a moral duty. Consequently, it gives the common interest a much wider, more complete unity. Nevertheless, there is need to exercise considerable caution in suggesting a homology of interest which all members of the group defend at all times. Osaghae's (1990) survey of ethnic associations in Ibadan reveals the importance of class identity as the source internal fractioning and tension within particular ethnic groups.

There is also the elite perspective. This perspective can easily pass as the most popular on the ethnic question largely because it conceives ethnicity in instrumental terms.
Although it appears to share a lot in common with the Marxist school on this account, the ideological chasm between elitism and Marxist class theory is a fundamental one. Osaghae (1991) provides an excellent review of this school which needs to be restated here. It simply argues that the elites who constitute a small, cohesive and closely knit group, found in all spheres of the society who are aspirants to, and competitors for power and privileges, are the primary users of the ethnic weapon. However, they find it easier in comparison to other options available to them, taking advantage of the inequality in socio-economic achievements in the various ethnic homelands.

This perspective, like all other ones, has a number of flaws. Apart from the ideological character of the theory of elitism alluded to earlier, it tends to ignore the situational character of ethnicity, while emphasizing macro-level ethnicity to the detriment of ethnicity at the micro-level (Osaghae, 1991). But the more fundamental weakness is the tendency to limit the dynamics of the ethnic question to the narrow interests of the elites. It assumes that the mass have no conception of ethnicity, or have no material interests which the ethnic weapon can be used to advance. While not disputing the crucial role of the elite in giving social and political meaning to ethnicity, its account remains incomplete without inserting the interests of the critical mass in determining the cause and direction of ethnic politics.

Fourth, is the perspective which presents ethnicity as a historical and political construction commonly referred to as the invention thesis. This view recognizes the essentially dynamic character of ethnic identity, and the fact that it is amenable to “re-invention” and “reconstruction” in order to fit into the project of “ethnic entrepreneurs. Werner Sollors (1989) and Terence Ranger (1983, 1994) strongly argue that African ethnicity was a direct product of colonial invention. The invention thesis which is strongly
corroborated by the work of Fabian (1983) on the invention of Swahili language in the Congo derives from the logic that the search for stable and manageable units led to a series of policies on the part of the colonial state, whose result was the transformation of identities hitherto based on flexibility into one based on rigidity. Not to give the misleading impression that “ethnics” were made out of unsuspecting ‘subjects’, he identifies the collaborators in this project as colonial administrators, missionaries, African chiefs and the emergent elite whose acceptance of this invention conferred legitimacy on it.

The case of Northern Nigeria, for example, shows how colonialism invented a new "Hausa-Fulani" identity in place of a fragmented system of several polities, and, to some extent, linguistic differences that existed in the pre-colonial epoch. The point is that, although much as the nineteenth century Islamic revolutionary movement led by Usman Danfodio attempted to evolve a unified and centralised political entity in the Caliphate, the society encountered by the British was a heterogeneous one. Yet, the British tried as much as they could to construct a “northern Nigerian” identity from the inception of colonial rule which was rigidly defined as Islamic and Hausa, thus, elevating the social categories of ‘Islamic’ and ‘Hausa’ into a more politically dominant position within the area (Kuna, 1998:3).

As Bala Usman (1994) has also noted, the idea of a monolithic Hausa-Fulani is a mystique, an artificial creation in place of multiple identities defined around the various polities such as Kanawa, Kabawa, Katsinawa, Gobirawa and Zamfarawa, to mention just a few examples. Similarly, the image of "Islamic" Hausa-Fulani that follows is misleading. For example, it ignores the survival up till today of pockets of "pagan" communities as found among the Maguzawa around Kano and Kastina. Indeed, the image of Hausa-Fulani as an amorphous group with the same political and economic interests has been
interrogated by the expression, over time, of class-based social discontents of the under-privileged (the talakawas) in both the First and Second Republics. It is in the same sense in which the Agbekoya revolts of the late 1960s and the constant resurgence of the fragmented identities characteristic of the pre-colonial era have put question mark on a unified notion of "Yorubaness".

We have gone to this length to show what the 'invention thesis' means in the Nigerian context, and to suggest further that ethnicity is not 'natural', and that its emergence is tied to specific class interest. Or it is a social project driven by a clearly identifiable objective. The fractional elements of the post-colonial ruling class have continued to (re)invent ethnicity in order to maintain their political and economic advantages. It is this dynamics of invention and re-invention that explains the constant transmutations as well as decomposition and re-composition of ethnic identity in contemporary Nigeria. A strong evidence of this is the prevailing tendency for many Nigerian ethnic communities to trade in names with pejorative meanings which had been given to them by others. This is true of the Taroh and Maghaavul in Plateau who were previously called ‘Yergam’ and ‘Sura’ respectively; and the Bwatiye in Adamawa State who were more popularly known as ‘Bachama’, or the the Gbagyi who used to be identified as ‘Gwari’. This dynamic process of ethnic identity construction appears to lend credence to Salomone’s (1992) observation that ethnic identity formation has a recent origin and history. But, more importantly, it shows how the construction of ethnic identity changes in relations to changes in existing power configurations.

Finally, there is the Marxist account of the ethnic question which has been undergoing reformulation. The conventional wisdom was to see the sphere of superstructure and ideology as epiphenomenon to economic relations. Ethnicity is thus
located in false consciousness, something used to mask the 'real' underlying class struggles or a simple ideological diversion. It is in this sense that Marxism achieved what Ake (1994) refers to as "the deconstruction of ethnicity". Although such crude reduction provides a counterpoise to the view that absolutises ethnicity, there is now a realization that something people are willing to die for should legitimately deserve attention (Nnoli, 1987; Munck, 1986; Solomos, 1992). Indeed, as Nnoli(1978) reminds us, it is necessary to overcome the one-sidedness inherent in both approaches.

The point of departure of a correct Marxist interpretation of the ethnic and nationality question, of course, is the dialectical position explicit in classical Marxism, but often ignored: that the economy is *only ultimately* the determining factor, while recognition is accorded the non-economic factors. This is at the heart of the debate on the relationship between the base and superstructure in a social formation which establishes the primacy of the former over the latter. The ultimate issue however, may not be the question of which is primary but how they interact in the social process. In the light of the resurgence of ethnic identity politics and the recognition of its salience by Marxist scholars, we can reformulate the position as follows: class relations and class conflicts may continue to be regarded as primary contradictions, while ethnic contradiction has become fundamental contradiction. This is because, although in theory, conflicts rooted in the production of the material means of existence are considered primary, contradictions arising out of multi-ethnic existence have tended to overshadow class-based conflicts.

What is important here is the recognition of the relative autonomy of ethnicity and other forms of group identity in contradistinction to the tendency to dismiss them as a mere epiphenomenon. It is only in this sense that one can appreciate the organic link between class and ethnicity in the social process (See Gabriel and Tolvin, 1978). In other words,
despite being an element of the superstructure, ethnicity is capable of asserting its "relative autonomy" in the course of social action. There is always the tendency for the elements of the superstructure to acquire their own dynamics and appear to play independent role in the social process. It is thus in consonance with the principle of dialectics to see elements of the superstructure as a reflection, as well as independent of the base.

However, for some scholars, the prevailing conditions of economic underdevelopment and the relatively low level of capitalist development does not make class identity a critical issue, let alone exerting a determinate influence over the cause of history and change. This then becomes the basis for pleading the primacy of ethnic consciousness over the class. Thus, Otite not only suggests that the membership of an ethnic group is more comprehensive and enduring but that the "strength of ethnicity is the structural corollary of the weakness of our class identities" (1983:20). Although this argument appears attractive it is far from a clear articulation of the complex relationships that exists between the two.

At the surface level it would appear that class and ethnic consciousness have separate existence. The point, however, is that they are organically linked in the social process and are both political resources at the disposal of the power seeking elites. What is important as we have suggested is to specify the context of their interaction and the political, economic and ideological underpinning of this interaction. Sklar (1967) makes an attempt in this direction. In a devastating critique of functionalism, he traced the emergence and sustenance of ethnic identities to "the new men of power" in the attempt to further their own interest which is at the same time "the constitutive interest of the emerging social classes". While scholars who deny the importance of class in preference for primordial identity seem to point to the absence of class cleavages or the prevailing low level of class
consciousness, Sklar reminds us that an approach which favours class analysis does not necessarily suggests the existence of major class conflict. For him "class formation appears to be more significant than class conflict as a form of class action.... Intra-class conflicts, is supremely important"(1967:7).

Elsewhere, he elaborated that:

Collective action may be interpreted as a class action if the effect is to increase or reduce social inequality and domination or to strengthen or weaken the means whereby domination of a privileged stratum is maintained (Sklar 1979:534).

What is suggested in Sklar's model is the fact that a fractionalised ruling class as found in Africa often has a recourse to ethnicity as a resource in the fractional competition to maintain its power and privileges. Their actions are calculated class actions. What appears to be missing in much of Africa is the collective actions of the dominated to challenge the class in power, including calling into question its strategy of sustaining domination. In which case, the entire ideological system, including the manipulation of ethnicity and religion, could be challenged. Why this remains so is another problematic altogether.

When, therefore, Marxists describe ethnicity as false consciousness, it is not to deny the existence of ethnicity but to come to terms with "the supposed tribesmen, who subscribe to an ideology that is inconsistent with their material interest therefore unwittingly responding to the call for their own exploitation" (Mafeje, 1971:259). A discourse on modern ethnicity and its urban forms, is of necessity, a discourse of how the ruling class, given its weak material base, organises and reproduces its interests in political and economic terms. Thus, as Robin Cohen (1974) suggested, class, ethnicity and power are bounded together. Ethnic
entrepreneur-politicians, traditional rulers, contractors and other urban big wigs- the
inheritors of the colonial state are those who first and foremost, profit from the use of
ethnicity. The intersection between ethnicity and class, as Badru (1998) argues, occurs
because many people see support for ethnic leaders as vehicle for group advancement in
the absence of a coherent ideology.

The extensive review of the Marxist theoretical position on ethnicity above
establishes the organic link between ethnicity and class. The fact that ethnic identity
interpenetrates with other identities such as religion is important in understanding the way
in which ethnic identity claims interface with contending claims over citizenship rights. To
begin with, ethnicity and religion are integrated into a common system of identity such that
in many situations the boundary between ethnic identity and religious allegiance tend to
coincide. Thus, Salamone (1991:46) notes that “sometimes religious identity becomes part
of an ethnic group’s identity. …when coupled with the power of the ethnic group’s myth
of common descent, it presents a volatile social mixture indeed”. Both therefore
underscore the relationship between power and group identity in a manner that has
consequence for group definition and perception of power. Where such definitions and
perception between different ethnic and religious groups are irreconcilable, the result is
conflict and violence. Although there could be situations in which this boundary may
appear not to be very neat given the trans-ethnic character of religious identity, there
seems to be some mutual reinforcement between the two. Religion in this case can be used
to construct or reinforce ethnic identity as Cohen’s study (1969) of the Hausa in Ibadan
suggests.
Two, religion and ethnicity are both sentiments that feed on unequal development and as such rise to the fore during periods of grave economic crisis. This organic link and the tendency for the politicization of these identities to assume more salience under conditions of scarcity and competition explains the rising incidences of ethno-religious violence in the decades marked by sharp economic decline and the deleterious impact of the structural adjustment programme. Third, sentiments generated on the basis of ethnic and religious identities tend to evoke passion and emotion such that 'objectivity' appears not to matter. Precisely, because these identities are constructed on the basis of ties of kinship, blood and faith, they tend to draw on total group solidarity and support. Members of the ‘in-group’ who fail to demonstrate loyalty to group solidarity and collective action aimed at the relevant others are perceived as betraying the cause of brotherhood. Group sanction for such ‘erring’ and ‘eccentric’ members could be more severe than the hardship meted out to members of the ‘out-group’.

The commonality between religious and ethnic identities as well as their intertwined nature in the social process is further illustrated by the fact that religion is part of the colonially "invented traditions" in Africa. In the specific colonial context, it was a subtle instrument of control and, hence, an integral element of the colonial ideological superstructure. For instance, colonialism did not just insist on particular religions but also specific forms of such religious practices that tended to correspond with the "official" view. This was evident in the way in which colonialism waged war against indigenous religions and ceremonies which were labeled either as "heathenism" or "paganism" in the Southern and Middle Belt areas in favour of the proselytizing influence of the Christian missions and missionaries. Even in Northern Nigeria, it was not only concerned about "protecting" Islam but a particular kind of Islam. Thus, the Ahmaddiya revolts and the
spread of Tijjanniyya influence were viewed with concern and had to be appropriately dealt with (Mohammed, 1993).

In this sense, religion is manipulated to serve definite political and economic end (Usman 1978). As in the case of ethnicity it could serve as a mask for class interest. But as Ibrahim (1991) however contends, much as the ‘manipulation thesis’ sheds some light on the role of religion in contemporary Nigeria, a lot more remains to be explained. For example, it does not answer the question of why people are susceptible to its manipulation. He argues rather forcefully that the resurgence of religious fundamentalism can be explained by the fact that religion has become an arena of accumulation, and not merely about the control of the theological space while religious movements do provide material support for their adherents such as helping them to secure employment, organising marriage and naming ceremonies as well as other material interventions to cushion the effect of the economic crisis (1991:125). It is this concrete material interest served by religion which provides a coping mechanism for some social groups that explains its salience more than "the growth of apocalyptic fear about the end of the universe". Religion thus provides a sense of community and, like ethnicity, can be constituted as an ideological space for all social classes to engage in cultural negotiations. In this sense, also, religion can reinforce ethnic identity as a weapon of struggle for rights or resisting oppression and domination.

The diversity of discursive genres to which ethnicity is amenable as suggested by the foregoing notwithstanding, there is a consensus that the political and social salience of ethnicity is accounted for by its instrumental value. Ethnic entrepreneurs, power-seeking elites, ethnic leaders of the various ruling class fractions and ordinary folks who perceive ethnicity as a weapon in advancing individual and group interests, all cling to it because of
this instrumental value. Although ethnicity possesses emotional attribute fostered by
kinship ties and imagination of a common origin and collective destiny, it is the material
interests underlying ethnic identity that gives it the most enduring quality.

As Cohen (1974), simply, puts it, one needs not to be a Marxist to be convinced
that the arena for earning of livelihood, the struggle for a larger share of income from the
economic system such as the struggle for housing, contracts, commercial privileges and
higher education constitute an important variable significantly related to ethnicity. Thus
ethnicity and its conflict spiral should be understood in the context of competition among
groups for scarce public goods. The urban setting, in particular, provides the most fertile
ground for these dynamics to be fully played out. The segmented nature of settlement
which has consequence for concentrating different ethnic groups in specific locations, for
example, provides the spatial framework for urban ethnicity with an ideological feeling of
territorial possession of such areas. Especially in the context of this acute economic crisis,
competition for public goods tends to acquire inter-ethnic character. Similarly, ethnic
solidarity tends to become materially functional for urban dwellers.

The centrality of ethnicity and ethnic networks for the material reproduction of
urban dwellers is exemplified by the massive resurgence of "tribal unions" in urban centres
as Osaghae's study (1994) of Kano seems to suggest. What now appears as a phenomenon
of “retribalization” in urban centres provides a strong evidence that ethnic associations and
networks operate as shadow state and appear to have filled the vacuum created by an
increasingly retreating post-colonial state which under the combined pressure of economic
decline and globalization has abandoned any serious commitment to development. The
tendency in most situations, therefore, is for urban dwellers to gravitate towards the ethnic
unions which are perceived as instrument in the course of competition. The tendency for
inter-ethnic competition to take organizational form as seen in the visibility of ethnic associational life as rallying points of identity shows that beyond the welfare functions which they claim to be their primary pre-occupation, they are also relevant in the course of competition for available opportunities for material reproduction.

This complex linkage between class, ethnicity and religion which we have been at pains to explore, is particularly useful to our understanding of the dynamics of ethnicity and its interface with citizenship claims and rights. It does point to the fact that ethnicity can hardly be constituted into an independent analytical category in the struggle and contestation over rights. Class and religious solidarities sometimes provide cross-cutting cleavages that could either weaken or strengthen ethnic solidarity and consciousness and the way they are deployed in the identification of “the relevant others” in the context of struggle for resources and power. The complexity of identity politics and the patterns of conflicts that are generated in the erstwhile northern region require a multiple track approach in which the mutual interaction between these identities must be recognized. It is most relevant in dealing with urban situations because of the multi-ethnic and multicultural setting, although this is becoming an increasingly relevant element of semi-urban and rural situations.

In order to bring out the ethnicity-citizenship nexus, the relevant question to ask is: What is the specific linkage between ethnicity and citizenship? Or put differently, how does the context provided by multi-ethnic existence frames the citizenship question? In the contemporary Nigerian context, four issues make ethnicity problematic in relation to discourse on identity and citizenship. First is that ethnic identity is not a fixed form of identity. It is subject to frequent reconstitution and redefinition. Both boundary breaking and reconstitution are enduring qualities of ethnic identity. And as Salamone (1993)
reminds us, in Nigeria ethnic identity is quite recent and therefore, in constant need of redefinition. Closely related to this is the politicization of ethnic and related identities by competing ethnic fractions of the Nigerian ruling class. Added to the dynamic nature of ethnic identity, the tendency is for resource competition and the struggle for power to generate tension and conflicts along communal lines.

The third issue arises from the state of unequal ethnic relations defined in terms of access to state power and resources. As Ifidon puts it, this is to be understood as "consequences of not merely ethnic plurality, but tentatively put, the state of ethnic relations characterised by intense unequal competition for resources of the state, the most sought after being the appropriation of state power, particularly its coercive and resource allocating elements" (1996:100). Fourth and finally, there is the impact of prolonged military rule and the accompanying over-centralisation of power and resources. This has accounted for the centralizing logic of the Nigerian federal system and has made the struggle for access to power at levels a bitter and acrimonious contest.

What we therefore find in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural setting like Nigeria is the tendency for groups to appeal to notions of identity and differences that leave little room for promoting and nurturing a common citizenship. In other words, the consequence is the difficulty of evolving a common political identity built around the nation-state (Nnoli, 2003:30). Multi-ethnic political existence practically leads to the problem of establishing a notion of citizenship that accommodates the multi-cultural character of the population and the rights of the individual as a member of the political community. Although it would appear that according separate rights to groups is at variance with a notion of common citizenship, it is obvious that fractured and differentiated citizenship is a
basic aspect of the political life of societies with deep ethnic divisions and cleavages (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000: 3). If anything, according rights to minority groups who are alienated or who feel unwanted may represent a strategy of inclusion (Nnoli, 2003).

At the core of the dilemma of citizenship question in a multi-ethnic society is the need to respect group dynamics. The meeting point of these dynamics can be located precisely between the quest for groups who have advantage to dominate and those who are disadvantaged to resist domination. In more practical terms, however, this appears to be the driving force behind the need to protect the rights of groups who perceive that they are grossly disadvantaged; such fears whether real or imagined. As Jinadu has argued, group rights must be recognised, promoted and protected precisely because “the hypothetical market place is not a level playing field, and because the conditions of perfect competition do not exist in the market place, and the state itself is not a neutral body or agency” (2003:10).

As Nzongola-Ntalaja has observed, “Africans are not only the first humans, they are also the humans with the greatest attachment to ancestral lands, and it is on the basis of their experience in living in the society from the family to the larger social units that their values of solidarity such as ethnic allegiance and patriotism are born. It follows that attachment to one’s community and, through it, to the soil of the ancestors or the homeland, is a fundamental dimension of the notion of citizenship in Africa”. It is within the context of the wider meaning which binds ethnic identity to ownership of a particular territorial space that “sons/daughters of the soil” syndrome acquires social and political meanings.
Although it is widely but validly recognised that discourses on rights in the African context places a high premium on group and community rights, arising from the strong attachment to the land and the prevailing communitarian ideology, the challenge of multi-cultural political existence across the world may not make the desire to protect group identity and rights a unique concern of the African people. Perhaps, it may be argued that the inherent concern for group identity and rights in Africa is reinforced by the demand of differentiated and fractured citizenship typical to a plural society. What the crisis does suggest is the antinomies between citizenship rights as formulated by the liberal project of modernity that defined the overriding objective of the nation-state as building a national identity and the emergence of collective ethnic rights that has become central to political conflicts in both urban and rural Nigeria, but more profound in the context of the former.

2.2.2 The State and Citizenship

The state is central to the discourse on citizenship for a number of reasons. Not only does citizenship denote membership of a political community and hence based on the recognition of man or woman as a “political being”. It requires a shared set of goals and values in a political community, and embodies other political values such as civic activity, public spiritedness and political participation. For these reasons, the class character of the state in particular provides a useful framework for defining inclusion and exclusion. It therefore becomes critical to theorize the state and how the interface between the state and group identities have implication for citizenship. But even more fundamental is the need to interrogate the liberal state and the flawed design of the nation-state within the framework of the post-Westphalian agenda.
The state remains a central factor in the discourse of identity and the crisis of citizenship. It is even more true of the post-colonial variant of the state with its ubiquitous role in the society. Murphree (1992) is therefore correct to suggest that the state system in Africa provides the authoritative arena for the definition among others, of structures, identity and goals. This partly derives from its role in the process of economic reproduction, the reason for which it is said to lack autonomy and remains a major actor in societally-based cleavages (Ake, 1985), and the conflicts they engender. The conception and definition of citizenship among others, provides insight into the way in which the state appear to legitimize these exclusive and discriminatory practices. Mamdani’s (2001:8) remark on this is quite profound. He writes:

If economic identities are a consequence of the history of the development of markets, and cultural identities of the development of communities that share a common language and meaning, political identities need to be understood as specifically a consequence of the history of state formation. As such political identities are inscribed in law.

The bifurcated notion of citizenship in Nigeria: between a “national” citizen and a “state” citizen which is implied in the notion of “indigeneity” has ensured that many Nigerians suffer severe deprivations of their citizenship rights in situations in which they are resident in states other than “their own”. This shows that the state itself provides the arena of exclusion and therefore remains a critical factor in the discourse on identity, citizenship and rights. In particular, its mode of mediation in identity conflicts, not only has implication for the management of diversity, but also for the construction and reconstruction of rights.
At every point in time, the nature and character of the state has had profound implications for the construction of identity and rights. For instance, the laissez fair or “night watchman” notion of the state associated with Adam Smith has its own implication for the way citizenship rights is constructed. It is also the same with the interventionist state that followed the crisis of global accumulation in the 1940s. With reference to developing societies including Nigeria, the nature of the post-colonial state that was inaugurated shortly before independence and became consolidated in the post-independence period is germane to the understanding of identity conflicts and the problem of citizenship. The analysis of the state and its form, however, has to be related to how it has attempted to grapple with the problem of accumulation, its response to the economic crisis and the implication of all these for the management of diversity.

Unfortunately however, the state remained a neglected domain in general political analysis in the period that witnessed the ascendancy of American political hegemony. Renewed interest in the state only gathered momentum in the late 1970s with the emergence of different variants of ‘state-centred’ analysis, one of which is reflected in Skocpol's plea (1985) to "Bring the state back In". For our purpose, it is germane to explore the relationship between the state and ethnic identity and the discourse on citizenship. Our task, therefore, is to examine the nature of the state and how its social orientation determines the form of regulation, intervention and mediation in identity (ethnic) conflicts as well as the implication on citizenship rights. For the purpose of our analysis, two dominant perspectives of the state come to mind: the liberal and the Marxist.

Recent liberal theorizing on the state, though largely a continuation of the Weberian tradition, appears to recognize the centrality of the state in structuring social and political
relations. The Weberian tradition sees the state as a system or regime of law which has monopoly over the use of violence. What follows is the notion of the state as a "system of decision-making" and formulation or expression of authoritative intentions. Krasner (1978), Nodlinger (1981,1988) and Skocpol (1985) represent mainstream American social science efforts to "re-introduce" the state. They present the state as an institutional ensemble or a ‘structured field of action’ with a unique centrality in both national and international formations.

Nodlinger, for example, conceives the state as a defender of national interest and hence, immune from societal pressures that presumably distract from this interest no matter how it is conceived. Thus, the state enjoys an autonomous vantage position from which it can defend broad goals such as the maintenance of the political and economic order (1988:882). Similarly, Krasner, using the case of United States' foreign policy in respect of foreign raw materials investments concludes, even against the logic of his own evidence, that the state is an autonomous promoter of public interest. For Skocpol, the state plays a distinctive role in shaping the character of institutions and forces beyond it.

The difficulty associated with the liberal account of the state is well known. The state is not only reified as a set of structures and institutions set apart from the society, it is equated with "the sovereign will", not to mention the denial of the class basis of state actions. Mitchel's (1991) seemingly devastating critique of the liberal position, though not without its own problem, is useful for our analysis. He correctly posits that the liberal position is misleading in so far as it suggests that "the state is a distinct entity, opposed to or set apart from a larger entity called society" (1991:87). He concludes, after a thorough review of Nodlinger and Krasner as follows:
The problem, as they each more or less admit, is that the edges of the state are uncertain; societal elements seem to penetrate it on all sides, and the resulting boundary between state and society is difficult to determine (1988:86).

Mitchel's point that the domain of the state is not discreet from that of society is useful in constructing a linkage between the state on the one hand, and societally-based cleavages on the other. At least, they all recognize the 'infrastructural power' of the state which enables it to penetrate, control, supervise and police modern societies in ways that impact on social forces and cleavages which are outside of the purview of the state (Jessop, 1990: 279). The point that the centrality of the state increases with the level of intervention is quite relevant to post-colonial situations where the state and state managers are too obvious to be neglected.

However, what appears to be the most significant liberal exposition on the state is the notion that the state is neutral in relation to the plurality of groups that compete for power and influence in the political market place. The best illustration of this theoretical tradition is provided by the pluralist variant of the liberal theory or 'polyarchy'. In the liberal conception of the state, the defining elements of pluralism are not ethnic and cultural groups as such; rather, pluralism is defined in terms of the plurality of social and economic groupings that shape public policy or seek to capture and control state power. In short, this plurality is defined by institutions of political and civil society that are fundamentally united or have reached consensus regarding, not only the goals of society, but also the means, mechanisms and rules governing the conduct of the political game. Even in this context the predominant plural theme has been homogeneity as well as the creation of a common culture and identity within a uniform nation-state (Grillo, 1989: 18).
For the Marxist scholars on the other hand, beginning with Marx and Engels, there exists a link between the state and society. The state, for example, is often seen as the instrument of members of the ruling class. Following from this premise, Miliband (1969) and Poulantzas (1974; 1978) have extended the analysis of the capitalist state. The differences in their expositions notwithstanding, there is an underlying unity in their analysis. Thus, whether the state behaves at the "behest" of the ruling class owing to the social and biological link between state officials and the powerful economic interests as Miliband argues or its behaviour is explained in terms of the structural logic of its position as a "factor of cohesion" in the capitalist society as Poulantzas sees it, it is agreed that the state serves the interest of the dominant class. What appears as the advantage of this theoretical position is that it never assumes a dichotomy between state and society.

Both liberal and Marxist theories of the state, from different points of view, shed considerable light on the complex relationship between state and society. The ideological underpinning of the liberal theory of the state as alluded to earlier, is the assumed neutrality of the state in the context of plural and divergent interests. Marxist theory, on the other hand, relates the state to the interests of the dominant class or its fractions which even when it serves as a factor of "cohesion", or as the instrument for fostering its hegemonic interests. The point of difference between these theoretical traditions notwithstanding, they are essentially inadequate in dealing with the challenge of citizenship in a multi-ethnic society. Within the liberal paradigm, for example, the problematic of citizenship is posed in terms of individual rights and freedom which a supposedly neutral state is expected to promote and defend. In other words, the different notions of rights embracing civil, political and social rights identified by Marshall (1950) in his evolutionary model of
citizenship are conceived as rights attached to the individual as a member of the political community.

What this means is that beyond the nation-state which is assumed to be difference-blind, the liberal conception of the state hardly anticipates other rallying points of identity such as ethnicity and religion. It is precisely for this reason that the state as conceived in the project of modernity is incapable of dealing with the challenge of citizenship constituted by a multiplicity of ethnic identity. As Jinadu (2003) has suggested, the continuing salience of the ethnic phenomenon is symptomatic of the inadequacies of the liberal state in so far as it is exploding the myth of the nation-state as an indivisible unified entity in the face of the reality that heterogeneous right bearing peoples united by blood ties are calling to question the position of the state as the representation of general interests. This trend has become so generalized that even in countries like the United States of America, Britain and France, the illusion of a ‘melting pot’ has been finally laid to rest (Grillo, 1989). Consequently, policies of out-and-out assimilation of immigrant populations have been abandoned in favour of a more pluralistic solution based on multiculturalism.

The Marxist position is no less flawless. It poses, by implication, the question of citizenship purely in class terms. It is so by implication because citizenship is not a major political question in Marxist discourse. Rather, what is central is the issue of class domination in a capitalist society and the ultimate resolution of this primary contradiction by the class struggle. Consequently, the struggles for universal adult suffrage and for wage increase are essentially reformist agenda which cannot be a substitute for the proletarian revolution. Indeed, if scholars of Marxist genre were to concede any validity to the struggle
for citizenship and associated rights, it would be to suggest it is a weapon of the weak and, therefore, a weak weapon.

But beyond this inadequacy, both perspectives hardly explain the nature of the state in backward social formations of the Nigerian type. When extrapolated to a third world situation, the classical Marxist account of the capitalist state hardly fits (Goulbourne, 1979). In advanced capitalist formations where classical Marxist formulation on the state has some validity, two things stand out. First, owing to the generalisation of capitalist relations, the state rather than the market plays a dominant role in the allocation of resources. At least, this has been the trend since the disintegration of the welfare state in leading western democracies. The second issue relates to the fact that it is possible to speak in these societies of a ruling class, or a ruling 'bloc' given that the ruling class hardly exists as a monolith. It is in this sense that Alavi's (1974) seminal essay remains a reference point.

Alavi distinguishes, among other things, the unique character of the post-colonial state considering the role it plays in the process of economic development. One important implication that follows from here which is of immediate relevance to us is that the state is directly inserted into the process of economic development and, therefore, completely immersed in the society. The remarkable features of the post-colonial state in the Alavian thesis include its overdeveloped nature, relative autonomy and the control of vast economic resources which is deployed in a bureaucratically directed manner in the name of development. The consequence is that state-society boundary is obliterated and rendered useless (Lemarchand, 1992). Extended further, this would suggest that the state is completely immersed in the politics of development and, therefore, an arena of contestation for various societal cleavages: class, ethnic and religion.
Indeed, much of the controversy in the more recent literature on the state derives from the implications of state-society relations for the ethnic question. For instance, it is widely accepted that the state plays an exceedingly important role in the economy and this accounts for the growth and sustenance of ethnicity in public life. The surplus controlled by the state on account of its interventionist role becomes a prime object of inter-ethnic competition. Consequently, vicious inter-ethnic competition and hostility is explained from this point of view (Otite 1990, Barrows 1990, Osaghae 1994b, Nnoli 1994). The point that seems to emerge is that the tendency for inter-ethnic competition for resources to degenerate into conflict is directly related to the degree and scope of government involvement in the control of resources, regulating access to opportunities and general participation in economic activities. This view, in recent times, has gained much currency considering the assault on the state from both the right and the left.

A more profound and elegant reformulation of this mild critique of the post-colonial state is found in the works of numerous Africanist scholars. With reference to Nigeria (Schatz, 1977), describes the process of using state resources for corrupt enrichment as marking the transition from 'nurture' capitalism to 'pirate' capitalism. The most systematic account in this respect is offered by Richard Joseph (1984; 1987) in his model of prebendal politics in which personal and authoritarian rule, firmly built on a vast network of patron-clientele relationships, choke the rest of society while advancing the interests of a few. As he concludes on his reflections, it is "a self-justifying system which grants legitimacy to a pattern of persistent conflict, and since its modus operandi is to politicise ethnic, regional and linguistic differences, it serves to make the Nigerian system a simmering cauldron of unresolvable tensions (1987: 10)."
Analyses which focus largely on prebendalism and patrimonialism are not without their own problems. For instance, it is inadequate to emphasize the primacy of informal networks in capturing the complexities of political life and the functioning of the state. Thus, Kasfir (1984: 13) warns that "personal connections so often emphasized in discussions on clientilism, should not lead us into ignoring the formal organisational base out of which many patronage hierarchies are formed". In a similar manner, Mamdani (1996) suggests that patrimonialist accounts inhibit our understanding of the specific nature of the state in Africa and its relationship with civil society. These weaknesses notwithstanding, it is this variant of analysis that feeds into the problematic of ethnicity. Accordingly, it forms the basis of the successful ideological assault that have been mounted on the post-colonial state by the IMF and the World Bank, and the assumption that rolling back the frontiers of the state may reduce the tendency towards ethnic conflicts.

However, while it is true that the state has become the "coveted price" for groups built around ethnic cleavage, this merely partly explains the phenomenon. The state-centred explanation of the problem of ethnicity ignores, at least, two crucial issues. One, it fails to consider ethnic tensions and conflicts arising from competition for resources not directly controlled by the state as in competition for business and commercial opportunities. Two, and perhaps more importantly, it fails to interrogate the form and character of the state in the first instance. This is because state mediation in ethnic conflicts is not unconnected with the social orientation of the state or the character of the class in power. We shall return to this point shortly.

Even more contentious is the solution predicated on this analysis. Enforcement of market rationality and the 'retreat' of the state are often pushed as the solutions to the problem. At issue is not so much the ideological character of the solution or the fact that it
coincides with the demands of the IMF and the World Bank. It is more from the fact that this solution is not empirically grounded, at least from the point of view of the experiences of underdeveloped societies. Thus, while it could be conceded that ethnicity is more intractable in command societies and those based on state-led capitalist development strategy, it should be pointed out at the same that the "market magic" is yet to cure the most advanced market system such as the United States of ethnic and racial conflicts (Steinberg, 1981; di Leonardo, 1985). This then, challenges us to explore the dynamics of the ethnic question beyond the concern of whether it is a developmental state or a ‘nightwatch man’ state.

On the contrary, market reforms in underdeveloped societies have had unprecedented impact of heightening ethnic conflicts arising from the polarising effect of the adjustment process. Timothy Shaw (1991) and Yusuf Bangura (1989), among others, have not only shown that ethnic sentiments feed on unequal development but that orthodox adjustment programme in most African societies have led to more urban misery, class inequality and rising levels of political violence. The more recent concern of the World Bank with the social dimensions of adjustment is closest to self-admission that its own programmes have failed. What all this suggests is that between the state and the market nexus, there are other intervening variables that may be useful in anticipating whether or not ethnic contradictions in a particular society are manageable. These variables have much to do with the state itself: its social orientation and class character as well as the way in which ethnic forces are built into the state. But to understand the dynamics of the ethnic question in Nigeria as it relates to the interface with the question of citizenship, it may be useful to understand the nature of the Nigerian state.
The Nigerian state is inherently a violent institution and to that extent a crisis generating mechanism. Repression, suppression and intimidation are essential attributes of the state. The establishment of hegemony, consensus-building, dialogue, negotiation, respect for human rights and the rule of law are largely alien to its *modus operandi*. These attributes were inherited from the colonial state that was its forebear. The development of a bourgeois nation-state based on abiding respect for the rights of citizens and the establishment of a liberal political order was not the central concern of the colonial state. If anything, the colonial state was an untamed leviathan which relied on force and coercion, rather than hegemony and legitimacy as mechanisms of rule.

The violence underlying the organization of the state has not been moderated in the post-colonial period, worsened by the phenomenon of protracted military rule and dictatorship which has resulted in diminishing prospect for the management of pluralism, ethnic and religious. This largely accounts for patterns of state violence and systematic deployment of terror against smaller ethnic groups and communities in the country fostered by the ethnically-based patron-client networks necessary for the survival of personalized and neo-patrimonial regimes. Once domination takes this form, response to domination which may appropriate the language of rights tends to take ethnic and regional form.

The significant point to make here is that ethnicity and related identities may appear paradoxically useful in the politics of space in the face of the totalizing claims of an authoritarian and undemocratic state. The dramatic rise in the incidents of ethnic and religious conflicts in the years marked by military dictatorship characterized by the imposition of unpopular economic and social policies and the most brazen violation of human rights suggests a link (even if tenuous) between the struggle against the banalities of
the post-colonial (Nigerian) state and ethno-religious conflicts. Thus as Ake (1993) suggests, in the context of authoritarian rule and the totalizing claims made by the state, ethnicity provides a vehicle of mobilization in the struggle to secure a space.

Ake (1985) also raises the important issue of lack of autonomy of the African state (post-colonial) which has implication for its mediation in the management of ethnic and religious pluralism. This is applicable to the Nigerian situation in every sense of the word. Being a capitalist state, it is first and foremost, a modality of class domination, saddled with the twin functions of providing the conditions for accumulation and legitimation. However, for a capitalist state to perform these functions efficiently, it should enjoy a degree of autonomy such that “the system of domination is differentiated and dissociated from the ruling class and even the society and appear as an objective force standing alongside society” (Ake, 1985:1). The absence of this in the Nigerian situation given the conditions of peripheral capitalism implies that the social formation cannot institutionalize individualism, competition, freedom and equality. The implication of the limited autonomy of the state is that the state is directly immersed in the contradictions of the society which are defined largely, but not exclusively, in terms of ethnic and religious cleavages.

The Nigerian experience provides ample evidence in support of the position that the problematic of ethnic and religious violence is a consequence of the process of state formation which precludes the emergence of a state that enjoys relative autonomy. Thus, Lawuyi (1991: 238), remarks that the Nigerian state, far from being a bystander in religious conflicts is partisan. The general perception that the central and local state apparatuses are controlled and operated on behalf of certain ethnic and religious interests severely limits the confidence of the vast majority of the people in the state. And as has been proved over and over, state response at all levels (including the police, the courts and key functionaries
of the government in power), to ethnic and religious conflicts has in-built biases and preferences (Egwu, 1998a, 1988b; Egwu, et.al. 2000). The state is thus caught between the dilemmas of its public character, and the universalistic appeals of democracy on the one hand, and the exclusive and particularistic claims of ethnic demands on the other.

Thus, in several respects, ethnic and religious identities threaten state viability and coherence which create severe constraints for its institutionalization. Not only is state loyalty in the major branches of government including the security apparatuses weakened, the state itself is perceived as a priced possession to be competed for among the various ethnic/religious factions of the ruling class. The consequence is that bourgeois state formation is impaired by the internalization of ethnic demands and pressures with severe consequences for state mediation in the management of ethnic and religious contradiction. The state therefore tends to lose its neutral and public character and is perceived as an instrument for advancing, promoting and defending the hegemonic interest of one group at the expense of another. Groups and individuals who feel threatened engage in ethnic, regional and religious withdrawal.

Nnoli (1978,1989) argues that the weak material base of the class in power defines its vulnerability and the resort to the manipulation of ethnic and other primordial sentiments. Sandbrook (1991) has also suggested that state formation in the third world is inchoate and severely impeded by the way in which ethnic forces are built into the state apparatuses at all levels. This line of argument might be more fruitful in explaining the intractability of ethnicity. The latter in particular provides a glimpse into the form of state mediation in ethnic conflict as well as the level to which ethnic interest permeates the state apparatuses. Here again, the role of the state, both colonial and post-colonial should be
borne in mind, particularly how it is perceived as promoting the interest of one ethnic group over others. This kind of perception engenders loss of faith and erosion of confidence in the Nigerian state on the part of those ethnic groups who feel the state is set against them. As Nkom (1994:439) points out, the consequence of this is the increased incidents of communal violence as people come to believe that it is incumbent upon them to defend themselves.

The logical extension of this is that the state can hardly offer platforms of inclusion and the promotion of the political objectives of national unity and integration. The Nigerian state has remained as a crisis-generating mechanism, hardly shedding its colonial attributes. The other side of its repressive character is that it is incapable of establishing hegemony, consensus-building, dialogue, negotiation and respect for human rights (Ihonvbere, 2000). This has consequently deepened the crisis of the nation-state project as well as inequality among the various ethnic groups and nationalities which is central to the problem of contemporary ethnicity.

What is the importance of the state framework which emerges from the foregoing for ethnicity and citizenship? The tendency is for ethnic and other related identities to be politicized by ethnic entrepreneurs. The pattern of fractional competition that the struggle for the control of the state has engendered is at the heart of communalization of politics. The early nationalists responded to this by seeking to design the state to accommodate differences by adopting the federal solution. What then is federalism?

Federalism is a system of government or power arrangement crafted deliberately to deal with a sociologically complex polity as presented by Nigeria’s multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic and multi-religious composition. Thus, as Oyovbaire (1979:9) has observed, “the existence of federalism presupposes the existence of certain compelling and propellant
forces which theoretically, at least, are absent from its opposite phenomenon, called unitary system”. The idea of federalism seeks to cope with the central problem of territorial distribution of power in such a manner that guarantees unity in diversity. Thus, central to federalism is the notion of involving some shared rule for some purposes and regional self-rule for others (Watts, 1999: 1) or “a particular form of union of self-rule plus shared rule”. (Elaazar, 1987: 12).

Discourses on federalism, from all indications, have moved away from the static and fixated model provided in Wheare’s (1956) classical formulation which has been subjected to numerous criticisms. Among others, it has been suggested that it fails to distinguish between an idea and its institutional manifestations, setting up the United States experience as the ideal-type federal system (Jinadu, 1979: 15). The important contribution of Livingston (1956) draws attention to the fact that the adoption of a federal constitutional framework is premised on what he describes as the sociological characteristics. These sociological qualities which necessitate the adoption of a federal solution may, in concrete terms, be expressed in the form of ethno-regional diversity, or other expressions of diversity which tend, more often than not, to be territorially distributed. In that context, federalism becomes a device for articulating and protecting the federal qualities of the society in question.

A related fact to this is the conceptualization of a federal polity in a dynamic sense as a process, rather than a particular ideal, frozen state. This perspective of federalism that has been emphasized by writers like Friedrich (1964), tends to build on the sociological factors in the construction of federalism. The strength of the process perspective, as Jinadu (1979) has pointed out, lies in drawing our attention to the changing and evolving nature of
a federation, a point that has been well illustrated by the experience of the United States of America where the federal experiment has evolved through critical phases such as centralizing, competitive and co-operative forms of federalism. Watts (1999) points to a trend in ‘old’ and ‘new’ federalism or ‘classical’ and ‘emergent’ in which the pendulum of power has shifted in favour of the national government.

Two issues emerge from here that are very useful in our understanding of the evolution and trends in the Nigerian federation. First, by its nature, federalism is dynamic, changing and in a flux, determined by the array of forces at play, especially the interests of the dominant social actors and the way changes and adjustments in their interests determine the balance of power between the national government and the constituent units. Second, every federal experiment is a reflection of the country’s peculiar historical circumstances, the size of the resources available and their territorial distribution, the nature of its ruling elite and its predisposition to compromise, as well as several other contingent factors.

By creating layers of government as a means of guaranteeing autonomy to groups who may otherwise feel unprotected given the multiplicity of ethnic diversity and other forms of differences that are territorially distributed, a federal arrangement necessarily creates layers of citizenship because of the existence of different centres of loyalty for the same population. In other words, a notion of “national” citizenship co-existing with “local” citizenship with varying levels of tension and compromise becomes inevitable. It is therefore difficult in the strict sense of the word to operationalise the notion of citizenship as the right of individuals which provided the organizing idea of the nation-state. As Laski has suggested, this notion of citizenship implies that “the demands of each citizen for the fulfillment of his best self must be taken as of equal worth and utility of a right is therefore
its value to all members of the state…. (Every right is) either equally applicable to all citizens without distinction or not applicable at all” (1982:92).

The liberal conception of citizenship which is of concern to Laski here is anchored on the assumption that the state is difference-blind. However, as Osaghae (1988) argues, this type of universal conception of citizenship hardly obtains in a federal system. Rather, what is more pronounced is differential citizenship as differences are protected in states or regions which make up the federation. These administrative units “serve as institutions of divisions and differentiation which seek to protect the interest of their citizens in the overall federal framework, by some times discriminating against non-indigenes” (1988:63). This is so because indigeneity implies establishing one’s authenticity through a membership of the local ethnic community. And here lies the ethnicity-citizenship nexus.

In Nigeria, the gradual evolution towards a federal arrangement, especially, in the terminal phase of colonial rule represented, in a large measure, the need to cope with ethnic, rather than geographical diversity as was the case with the United States of America. According to Jinadu (2003), the primary desire to deal with ethnic diversity has been the rationale behind the adoption of a federalist ideology. He thus identifies three main factors critical to the emergence of Nigeria’s ethno-federalism. First, was the imposition of administrative federalism on the country by colonialism emphasizing ethno-regional diversity. Two, the consensus among the emergent political class for a federal system of government as a strategic constitutional design to reflect the significant geopolitical and ethno-linguistic diversities in the country, in addition to the advantages offered by economies of scale and a large internal market. Third, the psychology of domination that is a consequence of the lived experience of the political class, especially
the minority ethnic fractions within it, who perceive as repugnant the domineering tendencies of the majority ethnic nationalities.

The legitimacy of a federal ideology in dealing with the problem of politicized ethnic identity by a self-seeking power elite is widely recognized by civilian leaders and military dictators alike. The latter which has dominated governance in the post-independence period, despite its command structure, has often sought legitimacy through allegiance to the federal arrangement. The only military head of state who was an exception to this, General Aguiyi Ironsi, faced insurmountable obstacle and was killed in a military putsch (Elaigwu, 1986). Although the ethnic logic and the fissiparous tendencies associated with it has been the driving force behind the structural transformation of the Nigerian federal system as seen in the re-alignment of power between the centre and the constituent units, especially, as exemplified in the phenomenal increase in the number of constituent states, there is a sense in which over centralization of power in the centre has rekindled ethnic fears and agitation.

As a means of dealing with such fears, consociational measures such as “ethnic arithmetic”, federal character and the quota system have been introduced. Such measures were consciously introduced as a means of protecting groups who are perceived to be weak relative to others in terms of access to resources and opportunities as well as ability to compete in the political market place. These measures have not only produced boomerang effects (Bach, 1989), they are far from addressing collective group rights which have been elevated to the level of substantive and justiceable human rights (Jinadu, 2003).

2.2. 3: Democracy, Democratization and Citizenship
Quite central to the notion of citizenship are civic virtues of political participation and inclusion. The right to participate in the governance of one’s country or community is a foremost political right and the basis for measuring the quality of citizenship. It is at the heart, not just of the liberal democratic project, but the very notion of statehood and its membership. For this reason, democracy and democratization provide useful arena for understanding the manifold contradictions that are embedded in the idea and practice of citizenship. In a multi-ethnic society in particular, it is necessary to explore the interface between democracy and democratization on the one hand, and the question of citizenship on the other.

What is democracy? What is democratization? How are they linked to the question of citizenship in a multi-ethnic society? These questions are pertinent considering the tendency for identity-based conflicts to increase and become more pronounced in the context of democratization and the construction of a liberal democratic state. The high incidences of ethno-religious conflicts since the return to civil politics in Nigeria in May 1999 provide ample evidence of this trend.

Democracy and democratization are closely related; the former describing very broadly the processes involved in attaining the latter. Democratization describes the processes that are involved in the transition from authoritarian rule or state to a more liberal and plural political order. Whereas a monolithic political order and absence of a plurality of voices and organizations constitute the hallmark of authoritarian regimes, democratization involves change processes aimed at the liberalization of the political space, the creation of plural or multiple centres of power, the increase in the margin of
freedom and a regime of associational life committed to the entrenchment of respect for human rights and the advancement of civil and political liberties.

Democratization is propelled by democratic forces within society that seek to expand the political space and the margin of freedom against the claims of a totalizing state. It passes through distinct stages and phases, produces winners and losers, or ensures the ascendance of some groups and the withering away of others. This in itself makes the process a conflict-ridden one. Likely losers fight to entrench their positions while groups in ascendancy seize new opportunities to express bottled up anger. The mobilization of critical voices, forces and groups within the civil society, the formation of political parties and the conduct of free and open electoral competition for power are critical stages of democratization, and could provide avenue for the mobilization of primordial sentiments.

Democratization as part of the project of routinizing and consolidating democracy is a continuous process of entrenching democratic cultures and values in every aspect of life. It has to be so because as Diamond (1999) has suggested there is no guarantee that democracy moves in one direction and, therefore, requires periodic reform and renewal. As Huntington (1999: 5) admits with a rare concession to the dialectical logic, “History unfolds in a dialectical fashion. Any substantial movement in one direction tends eventually to lose its momentum and to generate counter-veiling forces”. In other words, substantial progress in the direction of democratic consolidation is attended to by substantial possibility of democratic reversal which makes eternal vigilance of civil society and other stakeholders a necessary feature of democratization.

For a number of reasons, the interface between ethnicity and democratization generates tension and conflict. First, is the difficulty associated with democratization in a
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural context. Ethnic ‘entrepreneurs’ often make a political 'capital' out of ethnic differences in order to capture power. As Huntington (1989:6) puts it, “the easiest way to win votes is to appeal to tribal, ethnic and religious constituencies”. This is most evident during periods of free and competitive electoral politics. Besides, party politics and elections have the tendency to throw up certain patterns of ethnic alliances, the outcome of which may trigger off new patterns of ethnic divisions or the deepening of existing ones.

In addition, the prevalence of military dictatorship and authoritarian rule for much of the post-colonial period has tended to increase the saliency of ethnicity because of the ethnic-based forms of patron-clientele networks on which the legitimacy and survival of such regimes depend. Such a period is often characterised by appointments to public offices based on personal connections, quite often, not amenable to the usual bargain and trade-off characteristic of an open and competitive political environment. The consequence is the promotion of unequal treatment of different ethnic groups. In the context of the liberalization of the political space, ethnic groups which previously were disadvantaged use the new opportunity to redress past injustice. Tension and conflicts could be the outcome. Furthermore, the liberalization of the political space can provide incentives to conflict in the sense that the tendency to bring into question authority in general can promote an amoral, laissez faire, or “anything goes atmosphere” (Ibid, p.7).

On its part, democracy is an elusive concept. It is even more so because much of the academic discussions on democracy is ideologically laden. Democracy is either narrowly equated with liberal democracy or reduced to socialist democracy which places a high premium on social and economic equality. Indeed, in the quest for legitimacy, all kinds of
political systems ranging from "African socialism" to the most authoritarian appropriated the democratic appeal. Little or no attention is paid to the etymology of the concept. From its early usage, the English meaning of the original Latin word from which it is derived simply translates to "peoples' rule". Ake (1987) has pointed out that the ideas of equality and liberty were central to the original meaning of democracy. While the former emphasizes economic equality, the latter refers to civil and political liberties.

However, this was to change with the bourgeois revolution in Europe. Ake’s contention is that the idea of equality represented a threat to bourgeois property and so had to be expunged from the meaning of democracy. Thus, democracy came to be equated with liberal democracy. Having become narrowly defined as liberal democracy, the values which it came to espouse and defend, equally became constricted: as civil and political liberties and the associated representative institutions. In essence liberal democracy becomes a political system in which there is the choice of leaders by the people through competitive elections, a guarantee of extensive civil and political rights, the rule of law and public accountability (Diamond, 1996).

Africa's incorporation into the world capitalist economy offered no choice to the continent and its people. The departing colonial masters, under pressure from the nationalists, made efforts to reproduce their own type of institutional (democratic) arrangements in the colonies. As Timothy Shaw (1991:195) has observed, the modernisation project introduced by the imperial powers was predicated on the assumption that all African states would become developed and democratic with the spread of foreign investments, tastes and values. Of course, experience has proven this to be illusory. The consequence of this, however, is that the choice of democracy is narrowed to liberal
democracy with emphasis on multi-party system, periodic elections and the majoritarian principle.

As Graf (1996) points out, political liberalism just alluded to, is one side of the democracy coin. The other inter-related element is economic liberalism which elevates individualism as the guiding principle, seeks to roll back the state and substitutes the market as the mechanism for social control. The mutually reinforcing nature of the economic and political dimensions of liberal democracy finds the fullest expression in the neo-liberal paradigm in which political democracy is presented as the direct correlate of the market. The IMF and the World Bank are currently inducing this type of democracy in Africa to avoid a situation of "perestroika without glasnost". The real dilemma is how to advance democratization in the context of ethnic pluralism?

For instance, at one level we are forcefully reminded that ethnic, religious and other social cleavages find expressions in democracy which cannot be managed because what one finds is the substitution of ethnic for national interest (Nnoli 1994:10) The tension arises because while the principles of democracy are universalistic, ethnic claims are exclusive. Yet, at another level we are told that in plural societies democracy is a matter of political engineering, a kind of solution, but which should be tailored to suit the circumstances of the society in question (Osaghae 1994b: 44). Again, as Nnoli (1994:2) reminds us, there are positive values that inhere in ethnicity in the struggle for democracy since the concern of ethnic movements for liberty and justice are democratic in content.

Without attempting to suggest whether democracy exacerbates ethno-religious tension and conflicts or whether it is the solution to the political problem posed by the
politicization of ethnic identity, it is important to recognize that democracy and democratization pose enormous problem of politicization of ethnic and other primordial identities. Indeed, in addition to the tendency for politicians to appeal to notions of difference in the contest for power, the liberation of civil society which is celebrated as the gains of market reforms and democratization could provide incentives for the emergence of “uncivil” society (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996), as ethnic and religious groups provide framework for associational life in the wider quest for political power, or as a part of the process of mobilizing critical voices in the reconstruction of the public space.

The real dilemma which liberal democracy poses for the management of ethnic diversity arises from the very nature of political demands which it is in the position to effectively process. The original problematic of liberal democracy was to expand the frontiers of freedom and rights for the individuals, precisely because it was meant to be the political and ideological superstructure of the capitalist society. In other words, liberal democracy focuses on individuals whose claims are ultimately placed above those of the collectivity (Ake, 2000). For this reason, as an integral part of the project of modernity and the nation-state in the post-Westphalian era, it is impervious to notions of collective and group rights. It rests on individual rather than collective rights and does not guarantee equality between political, social, ethnic, religious and economic majorities and minorities (Alemika, 2003:11).

The conclusion that emerges is that liberal democracy is grossly inadequate in the context of multiple ethnic, regional and religious identities. First and foremost, the majoritarian principle which is at the core of the political values of liberal democracy provides no answer to the fears and anxiety of minority groups who are vulnerable to
exclusion. Second, its undue emphasis on civil and political liberties is too narrow in the sense it neglects issues of social welfare, unemployment and mass poverty which would be the hallmark of social democracy. The tendency of a liberal democratic state to ignore the important question of social citizenship, therefore, increases fears and anxieties that increase the possibility of negative mobilization of group identities. Finally, it lacks a notion of protection of minority rights in the form of constitutionally entrenched system of privileges and, therefore, the recognition of fractured and differentiated citizenship.

Each of the categories chosen for theoretical elaboration in this chapter relates to the question of ethnic identity and the tension that exists between it and citizenship. The nature of the state, for example, is critical in shaping and framing identity as it is in determining access to citizenship rights. In the same manner, competition for scarce resources and the deliberate manipulation of ethnic and religious identities by social actors have direct implications for both ethnic identity and the issue of citizenship. However, in coming to terms with the way in which the issues of ethnic identity and citizenship are specifically framed in Jos, it is necessary to examine the colonial experience which contributed significantly in framing, shaping and determining the character of the problem. The is the focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE

URBAN JOS: COLONIAL ORIGIN AND ETHNIC IDENTITY FORMATION

3.0: INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the historical origin of Jos and its growth as an urban centre in association with colonial tin mining activity. In doing so, it attempts to bring out the specific historical, economic and political conjectures which were crucial in shaping the identities of the various ethnic groups and their relationships thereafter. It is often asserted, though not without evidence, that colonialism remains a major culprit in shaping and determining the character of contemporary African (Nigerian) ethnicity. Jos provides a lucid example of how colonial policies fomented ethnic divisions, how colonially generated scarcity reinforced this sense of separateness and how competition for the available political and economic opportunities has continued to fuel further divisions and conflict. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to lay bare the role played by colonialism in the process of ethnic identity formation in Jos and how this origin can become useful in explaining the dynamics of ethnic relations in contemporary Jos. It helps us to come to terms with the objective basis of fear and suspicion that characterise existing ethnic relations in Jos.

3.1: JOS CITY: ORIGIN AND COLONIAL CONQUEST
The “tin city” of Jos has acquired a very important commercial, administrative and political significance within the geo-political area known as the "Middle Belt" or North-Central Nigeria as officially designated in the labeling of the various political zones in the country. To begin with, the location of Jos is geographically strategic as it provides a nexus of railroads and other kinds of transportation to other commercial and administrative points in Northern Nigeria. Indeed, it has been noted that Jos serves as “the commercial centre and jumping off place for the Northeast of Nigeria” (See Provincial Reports 1953:103). It is also a host to several ethnic minority groups, especially of northern origin, in addition to its acquisition of the unofficial status as a rallying point of ethnic minority agitation within the northern part of the country. Apart from serving as the administrative headquarters of Jos Division at the formal inception of colonial rule, it has remained the seat of government since the creation of Benue Plateau state in 1967. By far, it remains perhaps the leading commercial centre in the North-Central part of Nigeria.

Although the area covered by the city today had for long been inhabited by three main ethnic minority groups—the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta—the emergence of Jos as an urban centre and its subsequent growth was a direct consequence of colonial activity. Specifically, Jos owes its origin to the extraction of the precious mineral called tin which started at the beginning of the 20th century with the inception of colonial rule. To this extent, Jos corresponds to a model of urbanisation identified by Mabogunje (1968) as colonial and post-industrial centre in contradistinction to pre-industrial and post-colonial settlements resulting either from commerce or import and export trade. What is important, however, is that Jos has its own fairly peculiar history of urban population concentration and a cluster of spatial, socio-economic, and socio-political characteristics.
By the turn of the century tin had become a very important commodity. The industrial revolution of the preceding centuries had transformed the character of tin which, by now, had become critical to the expansion of the steel industry of leading nations such as Britain and, increasingly, the United States of America. The relatively strategic importance of this resource was to put Nigeria and Jos firmly on the world map. At the height of tin mining on the Plateau in the 1940s or thereabout, Nigeria was the world sixth largest producer, accounting for 5 per cent of world production. The Plateau alone accounted for 80 per cent of Nigeria's tin and columbite as well as 83 per cent of the country's metalliferous output (Plotnicov 1967:35). It was the abundant opportunity provided by the mining industry and associated commercial and administrative activities that led to the influx of people of diverse social and cultural backgrounds. The tin industry, therefore, accounted for the two classes of migrants identified by Kirk-Greene (1972): those who came in search of employment in the tin mines and those who came because of the trade which the demands of the minesfield created.

The city of Jos is situated approximately on latitude 9.5 degrees North and longitude 8.5 degrees East, standing on the edge of the Plateau from which the state derives its name. The city stands on a high altitude of about 4,000 feet above the sea level which together with its location close to the geographical centre of Nigeria are strategic factors for its growth and expansion. The former accounts for the scenic beauty and the "comparatively pleasant climate" which has been a major source of attraction to people of diverse origins and backgrounds, including Europeans. The tin industry provided a major fillip in this regard as both the colonial administration and the tin companies took part in easing the problem of transportation. By 1913, the railways was extended to Jos.
The projected population of Jos by 1987, based on the 1963 census figure and an annual growth rate of 2.5 per cent was 341,672 (see Plateau State Information Directorate, 1991). The 1990 figure put the population of Jos at 496,409. Although the actual breakdown on the basis of the different ethnic groups is difficult to obtain, it can be inferred from the previous figures that ethnic representation in the city appears in the following numerical order: Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba. They are followed by the indigenous ethnic communities which include Berom, Anaguta and Afizere. Other ethnic groups of numerical importance in Jos include the Tivs, Idoma, Igala, Ibibio, Ijaw and Urhobo, to mention but a few.

The conquered "tribes" who inhabited the area which came to be known as Jos include the Beroms who occupied the Eastern portion; the Afizere who were to the West; and the Anaguta who were located to the North. From what has been written about their pre-colonial political and economic organisations, each of them seemed to maintain a loose political organisation unlike the centralised political authority found among the pre-colonial Hausas, Yorubas or the Jukuns (Meek, 1925; Perham, 1962; Plotnicov, 1967; Freund, 1981; Kirk-Greene, 1972). For example, the Beroms maintained a loose political arrangement in which political and religious authority resided with the Gwom at the village level. The situation was not different among the Jarawa who, as Kirk-Greene (1972) has pointed out, is a generic term for a variety of peoples living in the towns of Jere, Lamiro, Gusum and Amo who may not necessarily be consaguinically homogenous.

There is evidence to suggest that the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere have historical basis, in the context of the current Nigerian discourse, to claim the status of natives or indigenes of Jos based on the history of migration and settlement. Isichei (1980:6-8), for example, has convincingly shown by drawing evidence from art, the technology of the Nok
culture, history of farming and migration, that people of Berom, Anaguta and Afizere
descent as well as other groups who exhibit similarities in culture and language had lived
together for centuries on the Jos Plateau prior to contact with “Hausa/Fulani” migrants. In
other words, there should be no disputation regarding groups which can be designated as
indigenous to Jos.

It is also possible to suggest, from accounts of mutual assistance rendered by one
group to the other, during periods of external threats, as were the cases during the
unsuccessful Jihadist invasion in the 19th century and the colonial conquest, that each was
not a “self-contained” community. The Anaguta and Jarawa, to be specific, fought side by
side against the Fulani Jihadists. And the former is believed to have assimilated much of
the culture of the latter (Kirk-Greene 1972:57). Significant political, economic and cultural
contacts may have existed between these peoples and, therefore, were no strangers to one
another. It is not, strictly speaking, within the mandate of this research to explore the pre-
colonial history of these groups. The point, however, is that these rather "independent
tribes" had to be conquered and their resistance crushed in what appeared as one of the
most repressive, barbaric and ruthless operations in the history of colonial empire building
(Freund, 1981:43-50).

The conquest of Jos Plateau followed the successful expedition mounted by the
British on Bauchi. One Sir William Wallace, said to have led the expeditionary force
toured the Plateau area and took with him samples of tin ore concentrate found there which
he subsequently presented to the Directors of the Royal Niger Company (RNC). But it was
George R. Nicolaus, a mining engineer with the RNC who, in 1902, confirmed the Plateau
as the source of the high quality tin straw which had for long been known. His
recommendation was said to have persuaded the RNC, which until then had indicated
interest in securing mining rights, to push for major concessions which included the whole Plateau (Freund 1981). In 1903, one year after, Colonel H. W. Laws, better known as the "uncrowned king of the Plateau" started the move that eventually resulted in the subjugation of the Plateau and its people. For the next one decade, between 1903 and 1912, expeditionary forces of both the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) which included Native African Soldiers and the RNC jointly took part in this brutal conquest. One after the other, surrounding settlements such as Shere hills, Gyel, Kwoll and Miango were violently suppressed, a process which involved killing, destruction and intimidation to make the areas 'safe' (Plotnicov, 1967; Freund 1981).

By 1904, Colonel Laws established a mining camp at Naraguta, north of Jos. And in 1905, as a result of what was termed the resistance of "Plateau tribesmen" who put up their best defensive methods in a collaborative network, an administrative section had to be opened at Bukuru to deal with these recalcitrant "tribesmen" whose periodic uprising had become a serious menace. Nevertheless, native resistance did not abate and the uneasiness arising from this for both the colonial authorities and the mining companies continued to reflect in annual colonial reports, even up to the late 1950s. In most cases, Hausa and Yoruba contingents of the WAFF were called for surveillance and to secure the mining fields and operations. However, by 1907, the British were compelled to mount a major punitive campaign which resulted in the pacification of Jos Plateau (Plotnicov, 1967).

The important consequences of the events of these early years of the 20th century have been adequately summarised by Bill Freund (1981). Among others, they include the violent conquest of the Jos Plateau aimed at preventing the indigenous population from the production and transportation of tin; the suppression of indigenous tin mining industry; the creation of a large labour force to service mining capital; and bringing into effect,
legislation which removed from the local population, land and water rights. In essence, it marked, as a part of the on-going process in the geographical area of Nigeria, the formal incorporation of the Plateau into the global capitalist economy. The importance of Jos for the tin mining economy and its subsequent growth as an administrative and commercial headquarters were to follow these historic events.

3.2: TIN MINING, MIGRATION AND URBANISATION IN JOS

As noted already, the most significant and decisive factors in urbanisation of Jos were colonial administrative and economic activities. Of particular significance was the colonial tin mining activity. In other words, Jos did not exist in the real sense of the word until the advent of colonialism and the "pacification of the pagan tribes" on the Plateau as a prelude to the commencement of mining. Actual mining started around 1905 and by 1910, it was reported that more than fifty syndicates were already involved with a heavy amount of capital investment (Plotnicov, 1967:34) The control of mining quotas which were held by these wholly foreign-owned companies as well as the technical skills and capital required effectively kept the "natives" out of the mining industry. The Royal Niger company which secured much of the mining rights gave out leases to several of such companies. Notable among these companies were Champion (Nigeria) Tin Fields, Consolidated Gold Fields and the Naraguta (Nigeria) Tin Mining Company.

Mining activity required a large labour force which, as will be pointed out later, had to be recruited from outside of the immediate communities. At least initially, this was the case and it was to have far-reaching implications for future ethnic relations in the city which is the subject-matter of our investigation. In addition, trade which the demands of
the minefield had created, provided another important factor for the concentration of people of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds in Jos. These two factors accounted for what Kirk-Greene (1972:17) described as a "new generation who have no country and no home except the minefield", and most of whom happened to be Hausa.

Thus, from its colonial inception and perhaps prior to it, Jos experienced immigration of different ethnic groups which today gives the city its multi-ethnic character. For the purpose of our research, it is important to discuss the migration patterns of the three dominant ethnic groups in Jos - the Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba. It was the movement of the administrative headquarters in 1915 from the initial location at Naraguta to the present city of Jos which marked the beginning of its growth as an urban centre. It was officially proclaimed the headquarters on the orders of the Governor of Northern Nigeria.

Studies of migration are replete with several accounts of the "push" and "pull" factors responsible for the movement of people from one point to another. Some, for example, emphasize the primacy of economic factors in the movement of people (Todaro, 1970). Others focus on demographic changes such as high population density and ecological problems as were the cases among the Ibos of Eastern Nigeria. Others still emphasize psycho-social factors resulting from changes in the migrant's need dispositions due to the forces of urbanisation and culture contact (Imoagene, 1967; Mabogunje, 1970). It has also been established that in the first wave of migrations characterised as migrations of colonisation, the pattern largely involved among others, movement of skilled labour from the south (principally of Ibos) toward the North and migrations from the other parts of the North into the middle belt (Amin, 1974). These same patterns of inter-regional and intra-regional migration continued into the later phase of migrations of colonisation (Green, 1974) And as Amin reminds us, it is important to relate these waves of migrations
to the transformation of the socio-economic organisation of the rural world occasioned by incorporation into the world capitalist system (1974:93).

Bingel (1978) offers two explanations for the rapid expansion of Jos at this initial phase. First, was the discovery by the miners after 1903 that the richest deposits of tin ore were to be found south of Naraguta, near the upper reaches of the Delimi River around Gangare, Rayfield and Bukuru. The establishment of Gangare, for example, as the largest mining camp along the Delimi River attracted miners from the original settlement. For this same reason, it became irresistible for the Barde, the successor to the Bunu as Chief of Naraguta to relocate from Naraguta to what later became the Native Town in Jos. Expectedly, his officials and loyalists moved along with him. The second explanation relates to the dramatic increase in the output of tin ore necessitating the construction of the Bauchi light railway which reached Jos in 1913. The extension of the Eastern railway line which reached Jos in 1927 at a time that coincided with increase in tin output and, hence, demand for more labour encouraged another wave of migration. The population of Jos, according to him, grew from 8,000 in 1920 to 10,000 in 1933, and to 20,000 in 1950.

We begin with the Hausa who by far constitute an ethnic category that has profound socio-economic, cultural and religious influence on the city. As earlier suggested in the definition of the problem of this study, Hausa ethnicity is a major factor in the politics and civil life of Jos. The presence of Hausa community on the Plateau and Jos in particular predated the colonial period, but was to become more significant during the advent of colonialism and large-scale mining. Available evidence seems to suggest that economic and commercial ties existed between the Hausa and the various communities on the Plateau pre-dating colonial rule. While the evidence suggests the failure of Hausa polities in establishing control over them, the same cannot be said of the communities occupying the
adjoining plains who were subjected to pervasive political and cultural influences of the “Hausa/Fulani” community.

Balarabe (1992:3) has suggested that contacts between Hausa and other communities in central Nigeria intensified following the in-roads made by Jihadists into places such as Wase and Lere which became tribute-collecting centres for the different emirates whose political supremacy was so recognized. Such vassal states attracted Hausa migrants and thus increased the possibility of cementing economic ties with the neighbouring polities. Commercial and trade links of this type and associated wave of migration led to the establishment of Hausa settlement at Naraguta at the outskirts of the Jos Plateau. Hausa settlement around Naraguta resulted from deposits of itinerant Hausa traders involved in buying and selling the tin ore around the Plateau, and those who were involved in the constant raid of the Plateau for slaves prior to 1900.

However, this presence did not amount to any considerable political, cultural and economic influence of the Hausas on the peoples on the Plateau who resisted successive attempts by their Hausa neighbours. They fiercely resisted the constant raid for slaves as they did in respect of attack from the Jihadists later. The Jihadists attack launched from Bauchi under Yakubu after the conquest of the lower Plateau, for instance, reached a dead-end at Panyam as the 'Suras' (corrupted version for the Maghaavul) on mounted horses put up a fierce resistance. A similar fate befell the armies of Zaria who attacked from the north end of the Plateau (Kirk-Greene 1972:31).

Apart from trade and commerce which led to increased contacts between the Hausa and Plateau communities and which attracted the migration of the former into the latter, there was also the ecological factor. James (2000: 29-58) has shown that drought and desertification which ravaged the arid and semi-arid zones to the North had, overtime,
encouraged the southward migration of pastoralists and agriculturalists. This was a very long historical process that started well before the advent of colonial rule. This led to the growth of several Hausa settlements in many parts of the middle belt which forms the historical basis of the contemporary “settler phenomenon” in the region.

As noted already, significant Hausa presence in Jos started with colonial rule and tin mining for two main reasons. To begin with, Hausa population formed the bulk of African Native Soldiers who took part in the early expeditions of Jos Plateau. Second, they contributed substantially to the provision of labour for the mines following the establishment of Tin fields in Naraguta and Bukuru. Freund (1981:51) has explained why most of the floating mine population (labour recruits) were Hausa as can be gleaned from Table 3.1. The bulk of labour recruits, Freund argues, came largely from areas where peoples' ties to the land had been considerably weakened or disconnected as a result of such factors as penetration of market relations into the countryside and the impact of slavery and petty commodity production - all of which had made wage labour available. To this can be added the fact that they had acquired some considerable skills in tin mining prior to the advent of the colonial economy. It could also be possible that natural factors like drought which affect the extreme north perennially may have accounted for southward migration of displaced Hausa peasant population. This position is buttressed by James (2000: 39) who explains the preponderance of Hausa and Borno labourers in terms of their large populations and scarce resources which forced them into southward migration.

Table 3.1 shows that the Hausa alone accounted for 6,498 out of 14,817 labourers in the mine, almost 50 % of the total population. If one were to include other groups whose identity could dissolve into that of the Hausa such as the Beriberi, Bagirmi and Fulani, it
will amount to 11,178 out of the total, which is more than 80% of the total population. Table 3.2 shows the ethnic origins of forced labourers in the mines in 1942, and it brings out a similar trend in terms of the dominance of Hausa population.

Thus, apart from the Hausas, Yoruba and Nupe labourers whom Colonel H.C. Law brought from Lokoja in 1906 and trained in pick and shovel work, Freund (1981) has further shown that between 1907 and 1914, the Hausa speaking areas of Kano, Zaria, Bauchi and Borno accounted for more than 20 per cent of the total recruited/forced labour in the mines of Jos plateau. Indeed, by the time Jos was officially founded in 1915 following the removal of the headquarters from
Table 3.1: Ethnic Distribution of Mines Labour: Jos Division, 1930 Based on the 1931 census Tabulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>6,498(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beriberi</td>
<td>1,906(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagirmi</td>
<td>1,677(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>1,097(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tera</td>
<td>648(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerikeri</td>
<td>590(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab (Shuwa)</td>
<td>424(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBO</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YORUBA</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARIBA</td>
<td>221(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZEBERWA</td>
<td>154(8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUNSHI</td>
<td>153(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLEWA</td>
<td>151(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUPE</td>
<td>95(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASABA (IBO)</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEROM</td>
<td>55(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER NORTHERN PROVINCES</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER SOUTHERN PROVINCES</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER FOREIGNERS</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>14,817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. From Nigeria and from Niger
2. Kanuri speakers, Borno Province
3. From Chad
4. Bauchi Province
5. Kano-Border People
6. Borno Province
7.?
8. From Western Niger
9. Tiv from Benue Province
10. Bauchi Province
11. Niger Province
12 Birom-Plateau
Table 3.2: ORIGIN BY PROVINCE OF FORCED LABOURERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1942 Sept.Planned First Scheduled</th>
<th>1942 Nov-Dec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bauchi</td>
<td>3,500 11% 3,184 22.6% 14,669 15.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue</td>
<td>8,000 26.7% 2,227 15.8% 11,987 12.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borno</td>
<td>3,000 10.0% 882 6.3% 10,585 11%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>2,000 6.7% 500 3.5% 1,952 2.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsina</td>
<td>2,000 6.7% 1,700 12.1% 8,903 9.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1,500 5.0% -------- 3.9% 7,689 8.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>2,500 8.3% -------- -------- 4,481 4.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokoto</td>
<td>3,500 11.7% 2,272 16.1% 4,808 16.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaria</td>
<td>4,000 13.3% 2,784 -------- 19.7% 7,629</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30,000 14,000 92,703</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Naraguta, there were enough Hausa residents to justify the reference to it as "Hausa settlement" (Plotnicov 1967:41). Hausa migrants, especially traders came in droves in the course of the consolidation of colonial presence and of the expansion in tin mining activities. This is easy to explain given the long history of distant trade and commerce associated with the Hausa particularly those of Kanawa origin who actually dominated migrant Hausa population.

As alluded to above, the movement of the Barde from Naraguta to Jos in 1915 encouraged the movement of a considerable number of Hausa population previously
resident at Naraguta. Besides, the construction of a light railway from Zaria to Jos in 1914, and to Bukuru in 1915, encouraged further influx into Jos of Hausa population. What, in the words of Plotnicov (1971), is the "possessive attitude" of the Hausa toward Jos may be located in this fact in which the early history of Jos was associated with the Hausa.

The Igbo of Eastern Nigeria also constitute one of the most significant ethnic groups in Jos city and have over the years established a hegemonic position in trade and commerce, in addition to their active participation in the political and cultural life of the city. It is a well known fact that the Igbo often experience a high level of integration into their host communities. Known generally to be adventurous, enterprising and forward-looking, the migration of the Igbo into Jos, like the case of other ethnic groups, was largely in connection with tin mining, colonial administration and the expanding opportunities for trade and commerce that followed.

Although it was possible that people of Igbo origin arrived the city prior to 1900, their significant presence was a post-conquest (colonial) affair. The extension of the railway lines to Jos in 1913 or thereabout provided additional fillip to several waves of north-ward movement of Igbo, especially into Jos. A large number of Igbo, for example, had acquired commercial orientation from serving as middlemen in the trade between Europeans and the hinterland and therefore, simply took advantage of the commercial opportunities offered by the new economic dispensation. Furthermore, many of them had acquired trained skills in several occupations ranging from carpentry, tailoring, masonry, plumbing and general electrical and mechanical services and were in the position to take advantage of the expanding colonially-induced economic activity and urbanization. It is also established that the Igbo undertook aggressive pursuit of western education in the first few decades of colonial rule in order to bridge the gap between them and their Yoruba
 counterparts who enjoyed a head start. Consequently, they had produced a considerable number of school leavers in search of clerical jobs. This explains the dominance of the Igbo in the employment of colonial trading companies such as the United African Company (UAC), Paterson Zochonis (PZ) and John Holt, to mention a few examples.

In addition to the commercial orientation of the Igbo people which developed from centuries of trading activities essentially as middlemen, and the incentive offered by the construction of railway lines, Nwudoh (1994) suggests that the economic depression which followed the end of the first world war and the violent repression of the Aba Women riots in 1929, encouraged the up-ward migration of Igbo people into the northern part of Nigeria, with many of them settling in Jos. This was to largely involve movement of skilled people and professionals such as pharmacists, lawyers and teachers.

Like the Igbo and the Hausa, the presence of Yoruba in Jos dates back to the tail end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Although there is a dearth of account of the waves of migration into Jos of the Yoruba, indications are that they constitute one of the early groups to domicile in the city. The West African Frontier Force that undertook the pacification of the "recalcitrant tribes" on the Jos Plateau included, among others, Yoruba troops. A significant number of Yoruba labourers were involved in the tin mining activities (Freund, 1981). However, with the formal establishment of colonial rule, the Yoruba, who enjoyed early start in terms of access to western education provided auxiliary services such as clerks in the colonial bureaucracy and, more importantly, in the European trading firms. In addition, trade and commerce, equally colonially-induced, played useful role in encouraging the migration of the Yoruba into Jos.
The population of "indigenous" ethnic groups -Beroms, Afizere and Anaguta- in Jos is extremely low. As can be gleaned from the early census of Jos (See tables I.1 and I.2 above), ethnic groups of northern Nigerian origin accounted for merely 17 per cent of the city of which the Beroms constituted 1.8 per cent. Curiously enough, no figures were recorded for both the Afizere and Anaguta. Balarabe (1992) has canvassed two possible explanations for this state of affairs. The first is that many members of these ethnic communities voluntarily relocated away from the city because they considered urban life an anathema, a possible threat to their culture. The second one is that the colonial authorities moved them to adjoining settlements to allow for the planned development of the city. The latter appears to be more credible. And there was more to it than the desire to plan the development of the city. The early colonial attitude, reinforced by the stubborn resistance of the Berom to the forced seizure of their land for mining purpose, was to make Jos predominantly Hausa and most suitable to indirect rule system. For this reason, the "indigenous" groups were not particularly encouraged as could be confirmed by the decision of the colonial officers much later to relocate the Berom away from the Jos Plateau.

3.3: THE COLONIAL STATE AND THE FORMATION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY 1915-1940

"Brief as it was in the overall history of Africa", writes Terence Ranger (1994:24), "the colonial period was long enough for a shifting history of hegemony". The intention of this passage, contrary to those who consider the colonial 'interlude' too brief to have had a meaningful impact, is to underscore the pervasiveness of this impact. And it is not just the
disruptive aspect of this impact but also the deliberate construction, invention and imposition of previously unknown forms of identity and hegemony. The colonial state played a key role in this shifting history of hegemony. It did so by imposing 'alien', "Hausa-Fulani" 'tradition' on some of the conquered groups, especially in the predominantly non-Muslim areas of northern Nigeria. It was the imposition of the post-Jihad system of rule, approximating what has been described as having "the least historical depth" (Mamdani, 1996) that is the root of the cultural distortion of the non-Muslim ethnic minorities of northern Nigeria and the construction of a new hegemony. This is the focus of our discussion in this section and the one that follows. First, we discuss the role of the colonial state in ethnic identity formation from 1915 when Jos was officially founded to the period of the Second World War in 1945.

The colonial state in Nigeria was, for all practical purposes, a logical extension of the British metropolitan state. In this sense, it was to fulfill one of the essential components of Lugard's Dual Mandate, namely, to accomplish the imperial desire of exploiting the resources of the conquered natives. This project, as it were, was fundamentally opposed to the interest of the Nigerian people, an issue that is well focused in several academic works. However, the colonial state could not execute this project without forging a close alliance with segments of the pre-colonial ruling elites such as Emirs and Obas. The former was infact more important as indirect rule which provided the basis of colonial administration was modeled after the aristocratic system of rule of the "Hausas-Fulani" derived from the Jihad.

According to Mamdani (1996), a major pre-occupation of the colonial state was the "native question" which primarily involved the establishment of law and order. In the attempt to resolve the native question a bifurcated state apparatus which created two laws
was established: one for citizens in urban areas and the other for tribesmen with the imposition of the native authority, allegedly to enforce tradition. The consequence of this as he points out, was that Africans were "containerised" as "tribesmen". However, as will be demonstrated, the situation in Jos was more complex than what Mamdani's analysis can offer. Quite alright, the colonial authorities enforced policies that led to the emergence of distinct ethnic consciousness, but imposed emirate tradition on a people to whom this was alien.

What are the consequences of the policies of the colonial state for ethnic relations in Jos? What are these policies in the first place? In response to the latter, three of such policies will be highlighted. First, was the colonial language policy. Second, was the deliberate segregation of settlements along ethnic and communal lines. Third and finally, was the closely related issue of the attempt to enforce the indirect rule system among "pagan" groups who neither had centralised political authority nor the cultural cum religious predispositions to the requirement of the indirect rule system. We now elaborate on each of these points.

One neglected aspect of the way in which colonialism heavily impacted on contemporary ethnic relations in Nigeria is the area of language policy. It is too often neglected in the analysis of the Nigerian situation and that of Northern Nigeria in particular. Much of existing analyses stop at how colonial policies and the material conditions in urban areas provided the social ferment to ethnicity. However, the more subtle but nevertheless, equally, if not more effective means of control was the role of religious missions who worked in tandem with the colonial state. The missions who played a key role in the choices and 'modernisation' of African languages were instrumental in the shaping of the language policy in the various colonies. In this respect, Johannes Fabian's
(1986) work which dwells on the development of Shaba Swahili and other native languages in the Belgian Congo is particularly illuminating. In his attempt to study the complex interplay between language, linguistics and politics, Fabian discusses two important issues in respect of missionary activities in the Belgian Congo. One, the role played by the missions in controlling multilingualism through the selection of those languages which were to be given privileged status in school curricula and administrative practice (1986:78). Two, how the various ‘mission orders’ and their linguistic works became associated with regions and with ethnic groups.

With particular reference to Shaba Swahili, Fabian has shown that Belgian linguists were fascinated in their 'scientific' findings of the practical and symbolic use to which it can be put in the colonial context. As he explains it, in their urgent need to communicate, the missionaries took important decisions in respect of which dialect to privilege, what orthography to employ and what vocabulary to regard as 'pure'. Several consequences emerged from this among which were the expansion and adoption of 'new' languages by many people who hitherto, had spoken other languages, and the tendency for such languages to be associated with the supposed intellectual, moral and even physical qualities of their speakers (Fabian, 1983,1986).

While not ignoring the differences in the style and philosophy underlying the Belgian system of colonial administration on the one hand and the British on the other, the scenario painted above is similar to the situation in Northern Nigeria. Although the relationship between the colonial officials and the Christian missions had somehow gone sour after 1906, following the first exit of Sir Frederick Lugard, the impact of the latter on the language question has been well registered. The Christian missions carried out a tireless job by extending the frontiers of Hausa language among the "pagan" people of the middle
belt through its scientific study and by translating the Bible and other Christian literature into the Hausa language.

Pioneer missionaries in Northern Nigeria, no doubt, had their own frustrations in proselytising among the Hausa. They turned out to be rather too ambitious or optimistic in perceiving the Hausa as "providential instrument of Christianisation" (Ayandele, 1966). They shared the mistaken view that Islam in Hausaland was imposed and sustained through force by the Fulani whom they considered as the main obstacle to progress and civilisation. But, as it turned out, conversion among the Hausa became a mission impossible. Not even the strategy of "cultural surrender" by which missionaries resorted to wearing Muslim clothes including the turban could make the Hausa budge (Ayandele 1966). Nevertheless, the missionaries in Hausaland shared a common idyllic view of the racial characteristics of Hausa people in terms of their intelligence, physiognomy and material culture. In addition, they considered the Hausa language as more developed, possessing a regular gender formation as it has a word for everything. This judgment largely informed the special patronage the colonial state gave toward the popularisation of the language through grants and other kinds of assistance to the missions in their endeavours. As a matter of fact, as far back as 1891, British linguists formed the Hausa Association in London.

Thus, while the missions were discouraged from proselytising in the core Islamic areas of the North, their activities were largely confined to the "pagan" areas of the middle belt. And so it was through the linguistic prisms of the Hausa that christianisation was carried out among these people. The Bible, hymn books and other christian literature were written in Hausa. Local pastors were given basic literacy skills in Hausa, a situation which indisputably promoted and strengthened Hausa influence over much of the middle belt of
Nigeria. But it is more important however, to stress the point that the efforts of the missions to propagate the language fitted squarely into the project of the colonial state.

For the colonial authorities, the "modernisation" of Hausa language was attractive for a different reason. And we can draw inferences from Fabian's analysis of the Belgian Congo as seen above. They had preference for the Hausa language, not merely for "scientific" reason as it is cheaply peddled, but because the language appeared superior in conveying "authority", "deference" and "order" (See for example, Adamu, 1978; Lovejoy, 1980). This becomes much clearer if it is remembered that the 'Habe' system of centralised political authority predated the Islamic jihadist movement of the early 19th century. It was this system of authority that was to be remodeled and refined in the aftermath of the victory of Usman Danfodio. Thus, the Hausa language over time, developed replete with idioms of authority, power and influence. This suited the purpose of extending indirect rule to the non-Muslim and non-Hausa areas. This brief account of how the colonial administration deliberately promoted the Hausa language over and above the indigenous languages in order to advance imperial interest partly accounts for the historical basis of Hausa ethnicity among the non-Hausa people of the middle belt in general and in Jos in particular.

The second colonial policy of consequence is related to the segregated settlement of the various ethnic groups. At the root of this policy was the famous Indirect Rule system introduced into northern Nigeria by the first most ranking colonial officer, Sir Federick Lugard. For him the basic idea was to modify and alter existing indigenous institutions to be effective agencies for the realisation of the colonial objectives, which also meant the flourishing of western practices alongside the "modified" tradition. However, Lugard's successors in northern Nigeria departed from this policy and instead, isolated the emirates from westernising influences (Uba, 1982:52). This would not, of course, include trade and
commerce as that could defeat the primary objective of colonialism. What then came to be perceived as the greatest threat to idyllic culture of the Hausa Muslims was pervasive contact with southern elements whose early contact with western education provided them with the consciousness to question certain aspects of colonial rule.

Thus, taking off from the position that Jos was essentially Hausa, the policy of ethnic residential segmentation shares the experiences of other Northern cities such as Kano, Zaria and Katsina. In these cases, "indigenous" Hausa were secluded in the originally walled cities. Other migrant Hausa populations were confined to Tudun-Wada area while non-Hausa ethnics, particularly of Southern origins were domiciled in Sabongari. But, unlike these cities which had been predominantly Hausa settlements centuries prior to colonisation, Jos was a new urban centre and did afford a continent of opportunity of fostering integration among peoples of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds.

Beginning with the inception of a native administration at Naraguta in 1905 and the subsequent movement of the administrative headquarters to its present location in 1915, the town remained balkanised into two: the Native Town and the Township. The former consisted largely of Hausa 'settlers' who were administered by the Divisional Native Authority. The latter, made up of ethnic groups of Southern origins, Europeans and Asians were placed directly under the Resident British officer. Europeans and Asians of course, were further secluded in a special reservation. As we shall demonstrate later, the policy of keeping culturally dissimilar groups separate was not unrelated to the desire to impose indirect rule. The British colonial authorities, out of the desire to enforce strict ethnic segmentation in settlement, insisted that the Hausa speaking Northerners who squatted in the Township were to be moved to the Native Town. The expectation of the colonial
authorities was that the "more alien" people in the Native Town would, on their own, move out to the township Sabongari so as not to interfere with the Native Administration (Plotnicov, 1967:41).

As it turned out however, this policy was not a total success. Some Igbo and Yoruba migrants, for example, continued to live in the Native Town into the mid-1940s and, in certain wards, accounted for the largest population. As can be gleaned from table 1.1 in chapter one above, while Ibo residents in Sarkin Arab ward accounted for 76 per cent of the ward population, Yoruba residents in Garba ward formed 46 per cent of the population. Nevertheless, the policy succeeded in large measure to keep the various ethnic groups apart for, as the same table shows, each ward tended to be dominated by a particular ethnic group. Tables I.1 and I.2 further illustrate the impact of the policy on ethnic distribution across the city. The Township is almost exclusively inhabited by ethnic groups of non-Northern origins who accounted for 83 per cent of the city population in the 1953 census. Once the colonial state officially sanctioned this policy, it was logical that subsequent immigrant population would follow the established pattern. As it is usually the case, brothers helped resettle sisters who reached out to cousins who told their friends -- a chain of migration that echoes the movement to urban areas of many people from the villages or urban neighbourhoods in search of better, more rewarding socio-economic opportunities. On the whole the policy of segregated settlement has tended to provide a spatial framework for ethnic politics within the city of Jos.

Thirdly and finally, was the determined effort to reproduce, in Jos, the system of indirect rule and its paraphernalia of juridico-administrative institutions. Instead of the Emir in a classical indirect rule situation, the British invented the office of Sarkin Hausawa to provide a veneer of traditional authority. Infact, until the appointment of Bitrus Rwang
Pam as the Chief of Jos in 1947, successive Hausa 'chiefs' held sway. This had, at least, two immediate consequences. One, it necessitated setting up two parallel systems of administration in the city - the Native Town and the Township. The Native Town was placed under the jurisdiction of the Jos Native Authority - the co-extension of Jos division.

The Township, on the other hand, was subject to the supervision of the Ministry for Local Government of Northern Nigeria and the direct command of the British Resident in Jos. Indeed, until independence in October 1960, law and order in the two administrative systems fell under two different police establishments. While the Native Authority police had jurisdiction in the former, law and order in the latter was the responsibility of the Nigerian Federal Police. Two, and more importantly, it helped in fostering the illusion that Jos was unarguably an exclusive domain of Hausa influence. This was so in so far as the raison detre of setting up separate residential and administrative systems was to insulate the Hausa "settlers" in the Native Town from the contaminating influence of the Southerners whose relative head start in western education and skills had always been a source of suspicion on the part of the colonial authorities.

The establishment of the Alkali court in the Native Town, much to the consternation of, and despite the protestation from the non-Muslims only served to reinforce this sense of separateness. The ultimate reaction of the colonial authorities was to establish a Supreme Court for the Township to handle "all suits and matters to which a non-native is a party" (Plotnicov 1967:42). Plotnicov was therefore correct to have noted that the operation of indirect rule system was not only paternalistic, preferential and inconsistent but also resulted in deep mistrust and grievances among the immigrant residents. It should also be added that the ad hoc nature of some of the policies and indeed,
indecision on the part of the colonial authorities did not in any way help matters at all. Consider the following for example.

At one breadth, the British declared their intention to protect the culture and perhaps, the religion of the Hausa "settlers" in the Native Town. For this purpose, separate settlements and administrations were put in place, an Alkali court established and the sale of alcoholic beverages prohibited in the Native Town until the 1950s, allegedly to protect muslim areas. This was, however, in response to persistent protest from educated Africans of southern Nigerian origin. At yet another breadth, the British underscored the fact that the Hausas were "alien" in Jos, expressly declaring that the "pagans" owned the land. Thus, the Jos Provincial Annual Report of 1921 declared Hausa settlements as "purely alien enclaves having no sort of authority over the pagans (the native people of Plateau state)". It further stated, rather formalyistically that "the land is the pagans' and their rights are jealously guarded". They could be talking merely tongue in cheek. However, it seemed evident that the British were confronted with a real dilemma. But the response to this dilemma was characteristically ambivalent as they were torn between either merging the Native town and the Township or handing over the 'control' of the administration to the "indigenous" ethnic communities. What could have been most logical against the backdrop of the strong feelings expressed above was a drastic policy shift in favour of the latter position. Instead, the policy shift was gradual and incremental. The result, inexorably, was the sharpening of ethnic perception between the Hausas on the one hand, and the indigenous ethnic communities on the other which would become the basis of defining the relevant "other".

Undoubtedly, it became clear that given the preponderance of educated elites, largely of Southern origins on the one hand, and the fact that the Hausas were 'alien' vis-a-vis the "pagan" people on the other, Jos became unsuitable to the classical form of indirect
rule as practiced in much of Northern Nigeria. One would, therefore, have expected a complete break from the model in vogue in core cities of the north with a preponderance of Hausa residents. However, from 1921 onward some kinds of incremental reforms were embarked upon but which did not amount to any fundamental shift in policy orientation.

In 1921, the office of the Hausa District Head in the Native Town was abolished and a town council with representation from each of the major ethnic groups was established for Jos. Leaders of such ethnic groups on the council were chiefs who carried titles such as Sarkin Yorubawa and Sarkin Iboawa. The Hausa representative on this council had the title of Chief of Jos, and exercised influence over the Native Town only. Similarly in 1932, following persistent demands of the Yoruba in the Native Town for the appointment of a Sarkin Yorubawa which, apparently, had been discontinued, an unofficial advisory council to Sarkin Jos was appointed. The council had four ex-officio ward heads and twenty three representatives of the various ethnic groups from the south. Advice was to be sought from each member on matters which concerned his own ethnic group. The council also had the additional responsibility of nominating members to the Township Advisory Board.

Both the Native Authority and the Township had limited powers with regard to local government and administration. For example, by 1920 when Jos was declared a second class township, its council was determined by the colonial administration. The governor of the Northern Region who also authorized the existence of a local authority with an Advisory Board for making bye-laws and ordinances defined the geographical and jurisdictional boundaries of the Township. The Advisory Board was initially composed entirely by Europeans who represented government departments and commercial interests. Only from the 1930s were Africans included on the Board.
Nevertheless, profound differences existed in relation to administration and justice. While the Native Authority had an Alkali Court as pointed out earlier, a supreme court was appointed for the Township from 1915. The court which was presided over by a station magistrate had jurisdiction over “all suits and matters to which a “non-native” was a party (Plotnicov, 1968:43). In 1934 the judicial powers of the local authority was drastically reduced and the magistrates and district courts took over most of the functions.

As can be seen from the foregoing, the thorny issue of evolving an administrative system for Jos, given the blundering of the colonial authorities, was to encourage a system of power-sharing of a kind, archetypal of a "grand coalition" cabinet better described as consociationalism. The pitfall was however obvious: the tendency to accentuate rather than attenuate ethnic differences. As Plotnicov has correctly observed, "the colonial administration thought of representative local government in terms of tribe, with traditional authority as its keystone" (1967:46). But given the objective reality that the colonial system was most undemocratic and autocratic in disposition, it could not have done otherwise. The obvious consequence was that representations on councils became a subject of inter-ethnic rivalry and competition and was the source of tension among migrant ethnic groups that Perham (1937) had extensively documented.

Although some remarkable administrative reforms were initiated in the post-second world war period to bring the indigenous "tribal" groups into the mainstream of political activity in Jos, the predominance of Hausa influence remained. As a reaction to this trend, the Berom, "amidst enthusiasm and rejoicing" launched the Berom Tribal Council in 1932 (see Provincial Reports, 1936). The goal, predictably, was to assert Berom interest in the emergent political landscape and increase the bargaining powers of the
Berom vis-a-vis the colonial authorities who had appropriated Berom land for mining purposes.

3.4: ANTI-COLONIAL POLITICS AND RISING ETHNIC CONSCIOUSNESS
1945-1960

The one and a half decade from the end of the second imperialist world war to independence in October 1960, marked a different phase in the historical evolution of ethnic relations in Jos. Four important reasons, three of which are direct consequences of the war, and the intensification of anti-colonial activity which accompanied it can be identified for this. These are the economic hardships identified with the war and after; the emergence of party politics; the regionalisation policy in the North; and the rising political consciousness of the Berom who sought a new but more assertive role in the politics of Jos. All these impacted negatively on ethnic relations by increasing ethnic consciousness and fostering social distance among the important ethnic groups. In what follows, we attempt a brief outline of how each of these impacted on ethnic relations and ethnic identity formation in Jos. It is however important to remark here that the first three factors are intricately linked in their workings and production of effects.

We begin with the account of the war. Both expectations and frustrations followed the end of the war, all of which considerably heightened anxiety among the urban population. Wartime exigencies, to begin with, led to greater control and exploitation of the colonies by the metropolitan powers as more and more surplus had to be generated in order to meet war costs and demands. At the same time, the war disrupted existing pattern of international trade. One immediate consequence of this was the collapse in the buyer
markets of the prices of agricultural and other vital exports. Jos whose economic activity centred on the extraction and export of raw tin was severely affected as a result of downward trend in tin prices and the consequent retrenchment of hundreds of workers in the minefield (Freund, 1981). This set of people had no choice but to vent their spleen against the colonial authorities.

For the African veterans who fought in the war, the failure to pay them war bonuses and other largesse which had been promised drove them into the mainstream of anti-colonial movement. In addition to the general inflationary trend in the post-war economy, there was acute shortage of essential commodities. Jos was particularly hard hit by such shortages as people had to queue for food items which were rationed. The situation was to become more acute during the 1945 general strike which received massive support from workers in government departments such as the Post and Telecommunications (P&T) and the railways. Incidentally, most of them happened to be Igbo. This situation led to the heightening of anti-Igbo sentiments by the largely politically apathetic Northerners (Plotnicov, 1971).

As it is well known, the unfavourable socio-economic conditions in the post-war years, by and large, legitimised incipient nationalism and hence, increased the tempo of nationalist activity. The leading role of the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the most nationally organised political party and more importantly, the visibility of its leader, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, whose popularity across the country was indisputable after the end of the war appeared to give the Igbo the image of "trouble makers". Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, in particular played a prominent role in the mobilisation of the trade unions and
the success of the 1945 general strike which shook the entire colonial society to its foundation.

Indeed, the preponderance of the southern leadership of the nationalist movement and the Igbo leadership of the NCNC in particular, in a sense, confirmed the long time apprehension with which the colonial authorities held the western educated elites. It promoted, in no uncertain term, the anti-Igbo venom of the colonial officers. Such anti-Igbo sentiments equally ran high among the Northern elites and the aristocracy who were always haunted by the spectre of southern domination considering the relative disadvantage of the North in western educational achievement. The events of later years, especially 1953, associated with Anthony Enahoro's "independence now" motion were to lend credence to this view. This inexorably culminated in the Hausa-Igbo riots of October 1945.

In October 1945, in the potatoes market located at the present railway terminal, a disagreement occurred between two traders, one Ibo, the other Hausa. It drew the intervention of Alhaji Ma Dankali, the head of potatoe sellers in the market. While he sought peace, one Onyeama, a popular Ibo timber merchant, rather impatient ran to the scene to provoke a fight, ostensibly in defence of his Igbo kin. What followed was generalised anarchy as all Igbo became target of Hausa attack. The rumour that one Hausaman died following the initial attack heightened the sense of vengeance among the Hausas. The fighting lasted for two days during which two people lost their lives according to official account. A large amount of properties was damaged. The Igbo, particularly those who lived in the Native Town, were the worst victims.

Plotnicov (1971) identified three factors in explaining this early Nigerian disturbance which preceded the Igbo killings in Kano in 1956, and in most Northern cities
in the 1965/66 period. First, the increased contact and competition in Jos as a result of the presence of a large number of Igbo immigrants. Second, the dialectics of expectation and frustration, occasioned by the economic hardships that followed the second world war. Third, the rising political prominence of the Igbo considered as a threat by the Hausas. Plotnicov further suggests the complicity of the colonial officers, particularly the British Resident in Jos who was believed to have instigated the attack of the Hausa on the Igbo. It is within this wider context that one can understand why the incident assumed such a violent dimension following a minor misunderstanding between Hausa and Ibo traders in the potatoes market.

The aftermath of the riot was the further poisoning of inter-ethnic relations in the city. For example, the pervading sense of insecurity among the Igbo led to their mass exodus from Sarkin Arab ward in the Native Town to the Township thus, reinforcing the existing pattern of segmentation in ethnic residence. The Ibos took yet another step to ensure their own 'safety' and protection. They sought membership of the Township Advisory Council and the Native Town Council as well as representation as assessors in the Alkali office (Plotnicov, 1971). These were critical fora for engaging in mutual bargaining and compromise on behalf of the Igbo group. Above all, the Jos chapter of the Igbo State Union cautioned its members to be more circumspect and to refrain from behaviours which could expose their persons and properties to attack in future.

Admittedly, the war and the accompanying social dislocation contributed to the politicization of the people in the colonies. However, as part of this general politicization was the fact that it enhanced the possibility of group awareness and identity. In the case of Jos, the post-war period increased the political awareness of the Berom and the desire to
play a key role in the control of affairs in Jos. Thus, in 1945, the Berom Progressive Union (BPU) was formed as a successor to the Berom Tribal Council. Its primary aim was to unite the Berom and secure for them fair compensation from the mining companies for land over which they held leases. But as Billy Dudley (1968) has also suggested, the formation of this organization also had a political motivation considering their opposition to the Hausa dominated Jos Native Authority. As a result of persistent demand and agitation, the position of Chief of Berom was created in 1947; and Mr. Rwang Pam, hitherto a secretary in the Jos Native Authority was appointed to the position.

The reason behind this major concession is disputable. In one respect, it can be attributed to the rising political profile of the Berom which may have signaled their ascendency in Jos politics and society. In yet another respect, it could be interpreted as a politically calculated move by the NPC – controlled regional government to punish the Hausa community in Jos the majority of whom were supporters of NEPU. Paden (1986:344) subscribes to the view that this political undertone was instrumental to the support which the Sardauna gave to the Berom in establishing a chieftaincy as opposed to the established Hausa chief – Sarkin Jos, because the traditional Hausa community in Jos which was substantially made of migrants from Kano supported NEPU which was in alliance with the NCNC. This fact may be reinforced by the alliance between a faction of the UMBC which had Berom leadership and the NPC.

Though a concession to the Berom, the implication of the title - Chief of Berom - was clear: his authority was restricted to the Berom, a point that would become relevant in the subsequent contestation over identity and citizenship in Jos. Nevertherless, it was a land mark development in the sense that the establishment of the institution which metamorphosed into the Gbom Gwom, brought to an end, the reign of successive Sarkin
Hausawa in the Jos metropolis. With this development, Mr. Rwang Pam was to resign his position as the Treasurer of BPU, a post to which he had been elected in 1946.

The period of the late 1940s and the early 1950s generally witnessed increased tempo in political activities, evident in the formation of various political associations such as the Northern Nigerian Non-Muslim League (NNNL), the Middle Belt Zone League (MZL), and the Middle Belt Peoples' Party (MBPP). The Plateau was not just an active political belt. The Berom whose leaders expressed unease at the thought of rapid advancement of self-government at a time they were not in the position to produce enough professional men and artisans to claim all the positions of control in their division were the most agitated, and provided the political initiatives. However, the basis of the political activism of the Berom could be sought in the way in which their political economy was adversely altered by the tin industry and their direct opposition to the colonial state and the interests it propagated and entrenched. In other words, it was the tin economy and its adverse effect on Berom land and socio-economic well-being that radicalised them into play a leading role in these nascent political movements. As a mark of the growing militancy of the Berom at this point in time the senior Resident of Plateau Province noted the continued opposition to mining companies and their refusal to the Jemaa Resettlement Scheme which had been planned for them by the colonial authorities (Provinces Reports, 1952).

As it turned out, these political associations could not survive for long owing largely to internal friction over political alliances. However, the most important political development whose relevance is quite critical to our analysis was the struggle between the Hausa and the Berom for the control of the political destiny of Jos. Reflecting the rising political profile of the Berom, the Jos Native Authority was renamed Berom Native
Authority under the Chief of Berom in 1951. The Hausa representative on the Jos Town Council, Magarin Garin Jos, became the Vice-President of the council. He was sacked a year later as the political ascendancy of the Berom was getting confirmation. As a matter of fact, the Berom Tribal Council, acting on behalf of Berom Native Authority, sacked the Town Council, most likely because it had a vocal Hausa representation but was justified "on the ground of too many political intrigues". The need to checkmate the overbearing influence of the Hausa appeared to have featured more prominently in the political calculation of the Berom. Of course, the Provincial Report of 1952 qualified the council as "irresponsible and obstructive". Part of the problem was that the council was solely conceived as a platform of ethnic representation such that it became too wieldy to be effective. When it was constituted in 1950, it had a membership of eighty (Provincial Report, 1952).

These developments elicited a defiant opposition from the Hausa community in Jos who felt threatened by the attempt to "transfer" power to the Berom. The tension and later, violence generated by these events were alluded to in the 1953 Provincial Reports concerning the outbreak of minor disturbances. In 1954 the situation was reversed as the name of Jos Native Authority was restored. Even then, the representatives of the Hausa community demanded the removal of the Native Town where the Hausa predominated from the jurisdiction and influence of the Jos Native Authority. This demand was roundly rejected. The Chief of Berom who had been elevated to a second class status became the Chief of Jos the same year, an event that was devotedly celebrated by the Beroms. But this did not mark the end of power play and intrigues.

After failing in their demand to remove the Native Town from the jurisdiction of the Jos Native Authority, the Hausa, particularly partisans of the NPC, sought other ways
of undermining the influence of the Native Authority. Once more in 1954, they rejected a new constitution for Jos based on the report of the “Administration of Urban Areas” and even threatened to boycott the town council election of that year. It had to take the intervention of the Minister for Local Government Affairs to ensure their participation in the election. It should however be noted that the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), whose political philosophy challenged the conservative strand of the NPC in the North, and whose supporters did not make overt ethnic claims won a majority of seats on the Council (Provincial Reports, 1954).

The Hausa supporters of the NPC, in what appeared like a desperate bid, sought alliance with the Rukubas whom they convinced to demand excision from Jos Native Authority. A.T. Weatherhead, the Resident of Jos, noted in his 1956 report that agitation from Hausa elements continued against Jos Native Authority, including pressure on the Rukubas to demand a merger with Zaria Province. It reached such an alarming proportion that Bitrus Rwang Pam, son of the Chief of Jos, who was the general secretary of a faction of the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) sympathetic to the NPC, and at the same time the Divisional Secretary of Jos Native Authority had cause to warn the NPC national body to the effect that it should urge the local (Jos) NPC to desist from instigating the Rukubas to break away from Jos Native Authority (Dudley, 1968:96).

So pervasive was the trend which produced political consciousness along ethnic and regional lines in this period that even workers’ organization in the mine sector of the Jos economy succumbed. The first trade union to be formed in the mines, the Nigerian African Minesworkers Union (NAMU) ran into serious internal troubles following the 1948 strike. The strike ended with improvement in the working conditions of skilled workers who were preponderantly Igbo. After the resignation of its treasurer, Alhaji Isah
Mohammed on this account, NAMU ended in a split in 1952, but nevertheless remained under the leadership of non-Northerners.

However, as a result of the massive electoral support enjoyed by the NEPU in the 1954 elections, the NPC leadership accused the southern leadership of delivering workers to NEPU and worked assiduously to ensure the break away of northern workers. In the same year, with its support, Alhaji Isah Mohammed formed the Northern Minesworkers Union (NMU) with 75% Hausa membership, 14% as Beroms and other Northerners the remaining. NAMU which was not open to the membership of southerners was believed to enjoy the backing of the Northern Regional Government. By the same dynamics, when the Middle Belt Movement came into existence, the Berom broke away in 1958 to form the Berom Mines Workers Union. By 1961, three unions of minesworkers organized mainly along ethnic and separatist lines existed in the mines (Mangwvat and Gonyok, 1981).

From the foregoing, the significance of the colonial period for formation of ethnic identity in Jos is indisputable. The most critical aspect is the differential manner in which the colonial state related to different ethnic and cultural groups expressed in the segregated settlement policy and mode of integration into the colonially-induced economic and administrative systems. But more fundamental is the fact that the colonial state deliberately fostered ethnic and regional differences among the people as a part of the stratagem of divide and rule, while socio-economic scarcity threw up ethnic associations as rallying points of group solidarity.

It is the same colonial context that explains the salience of Hausa ethnicity and the attempts by the "indigenous" ethnic /communal groups to develop what they consider
appropriate responses. But more significant, is the emergence over time, of clear ethnic patterns in the development of occupation, trade and commerce which have important consequences for the contestations over citizenship rights and identity.

What is obvious and which has been fairly demonstrated in this chapter is the way in which the colonial experience in general and the colonial state in particular contributed to the shaping of ethnic identity in urban Jos. In particular, the concern of the colonial state for law and order, or for the native question dictated the form of governance and civic engagement. The imposition of the Native Authority system and the undue influence and visibility given to the Hausa residents in Jos, for example, is at the root of the disaffection and unhealthy relationship between them and the indigenous ethnic population. The next chapter deals with the organizational forms taken by the pursuit of ethnic interests in urban situations. The next chapter, therefore, focuses on ethnic associational life which provides the framework for the pursuit of group interest and for shaping group identity as well as negotiating power relations between the different ethnic groups.
CHAPTER FOUR

ETHNIC ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN JOS

METROPOLIS

4.0: INTRODUCTION

From the arche-typal "tribal" and ethnic unions that flourished in the colonial era, Jos has continued to experience a very rich and robust tradition of ethnic associational life. The formation of ethnic and welfare associations is prevalent among all the ethnic and cultural groups in the city. Ethnic associational life is a vital component of the expression of ethnic and cultural identity that needs to be studied at the concrete level rather than engaging in the \textit{a priori} determination of its character and dynamics. However, in the context of the revival of the previously dormant ethnic associations and the founding of new ones, in response to the increasingly complex socio-economic and political dynamics of urban life, there is a need to relate the analysis of ethnic associations to the wider discourse of civil society.

In so doing, it should be borne in mind that the greater significance lies in the realm of construction and affirmation of ethnic group identity. The invocation of ethnic identity and the accompanying politics of exclusion which directly relates to the problematic of citizenship is more often than not, a consequence of group awareness and interests. The point, however, needs to be established as to the relevance in the exercise which attempts to link the discourse on ethnic networks and associational life to civil society and urban politics.
Relating our discussion of ethnic associational life to the problematic of civil society could be considered legitimate for a number of reasons. First, is the fact that inter-ethnic relations in the last two decades or so has been impacted upon by the dynamics of the economic crisis and adjustment on the one hand, and authoritarian rule on the other. Second, ethnic and kin-based associations form a major component of the resurgence of civil society in the era marked by economic decline, adjustment and authoritarian rule. Despite their tendency to be ‘uncivil’, they provide the framework for the pursuit of group interests and identity formation. But even more fundamentally, despite the formal definition of their roles as non-partisan, and the promotion of “culture”, they are involved in politics and the power process in several ways. For example, they provide organizational platform that facilitates political alliances during elections. They also provide a more or less structured avenue through which the state deals with the various groups during periods of disorder as was the case during the April 12, 1994 crisis in the Jos metropolis. As it became obvious during the ethno-religious violence of September 7, 2003, ethnic and cultural organizations became platforms of contestation and communal mobilization.

This chapter discusses ethnic associational life in the Jos metropolis, especially in the post-colonial period and how this is related to the way in which the different ethnic groups concerned in this study pursue their interests through the construction and imagining of group identity. The critical issue here is the role played by ethnic associations in the construction of identity and the definition of relevant “others”. It examines the question of ethnic associational life as a component of the emergent civil society in Jos. The fact that ethnic associations play pivotal roles in negotiating power relations between
groups and in the relationship between groups and the state make them a relevant category to study in the politics of identity.

The focus of this chapter, therefore, is the examination of ethnic associational life among the key ethnic groups such as the Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, Beroms, Anaguta and Afizere. This chapter seeks to address the nature and character of ethnic associational life and how it is linked to the discourse of civil society. It thus examines how the pursuit of interests through ethnic movements impacts on inter-ethnic relations, the construction of group identity in general and ultimately how such a sense of group identity and consciousness has implications for the contestation over citizenship rights.

4.1: ETHNIC ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND URBAN POLITICS

It is important, first, to establish the link between civil society and ethnic associational life. The concept of civil society has made a very strong re-entry into African political discourses. Civil society together with concepts such as democratic governance or "good governance", to use a phrase which is more appealing to the technocrats of the World Bank, has become such powerful and persuasive discourse forcing die-hard dictators to succumb to the pressures of multi-party, competitive politics and the respect for human rights. And it should be instructive that the re-emergence of the concept has occurred at the time of the so-called "African Renaissance" and when the popular agitation for the "second liberation" or the "second independence" movement has gained tremendous grounds. The significance of the idea of civil society in contemporary discourses stems from the fact that it presents an opportunity to redefine the public sphere in relation to authoritarian forms of rule and the wider struggle for the respect for human rights and the preservation of civil and political liberties of the citizens.
The concept of civil society is a very old one. It received the attention of a number of political philosophers ranging from Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel to Marx, Herbamas and Gramsci. Few concepts in the social sciences have such a deep historical and philosophical heritage. Yet, more than any other concept, it is deeply immersed in a definitional crisis which is reflected in the diverse usages to which the concept is put. This is widely recognized in the literature (Azarya, 1994; Young, 1994; Bayart, 1986; Harbeson, 1994). A general point of agreement, however, is that the domain of the state is empirically and analytically distinct from that of (civil) society. For Gramsci for instance, it refers to "those intermediary and autonomous organizations which function and sometimes flourish in the large and loosely bounded zone between organized sovereign authority and the family unit" (Quoted in Young, 1994). In a more direct effort to give character to the activities of organizations alluded to by Gramsci, Bratton (1994:52) suggests that the concept “embodies a core of universal beliefs and practices about the legitimation of, and limits to, state power". What emerges is the consensus that the non-state domain and activities, especially of associational life, whose goals are either to limit the power of the state or ensure autonomous reproduction of socio-economic and political life constitutes civil society.

Although there exists a consensus that the essence of “civil” as opposed to 'political' society is not to supersede the state, there appears to be two major strands in the discourse on civil society. One strand seeks to explore the interface between civil society and democratisation. A very popular assumption derived from the western experience is that civil society is necessarily defined in terms of opposition to the state. The essence of civil society, we are then told, is to seek a constructive engagement with the state, and to challenge it to curb its excesses that seek to constrict the social, political and cultural
spaces necessary for the realization of the human essence or the dignity of the human person. In this situation, in which according to Hirschman (1970), discontented elements vote for the "voice" rather than the "exit" option, civil society is strongly correlated to democratisation. What this perspective seems to ignore is that even in the western tradition, the relationship between state and civil society is a dialectical and complex one. Indeed, in the Hegelian conception of the civil society, it cannot be fully autonomous of the state for while on the one hand, it is the "soft under-belly" of a capitalist society, useful for manufacturing consent and legitimacy for the state, on the other, it can provide the basis for a counter-hegemonical and even revolutionary, challenge to the state.

The other strand in the discourse on civil society, which largely derived from the African experience, does not pose the problematic of the relationship between state and civil society in oppositional terms. Rather, it suggests the inter-penetration of the two levels. It is even a possibility that civic organisations may flourish without necessarily being directly related to the expansion of the frontiers of democracy. For example, as Fatton (1995) reminds us civil society can be 'uncivil', especially under conditions of acute crisis and adjustment as found in contemporary Africa (See also Gyimah-Boadi, 1996). This dimension is necessary in dealing with the African situation because of the diverse character of civil society and the different tendencies, divisions and tensions within it.

Some have objected to the inclusion of ethnic and religious associations as part of civil society on the grounds that their demands are not only exclusive, but in some instances seek to negate and even annihilate the state itself. This objection is understandable because derived from the western experience is the notion that civil society should lead to the emergence of "civility", itself, derived from the notion of a common good on which there is minimum consensus. Even if one were to be bound by this view, it
is still in order to accept ethnic and religious social movements as essential components of
civil society in-so-far as their existence is helpful in checkmating the excesses and
totalising claims of the state. In the context of anti-colonial struggle, ethnic social
movements formed the basis of political organisations. Demands articulated by such
movements such as justice, equality and self-determination are democratic in content
(Nnoli, 1994). Furthermore, what is usually described as Nigeria's strong tradition of civil
society is the inherently diverse and pluralistic socio-cultural configurations, of which
ethnic and cultural groupings are essential components.

Although the vibrant and dynamic associational life associated which this has failed
to prevent the descent of the country into military dictatorship and praetorianism, the
recognition of this pluralism has nevertheless been useful in serving as a kind of restraint
on successive regimes, including military dictatorships. Even in situations in which these
associations are not involved in challenging the state as such, they bring to bear on the state
policy-making process diverse demands and pressures that the state in turn must respond
to. Some of these pressures may border on the allocating power of the state.

Contemporary experience has further shown that proliferation of ethnic associations
has been necessitated by the need to secure a social and cultural space from the post-
colonial state in decay. It is even more so in the context of economic crisis and adjustment.
Bangura (1992) and Ake (1993) have shown that responses to the authoritarianism thrown
up by this process often take an ethnic form. Associational life is thus dominated by
traditional, ascriptive and kin-based groups as people attempt to flee from the improvident
and increasingly predatory state, and seek refuge in kin-based or religious organizations
(Gyimah-Boadi, 1996). It might, therefore, be rewarding to study ethnic and kin-based
organisations in urban situations in terms of the emergent civil society, responding to the
needs of their members in several ways. This could be for the purpose of mediating between their members and the state, delivering social security functions as a result of the paucity created by the retreat of the state, as coping mechanisms against the deleterious impact of the economic crisis and adjustment or even ministering to the cultural needs of members.

The overall consequence of this for all the facets of the political economy has been quite dramatic. The whittling of state legitimacy was accompanied by other problems such as the alteration in the balance of state-society relationships. In the urban areas, in particular, where continued rural-urban drift had led to more and more concentration of ethnically and culturally diverse populations, competition for diminishing resources and public goods assumed ethnic dimensions. The impact of this on the character of civic associations has been acknowledged by several watchers of the African political economy as alluded to above. What we see are "movements of rage" and backlashes of the adjustment which are expressed in the spate of urban violence (See Otite and Albert, 1999 for instance).

That associational life appears to be predominantly kin-based is to be understood in the peculiar character of the ethnic question. It is not just the emotional anchorage provided by ethnic identity. Under conditions of economic failure and a punitive adjustment programme under the aegis of the Bank and the Fund, authoritarianism is, among others, the obvious political consequence. And as Ake (1993) reminds us ethnic formations serve as a very significant counter-veiling force, providing a separate space against the totalising tendencies of the post-colonial state.

The extant literature makes allusion to the link between ethnic associational life and the pursuit of ethnic interests, whether socially constructed, imagined or real. In this regard,
Abner Cohen (1969) was the first to adumbrate the view that ethnic and kinship-based associations do provide the organisational platform for the pursuit of such interests. This much is clearly demonstrated in his classic on migrant Hausa community in Ibadan, who through the manipulation of customs, values, myths, symbols and ceremonials, articulates an informal political organisation as a weapon of struggle. In the same vein, Enloe (1973) and Bates (1983), among others, locate associational ethnicity within the interest group framework.

Osaghae (1994b) would not go as far as suggesting that associational ethnicity implies that the ethnic group as a whole is in competition, but sees them as "formal or informal organisations that seek to further the interests of members of the group in competition with the other over determination of public policy". Osaghae (1990; 1994b) further draws attention to the fact that, in some instances, there may be no such a monolithic ethnic agenda to be prosecuted by ethnic organisations on behalf of all the members of the ethnic groups. Other cleavages such as class and gender may provide sources of internal tension and division. This point, as will be revealed later, is true of associational life among the different ethnic communities in Jos. What is, however, important is that they pursue a variety of interests which are not necessarily defined in ethnic terms. While some have their primary pre-occupation as cultural revival especially in contexts in which their dominant cultural values face threats of extinction from other more powerful ones, others pursue political interests or the promotion of economic wellbeing of members.

It is useful in the present context however, to link the discussion of ethnic associational life as integral element of the civil society to the current economic crisis and the specific urban dimension of the crisis of social reproduction, especially as thrown up by
the policies of the structural adjustment programme. The massive devaluation of the Nigerian currency, for example, has taken a heavy toll on the real wages. Also the prevailing situation of urban unemployment became worsened by the retrenchment occasioned by the imperative of “minimum government” as well as the contraction of industrial production as a result of the dramatic rise in the cost of imported raw materials and spare parts denominated in foreign currency. Matters are not helped by the demand management policies of the adjustment programme that have signalled further deterioration in the provision of social services such as health, education and housing.

The dramatic impact of the economic crisis and the adjustment programme on the ethnic question is well captured in a number of works (Osaghae, 1995; Egwu, 1998). Osaghae (1995: 46) points to the profound impact of these twin moments on ethnicity at both the personal and group levels as follows:

At the inter-personal level there was the heightening of ethnic consciousness as many people fell back on their ethnic and kinship connections to secure employment or retain their jobs, to get loans or aid to begin small or medium scale businesses, or even get money for food, buy drugs, pay school fees, and meet other essential needs. The heightening of ethnic consciousness and the interests begotten uses to which it was put was clearly manifested in the rising profiles of ethnic associations in towns and cities. Not only was there an upsurge in the membership of these associations and enthusiasm for their organisations.....there was a rapid expansion in their number, variety and purpose.

The state of ethnic associational life provides further empirical justification for the claims made by Osaghae as captured in the quote above. It also lends additional credence to his observations concerning the emergent patterns of ethnic associational life occasioned by the aftermath of the crisis and adjustment. These include the rise in the number of educated men and women who play active and visible roles in the various ethnic (social)
movements, and the proliferation of more modern and status enhancing youth and social organisations alongside or in place of conservative ethnic associations.

Thus, akin to the socio-economic scarcity and insecurity unleashed by the colonial policies that accounted for the initial upsurge in ethnic and town unions, the crisis of the 1980s and the 1990s account for the exponential increase in the number of ethnic social movements and associational life. In response to the present crisis the trend has been the continued re-invention of previously known forms of ethnic associational life which play a critical role in the efforts of the different groups to either relate to the state for maximum group benefits, or to be used as organisational platform in the struggle for advantages. The tendency for many of them to undertake social and welfare services abandoned by the state, or provide sources of credit to distressed members lends strong credence to the claim by Barakan et. al. (1991) that they are critical in creating local capital and functioning as "shadow" or "alternative" states in the provision of amenities and social services.

It is also significant to point out that in the fluid socio-economic context defined by market reforms and the implementation of unpopular policies, the state may find ethnic associations as effective mediatory mechanisms or instruments of control over a restive urban populace. In fact, given the increasing spate of urban violence largely in response to the deleterious consequences of adjustment, the state may find ethnic associations very useful in managing inter-ethnic and communal violence. As will be shown later in the chapter, the communal violence of April 12, 1994 provided immediate impetus for the re-invigoration of some ethnic associations as the government found it expedient to maintain peace through the leadership of the various ethnic organizations.

Nevertheless, ethnic associational life, whether limited to the pursuit of cultural revival, the development of the "home town," or expanded to include socio-economic and
political advancement of the group in question, is central to the construction or imagining of group identity. The significant point is that they set boundaries at the level of group identity even in the context of trans-ethnic solidarity and other forms of cross-cutting civic engagements. Such boundary setting and group identity may become the relevant basis for the identification of "otherness" in some competitive situations. While their transformation into the kind of civil society concerned with the public space and the struggle for democracy is not precluded, it is important to take urban ethnic social movements for what they are.

4.2: ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AND ETHNICITY AMONG THE HAUSA IN JOS

The Hausa constitute a dominant ethnic and cultural group in Jos much in the same way they exert enormous cultural influence all over West Africa through the formation of a formidable 'commercial diaspora' (Lovejoy, 1980). With specific reference to Jos as has been shown so far, Hausa ethnicity has remained a strong contending factor in politics and the entire social life. This is partly related to the historical fact of the long history of presence of a very vibrant Hausa community in commerce, the provision of labour for the tin industry and the dominant position in the politics of Jos, especially in the early phase of its development. For this very historical reason, the Hausa community lays claim to the “indigeneity” of Jos, a point which pitches them against the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta in direct competition in terms of access to resources and opportunities in the city.

Although Hausa associational life in Jos is expressed in different forms and styles aimed at fostering a sense of commonness and preservation of ethnic and cultural identity, the formation of JASSAWA Development Association (JDA) in 1983 is, by far, the most organised representation Hausa associational life. It started as JASSAWA Youth
Association formed by youths who were mainly students. The name JASSAWA is a Hausa self-explanatory adjective which by implication refers to the Hausa community in Jos, although its membership is broadly and loosely defined to include, according to some Hausa informants, all those who are discriminated against by the ‘so-called’ indigenes (Interview: Hassan Wayo and Hussaini Wayo, 10/9/1997). Despite the fact that the association was decidedly founded as a vehicle for promoting the communal interests of the Hausa community in Jos, the constitution of the association adopted in 1987 states that membership is open to all residents in Jos irrespective of ethnic and religious affiliations.

Prior to metamorphosing from a students’ organization that it was initially into JDA in 1983, what existed was a Hausa community committee of Elders/Leaders that held regular meetings to protect and advance the interests of their members. In 1987, the JDA formalized its activities when it adopted a constitution stating clearly the objectives and membership of, as well as the offices to be held in the association. Although the objectives of the association are generally defined as promoting development and self-help among members, it plays a very crucial role in fostering a common sense of identity among members and, more importantly, it plays active roles in the politics and civil life in Jos city. Despite the claim that membership is open to all, the bulk of the membership is predominantly, if not exclusively, “Hausa/Fulani” residents in Jos.

It is however, difficult to capture the dynamics and complexity of associational life among the Hausa in Jos without a much clearer understanding of the nature, character and, if possible, the content of Hausa ethnicity. This is necessary for at least two reasons. In the first place, it is not all those who claim and invoke Hausa ethnic identity that are Hausa by either linguistic designation or blood. The second is what may be described as the "imperial" character of Hausa ethnicity and its non-diffusionist nature into the host
community. It might be necessary to elaborate on each of these two points for the purpose of emphasis.

Hausa ethnicity appears to be the most dynamic, fluid and situational of all known ethnics. According to Adamu, the criteria of 'Hausaness' are broad and include, among others, historical claims, cultural traits, and social values as well as language and religion. Of these, Islam has been identified as a "powerful social landmark in the acculturating frontier of the Hausa both at home and in migration" (Adamu, 1978:3). While those who are Hausa by descent but have lost the ability to speak the language can claim the identity, it can also be conferred on those who are not Hausa through ties of blood having embraced the Islamic religion. In fact, so crucial is the Islamic religion that it forms the basis of distinction between the Maguzawa that have either retained their "pagan" rites and religion on the one hand, and Muslim Hausa or "Wurinsallah" on the other.

Other eminent scholars such as Paden (1967, 1970, 1973) and Miles (1994) seem to accept this view of Hausa ethnicity and provide further elaboration. Paden in particular demonstrates how Hausa identity has extended to areas outside of Hausaland and to non-Hausa ethnic groups through acculturation and assimilation; travel and migration; and the widespread use of Huasa as a lingua franca. The conclusion he reaches is rather profound, namely, that “Hausa ethnicity has become largely affiliational. By an act of will, a person can choose to speak Hausa, become a muslim (perhaps nominal), and claim to be a Hausa” (1973: 380).

It is important to point out that very central to Hausa ethnic associational life is the use of social networks built on the basis of Hausa language and fostered by ties of Islam to promote economic, social and cultural interests of members. This is often much more
simplified by the spatial dimension to Hausa ethnic identity as their residence tends to be more or less segregated. As Paul Lovejoy (1980:3) has perceptively observed in his study of Hausa commercial diaspora in West Africa, Hausa language and Islamic religion evolved a culture which transcended political and regional boundaries, relying on a unifying ideology which was essential to business operations and the guarantee of credits. In this way, he argues further, ethnicity was further equated with class so that to be Hausa along the trade routes presupposed certain occupations, particularly merchants, professionals and craftsmen.

One very strong inference that can be drawn from the foregoing, and which is quite useful in the Jos case, is that several of those conferred with Hausa ethnicity today were not originally Hausa, that is, by birth or consanguinity. For while it is true that a preponderance of original Hausa settlers in Jos came form Kano, Sokoto and Katsina, several other migrants were of Nupe, Kanuri and Bargirmi and Kerikeri origins. The tendency for them to be concentrated in one section of the town, based on the unifying force of Islam, formed them into a single community whose interests were based on trade, drawing on the vast transportation and credit networks from Kano (Balarabe, 1992). Besides, other migrants drawn from minority ethnic groups such as the Igala and Ebira who subscribed to the Islamic faith were over the years absorbed into the rather more flexible Hausa ethnic and cultural identity. It is thus always the case that third and fourth generations of such migrants have their previous ethnic identity dissolved into the Hausa community.

Nevertheless, the most significant aspect of the activities of JDA in Jos today is the struggle for the rights of the “Hausa/Fulani” community in Jos, not only as citizens of the Nigerian state, but, more critically, as “indigenes” of Jos based on their effective residency which predated formal colonial rule. It is important to restate the obvious fact that the
formation of JDA in the early 1980s was motivated by the need to resist what was increasingly perceived by the “Huasa/Fulani” as their marginalisation in the political and civil life of Jos. They believe that the civilian administration under Chief Solomon Lar in the Second Republic with its slogan of emancipation, had a grand design to exclude the “Hausa/Fulani” community from participation in the politics of Jos. The renewed demand for new local governments and districts in the late 1980s, led to the revival and formalisation of the activity of JDA, with the formal adoption of a constitution.

In addition to the allegation that the pioneer president of JDA, Alhaji Saleh Hassan, urged the “Hausa/Fulani” community in Jos to retrieve the leadership of Jos from the combined forces of the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere, and that he and the president at the time of the April 12 incident, Alhaji Yahaya Aga Abubakar, incited JASSAWA youths to embark on a violent demonstration, many of those who testified before the Commission of Inquiry set up following the April 12, 1994 carnage on the platform of JDA, reiterated the point that a pre-condition for peace in Jos, was the restoration of the “Hausa/Fulani” to a pre-eminent position in the social and political life of Jos. This, perhaps, illustrates the point that JDA plays more or less overtly political life, and has no pretension about what ought to be the position of the “Hausa-Fulani” community in Jos.

On the basis of the foregoing, therefore, it can be suggested that associational life among the Hausa community is largely dictated by the need to forge solidarity for the purpose of engaging the state and other groups perceived to have interest in excluding the Hausa from participating in the political and civil life of Jos. This, perhaps, explains the vanguard role played by JDA in the events that led to the outbreak of the April 12, 1994 “riots” in Jos, and other numerous cases of agitation to resist and challenge the marginalization of the Hausa community.
4.3: ETHNIC ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AMONG THE YORUBA

For the first time, the Yorubas in Jos established associational life at a pan-ethnic level with the election on October 1, 1998 of Chief Solomon Olugbodi as the Oba of Yoruba. It definitely marks a new chapter in the promotion of Yoruba communal life and solidarity in the fluid political and social context that had been the case since the resurgence of ethnic identity in urban areas since the 1980s. However, it must be seen as the final consummation of the exigency of migrant empire building among the Yorubas in the city resulting from the changing dynamics of inter-ethnic relations. In several respect, the Yorubas share the experience of several other ethnic groups in this "invention of tradition".

Although it took the Yorubas in Jos several decades to establish the "Obaship" institution in Jos, associational life, though relatively domant, had always thrived among Yoruba from the beginning of their migration into Jos. The Ogbomosho Parapo (descendants of Ogbomosho), established as far back as 1932, is the best known example of ethnic associational life among the Yorubas in Jos prior to the creation of additional states which had the additional effect of establishing a new territorial basis of organization of such associational life. To a large extent, the objectives and goals of this organization provide some insight into the nature of associational life among the other Yoruba groups in Jos.

The emergence of early associational life among the Ogbomosho should not be surprising considering the fact that Yoruba of Ogbomosho extraction were among the earliest and, perhaps, the most numerically significant of the Yoruba migrants in Jos. It is well known that Ogbomosho Yoruba constitute a powerful network in the ‘diaspora’ which
makes their presence in Jos an established pattern. Pa Adeshina, 68, from Ogbomosho who admitted that his father was among the first set of Yoruba to settle in Jos also supported this position (Interview: 10/8/1995).

Ogbomosho Parapo is the typical ‘traditional’ type of urban ethnic organization, established primarily to enhance solidarity and social interaction among the descendants of Ogbomosho and its environments in Jos. The Constitution, Rules and Regulations of the Parapo states two primary aims and objectives. One, to foster mutual understanding among all Ogbomosho descendants resident in the Plateau Province; and, two, to help morally and financially, any member in difficulty, and for the progress and stability of Ogbomosho generally. Thus, in addition to the broad objectives, the development of the "home town" is a core element in the pursuit of the Parapo. According to Pa Adeshina, the major achievement of the association is the promotion of development in Ogbomosho and the surrounding villages. These include the building of numerous secondary schools and, more recently, the establishment of the Ladoke Akintola University in Ogbomosho under the military presidency of General Ibrahim Babangida (Interview: Pa Adeshina, 10/8/1995). The Independent Club in Jos and the Ogbomosho Parapo Hall situated at Dilimi street were established and built by the organization.

As a group, the Yoruba value peaceful co-existence with their host communities as well as integration into such communities. Not unexpectedly, Reconciliation Committee is one of the prominent committees of Ogbomosho Parapo. This is explained by the urbane nature of the Yoruba and the high propensity to move into urban centres in pursuit of trade, commerce and the numerous skills and professions which their early access to western education provide them.
Religion is hardly a factor in the construction of Yoruba identity for purely historical reasons. Islam had been a strong social factor in Yorubaland since the collapse of the Old Oyo empire when the religion made incursions into the heartland of the Yorubas in the first quarter of the 19th century. This, together with the equally forceful influence of Christianity from the middle of the 19th century made Yorubaland a zone of cultural contestation, only in the search of a healthy rivalry between converts to the two religions. The response to the two religions, for the Yoruba, appeared more like a response to new opportunities, as opposed to a form of identity that pervasive influence on social and political life of the people. Consequently, religious differences have no profound effect of whittling down Yoruba sense of identity.

Despite a strong presence of Yoruba Muslims in Jos and the sense of brotherhood pervading the adherents to the religious belief, the Yoruba have maintained a distinct ethnic identity within the Islamic faith. This is evident in the existence of separate praying grounds and mosques for the Yoruba. One Yoruba elder interviewed suggested two reasons for this state of affairs. Yoruba Muslims resist the leadership position assumed by the Hausa based on a ‘superior’ claim to the Islamic religion. The second explanation lies in the differences in the disposition of Yoruba and Hausa Muslim leaders in the city. The former appears to be opposed to the attitude adopted by the latter in respect of proselytisation which favours reliance on external funding for the building of mosques, especially from the Middle East. He suggested that philanthropists within the Yoruba Muslim community in Jos such as Chief Owoduni strongly favour voluntary contributions from well-to-do members.
The recent establishment of the “Obaship” institution among the Yoruba in Jos in the mold of reproducing Yoruba traditional type of leadership is a remarkable feature of the existing trends in migrant empire building. According to Pa Adeshina, this was never the pre-occupation of members of Ogbomosho group resident in Jos. Even though there had been suggestions among opinion leaders and other influential groups during successive military administrations, no serious consideration was given to the idea. The rapid change of opinion which led to the construction of Yoruba ‘empire’ in recent times, therefore, can be explained in terms of the changing dynamics of urban life.

Among others, the most outstanding explanation was the perceived threat to the entire Yoruba race represented by the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections. The annulment effected with the executive fiat of Nigeria’s military president, General Ibrahim Babangida, aborted the presidency of Chief MKO Abiola, who was widely believed to have won the election. In addition to being Yoruba, Chief Abiola held the title of Are Onakakanfo (the generalismo of 19th century Yoruba army) of Yorubaland, the modern-day symbolic representation of the most powerful figure of the land. The ethnic reactions to the annulment, especially the groundswell of opposition in the south-west, raised new fears about threats to the Yoruba race and civilization. This, in no small way, led to the desire to rebuild unity and solidarity among the Yoruba.

However, the more immediate impetus to the revival of communal solidarity among the Yoruba was the ethnic tension that built up leading to the outbreak of violence on April 12, 1994. Although the Yoruba as a group were not directly involved in the ethnic alliances and confrontations of April 12, Yoruba commercial interest was threatened in the orgy of violence and looting in the Jos main market. According to Pa Adeshina, in the efforts to
restore peace and mutual trust and confidence among the various communal groups, the then Military Administrator of Plateau State summoned a meeting of opinion leaders of the different groups. Following the meeting during which he and other elders represented the Yoruba community, there was renewed call for a pan-ethnic organization among the Yoruba in Jos.

With the “Obaship” institution in place and the first Oba installed, the first of November every year has been set aside as the Yoruba day in Jos. It is a day set aside for the promotion of Yoruba communal life and solidarity. The significance of this development is that it signaled the emergence of a truly pan-Yoruba ethnic organization that attempts to fill the vacuum that hitherto existed. Its function in the increasingly volatile context of inter-ethnic relations in Jos is to promote unity among people of Yoruba descent and to enhance the prospect of harmonious existence with the other ethno-cultural groups. It is, however, not a replacement for thriving associational among the various sub-Yoruba groups such as the Ogbomosho, Owo, Ijebu, Egba, and other sub-Yoruba groups and Development Associations on the basis of the five Yoruba states in the south-west of Nigeria.

4.4: ETHNIC ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AMONG THE IGBO

On May 4, 1996, amidst fanfare, pomp and peagantry inside the Jos Township Stadium, the community of Igbo migrants on the Plateau defied the scorching sun to install the first Eze Igbo, Igwe Joseph Ejimbe (snr). This typical example of "invention of tradition" was celebrated as a landmark event as attested to by the elaborate ceremony that heralded the installation at the Jos Township Stadium, attended by a number of leading Igbo business, educated and political elites. In attendance were Igbo Ministers in the
cabinet of the then military Head of State, General Sani Abacha¹. The Eze Igbo institution which had been established earlier on November 27, 1993 is the traditional arm of Igbo Cultural Union, the re-emerged pan-Ibo ethnic movement. The holder of the office becomes the custodian of Igbo culture as well as handling and mediating disputes with other ethnic communities. This aspect of ethnic associational life typical of many urban areas is what Osaghae (1994) describes as "migrant ethnic empire building". For the Igbo, it is a strategy of recreating their ‘traditional’ life in places where they are domiciled while at the same time integrating into the host community.

The revival of associational life among the Igbo after the civil war culminating into the events described immediately above shows that they are one of the most significant ethnic and cultural groups in Jos with a vibrant and robust associational life. This is not surprising given that as a group with a strong sense of competition and industry, and always on the move, they have used associational life both as a mechanism of adaptation to the realities of urban life, for developing the "home town", for promoting harmonious relationship with the host community, and for creatively engaging the state wherever they find themselves.

However, the revival of ethnic associational life among the Igbo in Jos is quite recent. It followed a prolonged period of dormancy which started with the breakdown of the democratic process in 1966 up to the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The specific socio-economic and political context for the re-emergence of a pan-Igbo ethnic movement provides some useful insight into the dynamics of ethnic associational life in the urban areas. But more importantly, it brings into bolder relief, the coincidence between the

¹Dr. Walter Ofonagoro, General Sani Abacha's Minister of Information was present with all the glamour. There was also the presence of Chief Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Ikemba of Nnewi whose
deepening economic crisis and the unpalatable consequences of market reforms as well as the pressures unleashed by democratisation on the one hand, and the resurgence of ethnic associational life on the other.

Prior to the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war, the Igbo in Jos had one of the most vibrant ethnic movements (Plotnicov, 1967; 1970). For instance, the Igbo Union which had been in existence from the 1940s up to the time of the first military coup when, it was, along with other "tribal" organisations proscribed, drew support from a wide spectrum of the numerous Igbo resident in the city. However, following their return to the city at the end of war they had a lukewarm attitude to reviving the union. As one prominent leader of the community explained, the pre-occupation at the end of the war was the economic rehabilitation and re-integration of individual members (Meka, 1996:13).

The re-birth of a pan-ethnic organisation among the Igbos, the Igbo Cultural Union as it is known today, was not formally achieved until December 11, 1993. This was preceded by a number of efforts, some episodic and others, partially successful, after the initial period of dormancy and inertia. One of such efforts was undertaken by one Mr. J. Ugafor between 1972-1973. Expectedly, his efforts came to grief because of the primary concern for survival and anxiety which followed the social and economic dislocation of the Igbo during the three year gruesome fratricidal war.

Again, following the lifting of the ban on political activities in 1978 as a part of the transition to civil rule programme of the General Olusegun Obasanjo administration, renewed efforts were made to organise a pan-Igbo organisation. It appeared from all indications that these efforts were in response to the immense opportunity provided by the new atmosphere of political liberalisation, which to a large extent shows the link between ambition for the highest title in Ibo land has never been in doubt.
politics and ethnic social movements of this nature. In particular the return of party politics created the need for a platform for the Igbo community in Jos to mobilise support for leading Igbo politicians like the late Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Chief Sam Mbakwe and Chief Jim Nwobodo to mention just a few.

Apart from the fact that the presidential ambition of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe required the mobilisation of support at least among the Igbo in Jos, many town unions with their main thrust as the development of the "home town" wield tremendous political influence back home, with a high stake in the governance of their state of origin. It was therefore not surprising that it needed the return of electoral politics to rekindle interest in the establishment of a pan-ethnic organisation.

Thus, on February 10, 1980, one Chief S. A. Ike, through own initiative, launched the Igbo Cultural Union in Owerri Hall. This personal initiative did achieve the purpose of creating a platform of mobilising support for the leading Igbo politicians of the Second Republic. Expectedly, the collapse of the second democratic experiment in December 1983 sounded the death knell of the Union. It was not until 1986 that renewed efforts which yielded dividend in the eventual establishment of Igbo Cultural Union, started as a result of the tireless efforts of Chief C. C. O. Meka.

The Igbo community in Jos has every reason to thank Chief Meka for the re-birth of their cultural organisation. Chief Meka, an accomplished pharmacist, moved into Jos from Lagos in 1956, and had been a prominent leader of the defunct Igbo Union. His initiative followed the failure of another initiative that was commenced a year earlier in 1985 when a group of Igbo leaders in Jos set up a 25-man committee with representation from each of the then three Igbo speaking states of Anambra, Imo and Bendel. The Committee had a
representation of ten each from Anambra and Imo, while Bendel had five representatives reflecting the strength of the Igbo community from the state. This effort proved futile as a result of internal conflicts, intrigues and lack of a common purpose (Meka, 1996).

And it was against this background that Chief Meka raised a Committee of "Igbo Leaders of Thought" which comprised 23 representatives from the Igbo speaking states. It was the meeting of these leaders at Owerri Hall on February 25, 1986 that gave birth to Igbo Cultural Union. At this formative stage, the "Igbo Leaders of Thought" which functioned as an interim executive committee was based on state representation. While Anambra and Imo States were represented by eleven members each, Bendel State had six representatives. The Constitution of Igbo Union was approved in 1988.

However, elections into the Central Executive Committee of Igbo Union were not held until 1993. This followed persistent pressures from the rank and file of the membership, and a number of futile attempts at holding elections. The Central Committee has retained the principle of state representation with the additional modification of equal state representation. Presently, the five Ibo-speaking states of Abia, Anambra, Enugu, Delta, Ebonyi and Imo have six representatives each on the Central Executive Committee. The election into the central executive council paved the way for election into the office of Eze Igbo of Jos which was held in 1995, while the coronation ceremony for the eventual winner was performed in May 1996 with Ezeh Joseph Ejimbe as the first Eze Igbo of Jos.

The profile of personalities that are members of the "Igbo Leaders of Thought" as well as those who competed for the coveted office of the Eze Igbo of Jos appear to lend strong credence to Osaghae's (1995) point about the increasing role of middle class and petty bourgeois elements in contemporary urban ethnic associational life. Many of them
belong to the cream of society reflecting diverse backgrounds and professions such as lawyers, pharmacists, university professors and highly placed bureaucrats (Meka, 1996:14). The evidence does appear to show that it is not just a mere attempt by ethnic migrants to parody or replicate their 'traditional' political institutions. It must be situated in the wider context of the exigency of urban life, and the creative attempts of migrants to respond organisationally to the challenges of material, political, psychological and emotional survival.

Nothing lends credence to this than the overt political functions carried out by such pan-ethnic organisations in the urban centres. Despite the nomenclature of a 'cultural' organisation, pan-ethnic organisations are powerful actors on the political scene, and are either formally or informally involved in the contest for power. This is most aptly exemplified by the experience of the Igbo residents in Jos as explained above. The return to civil politics in 1979, for example, created the urgency to re-launch the Igbo cultural union which, though shortlived, was primarily a tool of political mobilisation and identification. In order to do this formal affiliation to political parties is not necessary. Indeed, Igbo leaders in Jos have blamed the poor electoral performance of Igbo candidates in the 1987 local government election on the absence of a pan-ethnic organisational platform (Ibid.: 14).

Besides, the short period since the re-birth of Igbo Union in Jos has witnessed the functional utility of such a platform, especially in relation to resolution of intra-communal disputes. According to Chief Meka, the Union has successfully settled a number of cases involving different Igbo groups out of court. These include the disputes between two factions of Izu Umunna Cultural Association in Jos in 1992, the court case between aggrieved members of "Igbo Leaders of Thought" and the Igbo Cultural Union, and the
high court case between Lazarus Awgu and the Igbos in Jos, all in 1993. Other notable examples of intra-communal disputes resolved by the Igbo Union are the High Court case between Ezeagu Local Government and Enugu state, and the High Court case instituted by Dr. Egbe against Nze Sam Edeh, the then elected President General of Igbo Cultural Union in 1997(Ibid.: 13).

In addition to the resolution of disputes among warring Igbo groups in Jos and Plateau State in general, the Igbo Cultural Union and the larger Igbo ethnic network have been useful in providing protection to migrant Igbo communities in other cities in Northern Nigeria. The relative peace enjoyed by Jos has meant that Igbo residents in other northern cities who are vulnerable to attacks often find Jos as the haven. Thus, the Igbo in Jos have often provided accommodation to their ethnic kins displaced from the frequent communal riots in Kaduna and Kano. In 1991 for example, "Igbo Leaders of Thought" in Jos chartered luxurious buses and evacuated Igbo victims of ethno-religious violence in Bauchi to their south-eastern homeland (Ibid.:12).

Finally, it is instructive to note the sense in which urban ethnic associations have become crucial to the state in the overall process of governance and the management of inter-group relations and conflicts. This again, re-echoes the issue of the inadequacy and the non-hegemonic character of the post-colonial state which necessitates the use of networks provided by ethnic associations in the maintenance of law and order. In the wake of the ethno-religious conflicts that have wreaked havoc in many urban centres in the northern part of the country, and, specifically, the outbreak of communal violence in Jos in April 1994, the government of Plateau State had to set up Inter-Religious and Inter-Community Relations Committee. The Igbo Cultural Union, among others, was
represented on the Committee to mediate and promote peace and harmony among the various ethno-cultural groups in Jos.

It is therefore clear that the peculiar historical experiences of the Igbo residents in places outside their ethnic homeland in the post-independence period have shaped their attitude to ethnic associational life. Being perhaps the most mobile group of Nigerians in search of trading and commercial opportunities on the basis of which they have enjoyed relative prosperity, they have the additional need to safeguard their property in the face of animosity and a sense of envy which they perceive characterize the attitude of most Nigerians towards them. The frequent attacks launched on Igbo commercial and business interests in many riots in northern cities such as Kano, Kaduna and Gboko, therefore, has tended to force the Igbo to forge a very close sense of solidarity amidst the insecurity of urban life worsened by palpable evidence of state failure to provide security and safety.

4.5: ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE BEROM, ANAGUTA AND AFIZERE

As alluded to above, the dynamics of associational life among the three "indigenous" ethnic groups - the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere - may be slightly different and, therefore, more difficult to capture using the conventional approach to urban ethnic social movement. One important reason for this is that unlike the Igbo and the Yoruba who may be considered migrants in urban Jos, these communal groups are not as physically separated from their 'homeland'. It may therefore be difficult to sustain the argument that they are subject to the same degree of pressures of urban life. Rather, the motivational factor of associational life may be rooted in the psychology of domination. In other words,
it may not be the fears and anxieties associated with urbanism, but the need to protect themselves against more powerful competitors in economic, political and social spheres.

Associational life among these three communal groups appears vibrant in the sense of each promoting group awareness and solidarity. At one level, the struggle for hegemony and advantage among them is waged through the instrumentalities of ethnic organizations. For instance, the struggle over the Gbong Gwom institution, “ownership” of various parts of Jos metropolis, and political representation in the local government within these groups can be as intense as the one that pitches them collectively against other groups. The series of exchanges and media warfare between the Berom Youth Association and the Afizere Cultural and Community Development Association over the “ownership” of parts of Jos such as Tudun-Wada, Alheri and Kabong provide useful illustration of the internal friction that could exist among these “indigenous” communal groups (see for example, Sunday Standard, October 20 and November 24, 1991). Be that as it may, these groups, based on the theory of segmentary opposition tend to unite with a common front when pitched against the “Hausa/Fulani” and other groups perceived as a threat to their common interests, especially in matters relating to claims over the resources and political opportunities in Jos metropolis. This was amply demonstrated in respect of the events that led to the April 12, 1994 crisis, and the aftermath when ethnic movements representing the Berom, Anaguta and the Afizere presented a common position in relation to the Hausa community.

It would appear that the primary motivation for the formation of ethnic associations is the need to respond to the threat of economic, political and cultural domination represented by the presence of ethno-cultural groups that are both numerically and sociologically majorities. For example, for these minority groups the preponderance and
pervasive cultural and linguistic influence of the Hausa represents immediate threat to their own identity. There is also the question of the dominant economic position of the various migrant ethnic groups. These two factors have dictated the need to ensure their control and dominance over institutions and apparatuses of local power. This, however, does not suggest unanimity of position and interests among the three groups, for as will be revealed later contestations and disputations exist among them over these issues.

What this tends to suggest, therefore, is that ethnic associational life among these groups is very germane to the whole process of construction of ethnic identity in the conscious attempt to position themselves in the contest for power and resources. It is on the basis of this that the debates over citizenship rights vis-a-vis the claims of "indigeneity" appear intelligible. As will be shown in this section, the history of ethnic associational life is relatively recent in respect of the Afizere and the Anaguta, while it has a fairly long history among the Berom. In what follows, ethnic associational life among the Berom will be discussed followed by the Anaguta and the Afizere.

The Berom constitute one of the most important "indigenous" ethnic communities in Jos, an importance that derives partly from their early role in the politics of identity, not only in Jos (and Plateau) but in what is generally regarded today as the Middle Belt. A significant contributory factor for the pre-eminent role of the Berom is the fact that tin mines were largely concentrated on Berom land. For this reason they were at the forefront of political mobilisation and active opposition to the colonial project, and much later the rallying point of nationalist agitation within the Jos Plateau and indeed the entire Middle Belt. Berom politicians were active in the formation and activities of the Middle Zone League (MZL).
Against this background, therefore, it is not surprising that of the "indigenous" ethnic groups, the Beroms have the longest history of associational life. As far back as 1947, they formed the Berom Progressive Union (BPU) which had to be taken seriously by the colonial authorities because of its affiliation with the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). The objectives of BPU, according to the founders, include promoting Berom unity embracing all Berom villages; the enlightenment of the Berom on their rights, especially in relation to their land around Bukuru and Jos; and the defence of Berom interests, especially in matters relating to land compensation.

Today, however, the Berom Educational and Cultural Organisation (BECO) is the foremost pan-Berom organisation, incorporating gender and age differentiations. As the name clearly suggests, it exists primarily to promote the educational and cultural development of the Berom people. It is easy to understand why preservation of cultural identity should be a key issue for the Berom. Berom culture appears to be severely threatened by the more powerful cultural influence of the Hausa, and the accompanying fear of islamisation. As the General Secretary of BECO proudly admitted in his 1987 report, "the organisation has been able to bring the tribe under one umbrella and its members in various districts/branches have undertaken various projects at their local level, especially community development projects".

The importance of cultural revival and awakening in the overall project of BECO is attested to by the annual Nzem Berom festival which it organises in the month of April. The activities of this annual event include cultural displays during which different aspects of Berom culture, including dances are on display. It is often a major activity which commands the attention of most of the residents in the city, involving large crowds of Berom people from neighbouring towns and villages, as well as Beroms resident outside
Plateau state. While giving the 1987 annual report of BECO at that year's **Nze Berom** festival, the Secretary-General, Mr. Isyaku Nus remarked that the festival is "an occasion that unites the tribe and refresh their memory on their cultural heritage and awareness" (BECO, 1987).

The annual **Nzem Berom** festival, more than any other activity, provides the most effective platform for the projection of Berom culture as well as attempts to revive other aspects of their retreating culture. Thus, the Chairman of the 1990 Annual **Nzem Berom** festival, held on April 14, Air Commodore I. D. Mwadkwum (1990) used the occasion to appeal to Berom elders to "return as much as possible to the original state of Berom cultural festivals ...... I wish to suggest that the Berom revive festivals like Badu, Nshok, Mandyeng, e.t.c."

One of the most significant contributions of BECO to the development of Berom identity and culture was the inauguration, in October 1985, of the Berom Language Board (BLP). The Board, which has the secretaries of BECO, Berom Youth Movement and Berom Youth Association as ex-officio-members, was constituted following a meeting summoned at Gyel by His Royal Highness, Dr. Fom Bot, the Gbom Gwong with all Berom District Heads (BeDagwom) and a number of Village Heads (Be Gwom). The objectives of BLB, among others, include research into the rich history of the Berom language; to retrieve and preserve its vocabulary, structure and functional parts as spoken in Berom land; to develop an official Berom language for the purpose of educational and other communication; and to be the final authority in matters of interpreting, elucidating, developing and promoting the language (BLB Constitution, 1985: 2).

In accordance with these objectives the Board was empowered to determine the orthography of Berom language, spelling, and choice of dialects towards standardising it,
and using it to preserve the culture of the people through literary works as well as promoting the use of the language in churches and other religious institutions and assemblies. Accordingly, the Board was tasked to liaise with institutions such as the Bible Translation Trust and the National Language Centre.

It needs to be noted that the significance of the task outlined for the BLB derives from the social and political significance of language in the problematic of identity. Against the background of the specific historical experience of the Berom in relation to Hausa ethnicity, the preservation of the Berom language is very central to the preservation of ethnic and cultural identity. In the context of identity politics in Northern Nigeria and the way in which the ethnic minority identity question is framed, adoption and usage of Hausa language at all levels of social articulation may not be a matter of celebration of cultural integration, but a good measure for existing power relations and distribution.

BECO's range of activities goes beyond the concern for culture and unity of the Berom nationality. The Nzem Berom among other platforms, provides an avenue for high level consultations among the Berom elites. But, more significantly, it is immersed in the politics of resource allocation and the struggle for opportunities within Jos and Plateau State in general. In particular, it is deeply involved in the struggle for the "ownership" of Jos which, not unexpectedly, it sees as belonging to the Berom. In the wake of the demand for the creation of new local governments in 1991, and the aftermath of the split of what used to be Jos Local Government into Jos North and Jos South, BECO took a very uncompromising position in the defence of Berom political and cultural interests.

For example, BECO addressed a well publicised Press Conference titled "The Rip-Off of Democracy and the Denial of Natural Justice" (see The Standard, October 2, 1991). It described the exercise which was believed to have favoured the Hausa community as a
capitulation to “Hausa-Fulani” pressure which did not only have the implication of denying the Berom their "traditional home or abode", but as a part of the grand design to islamise Nigeria. Apart from engaging with this kind of political issue, the concern for development, in obvious response to the inadequacy of the post-colonial state is also a focus of the organisation.

As we have shown in respect of other ethnic associations, the vacuum created as a result of rolling back of the state as well as government slogan of self-help development have led to BECO to be involved in development activities. The organisation has built a Comprehensive High School with boarding facilities at Kwi which admits both boys and girls. In 1987, the organisation, through fund-raising activities, mobilised about N500,000.00 for the building of a science laboratory and workshop at the permanent site of the school. Recognising the potential role of the organisation in promoting development in other ways, the Chairman of the 1990 annual Nzem Berom festival admonished BECO to organise its district branches and village associations to register with the Directorate of Food and Rural Infrastructure (DFFRI) to take advantage of the federal government plans to assist communities in development efforts (Mwadkwum, 1990).

Beside BECO, there is the Berom Youth Association which is affiliated to the Plateau Youth Council (PYC), an organisation embracing all the youths in Plateau state. The PYC emerged in the early 1980s as a government inspired organisation. Although it has grown powerful and somehow autonomous, it tends, in terms of its practices, to vacillate between state and civil society. Since there is no known organisation of Hausa youths formally affiliated to the PYC as others, it could be suggested that it shares the anti-Hausa sentiment of the Berom Youth Association in relation to the contestation over the "ownership" of Jos.
For reasons that are obvious, the same degree of vibrancy and long tradition of associational life found among the Berom is not replicated with respect to the Anaguta and Afizere. Associational life developed fairly lately, precisely because they did not enjoy the political visibility enjoyed by the Berom which, as earlier pointed out, has much to do with the confrontation between the Berom and the colonial state as a result of their opposition to the ruinous impact of the tin mining industry.

The Anaguta have two pan-ethnic associations that have so far played active role in fostering group awareness and solidarity: the Anaguta Development Association and Anaguta Youth Movement. The former appears to be the apex organization to which are affiliated other sub-groups and associations such as Anaguta women and students’ associations. The objectives as outlined in the constitution are loosely defined in terms of promoting unity and awareness among the Anaguta as a people, and to promote their culture and welfare. The Anaguta Youth Movement as it is now known, was founded in the late 1970s as Anaguta Youth Development Association. The constitution of the Association which is an umbrella organization for village-based organizations states its objectives as uniting the youth, enlightening the people regarding development and opportunities within the local government, and encouraging the growth of education among the Anaguta as a people.

However, in addition to the pursuit of development and welfare matters, the two organizations are strongly involved in the politics of identity in Jos, based on the historical claims that establish the Anaguta as one the groups who inhabited the Jos area prior to the establishment of colonial rule and to that extent, enjoy the status of “native” or “indigene”. These organizations, consequently, have been at the forefront of mobilizing the Anaguta and staking the claims of the Anaguta in the struggle for resources and opportunities in Jos.
As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, they are involved in the struggle against what is perceived as “Hausa/Fulani” hegemony, which drawing on their own construction of history, are laying equal claims to the indigeneity and ownership of Jos.

Of the three groups, the Afizere are ‘latecomers’ in the contestation over political identity and citizenship rights in Jos. This is partly a consequence of successive administrative actions and the arbitrariness characteristic of colonial rule which from inception placed the Afizere under Bauchi emirate administration. It was not until the 1976 boundary adjustment exercise undertaken by the Justice Irikefe Panel on Creation of States and Boundary Adjustment that the bulk of the Afizere population in the former Federe District were brought back to Plateau State. Interestingly, it was the struggle toward the boundary adjustment that provided the impetus for the establishment of the Afizere Cultural and Community Development Association in the early 1970s. It was in the aftermath of the boundary adjustment that the Afizere became inserted into the struggle for the “ownership” of Jos, anchored on the same historical claims which make the Berom and Anaguta legitimate contending parties over the affairs of Jos.

In addition to a plethora of village-based clubs and associations, three major organizations can be found claiming to represent the Afizere at the level of of ethnic and cultural identity. These include the Afizere Cultural and Community Development Association earlier mentioned, the Afizere Youth Movement and Afizere Conscience Club. The first among these three appears to be the most influential pan-ethnic organization among the Afizere. The objectives of the Association, like most ethnic cum cultural associations, are defined in terms of the development of the homeland, and projecting the cultural identity of the people. The leadership, like the ethnic movements among the Berom and Anaguta, is largely drawn from the elites.
Beyond the stated objectives of promoting development and projecting the culture of the people, these pan-ethnic associations are deeply involved in the on-going contestation over identity and rights in Jos. The immediate circumstances for the revival of the Afizere Cultural and Community Development Association provides some glimpse into the roles of these associations in fostering group solidarity as well as political mobilization among the Afizere. Although it had been in existence prior to the boundary adjustment which brought the Afizere into Plateau State in 1976, its revival in the course of the 1980s was in response to the demand for the creation of Federe Local Government out of Jos Local Government. It was largely a case of demand for the restoration of the local government since it was one of the local councils created in the dying days of the Second Republic, but dissolved by the succeeding military government of General Mohammed Buhari. But the greater significance of these ethnic associations came to light in the communal mobilization leading to the April 12 crisis, and the commonality of the position (along with the Berom and Anaguta) presented before the government appointed Commission of Inquiry into the April 12, 1994 communal disturbances in Jos.

However, it is in the arena of the struggle for the control of power at the local level and the competition for scarce values that the full dynamics of ethnicity and how it is related to citizens’ rights are fully played out. It is the way in which access to power and resources is historically framed for the different ethnic groups that has impacted on the question of identity and citizenship rights. The next chapter, therefore, focuses on these issues that played significant role in the production of history by the different ethnic communities in Jos.
CHAPTER FIVE

POLITICS, RESOURCE COMPETITION AND THE CITIZENSHIP QUESTION
IN JOS

5.0: INTRODUCTION

The focus of this chapter is to examine the patterns of competition for economic resources/opportunities and political power in Jos and how they impact on the ethnic identity question. While it is indisputable that pan-ethnic organizations and related forms of associational life covered in the previous chapter contribute to the construction of ethnic identity, they are more meaningful in relation to competition for resources and power. At the same time, competition for power and resources tend to reinforce the process of identity formation, the definition of the relevant “others” in the field of struggle for material wellbeing, and ultimately in patterns of exclusion that have implications for access to citizenship rights among the different socio-cultural aggregates.

The question of competition for, and access to, power and economic opportunities is at the heart of the contestation over citizens’ rights in urban situations such as Jos. As will be shown later, the on-going debates and contestation concerning identity and citizens’ rights are rooted in the struggle for economic resources and access to power, including institutions of local governance. The discourse on citizens’ rights in relation to the issue of indigeneity appears intelligible only in the context of what is perceived by the “indigenous” groups as their relative share of available resources and opportunities in Jos in relation to other groups.
In order to contextualise the debates and contestation among the various groups over identity and citizenship rights, it is important to examine the nature of competition for resources and power in the Jos metropolis. In relation to politics, the chapter discusses the basic character of political development in the Jos metropolis since independence. In so doing the chapter aims at establishing the impact of competition for political power on the ethnic identity and consciousness. With regard to economic competition, the chapter examines, first, the nature and character of the Jos economy which provides the context for economic competition and attempts to look at the ethnic patterns of control over economic activities.

The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the mutual interaction between the twin processes of competition for power and resources and the question of ethnic identity. It is specifically interested in establishing how these processes have occasioned shifts and transformation in ethnic identity boundaries. For here lies the nexus between the issue of ethnic identity and the contestation over citizenship rights.

5.1: ETHNIC IDENTITY, POLITICS AND LOCAL POWER IN JOS METROPOLIS

The politicization of ethnic identity and the differential access of the various groups to power provide a major context for the debate over citizenship in Jos. This section examines the historical trends in the development of politicized identity in the Jos metropolis in the post-colonial period. Two important issues emerge from the discussion which follows. One, the politicization of ethnic identity which draws a distinction between a Nigerian citizen *per se* and an indigene as a consequence of the progressive weakening of
a sense of national identity and the bitter historical memories arising out of inter-group relations. Two, it reveals the obvious tension that exists between the progressive character of electoral laws on the one hand, and the limitations imposed on the citizenship rights of Nigerians by demands based on “indigeneity”. It is, however, important that we attempt to understand the larger context of the struggle for power in the Jos metropolis.

5.1.1: The Context of the Struggle for Local Power

There are basically two levels of the struggle for power which are of immediate relevance to the contestation of citizens’ rights in the Jos metropolis. These include the struggle for the control of the institutions of local governance as expressed in the local government councils and the control of institutions of traditional rulership and related structures of local power. The context which defines the significance of these two levels of the struggles for local power will be discussed in this section.

The 1976 local government reforms enhanced the political profile of the local government system in more ways than one. In a radical break with the colonial legacy, the philosophy of the reforms initiated by the military government under General Olusegun Obasanjo assigned developmental functions to the local government, as opposed to being a mere instrument of control and manipulation of the local population. For the first time, the local government was recognised as a distinct tier of government in the evolving federal arrangement, and this was expressly entrenched in the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The functions to be performed by the local government councils were listed under the residual list in the constitution.
The most important among these functions include the powers to make bye-laws in respect of markets and motor vehicle parks; sanitary inspection, seweage, refuse and nightsoil disposal; slaughter houses and slaughter slabs; licensing, supervision and regulation of bakery and eating houses; control of land held under customary tenure; collection of vehicle parking charges; and collection of community tax, property and other rates. Besides, a local government council concurrently with the state government exercises power in the provision of scholarship and bursaries, rural and semi-urban water supply; regulation and control of buildings; and the operation of commercial undertakings. This is the sense in which it has become a critical element of the Nigerian state system, not only enjoying allocating, extractive and distributive functions, but offering at the same time, opportunities for resource appropriation by the local power elites. These provisions have been retained in the subsequent constitutions including the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Since 1976, therefore, the enhanced political status of the local government council as a tier of government is not in doubt. In several respect, local government chairmen play the role of ‘gate keepers’ in respect of access to opportunities. For example, they preside over the land allocation committee in the local government and vital in regulating access to land. Across the country, the local government issue certificate of indigeneship which increasingly has become a requirement for access to employment, admission into schools and scholarships. In other words, the control of the machinery of local administration is critical in determining the status of members of the local community as natives or indigenes. To mention one more relevant example, local government councils are important in the distribution of vital commodities such as fertilizers such that the question of who controls becomes a central issue in determining the beneficiaries.
It is also a fact that traditional office holders have continued to play a significant role in the operation and functioning of the modern state system, especially at the lowest level of governance. Despite the concerted efforts to democratise the institutions of local governance since 1968 when the state and federal governments took over the Native Authority Police, Prisons and native courts, and more critically since the 1976 reforms which sought to democratise the system, traditional office holders have continued to be relevant. Whitaker's classic (1970) reveals the false dichotomy between the 'traditional' and the 'modern' in the context of colonial and post-colonial governance arrangements in the northern part of Nigeria. In fact, what has happened in the post-colonial period is the continued reconstruction of chieftaincy to reinforce the power and status of the dominant classes, particularly promoting the influence of allies among the local leaders beyond their traditional status. And to this extent they have remained agents of legitimation and stabilisation at the local level (Vaughan, 1992: 35).

From all indications, Akpan (1984: 109) is correct in his conclusion that the 1976 reforms "offers traditional rulers tremendous opportunity to bring their influence to bear on the political game without being injured in the process". Some of the functions assigned to the traditional office holders include advising the local government, assistance in the assessment and collection of community tax, maintenance of law and order, and the determination of questions relating to chieftaincy matters as well as customary law, especially land tenure. This is one important sense in which the struggle for the control of chieftaincy titles, including District Heads becomes a critical issue in the contestation over identity and citizenship in Jos.

Among these, the issue of control over the process of land allocation in a rapidly growing urban situation brings into bold relief the question of which group controls the
machinery of the local administration. The relative disadvantage of “indigenous” groups in
the earlier period in Jos when the machinery of local administration, the Jos Native
Authority, was under the control of the Hausa elements, backed by the colonial authorities,
provide indications as to the stake involved in the control of this level of governance.

Tyoden (1993), for example, provides insight into the tussle in 1961 between Alhaji
Ali Kazaure who was then president of Jos Town Council as well as Chairman of the
Native Authority Plots Advisory Committee on the one hand, and Bitrus Rwang Pam, the
son of the Chief of Jos who was a member of the Native Authority Council and Chairman
of its Plot Committee. The latter was said to have expressed concern over the influence
wielded by the former, which ostensibly went beyond advisory capacity, and proposed that
the functions of the Native Authority(NA) Plots Advisory Committee be merged with that
of the Plot Committee. Another allegation made by Bitrus Rwang Pam was that Ali
Kazaure had the penchant of favouring his Hausa kith and kin over the Berom in matters of
land allocation. The result was that Bitrus Rwang Pam ended up being removed from the
NA Council. This rather ugly development reflected the balance of ethnic forces that
shaped local power and authority in the Jos metropolis at this point in time.

Following from the above, there is often a strong tendency for the local government
authorities to either come under the political pressure of the dominant ethnic interest or for
the control of the apparatus of the local authority to be fiercely contested by the competing
ethnic interests (see Egwu, 1998 for example). This should not be suprising, because as we
have clearly shown above, the local government authority is a miniature representation of
the state. Constitutional developments since 1979, for example, recognise the local
government as autonomous level of government, a third tier within a federal setting, with
constitutionally defined powers and sources of revenue. It is particularly instructive that
local governments derive a share from revenues collected by the central government in the Federation Account. Access to power at such a level, and the control of the apparatus of the council can become a mechanism for regulating access to accumulation and other opportunities. It is precisely for this reason that the control of Jos Local Government has been a key issue in the contestation between the Hausa community in Jos and the "indigenous" ethnic minority groups.

However, the character of the state and the authoritarian context tend to exacerbate the ethnic problem. In post-colonial situation, the state system has remained the authoritative arena for the definition of, among others, structures, identity and goals (Murphree, 1992: 165). Here, it may be useful to recall the essential features of the post-colonial state which have implications for the formation of ethnic identity and the general definition of "otherness". First, the state lacks autonomy in the sense that makes it difficult for the social formation to institutionalise individualism, competition, freedom and equality (Ake, 1985). Consequently, social cleavages including ethnicity threaten state viability and coherence. Ethnic cleavages are not only internalised by state institutions, but the state itself becomes a coveted trophy for the different ethnic fractions of the ruling class.

Second, the state is highly personalised and privatised such that the distinction between the public purpose of the state and the private interest of those who wield power becomes blurred. More often than not, the calculation for the personal survival and interests of those in power takes precedence over the public interest. At best, the state is reduced to a vast network of patron-clientele networks in which disproportinate reward is given in return for personal loyalty. Third, is the weak material base of the ruling class. It is a class that is not firmly anchored in production; rather, its material base is in the sphere of
circulation and the control of state power. The ruling class remains highly fractionalised along ethnic and regional lines and consequently has remained non-hegemonic. The consequence of this is that state actions are generally unpredictable, determined by personal ties and access to those in power, and decisions taken in the interest of those whose support is critical for the survival of those in power.

Worse still is the context of authoritarian rule manifested in protracted military rule and dictatorship. This has had a lasting impact of militarising the process of governance as military ethos and values are enthroned in place of democratic and civil procedures in addressing grievances and management of conflicts. This in effect means that prolonged military rule precludes a democratic framework which values negotiation, dialogue, consensus building and shared commitment to laid down procedures. It is particularly striking that military dictatorship survives on the basis of patron-client networks, often narrow and ethnic-based. It therefore increases the prospect of uneven distribution of rewards and resources among the different ethnic constituents and hence deepens the problem of unequal ethnic relations in terms of access to power as well as authoritative allocation of values. Two consequences flow from this which are immediately relevant for our discussion.

One, important decisions including the creation of local governments are taken without due process and regard for consultation with the people. Most of the existing local governments have been created through executive fiat and arbitrary criteria, including the siting of their administrative headquarters. By the end of the second democratic experiment in December 1983, for example, the country had a mere 301 local government areas. At the time of the return to civil politics following more than one decade of sustained military rule in May 1999, there had occurred a phenomenal increase in the number of local
governments. The number of local governments thus increased by over 200 per cent as the number of local governments rose to 774 across the country. Out of several competing demands, those created are often personal 'gifts' of the leading functionaries of the military junta to loyal friends, supporters and favoured ethnic communities. Similar interests determined the siting of the administrative headquarters of such local governments.

Two, authoritarian rule and military dictatorship appear to have advanced the interests of certain ethnic 'power blocs' over others, deepened the sense of ethnic injustice and inequity, and creating suspicion in ethnic relations. For instance, it is a general perception that military rule has tended to favour the northern power elites, especially the Hausa-Fulani on whose behalf military rulers have allegedly ruled (See Omoruyi, 2000, for example). One implication of this for local politics in Jos where there is a considerable size of Hausa-Fulani "settlers" is the general perception within the indigenous ethnic communities that they have exploited this control of power in the federal centre to their advantage. These minority groups, for example, accuse influential Hausa-Fulani officers in the Babangida and Abacha military regimes of using their positions to favour the Hausa community in matters relating to the creation of new local governments, as was the case of the creation of Jos “North” and “South” local governments in 1991.

Furthermore, the period of prolonged military rule and the considerable erosion of the democratic landscape meant the complete absence of political parties as mediating institutions in the contest for power, as the basis of political recruitment, and as the important vehicles of interest articulation and aggregation. Ethnic associations and ethnic political organizations emerged to fill the social space vacated by political parties in the advancement of community interest and they came to play a crucial role in the mobilization of such communities on the basis of what they perceived to be justice or injustice for the
communities they represent. The leading role of the Jassawa Development Association in Jos from the 1980s and other organizations such as the BECO, Afizere Youth Development Association (AYDA) and the pan-Plateau Youth Council which is basically a network of ethnic-based youth associations in the state provide a good illustration of these trends.

The emergence of ethnic based associations as mediating mechanisms in inter-group (essentially ethnic) relations and in negotiating power relations among themselves, and between the groups they represent on the one hand and the state on the other, is not limited to the Hausa-Fulani and the indigenous ethnic communities in Jos. Such ethn-cultural associations are found among other migrant groups such as the Yoruba and the Igbo as suggested in chapter 4 above. Unlike political parties that have great potentials in building solidarity across ethnic and cultural divide and in providing platforms for building consensus across such divide, ethno-cultural and political organizations project exclusive demands and have greater potentials in transforming competition for economic and political opportunities into inter-ethnic competition.

5.1.2: Ethnicity and Power in Jos Local Government Area

As suggested above, access to power and the struggle for the control of institutions of local governance, including traditional rulership, are at the heart of the unending tension and animosity between the various ethno-cultural aggregates in the Jos metropolis. It is therefore important to show the historical trends in electoral politics and the struggle for power in Jos, in order to lay bare the patterns of control and domination over time, and how this pattern of control feeds into contestation over identity and citizens’ rights.
That the Hausa community had enjoyed a pre-eminent position in the politics of Jos is hardly in doubt. This is evident in their political visibility right from the inception of Jos to the end of the Second Republic. The influential position of a succession of Hausa as ‘Sarkin’ Jos between 1902 and 1947 when Rwang Pam was appointed the Chief of the Berom has earlier been underscored. In a similar manner, Hausa politicians represented Jos area in the period prior to independence. For example, Alhaji Garba Baka- Zuwa – Jere was the first elected representative of Jos in the Northern Regional Assembly. Another Hausa man, Alhaji Isah Haruna, represented Jos in the pre-independence conference of Nigeria. This trend of Hausa domination continued into the Second Republic.
In the Constituent Assembly inaugated in the 1976 –1979 transition period, Alhaji Audu Danladi was nominated to the Constituent Assembly. It could be argued that it was possible for a Hausa man to gain this position because the mode of recruitment was nomination which is determined by executive fiat rather than popular choice. However, the trend continued in the Second Republic. Jos metropolis was represented in the Plateau House of Assembly by three Hausa politicians. These were Alhaji Salihu Malumbo, Inuwa Addah and Inuwa Anacha. Two other Hausa politicians, Alhaji Inuwa Aliyu and Alhaji Baba Akawu, represented Jos area in the Federal House of Representatives. While the pre-eminence of the Hausa in politics and the power arena in Jos is not in contention, the “indigenous” ethnic groups played a rather marginal and less visible role. But this should be understood in the context of the high degree of ethnic tolerance at this point in time, as patterns of elections buttressed by the composition of the local council in the Jos metropolis shows that other ethnic groups such as the Igbo were represented in the council.

In this early phase, for example, the only Berom who was visible in the political affairs of Jos was D.B. Zang. He was nominated into the Regional House in Kaduna. Even then, his nomination was to secure representation for the mining interest. Apparently, the strong claims to the ‘ownership’ of Jos by the Hausa community is largely predicated on their hegemonic role in the political life of Jos, which is then used to reinforce the construction of the history of the city as belonging to the Hausa community.

The early political life in the Jos metropolis was not only characterized by the dominance of the Hausa. It was indeed, marked by a high degree of ethnic and inter-group tolerance such that representation in the institutions of local governance reflected the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural diversity of the city. This was partly a consequence of the progressive character of electoral laws which appear to be at variance with the restrictions
on rights and privileges of some ethnic communities in specific local contexts which the federal character provisions in the 1979 Constitution came to place through the introduction of the “indigeneship” clause. As a matter of fact, what obtained in Jos, especially from the late colonial period up to the breakdown of the post-colonial political process in 1966 was a rather robust and healthy political competition which accounted for the multi-ethnic character of political representation in the Jos Native Authority.

Although it is difficult to fully reconstruct the picture of political representation owing to absence of records, information obtained from some of the key actors at the time provides some useful insight. According to Chief Sab Okoye, ethnic identity appeared to be of secondary significance in determining outcome of electoral contest and elections in the early years after independence. Rather, the programme of the party and what was considered the ability of the individual candidate to deliver on election promises tended to determine outcome of elections. He provided further proof of this by using his own personal experience of winning councillorship elections for two consecutive times between 1960 and 1966 in a Council that was multi-ethnic in composition: three Igbo, two Yoruba, a number of Miango, and the President of the Council, Alhaji Ali Kazaure who was Hausa (Chief Sab Okoye: Interview, 25/8/1995). This was the situation for the six years including the presidency of Alhaji Ali Kazaure.

The successful political career of Chief Sab Okoye, like many other people, and the prominent role he played in the political and civil life of Jos provides evidence for the high degree of ethnic tolerance. Chief Sab Okoye is Igbo from Orlu in the present Imo State who migrated to Jos in 1950. He played a very active and prominent role in organizing Igbo community life in the “diaspora” and enjoyed enormous political visibility, not only
within the Igbo community in Jos, but across ethnic lines which accounted for his being elected councilor for two successive terms in Jos Local Government between 1960 and 1966. What appears even more significant was the fact that he won the first time in Nasarawa “A” and “B” ward which was predominantly Yoruba and Hausa, despite the fact that he was Igbo and very active in the activities of the Igbo Union. The second election was by far more instructive as he won as an independent candidate having been denied the platform by his party, the NCNC. Partly as a mark of his popularity and partly as a mark of the de-ethnicised nature of the electoral process, Chief Sab Okoye won the election at the expense of candidates fielded by established political parties including the NPC which was the ruling party, NEPU, NCNC and the AG. This victory however did not come easily as it was characterised by intrigues and intense manoeuvres. The election was at first overturned by the Election Tribunal sitting at the Jos High Court, although the ruling of the presiding white judge which annulled the election was relayed in a radio broadcast from Kaduna the following day as he failed to make public his ruling immediately. He won in the bye-election that followed (Okoye, 1996: 26-28).

In other respects, the experience of Chief Sab Okoye who sees himself as an “indigene” of Jos (Ibid.:27) provides further proof of the level of inter-group tolerance and the framework of civic engagements transcending ethnicities in Jos. Apart from his visibility in the arena of local politics, he was appointed a Director in the Plateau Urban Development Board between 1980 and 1984, and, for many years, served on the Board of Directors of the Plateau State Tourism Corporation. Several other Igbo, Yoruba and Urhobo may not have shared a similar experience, but certainly were integrated into the civil and political life of Jos in varying degrees.
Available evidence seems to suggest that a dramatic shift has occurred in respect of ethnicity and politics within the context of local governance in Jos since after the civil war and in the course of the 1970s. Some of the factors responsible for these changes include the rise of ethnic minority consciousness and the deconstruction of a monolithic ‘northern’ Nigerian identity, as well as the rise of a new generation of educated elites who came to occupy key positions in government and in the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the new status accorded the local government system following the 1976 reform constituted it into an important level of state power whose control became increasingly important in the calculation of the rising power elite.

Although the progressive character of the electoral system alluded to earlier has continued to account for a multi-ethnic system of representation in the local government council, there is a sense in which the position of the Chairman of the Council, or its equivalent, is perceived a prized possession to be monopolized by the political and bureaucratic elite of the indigenous ethnic groups. This is clearly illustrated by Table 5.1 showing the ethnic distribution of appointed Sole Administrators and elected Chairmen in Jos Local Government since 1976. It is, however, instructive to note that the basis of political recruitment in this period was appointment, more often than not, by executive fiat exercised by the Military Governors/Administrators in consultation with his superiors. Elections were exceptions, rather than the rule: held only in 1976, 1987 and 1996 on non-party basis, and in 1979, 1990 and 1998 on the basis of competitive elections.

The table, for example, shows that out of a total number of fifteen (15) elected Chairmen and appointed Sole Administrators, the three indigenous ethnic groups – the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta - have accounted for nine which is a half of the number. Among the three groups, the Anaguta have produced four “chief executives”, the Berom,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC GROUPS</th>
<th>NAMES OF CHAIRMEN/ADMINISTRATORS</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anaguta</td>
<td>Philip Yakubu</td>
<td>1986 – 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haruna G. Umar</td>
<td>1988 – 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bala Magaji</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frank Tardy</td>
<td>1999?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>Choji Zang</td>
<td>1990 - 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Plateau**</td>
<td>D.D Sheni</td>
<td>1983 - 1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taroh</td>
<td>P.D. Dandam</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>V.T Lar</td>
<td>1991 – 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geomai</td>
<td>Fidelis Tapgun</td>
<td>1985 – 1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alago</td>
<td>Usman Doma</td>
<td>1987 – 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghaaval</td>
<td>Fidelis Dadiyeng</td>
<td>1981 - 1982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Jos Local Government includes the present Jos North, South and East prior to 1991

**Plateau State as it existed prior to the excision of Nasarawa State in 1995

Source: Compiled from the Records of Jos North Local Government Area.
Table 5.2: Ethnic Origins Of Councilors For Selected Years In Jos Local Government *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP</th>
<th>(Old Jos L.G Now broken ) into 3 LGA’s</th>
<th>(By appointment)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afizere</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaguta</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berom</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Plateau Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Nigerian Groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Jos Local Government include the present Jos North, Jos South and Jos East Local Governments prior to 1991 from when new Local Councils were carved out.

Source: Compiled from the Records of Jos North Local Government Area, Jos.
four; while Christopher Jang, an Afizere occupied the position twice. The only Hausa who has occupied the position of Chairman in this period was Alhaji Sumaila Mohammed who won on the ticket of the NRC between 1991 and 1993. Another Hausa candidate, Alhaji Muktar Mohammed won the Chairmanship of the Local Government in 1996 on a non-party basis but had his election upturned by the tribunal on account of falsification in age. The appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato, another Hausa as Chairman of the Caretaker Management Committee of the Local Government in 1994 was met with a groundswell of opposition from the indigenous ethnic communities. Efforts by the Hausa community to protect the appointment in the face of the opposition mounted by the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere against what they perceived as imposition of “Hausa/Fulani” hegemony led to the April 12 ethnic violence in the Jos metropolis.

As the table further suggests, other ethnic groups of Plateau origin such as the Taroh, Maghaavul, Goemai, Alago and Ebira accounted for the other half in terms of the ethnic origins of those who occupied the position of the chief executive of Jos Local Government Council. It needs be pointed out that these other minority elements share the anti-“Hausa/Fulani” sentiment which is the driving force of minority agitation against perceived hegemony of the Hausa community in Jos. It is, therefore, not surprising that appointments of such minority elements did not elicit the kind of opposition which greeted the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato in 1994.

Apart from the position of the “chief executive” of the Local Government which appears to be monopolized by the indigenous ethnic communities, the composition of the rest members of the council has continued to reflect the ethnic diversity of Jos city. The evidence for this is provided by the prevailing situation between 1960 and 1966 as
suggested above and the composition of the councils for selected years as shown in Table 5.2.

The table shows that from 1988 to about 2001, ethnic composition of councilors reflects the diverse nature of ethnic representation and participation in decision-making. It shows a pattern of ethnic representation in the following order: Hausa, 13; Berom, 10; Afizere, 7; Igbo, 6; Anaguta, 4; and Yoruba, 3. This general trend apart, the picture of the composition during specific tenure shows some changes in the political fortunes of the various ethnic groups. A few examples will be used to illustrate this point. For instance, the Berom who accounted for eight (8) councilors in 1988 could only produce one (1) during the 1991-1993 dispensation; whereas, Hausa representation improved from one (1) in 1988 to seven (7) during the 1991 period when incidentally the Chairman of the Council was Hausa. Hausa representation based on the 1999 composition is five, while they had no single representation in the preceding 1998 dispensation.

Despite the continued multi-ethnic composition of successive councils within the Jos metropolis, there is a marked departure from the pre-war pattern in terms of the level of ethnic tolerance. During this period, according to Okoye, it was not uncommon for candidates to win elections in wards and constituencies dominated by ethnic groups other than the one which the candidate belonged as he himself had won elections from Dung and Nasarawa wards which were predominantly Berom and Yoruba, respectively (Interview: 25/8/1995). In contradistinction to this is a trend in which candidates are elected from wards in which their ethnic groups predominate. Thus, wards such as Sarkin Arab, Tafawa Balewa, Venderpuye and Jenta Apata are often represented by Igbo councilors; Naraguta ‘A’ ward which includes Nasarawa produces Yoruba councilors; while Jos Jarawa and Tudun-Wada Kabong often throw up Afizere and Anaguta councilors respectively.
Similarly, Ali Kazaure, Gangare, Ibrahim Katsina, Abba Na Shehu and Garba Daho wards are often represented by Hausa councilors (See Appendix 1). It is thus, a situation of ethnic segmentation in settlement providing a spatial framework for the playing out of ethnic politics.

Another important level at which ethnic identity becomes critical in access to power and contestation over rights is the struggle for the control of institutions of local governance. In the case of Jos, it is not limited to the question of controlling power, or the privileges of power at the local level. It is also strongly manifested in the politics of demand for new local governments as such demands are based on ethnic and group calculations for advantage and how to access power. Thus, the continued creation of new local governments and the frequent re-drawing of administrative boundaries throw up situations of stiff inter-ethnic competition in Jos. The way in which inter-ethnic competition for political hegemony has been fought at the level of the struggle for creation of new local government offers tremendous insight into the struggle for local power.

However, it needs to be realized that this level of struggle has a wider significance, because in the contest over whose claim to indigeneity of Jos is more authentic, the contending groups have come to perceive the control over the apparatus of the local council and the institutions of traditional rulership in Jos as having both practical and symbolic imperatives. In this sense the request for the continued re-drawing of local administrative boundaries has become a useful strategy of seeking control and warding off competition from rival groups. Not unexpectedly, this has often produced fascinating patterns of ethnic alliances which often pitch the Hausa community against the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta, as the latter often attempt to submerge their inter-group differences.
It is against the foregoing background that the context of the politics of the demands for the creation of new local governments within and around Jos metropolis as well as the strategy employed by each group to gain control of the local government apparatus in Jos to the exclusion and marginalisation of the rival group becomes intelligible. A core element of this strategy is how one group can manipulate and exclude the other by ensuring that administrative boundaries are re-drawn in such a way that the group remains preponderant in terms of population for obvious electoral advantage. It is in this sense that the alliance of the three "indigenous" ethnic groups to remain in contention for the control of the local state apparatus makes meaning when the share weight of the population of the Hausa community in Jos is considered.

Under the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the states have the responsibility for the creation of new local government areas. One possibility arising from this is that a particular state could use its power in relation to this for political patronage: rewarding supporters and punishing those perceived to be in the opposition. Such fears were very rife in the four years that the Second Republic lasted between 1979 and 1983. However, before the overthrow of the regime in December 1983, additional local governments were created throughout the country. The Buhari military regime which followed decided to dissolve all the newly created councils. Among these was Federe Local Government which, like all the other newly created local governments, was abolished by the Buhari regime on the ground that they hardly met the requirement of economic viability, or were created out of purely partisan considerations. This may not be surprising considering the general attitude of the regime which understood the major problem of the Nigerian political economy as stemming from indiscipline and the mismanagement of resources by the political class it had sacked.
As indicated above, the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida came to see the creation of new states and local government as a strategy of acceding to 'popular' demand while buying time and support for his "permanent transition". One of such exercises of creating new local governments took place in 1991. The Hausa community in Jos as well as the "indigenous" ethnic communities demanded for the creation of new local governments. Expectedly, the demand of each group was informed by calculation of political gains. The Hausa community demanded that the main city of Jos be accorded the status of a local government, while the other part be constituted into a separate local government with Bukuru as the headquarter. By making this demand, it was the calculation of the Hausa community that their political hegemony and supremacy would become unassailable in Jos. The Berom, Afizere and Anaguta, on the other, made a counter proposal for the creation of a Federe local government out of what was then Jos local government which would have the effect of denying the Hausa community the opportunity of becoming the dominant ethnic group in Jos local government.

As it turned out, the military government of General Ibrahim Babangida split Jos Local Government into two - Jos North and Jos South. The main city of Jos remained the headquarter of Jos North Local Government, while Bukuru and what was proposed as Federe Local Government by the 'indigenous' ethnic communities became Jos South Local Government with Bukuru as the administrative headquarter. This decision, announced and implemented with military fiat, corresponded to the demand of the Huasa community in Jos. Out of the eleven (11) wards in the new Jos North local government, the Hausa-Fulani predominate in six (6). These wards are: Abba Na Shehu, Ali Kazaure, Ibrahim, Garba Daho, Gangare and Sarkin Arab. In addition, they have considerable presence in four other wards such as Jenta Adamu, Tafawa Balewa, Vanderpuye and Naraguta.
Worse still, is the fact that this new development had the effect of bringing most of the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta under the jurisdiction of Jos South Local Government, with the immediate effect of isolating the Gbom Gwom, whose power base had been severely undermined, in Jos North Local Government. From the subsequent reaction of the Hausa community to this development, it came to be assumed that the split of Jos into north and south has had the effect of undermining the moral and traditional basis of the authority of the Gbom Gwom since the bulk of the ‘indigenous’ non-Hausa population from whom he allegedly derives the legitimacy of office have now found themselves in another local government.

For these ethnic groups, especially the Berom, this development was taken as an unmitigated political disaster. They were to feel a more complete sense of loss when it turned out that a Hausa-Fulani candidate, Alhaji Ismaila Mohammed won the position of Jos North Local Government Chairman on the ticket of the National Republican Convention (NRC). The NRC was generally perceived as a party that represented the interest of the ‘Hausa-Fulani’ within the framework of national politics, and enjoyed massive electoral support of the ‘Hausa- Fulani’ community in Jos. On the contrary, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was perceived as the rallying point of ‘progressives’ and those generally opposed to ‘Hausa-Fulani’ power system. It enjoyed the support of northern minorities which included ethnic minorities on the Plateau.

As far as the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere were concerned, the split of Jos into North and South local governments was a result of high level scheming on the part of the Hausa community using their ethnic connections at the national level to exclude them as power contenders in Jos. Moreover, this new arrangement would in no small way legitimise their claims to ‘indigeneity’, not to contemplate the psychological effect of
isolating the Gbom Gwom from most of the Beroms whose culture and tradition he symbolises. The situation merely defined the battleground as the Berom and her allies persisted in the demand for the creation of new local governments or the re-drawing of the administrative boundaries in such a way that their fears would be assuaged.

In a paid advertorial titled "The Rip-Off of Democracy and the Denial of Natural Justice", the Berom Cultural Organisation (BECO) argued that the exercise was carried out for two reasons. One, to rid the Berom of their traditional abode which it alleged had been goal of the "Hausa-Fulani" group since the era of the Jihad. Two, to prepare for the islamisation of the predominantly non-Muslim groups which it claimed, was a grand design. BECO went further to point out the fundamental implications of this exercise for the Berom in respect of the future of Jos. It did not only lament what it called "the forceful" removal of the Berom from their "fatherland", but decried a situation in which the heart of the state capital had been "handed over to stranger elements". It also expressed the fear that Hausa District Heads would be appointed in place of "our respected District Heads in the new Jos North Local Government (The Standard, October 2, 1991).

Apparent unease and tension on the part of the indigenous groups, especially the Berom, was heightened by the palpable show of victory on the part of the Hausa community. The JASSAWA Youth Association, for example, in an undated letter, congratulated President Babangida for splitting what used to be Jos Local Government into North and South local governments with the Hausa community as the overwhelming majority in the former. In the same letter, they described the opposition to the exercise as a “grand design by the Berom to precipitate confusion and anarchy” (JASSAWA Youth Association, 1991:2).
The Berom in particular perceived this to be a systematic attempt aimed at undermining their political influence in Jos and more fundamentally, subject the institution of Gbom Gwom to ridicule. This feeling was strengthened by an event which reportedly followed the announcement of the newly created local government councils. A group of youths, believed to be “Hausa-Fulani,” were said to have stormed the palace of the Gbom Gwom, demanding immediate vacation from office and/or relocation of his palace to Bukuru, the headquarter of Jos South Local Government, now considered the domain of Berom and other groups considered to be his subjects. This was seen as an affront to the Berom who had stated in their September 11, 1991, demand for a new local government, the desire to have “their impact felt in the pulse of the local administration of their chieftaincy institution…. in order to avoid any possible harassment and eventual threat to the institution” (BECO, 1991).

Expectedly, this elicited reaction from the Berom leaders and elites. They pointed accusing fingers at some individuals of “Hausa-Fulani” extraction who may have used their influence and connections in the Babangida regime to turn the tide in favour of the Hausa community in Jos. They specifically pointed accusing fingers at some individuals like Colonel Lawan Gwadabe, a military officer with “settler” connection in Jos, believed to very influential in the General Ibrahim Babangida administration, and Alhaji Ramalan Abubakar, a civilian deputy governor in Plateau State who was perceived to be sympathetic towards the Hausa community in Jos. This much was conveyed in a letter dated 24th September 1991, addressed to the military president, General Ibrahim Babangida, in which leading Berom elders including the Gbom Gwom, Dr. Fom Bot, D. B. Zang, Bitrus Pam, Barnabas Dusu, Patrick Dokotri and Christopher Mancha, expressed the feelings that the Berom were being subjected to marginalisation as well as being reduced to a minority
status in the scheme of things in the Jos metropolis. They also raised the issue of possible
destruction of the sites of the traditional shrines, rites and the reservoir of Berom culture
(Ibid.).

In trying to demonstrate their relentlessness on the matter, they suggested two
options to the government. The first option suggested that government could accede to the
demand of the Afizere community by restoring the “Federe” local government which
would have the effect of making the chiefdom a separate local government. As pointed out
earlier, “Federe” was among the ill-fated local government councils created in the dying
days of the Shagari administration in the Second Republic. By this calculation, only the
Afizere would be excised from Jos Local Government. The other option was for the
government to merge Vwang and Kuru districts, hitherto, parts of Jos Local Government
with the proposed Riyom local government. This, again, would have the effect of
preserving Jos Local Government in such a way that would not significantly undermine the
political influence of the Berom, while at the same time protecting the Gbom Gwom
institution as a Berom heritage. All these demands, however, fell on deaf ears.

Another opportunity came in 1994 when the military dictatorship of General Sani
Abacha, in desperate search for legitimacy and popular support decided once more to
revisit the creation of new local governments. Alongside the National Constitutional
Conference which was set up by the regime as a part of its transition agenda, it raised a
National Committee for the Creation of Local Governments and Boundary Adjustment
under the chairmanship of a seasoned technocrat, Chief C. C. Mbanefo. Again, the Berom,
Afizere and Anaguta made representation to the Mbanefo Committee demanding for what
looked like a reversal of the previous exercise in 1991. They counterposed the existing split
of Jos into north and south by requesting for the creation of Jos East and Jos West local
governments. If the Mbanefo Committee heeded to this proposal, the indigenous ethnic communities would maintain substantial presence in the two local governments and could accordingly stake claims to the control of the apparatus of the local governments and other institutions of local power.

Not willing to be upstaged, the Hausa community responded by demanding the creation of Jos Central local government with a boundary that would be almost co-terminous with Jos North Local Government. Only five wards - Naraguta B ward, those of Jos Jarawa, Jenta Ademu, Tudun-Wada and Kabong, were excluded from what had been created as Jos North Local Government in 1991. What the Hausa community proposed, in effect, was a new “Jos North” Local Government with headquarters at Nasarawa Gwom. It is important to underscore the fact that the political manoeuvres in respect of the creation of new local governments became more acrimonious during this period because of the violent eruption of April 12 of the same year, following the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato as Chairman of the Caretaker Management Committee of Jos North Local Government Area.

While presenting their request for the creation of Jos Central Local Government in opposition to the desire of the 'indigenous' ethnic communities who favoured a split into Jos East and West to ensure their strong representation in the two local governments, the Hausa community addressed the adverse implication of splitting Jos into East and West local governments. Their memorandum submitted through JASAWA Youth Association opposed it for fear that "we may be brought under the control of smaller groups and subjected to their tyranny" (JASAWA, 1994:6). Elaborating further on their opposition in the same document they argued that
it will reduce our people to the status of slavery and indirectly we shall become non-Nigerians because everything enjoyed by other Nigerians will be denied us.....It will neither enhance unity nor meet the yearnings of our people for self-determination. It will rather necessitate rancour and friction and give a wide room for maginalisation and injustice...resources will be allocated on quota system, which will be strictly carried out, directly or indirectly, through local government councils. Ibid.

This kind of feelings and fears regarding how the administrative boundaries of the new local government should be drawn is not peculiar to the Hausa community as can be seen so far. The strong feelings expressed by the Hausa community on this matter go to show that the question of control of structures and institutions of local power is immersed in the crisis of local citizenship in the Jos metropolis. Not only does it constitute an arena for the identification of the relevant “others”, it is directly tied to attempts by the contending groups to establish the authenticity of their claim to the indigeneship of Jos.

There are other levels of struggle over access to local power which have direct consequence for ethnic identity politics and discourses of citizenship rights. These levels include the appointment of districts and ward heads and the creation of chiefdoms which do not only raise issues of access to power and resources, but also the fundamental question of ethnic self-determination. For the avoidance of doubts, chiefdoms, districts and wards are important levels of state power with implication for the construction of legitimacy and order, and as focal points in promoting development. But even more fundamentally, they are crucial in the determination of access to power and resources at the local level. For these reasons they are to be understood as a part and parcel of the structure of power within the Nigerian state system.

Despite the fact these positions are not endowed with constitutionally defined roles, they nevertheless play critical roles in the process of governance. They are useful, for
example, in the performance of extractive and regulatory functions associated with the post-colonial state such as the collection of taxes and dues and the maintenance of security surveillance within their domain. That they constitute a part and parcel of the structure of power and domination is further attested to by the fact that occupants of such positions are looked upon as agents of the state who have the responsibility to propagate the views and policies of the state and hence, within the framework of the search for legitimacy by the state.

It is even more particularly so in the context of the so-called grassroots approach to development in which wards and districts are necessarily reference points in the process of resource allocation as well as providing the basis for political representation. In more recent times wards have come to be recognized as the territorial level of political identity and representation closest to the people. For the political parties, the ward level is the level of party organization closest to the people. Consequently, the control of the ward for the aspiring political elites is seen as a major step in the quest to institute political control at the higher levels. Besides, district and ward heads play useful role in regulating access to land and housing, especially in urban situations.

It is against this background that the tension, disagreements and bad blood generated among the different communal groups in relation to creation of chiefdoms and appointments into positions of District and Ward heads in Jos can be understood. The immediate context for this was the removal in August 1985 of Alhaji Ali Kazaure as the Head of Ali Kazaure Ward. Expectedly, his removal generated so much bad blood between the Hausa community and the indigenous ethnic groups, and has continued to provide a reference point for the Hausa community to whom it is a demonstrable evidence of marginalization and ethnic persecution.
Prior to the removal of Alhaji Kazaure, there had been persistent complaint by the Hausa community to the effect that non-Hausa dominated areas were being unduly favoured in the creation of new districts and wards. Thus, they demanded that Hausa populated wards be upgraded to the status of districts. This was requested, first, in recognition of the high concentration of Hausa population in these wards; and secondly, to ensure equity and proportionality in the number of districts among the various communal groups. They first accuse the civilian government of Chief Solomon Daushep Lar during the Second Republic as being decidedly discriminatory against the Hausa community for its alleged failure to accede to such demands. Such discriminatory practices were allegedly perpetrated in the short lived ‘third republic’ when Chief Fidelis Tapgun was in power as Governor of Plateau State when he left out ‘Hausawa’ areas in the creation of new districts and wards. It was against the background of such demands and allegations that Alhaji Ali Kazaure was removed.

The circumstances surrounding his removal, however, need to be explained to enable one appreciate the issues and the political discurses that followed. Earlier on, before Alhaji Ali Kazaure emerged as the Ward Head, the substantive Hausa Ward Head was suspended and subsequently removed over some alleged wrongdoings. In his place, the Gbong Gwom, Dr. Fom Bot, appointed one Mallam Bulus in acting capacity. However, his appointment did not go down well with the predominantly Hausa population in the ward who consequently, pressured the authorities for his removal.

In response to what appeared to be a recognition of a groundswell of opposition to the appointment of a non-Muslim over a predominantly muslim population, the Gbong Gwom then constituted an electoral college for the election of a new, substantive ward head. It was the electoral college that elected Alhaji Ali Kazaure ahead of three other
contestants with 26 votes. The other contestants, Alhaji Ango Gyang, Alhaji Danjuma Audu and Alhaji Musa Maiyashi secured 25, 5 and nil votes, respectively. The three losers promptly rejected the outcome of the election and called for outright cancellation.

In addition to the religious cum ethnic undercurrent, especially considering the rejection of Mallam Bulus, a non-Hausa, the three candidates protested to the Sole Administrator of Jos Local Government in a letter dated August 21, 1985, on a number of grounds. First, they protested the lopsidedness in the composition of the Electoral College which had the following ethnic composition: Hausa (45), Berom (10), Ibo (4), and Yoruba (4). Second, they challenged the contempt for the non-Hausa residents in the ward who were not consulted prior to the removal of Mallam Bulus even though in an acting capacity. They further contended that Alhaji Ali Kazaure had been involved in partisan politics, and did not only need to be cleared by the government before taking any position of leadership in view of the general ban then clamped on politicians following the overthrow of civil politics in December 1983, but that his leadership in the ward would not inspire the confidence of his political opponents. Finally, they contended that the victory of Alhaji Ali Kazaure was manipulated given the short notice for election to members of the Electoral College, accounting for a turn out of 53 out of the 63 members of the electoral college.

The petitioners who were hopeful that the substantive issue raised by their petition would be tabled at Jos/Barkin Ladi Traditional Council expressed the desire that the Gbong Gwom invoke the traditional method used by the District Head or the Jos/Barkin Ladi Government Councils which entitles him to make a free choice of people to the office of the Ward Head. Given this context of undue politicization of issues, it is understandable that the Hausa community accused the power elite and aspiring politicians belonging to
these ethnic groups of master minding the removal of Hausa District Heads from the Jos and Barkin Ladi Joint Traditional Council in 1989. The decision was however reversed following the intervention of the Military Governor.

Nevertheless, agitation based on a feeling of marginalization has continued within the Hausa community over matters of creating new districts and appointment of Hausa District Heads to redress the imbalance between them and the indigenous ethnic communities. Thus, in one of their petitions addressed to the Committee raised by the Plateau State Government on the creation of Chiefdoms, Districts and Village Areas in July 1999, the JASSAWA Development Association, restated the demand for the creation of two districts for the Hausa community in Jos: Dilimi and Jos Central Districts (Jassawa, 1999). As usual, the demand was premised on the alleged economic viability of the areas proposed, the preponderance of Hausa population in the areas and the history of long residence which is often tied to their claim to the “ownership” of Jos.

Against the background of persistence in demand for the creation of additional districts as well as appointment of new District Heads and the refusal of the authorities to do so, the Hausa community harbours a strong feeling of alienation and marginalization. But for the Hausa, it is more than the question of controlling power and resources within the areas they reside. The more fundamental issue appears to be the fact that this denial is tied to the denial of their local citizenship and the claim to authenticity in this regard.

5.2: ECONOMIC/RESOURCE COMPETITION AND ETHNIC IDENTITY

As noted already, competition for resources including a share of the market provides a site for the reproduction of ethnicity in the sense that competition tend to acquire inter-ethnic character. Two critical issues raise the question of ethnic identity to the
foreground in the process of competition for resources: unevenness in the level of access among the various ethnic groups to resources which is related to historical factors which may confer advantage or disdvantage and the tendency towards ethnic segmentation of the market. These two factors are relevant in seeking to understand the distribution of economic power among the various groups and the way in which this feeds into the construction of their identity and rights. This section attempts to highlight these issues as part of the overall framework that shape the question of identity and rights in Jos.

5.2.1: The Context

In order to understand the overall context that frames the contestation over identity and rights in Jos, it is important to examine the nature of the economy in Jos and the patterns of ethnic control and domination in crucial spheres of economic activities. The nature of economy has implication for issues related to identity and rights in at least three ways. For one, it is well established that the mobilization of ethnic identity takes place in the context of stiff competition for resources. Second, lopsidedness in the distribution of economic power and unequal access to resources which occurs along ethnic and communal line can provide the basis for identity-based conflicts. Whereas those who are disadvantaged attempt to challenge the imbalance, a tilt in the existing balance can as well generate tension and animosity. Third, conditions of underdevelopment and low level of industrial and economic activities can result in scarcity which not only encourages stiff competition, but creates a fertile ground for ethnic and related forms of primordial sentiments to grow.

The economy of Jos metropolis manifests all the conditions and/or contradictions associated with underdevelopment. Located as it is within the Middle Belt region, a region
that is historically disadvantaged, the economy is generally characterized by low levels of
industrial production and the predominance of trading and commercial activities. Jos
therefore provides a sharp contrast to a city such as Kano with relatively heavier industrial
base, despite the fact that it shares all the features of an underdeveloped and backward
economy. Against this backdrop it is expected that the economic decline witnessed from
the 1980s and the market-based adjustment programme which followed would have
tremendous impact on the identity question. The impact of such economic conditions for
the sharpening of ethnic and communal differences is underscored in many studies and
particularly in specific cases of inter-ethnic tension as in Jos in 1945 (Plotnicov, 1972). It
also provided a useful context for the April 12, 1994 violence in Jos as will be pointed out.

Four main features of contemporary Jos economy are significant for attention
because of their implication for competition and inter-ethnic relations. First, is the decline
of tin which provided the linchpin for the colonial economy at the beginning of the 20th
century. Second, is the structure of ownership of the major economic and industrial
activities which is heavily skewed in favour of the public sector, and a correspondingly low
level of accumulation undertaken by the private sector apart from the informal sector.
Third, is the ruinous impact of the orthodox adjustment programme introduced from the
mid-1980s which has led to the collapse of the public sector-led industrial activities of the
1970s and the early 1980s. Fourth and perhaps the most significant, is the tendency ethnic
segmentation of the market as reflected in the patterns of ethnic control of the share of the
market as well as ethnic monopolies of certain trade. The first three are elaborated in
greater detail below, while the fourth is illustrated by the focus on the allocation of stalls in
the Ultra-Modern Jos Market and the informal sector.
It is important to begin with the position of tin in the economy of Jos. Ironically, tin mining which opened the Jos economy to massive inflow of foreign capital and immensely accelerated the process of urbanization has suffered a decline, and has virtually ceased to be important. By the mid-1980s, after a series of attempt by the government to retrieve the fortunes of the sector, it finally went into a comatose situation. This has correspondingly affected the contribution of the sector to productive activities and employment generation in particular.

At the time the tin mining industry attained its zenith the Jos Plateau accounted for a substantial part of Nigeria’s contribution which was approximately 5 % of the world’s total production. The production of tin ore was dominated by five foreign companies, including the Almagamated Tin Mining Company of Nigeria (ATMN), which was by far the biggest. Before the secular collapse of the sector in the early 1980s, the ATMN alone produced 1,211 tonnes of tin and 80 tonnes of columbite in 1982. The production figure for 1983 was 1,136 tonnes of tin and 80 tonnes of columbite. The company, which then sold its product to the Makeri Smelting Company (SMC), had a staff strength of about 591. Of these, 543 were in the intermediate and junior staff categories, while 48 were in the senior staff category (Plateau State Information Directorate, 1989: 12).

The production of tin and columbite however nose-dived after 1983. A number of factors accounted for this downward trend. Very significant was the fall in the international prices of the two commodities and the corresponding absence of local industries for the smelting of tin. The Makeri Smelting Company which was set up in 1962 for the purpose of smelting and refining Nigeria’s output of tin ore fell short of the demand. For instance, the smelting company continued to suffer capacity under-utilization. It was only in 1968 that the company recorded its best performance of 13,000 tonnes of the installed 18,000
capacity. What followed was a steady decline which forced the company to diversify into other activities in order to keep afloat (Ibid. :12).

Another factor, perhaps more significant, was the emergence of crude petroleum export as the foreign exchange earner for the country. The ruinous impact of the oil sector on the other sectors is a tale too familiar in the account of the Nigerian economic crisis that need not be reproduced here. It played a key role in forcing attention away from the non-oil exports including tin and columbite. Aware of the dwindling fortunes of the tin sector, government initiated some responses chief among which was the decision to nationalize the existing five tin companies in 1985. This led to the establishment of the Nigerian Tin Mining Company. However, the fact remains that the sector remains insignificant in terms of its contribution to the health of the economy of Jos as illegal mining activity has taken over outside of the purview of the state.

Added to the collapse of the tin sector is the near total ruin experienced by state sponsored economic ventures which contributed to the growth and dynamism of the Jos economy in the 1980s. Many have either declined, folded up or outrightly sold out to private hands. One good example is the Jos International Breweries (JIB), brewers of “Rock” and “Class” lager beer and malt. The idea of establishing the JIB was muted in 1975, at a time the assault on the “developmentalist” state currently spearheaded by the World Bank and the IMF had not started. The government of Plateau State, concerned with the desire to boost economic and industrial activities in the state, went into negotiation with Cerekem Foods of Denmark.

By 1979 construction work and installation of machinery had been completed for the take-off of the company. The company thus started production the same year as a limited liability company with the Plateau State Government holding majority shares. It
however became a public liability company by 1990. The first ten years of the company witnessed its substantial contribution to the growth of the Jos economy because the range of beer produced by the company gained public acceptability. For this reason the company which commenced initially with a production range of 250,000 hecto litres reached a production range of 1.1 million hecto litres per annum. The company also embarked on intensive backward integration ventures with the establishment of BARC Farms Limited, a large scale integrated and modern farming venture. It also established Pioneer Mills Company which produced brewing grits, flour, animal feeds and grain germs. At the peak of the company’s productivity, it offered along with its subsidiaries, employment to 2000 people and indirect employment to many more through the redistribution of the company’s many products (Karuri, 1990).

However, the company began to experience a steady decline from the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s as the full weight of the adverse impact of the market reforms instituted by the Nigerian state from the mid-1980s came to bear on the operations of the company. In particular the collapse in the value of the Naira and the foreign exchange cost of imported spare parts took a heavy toll on the fortunes of the company. Faced with a steady decline, the company like several other public companies, embarked on the retrenchment of its work force. Thus, coupled with the problem of corruption and mismanagement, the civilian government in Plateau State in the shortlived ‘Third Republic’ sold the BARC Farms.

Given the full embrace of market reforms and official sanction of a private sector led capitalist economy and the ascendancy of the forces of globalization prospects of state intervention in the economy is increasingly diminishing. This means that with a very weak private sector and the absence of a strong local entrepreneurial class, the economy is
virtually grounded. Indeed, the private sector is considerably weak. Notable private industrial ventures whose contribution to the economy in terms of productivity and employment generation are significant include NASCO, Grand Cereals, Jos Four Mills and the WAMPCO, located at Vom. Of these, NASCO which was established in 1963 by an Eritrean business man, Alhaji Abdul Nasredin, has made a huge contribution to the growth and expansion of the Jos economy.

The range of products produced by NASCO include biscuits, tiles, carpets, blanket and jute bags which are widely distributed in the Nigerian market and in a number of countries in the West African sub-region. The company witnessed rapid expansion from inception as attested to by the establishment of different subsidiaries. In 1967, a fibre factory was established to produce jute bags. It was followed by the establishment of NASCO Household Products in 1977 specializing in the production of detergents. The late 1970s was also marked by the establishment of additional manufacturing concerns when NASCO Food and Biscuits Company came into being. However, the expansion which continued into the early 1980s was caught up by the economic crisis and the introduction of SAP which followed. Consequently, it suffered the fate that befell several other industrial and manufacturing concerns. The company was forced to down size the work force with corresponding growth in the number of casual labourers.

What predominates, therefore, in terms of industrial activity is the numerous small-scale economic ventures with varying levels of state support in Jos, and which are contributing to building a crop of petty bourgeoisie and indigenous entrepreneurial class. But as has been shown, this sector cannot thrive except with massive state support which increasingly cannot be guaranteed, thus weakening its strength vis-à-vis foreign capital and the overall potential to contribute to the transformation of the economy (Sha, 1985).
The consequence of all this is that commerce and trade is the most thriving sphere of economic activity in Jos. Given the nature and level of economic activity, coupled with the prevailing notion of “minimum” government and the concomitant downsizing of the work force in the public sector, unemployment and underemployment have become endemic. In short, the economy can be characterized as weak and fragile, based on low level of industrial activity and the rapid expansion of the informal sector which continues to swell as a result of retrenchment in the public and private sectors. This prevailing economic condition contributes to the growing problem of scarcity and socio-economic insecurity which face many of the residents, and has considerably impacted on identity and inter-group relations. But even more importantly, the pattern of ethnic control over trade and commerce including the informal sector shows a pattern of domination which, again, has consequence for competition, identity and inter-group relations.

To illustrate this point further, the pattern of ownership of market stalls in the Jos main market and the ethnic segmentation of the informal market are used. These two issues are discussed in the sections which immediately follow.

5.2.2: The Case of Jos Main Market

The allocation of market stalls falls directly under resources and opportunities, access to which are subject to, and determined by, state control and regulation. Precisely, because access is defined by state control, allocation of benefits and opportunities is open to local ethnic and communal pressure. Although this pressure is useful in determining beneficiaries from the allocation, other factors which include the relative strength of the groups in competition which itself, is a function of the previous historical advantage and
resource endowments ultimately will determine which groups benefit in the process of accumulation.

The differential access of the various groups to allocation of market stalls and related opportunity for the purpose of accumulation has always been a vexed issue in the relationships between the various ethno-cultural groups in Jos, although it appears more profound between the Hausa community on the one hand the “indigenous” ethnic communities on the other. Not unexpectedly, it was one of the most contentious issues between the two groups in the early 1980s when the debate over citizenship rights was most intense.

However, allocation of market stalls did not become a contentious issue prior to 1970 when Hausa monopoly in trade and commerce was unchallenged. The re-entry of the Igbo after the end of the civil war and the rise of a core of local elite in the course of the 1970s completely altered the situation. The allocation of stalls in the Jos Main market as it existed before it was gutted by fire in November 1966 was the responsibility of the Chief Scribe in the market. It was he who rented the stalls to traders on monthly basis. It has been suggested that the Jos Town Council Market Committee which handled general administrative matters exercised, while it lasted, evenhandedness in the discharge of its assignment (Balarabe, 1992: 53). Despite this claim, Igbo traders protested in 1965 against the alleged bias of the Committee in matters relating to allocation of stalls. The alleged discriminatory practices were aimed at checkmating the advance of Igbo commercial interest in the city.

In 1981, one Umaru Sani, claiming to be speaking on behalf of Hausa community in Jos, alleged “the intensified oppression and marginalization” of the Hausa community in several spheres, including the allocation of market stalls. Claiming that the marginalization
of the Hausa community was a deliberate act of vengeance with the rise of the Berom to political ascendancy, he insinuated that the Jos main market was burnt down in 1975 by the “mountain tribes” as a deliberate action to bring to an end the advantageous position of the Hausa in terms of allocation of market stalls (*Sunday New Nigerian*, September 20, 1981). Umaru Sani probably had in mind the flurry of petitions that followed the reconstruction of the market after the 1975 fire incident, regarding the manner of allocation of market stalls. The Allocation Committee which handled the allocation of market stalls in the three places involved – New Market, Meat Market and Laranto – was accused of doing undue favour to the “indigenes”.

This allegation of ethnic bias and nepotism in the allocation exercise was however refuted by one rather awkward body by the name “Berom Intellectual Revived Organizational Club”. Sen Luka Gwom who signed the advertorial on behalf of the organization and who later became president of Berom Educational and Cultural Organization (BECO), engaged in what was essentially a rebuttal of the claims and insinuations contained in Umaru Sani’s article which has been referred to earlier (*Nigeria Standard*, October 5, 1981). The response which almost turned out to be a confirmation of the fear and anxiety of the Hausa community was that, despite the fact that the Hausa did not account for the majority of the population in Jos, they had highest the number of beneficiaries from market stalls allocation in Jos. Allegations of sharp practices were so rife then that the Plateau State Government set up a panel in June 1976 to investigate the activities of the Allocation Committee. The white paper issued by the government in October the same year attempted to redress the plethora of grievances contained in the numerous petitions that greeted the exercise.
Considering the history of inter-ethnic competition and the furore generated by the allocation of market stalls in a setting in which trade and commerce constitute the dominant mode of accumulation as well as intense scarcity occasioned by massive economic decline, the struggle for allocation of stalls in the Ultra-Modern Jos Main Market (JUMA) becomes a critical issue. The market is a monumental edifice located at the heart of the Jos metropolis. Although the project was initiated much earlier, it was the Second Republic civilian administration in the State, under Chief Solomon D. Lar, that completed it. The contract for the construction of a new market followed the fire incident in 1975 which completely razed the market built in 1954.

The contract for the construction of the market was actually awarded to BEPCO in August 1977 by the government at the cost of N24m. Being a major capital investment, expected to boost economic and commercial activities and earn revenue for the government, the loan for the project was obtained from the United Bank for Africa Plc. Although construction work started in October the same year, the suspension of financial transaction with the bank stalled the execution of the project for the next two years. However, following the inauguration of civil politics in October 1979, the new civilian administration revived the project which was subsequently completed and commissioned in 1984.

Described as the first of its kind in Nigeria and the West African sub-region, the ultra-modern market is a focal point of attention both in terms of revenue prospects to the Plateau State Government and contribution to the growth in economic and commercial activities in general (Plateau State Ministry of Information, 1981: 28). The immense potential of the market in these terms, certainly makes it one of the most ambitious projects of the state government. The market has provisions for all kinds of facilities including
1,650 traditional market platforms of approximately 3.10 square metres each, 144 meat and fish retail stalls, 2,406 retail and wholesale stalls for various items and wares and 44 canteens of approximately 10 square metres. Other facilities in the market are 37 meat and fish wholesale stalls, one large modern restaurant of approximate area of 175 square metres, and provision for 5,000 different categories of traders. Besides, the market provides spaces which can accommodate 300 cars, 60 trailers and 200 buses, in addition to provision for two banking halls and an administrative complex which houses the market authority.

Against this background, it is logical to expect that allocation of market stalls and related opportunities is likely to be highly politicized. The control of the market and the distribution of stalls and other related opportunities are, therefore, bound to be of focal interest for the local elite. A consequence of this is that the administration of the market is likely to be brought under severe local pressure to exclude people perceived as “settlers” and “strangers” in the allocation of market stalls. It is therefore expected that the JUMA, the bureaucracy responsible for the general administration of the market will become a site of all kinds of pressure, especially the pressure to exclude “non-indigenes” and to encourage the emergence of a crop of traders and businessmen from among the indigenous ethnic communities.

The records obtained from JUMA, regarding the ethnic pattern of beneficiaries in the allocation of market stalls is presented in Table 5.3. The evidence suggests that the Hausa constitute the single largest ethnic group to have allocation of stalls as represented in the table is the other ethnic groups outside of the three ethnic nationalities that are believed to enjoy ethnic majority status in the Nigerian political discourse. This group includes the indigenous ethnic communities in Jos to which belong the Berom, Afizere and
Table 5.3: Ethnic Distribution Of Stalls In The Ultra-Modern Market, Jos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hall</th>
<th>Igbo</th>
<th>Yoruba</th>
<th>Hausa</th>
<th>Plateau &amp; Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JOS</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANGU</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASE</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANAM</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWE</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEFFI</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHENDAM</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKWANGA</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTSIDE</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1165 (29.47%)</td>
<td>496 (12.55%)</td>
<td>1237 (31.29%)</td>
<td>1055 (26.69%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Grand Total = 3953**

Anaguta as well as other minorities from the various parts of the country. They account for 1055 stalls (26.69%) in the allocation exercise. The picture will appear absurd if we disaggregate the entire groups on ethnic basis to see the quantum of allocation to each of the ethnic groups.

Worse still, as suggested by the findings, it is not uncommon for beneficiaries of allocation, especially among groups outside these majority ethnic nationalities to either lease out their allocations to more prosperous traders, or to engage in outright sale of the allocation to Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba traders. Thus, even if it were possible to allocate market stalls exclusively to indigenes on justifiable political grounds of encouraging them to gain a foothold in trade and commerce, there will still linger the problem of inability to take advantage as a result of the skewed nature of resource endowment which is hardly in their favour.

The evidence therefore tends to support the existence of marginalization and the existing structure of opportunities in which the indigenous ethnic communities are disadvantaged. This question of domination of the Jos economy by people considered to be “outsiders” is at the root of the fears, anxiety and frustration being expressed by the natives. It is, therefore, an important issue in the discourse on identity and how it relates to the wider issues of citizenship rights. Apart from access to resources as it relates to control over trading and commercial activities as shown here, the pattern of domination of the informal sector is another key issue. The section which immediately follows, attempts to highlight the patterns of dominance in the urban informal sector in the Jos metropolis.

5.2.3: Ethnicity and Resource Competition in the Informal Sector
The need to focus on the informal sector derives from a number of factors. First, the informal sector is an outstanding feature of the Jos economy. This includes the range of economic activities that consist of one-man firms, run either on the basis of family labour or hiring outside labour, focusing on retail trade, construction, wood and metal working, and electrical mechanical repairing and transportation among others (JASPA, 1986: 244). The significance of this sector derives from its employment potentials which relies on traditional social networks of family, friends and neighbours. It is well established in the literature that this sector contributes significantly to the employment of urban population and poverty reduction.

Second, the pattern of ethnic control and domination has been central to the debates and contestation over identity and citizens rights. Mangwvat and Gonyok (1981), for example, contend that immigrant groups such as Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba dominate trade and commerce in the Jos metropolis to the exclusion of “indigenous” groups. This, they contend, has been made possible through their connections with well established ware houses and market centres located at Ibadan, Onitsha, Kano and Ogbomosho. In other words, the claims regarding the domination of indigenous ethnic communities, especially the Berom, Anaguta and Afizarere, and the need to ward off competititon from more economically powerful migrants through the control of the structure of local power and other exclusive practices is embedded in this history.

However, any discussion about the urban informal sector will have to take into account the three broad typologies identified by Aboagye and Gozo (1986). These include the informal sector as a result of migration of artisans from the rural areas; the informal sector as a result of the failure of the modern sector to provide adequate employment, skilled opportunities to unskilled migrants and the existing urban labour force; and the one
resulting from the legitimate desires of persons with jobs in the modern sector to control and operate their own businesses. The growth and development of the sector in the Jos metropolis is a result of combination of these three broad forms.

The early history of migration and subsequent development within the Jos economy provide insight to the preponderance and the enduring character of the informal sector. For one, there is the generally low level of economic activity in Jos which derives partly from the relative economic backwardness of the Middle Belt region. Neither has the private sector nor the state, dating back to the colonial era, stimulated substantial economic activities capable of absorbing all the immigrants who left their rural economies in search of greener pastures. Not even the tin mining industry, which accounted for the bulk of employment in the colonial period could absorb the available labour force, because of the periodic crisis occasioned by the collapse in the world prices of the commodity (Freund, 1980).

The informal sector, on the other hand, is not directly tied to state control and regulation. As in most cases, the informal sector in Jos lacks autonomous existence from the formal sector. Its growth and continued vibrancy has been tied to the development of the formal sector. In addition to the fact that imported goods traded upon by those in the informal sector are obtained from the big trading companies such as G. B.O, UAC and PZ, it derived its initial impetus from servicing people employed in the formal sector and in the mining companies (Balarabe, 1992:26).

The history of migration into Jos provides some insight about the nature of the urban informal sector. Early migrants were mostly of skilled labour and artisans who were of southern origin. Igbo and Yoruba, especially the former constituted the bulk; while a number were absorbed into many of the colonial trading companies such as the UAC and
UTC, and into the technical departments of the burgeoning colonial administration, others had been self-employed. On retirement, those who were previously employed had to swell the rank of those in the emergent informal market of self-employment.

Some existing studies attempt to provide insight into the ethnic structure of the informal market in Jos. Balarabe (1992), for example, suggests the overwhelming dominance of the Hausa in trade and commercial activities in the Jos metropolis up to the 1940s. This dominance is said to be a consequence of the vast Hausa commercial network historically fostered by ties based on a common Islamic religion and access to credit and transportation networks centred around Kano. This is easy to understand given the central role of Kano in the entire Hausa commercial diaspora covering a substantial part of West Africa and dating back to the trans-saharan trade era. Hausa trading and commercial hegemony which was established around the mines was followed by the Yoruba and much later by the Igbo who emerged as a factor from the end of the 1940s.

Hausa dominance in this early phase centred around cattle trade, transportation, kola nuts, food stuffs, handicrafts, blacksmithing, household furniture making and general merchandise. The control of transportation made it possible for the Hausa to dominate the “middle men” position by purchasing foodstuffs and other agricultural products from farmers on the Plateau and markets around Jos. Dominance in kolanut trade and handicrafts resulted from the control of the vast trade networks alluded to earlier. That of kolanut, in particular, resulted from the existence of a vibrant Hausa commercial diaspora extending into the forest belt of the West African sub-region including Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire as well as the kolanut trade in western Nigeria. According to Balarabe (1992: 46-47), the dominance of the Hausa trade in this early period up to the early 1960s was evident in the
fact that they accounted for 80% of the ownership of about 400 market stalls built at the time.

However, the arrival of more aggressive competitors, especially the Igbo from the end of the 1940s posed a serious threat to Hausa commercial monopoly. Thus, Balarabe (Ibid.:88) noted that by 1966 the competing commercial interests between the Hausa and the Igbo had become very acute as the latter had made significant incursions into Hausa trade monopolies. Issues like discrimination in the allocation of market stalls and other restrictive practices to undecut Igbo trading interests were increasingly becoming matters of contention and contestation as exemplified by the protest embarked upon by all Igbo traders on 19th March 1965 to register their grievances which included the forced relocation of their building materials market. It is believed that apart from the political developments which led to the urban riots in northern cities in May and October 1966 in which people of Igbo origins were massacred, the animosity generated by the rising threat of Igbo commercial interests further fueled anti-Igbo sentiments.

The riots of May and October and the civil war that followed led to the exodus of the Igbos to their ethnic homeland in Eastern Nigeria. It brought a temporary hault to the commercial ascendancy of the Igbo and re-established Hausa leadership in trade and commerce. Further development in the immediate post-war years provided additional boost to the entrenchment of Hausa commercial interests within the Jos metropolis, namely, the exodus of the Lebanese as a result of the indigenisation programme of 1972 and 1977. The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees (later Acts) sought to entrench national control of the economy by reserving some spheres of accumulation exclusively for Nigerians. Lebanese and the Asian communities were adversely affected and this created additional opportunities for Nigerian businessmen to move into such areas. Thus, the vacuum created
by the exit of Levantine commercial and trading interests, were filled by the Hausa taking advantage of their previous resource endowments.

The pattern of ethnic control within the informal sector of the Jos economy has not dramatically changed in the sense that Hausa dominance in trade and commerce has survived. What perhaps may be regarded as a significant change is the re-entry of the Igbo into the trading and commercial activities of the city following the end of the war. Returning at the end of the war with the ban on “tribal unions” clamped by the Ironsi administration still in force, and with a deep sense of deprivation and displacement, their re-entry took on a more aggressive form. The Igbo are found in virtually all spheres of the informal economy, ranging from sale of food stuffs, patent medicine and timber to haulage business and commercial transportation, textile and general merchandise. Igbo control and dominance extends even beyond what can be strictly described as the informal sector to include real estate, hospitals and clinics and a substantial number of private educational institutions (see Peoples and Events, 1996, for example).

The overall picture that emerges in terms of the ethnic patterns of control of the informal sector within the Jos economy tends to suggest the dominance of the Igbo and the Hausa in that order, followed the Yoruba. These ethnic groups, as has been previously suggested, are historically advantaged to exercise this dominance, given the long tradition of trade and commerce pre-dating the colonial period as well as the control of the national economy by their bourgeois elements. Kano clearly stands out as the centre of industrial and commercial activities in the entire area hitherto referred to as Northern Nigeria. Similarly, Lagos-Ibadan axis and Onitsha-Aba axis are undisputably the hub of industrial and commercial activities for the south-west and the south-east, respectively. This reality which reflects the unevenness characteristic of Nigeria’s dependent capitalism and the
structure of inequality account for the unequal access to credits and other facilities which are heavily skewed in favour of business men from the majority ethnic nationalities.

The survey conducted in 1995 to determine and ascertain the pattern of ethnic dominance and control of some aspects of the informal economy appears to confirm this trend. The survey covers those trades that are fairly organized, visible and amenable to documentation. The businesses and trades covered in the survey are: spare parts, hotels, building materials, patent medicine and textile. A total of 200 businesses within the Jos metropolis were randomly selected for the purpose of the survey. Among the selected businesses the distribution of sample in terms of the specific economic activity is as follows: spare parts – 42 (21%); hotels and restaurants – 29 (14.5%); building materials – 46 (23%); patent medicine – 29 (14.5%); timber – 21 (10.5%); and textiles – 33 (16.5%).

One significance of the survey derives from shedding light on the very nature of the informal sector, providing evidence regarding why the ethnic pattern of ownership and control may not be amenable to change over time. People who tend to be drawn into the informal trade networks as apprentices and on-the-job skill acquisition are usually blood brother, members of the extended family and people from the “home town”. Such persons are “sent off” at the end of apprenticeship, often on very generous terms with the intention to set up their own business. Biological and social ties which are fostered among people in the same line of business tend to create a bond of solidarity and internal cohesion which can be deployed to ward off unwanted entrants and competitors into the trade. It therefore tends to reinforce and reproduce ethnic monopolies.

The consequence of this as established by the survey is that what exists is not just a pattern of control that reflects ethnic monopolies of certain trade or aspects of the informal sector. It also shows some degree of “localism” in the pattern of dominance as people from
one sub-ethnic unit tend to predominate in a particular business. Igbo who dominate the spare parts trade are mostly from Nnewi, those entrenched in patent medicine come largely

Table 5.4: Ethnic Patterns Of Control Of Selected Informal Economic Activities In Jos (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>HAUSA</th>
<th>IGBO</th>
<th>YORUBA</th>
<th>OTHERS</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spare parts</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Materials</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work (1995)
from the Orlu axis, while the timber trade tends to be synonymous with people from Enugu-Agidi. It does appear that what happens in the Igbo commercial diaspora is a reflection of the pattern of economic specialization in their ethnic homeland.

Table 5.4 is derived from the result of the 1995 survey. It shows clearly the hegemonic position of the Igbo in the economic activities covered such as the spare parts, hotels, building materials, timber and textiles. Only in timber and textiles one finds some element of competition from the Hausa. As useful as the survey may be in showing patterns of ethnic control and/or monopoly, it grossly understates the level of control exerted by the Hausa community in the realm of economic activities in general and the informal sector in particular. This results from the fact that the selected activities happen to be ones with high Igbo participation. The survey did not include areas of strategic investments such as real estate and the distribution of petroleum products. Nor did it include informal economic activities such as trade in kolanut, used clothes, general merchandise, tailoring, mechanical repairs, commercial cycling and butchery to mention some very prominent examples of activities with high level of Hausa participation.

It is evident from the foregoing that the economy of Jos is predominantly controlled by ethnic groups other than the indigenous ethnic communities of the Jos Plateau, regarded as the “natives” of Jos. Migrant ethnic communities such as the Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba and several other nationalities exercise varying degrees of control. The Berom, Anaguta and Afizere as well as other ethnic minorities from Plateau State exercise little or no control. Although agitation and grievances focusing on the control exercised over the economy has not yet been openly articulated by the elite of these ethnic minorities, or has not yet become the basis of inter-ethnic disharmony, it is nevertheless a useful component of the overall
experience of domination and oppression which remains a sub-text in the construction of identity and the production of history.
CHAPTER SIX

PRODUCTION OF HISTORY: INDIGENEITY AND CONTRADICTORY NOTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN JOS

6.0. Introduction:

In a significant sense the relationship between the exclusive character of ethnic claims on the one hand, and the question of citizenship on the other, is exemplified by the notion of "indigeneity" which was introduced into Nigeria's public law in 1979. Precisely because "indigeneity" is defined in biological terms, or on the basis of descent, individuals and groups involved in contestation and claims necessarily have to resort to history to construct and reconstruct their identity on the basis of which their claims to rights and entitlements within the local political space is anchored.

The construction of identity on the basis of historical facts and evidence to establish the authenticity of the claims of a group to a native or indigeneship status necessarily involves the production of history. This chapter discusses the production of history that is implied in the contradictory claims and assertions based on history in the effort to establish their identities. The chapter intends to, among others, illustrate the tension, passion and group perception of justice as well as expectations associated with this form of production of history within the Nigerian state, in the way in which the contradictory claims of the Hausa community on the one hand, and the ethnic minorities such as the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta on the other are framed. Although inter-ethnic relations among the various ethnic groups in Jos is marked by a certain degree of competition, collaboration and tension, the relationship between these two groups has been
particularly marked by animosity and tension as exemplified by the April 12, 1994 carnage which for two days brought the city of Jos to a standstill. As will be shown the crisis provided the arena for the groups at conflict to tell their own story on the basis of lived experiences. This is essentially what is captured in this chapter centred around the “production of history”.

The chapter explores the position of the various contending ethnic groups on the question of citizenship rights and entitlements within the political and social space of Jos metropolis. At some level, it is not simply a question of the tussle over “ownership” of Jos in the abstract sense of the word as such. Strongly implicated in this is the contestation over identity, access to power and resources, all of which bring out the tension between ethnic claims, citizenship and "indigeneity". For instance, as will be shown, the claims of the Hausa community which includes the question of access to political power and resources appears diametrically opposed to that of the "indigenous" ethnic nationalities. This is well played out in the use of historical facts and logic as each side attempts to justify its claims.

6.1: The Production of History and the Discourse on Identity and Citizenship

To a large extent the way in which the "ownership" of Jos is debated, contested and fought over between the Hausa community and the ethnic minorities of the Jos Plateau can be appropriately described as the production of history. So is the claims of other groups that are involved in the civil and political life of Jos. What makes it unique is the exclusivity of their claims and the selective deployment of historical facts to bolster their claims. It essentially involves each party telling its own story, its own "truth" concerning the ownership of Jos, based on its own interest, experience, social location and above all, its expectations from other groups with which it is locked in the contest. Although not strictly an intellectual exercise of the sort as in Kenya over the meaning of Mau Mau where the notion of production of history is derived, the
unending debates and disputation between the Hausa who are labelled "settlers" and Berom, Afizere and Anaguta who have appropriated the status of "natives" encompass as Cohen and Atieno-Odhiambo (1992:80) put it,

......not only conventions and paradigms, in the formation of historical knowledge and historical texts, but also - among other things - the forces underlying interpretation and the contentions, emotions, and forces which evoke and produce historical literature.

What this suggests is that the production of history is not strictly confined to the conventional understanding of producing knowledge. The domain of production of history also includes the way in which the people who make history understand themselves and how this understanding shapes their perception and consciousness. Production of history in this sense involves the people telling their own history as they understand it. It is deeper and richer in terms of meaning and tend to provide greater insight into individual and collective consciousness on the basis of which group expectations and demands are framed.

The production of history as examplified in the contest of "ownership" of Jos derives meaning from the larger Nigerian polity where the issues of citizenship and indigeneity have evoked so much passion and, therefore, have not been settled. Conceptions of citizenship and indigeneity appear to move in two opposite directions as criteria based on the latter could mean exclusion for those constitutionally conferred with the former status. The difficult question is who qualifies to be an ‘indigene’ of a state or a local government? Is it those who have settled in the area before 1960, the time of the country's independence? Or should it refer to those who had settled prior to colonial rule? And in instances where groups at conflict had occupied the physical space prior to colonisation, should it be the group that can provide historical proof of prior settlement? All these questions frame the issues around which debates over identity, citizenship and indigeneity are conducted.
The real site for the production of history is the expression of individual and group feelings, sentiments and experiences as opposed to the 'official' version of history sanctioned by the state. These include the different agitation contained in press conferences organised by groups and individuals who claim to press the claims of specific communal groups as well as the memoranda and oral representations made to state appointed panels of inquiry dealing with communal violence and disturbances. In fact, it is a whole range of processes and activities which include real and imagined ways of constructing group identity and "otherness". A very intriguing dimension of this process is the way in which key actors and participants in the process resort to local history in legitimizing their claims. If the implication of Elizabeth Isichei’s remark (1980:8) that “traditions of origin can be fabricated to suit a political or other purpose” is fully digested, it is precisely the source of the tension and sometimes violent outburst that has characterized the contestation over identity and citizens’ rights in Jos.

The production of history as understood in this context appears to be essentially an elites problem. It is a form of social construction and sometimes imagining, by the leading elites, in the attempt to legitimize a certain pattern of exclusion, or in challenging and deconstructing existing system of power and domination. This is the sense in which local history is deployed in matters relating to contestation over identity and rights and the material advantage associated with such contestation. Besides the deployment of local history, there is the tendency for the elite who engage in such struggles in the modern/public domain to resort to culture and tradition in mobilizing support from the rank and file of the membership of the ethnic community involved, and in the process confer legitimacy and moral support for the struggle. This strategy of group and community mobilization on the basis of the past and the cultural heritage and traditions of the people is not new.
Marx recognized the importance of the uses of past glories for the bourgeoisie to sustain their leading position in the political economy. Thus, Marx revealed that the unheroic bourgeoisie of his own day borrowed metaphors of bravery from a heroic Roman epoch. He says further that

………a century earlier, Cromwell and the English people had borrowed speeches, passions and illusions from the Old Testament for their bourgeois revolution. When the real aim had been achieved, when the bourgeois transformation of English society had been accomplished, Locke supplanted Habbakuk……Thus, the awakening of the dead in these revolutions served the purpose of glorifying the new struggles (Marx, 1982:3).

The point being illustrated here is that resorting to the past in order to give meaning and legitimacy to the present struggles appears to be the case in many historical epochs and situations. But it also suggests that those who deploy it do not do so because of any intention to recreate the past. The past is only invoked opportunistically and as a strategy for prosecuting the struggle of the present.

The claims of the Hausa community, for example, reflect both their actual and imagined historical experiences with the other communal groups, their conceptions of, and expectations from the Nigerian state, and what they perceive as justice on the basis of these conceptions and expectations. What is even more important is how these have structured their understanding of “otherness”. Similarly, the positions of the Berom, Afizere and the Anaguta who invoke "indigeneity" cannot be divorced from their collective memory of encounters with the so-called "Hausa-Fulani" from periods prior to colonial intervention and as mediated by the Nigerian state from the colonial times into the post-colonial period. In the more contemporary sense, it has to do with the memory of oppression and domination in the context of Northern Nigeria, and how this is being deployed in the contestation over rights and access to opportunities.

A closer examination, however, reveals that the history which all the parties draw upon is largely constituted, distorted and mediated by colonial intervention. As will be shown later, one
interesting paradox in the contest over identity is that the two sides to the debate draw from
colonial sources which include official records and the supposedly 'objective' studies of colonial
anthropologists in legitimising their claims. As Isichei (1980:6-7) points out with remarkable
profoundity, most “traditions” which contenders for power and wealth invoke is closely
associated with “official viewpoint”, derived from Nigerian history and ethnography. As she
reveals further, the colonial authorities started with a classification of Nigerian people into
hierarchy: “advanced” and “primitive” communities. And the tendency was to explain the
achievements of the latter in terms of the former; the former being the “Hausa/Fulani” while the
latter are the “pagan” people of the Middle Belt. It is this kind of history germane to the colonial
construction of a “northern” Nigerian identity which the ethnic minorities of the region are
reacting to that is at the root of the tension and antagonism in their relationship with the so-called
Hausa/Fulani. It is however, important to look more closely at the relationship between the
question of citizenship, ethnicity and indigeneity in the larger national context of Nigerian
politics and how this has important consequences in structuring positions and contestations at the
local level.

Production of history, essentially being a form of social construction and sometimes
imagining by the leading elite in legitimizing certain patterns of exclusion, or contesting existing
system of power and domination which rival elite seek to deconstruct. This is the sense in which
local history is used in matters relating to contestation over identity, rights and material
opportunities. But to reduce the entire gamut of production of history to the activities of elites
who are either seeking to retain certain privileges and opportunities, or those seeking to challenge
existing structures of domination is to ignore its impact on the consciousness of the ordinary
people who take certain actions on the basis of this consciousness.
To the extent that members of the communal groups who share this history and "truth" are ordinary people who are not necessarily part of the system of power and authority, one is dealing with popular history which is passed by one generation to the succeeding generation. In other words, one is dealing with “real” history, repeatedly told and integrated into the peoples system of consciousness. Nevertheless, it is important to identify the elite character of those at the forefront of this process of production of history. It thus appear that the driving force of the contestation is the interest of the economic and political elite or the leading (ruling) factions of the ethnic group concerned.

The ultimate significance of the process of production of history in the present context is dual: the simultaneous process of re-invention of group and communal identity, and the accompanying patterns of exclusion which has implication for citizenship rights. As Werner Sollors reminds us of the invention thesis, it should not "evoke a conspiratorial interpretation of a manipulative inventor who single handedly makes ethnics out of unsuspecting subjects, but to suggest widely shared, though intensely debated, collective fictions that are continually re-invented" (1989: xi).

It is precisely against this backdrop that the debates and contestation appear only intelligible to both actors and audience in search of power. And to the extent that this pattern of contestation constitutes an important element in the construction of group identity, it serves as a mobilizational tool for the "ethnic entrepreneurs" in the calculation for power and other privileges. It thus brings together, at once, a sense of high politics (for the control of the state apparatus), and the social processes of change underlying the deep politics of the clan.

As will be shown in the discussion below, the contestation is essentially between the Hausa community and the “indigenous” ethnic communities – the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere. As for other several migrant groups such as the Igbo and the Yoruba, they appear to have
accepted to live under conditions of “self-imposed social passivity as a strategy of survival” (Ifidon, 1996: 103). Igbo and Yoruba leaders and opinion leaders interviewed tend to abhor competition and interference with the rights of the indigenous groups in matters relating to control of the machinery of local governance and chieftaincy affairs. One particularly striking example occurred in the course of the transition programme under the Abacha regime. An Igbo candidate who indicated interest in running for the position of Mayor in Jos was warned by the Eze Igbo to drop the ambition on the ground that the mayorship position was undisputably the exclusive preserve of the indigenes.

However, unlike the Igbo, Yoruba and other migrant ethnic communities who appear to accept to endure in passivity the denial of their rights and citizens of the Nigerian state, the Hausa community resents this exclusion. As will be shown in the way they produce their history and frame their identity and claims, they too lay claim to the indigeneity of Jos. It is perhaps this competing claims that is the root of the growing animosity and great social distance between the two groups.

The issue of production of history and how it relates to the question of ethnic identity and citizens’ rights is most graphically illustrated by the violent encounter between the Hausa community on the one hand, and the “indigenous” ethnic communities on the other on April 12, 1994. This is the case both in terms of raging debates and controversy between the two groups and the aftermath of the violent encounter. April 12, 1994 provides a condensation of the historical and contemporary issues raised by contestation over citizens’ rights in Jos, a fact embedded in the production of history by the various groups at conflict. For this purpose, it is worth recounting here, even if briefly, the nature and dimensions of the violent encounter whose bitter memory would have a determinant effect on the future of inter-group relations. In addition it will show the extent to which production of history provides the logic for communal violence.
On April 12, 1994, the relationship between the Hausa community resident in Jos and the “indigenous” ethnic communities – the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta – in the main, and to some extent, enjoying the sympathy of other minority elements in Plateau state reached a nadir. What hitherto had been characterized by tension and latent antagonism resulted in a deadly confrontation between the two groups. The riot, as it were, ruptured the relative peace which the city had witnessed since the communal disturbances of the mid-1960s. Thus, contrary to the claim of the government appointed commission which inquired into the disturbances to the effect that the April 12 incident “broke a record of peace and tranquility for which the town was since inception” or that “the town was in turmoil for the first time in the annals of its history” (Plateau State Government, 1994: 4), it was in several respect a parody of the earlier ones in 1945 and in the 1964/65 period.

In these earlier occurrences, regional identity was a strong factor uniting northerners against perceived southern foes. Consequently, ethnic groups of northern origin attacked Igbo persons and property in Jos, whereas in 1994, the episode occurred in the context of a major shift in identity boundary. It occurred in the specific political context in which the myth of ‘One North’ had been shattered, leading to a sharpening of differences between the ethnic minorities of the ‘Middle Belt’ and the “Hausa/Fulani of the core north. The “indigenous” ethnic groups in Jos who belong to the former are a part of the resistance against what is perceived as “Hausa/Fulani” hegemony and domination. However, as in the case of the previous disturbances, Igbo commercial and economic interest was attacked.

In trying to capture the dynamics of the disturbances, the prevailing economic context of the April 1994 communal disturbances is as important as the events that led to the outbreak of the violence. It was a context of a massive economic decline worsened by the generally low level of industrial and other related economic activities. The crisis heightened the problems of
inflation, unemployment and collapse in real wages were at their lowest ebb as well as a phenomenal increase in the size of the informal sector. At the macro-level, the general down turn in the Nigerian economy that started in the early 1980s, necessitating the imposition of orthodox adjustment programme in 1986 had recorded a major impact on the ethnic question (Osaghae, 1995).

Against this background, Jos experienced youth unemployment, a general rise in crime levels, as well as exponential growth in the informal sector. The phenomenon of commercial cycling (otherwise known as okada or going) and the hawking of petroleum products became the most visible manifestations of such informal economic activities providing alternative means of livelihood for the youths. The main impetus to commercial cycling was the increasing costs of vehicle spare parts as a result of the naira value of imported spare parts, while the collapse of formal distribution channels of petroleum products, including the state of disrepair of the refineries provided fillip to the emergence of hawkers who are largely youths. Alongside this was the fear and anxiety which had profoundly transformed inter-personal and inter-group relations. And as shown in the previous chapter on associational life, the period witnessed the revival of a number of them that had remained domant as well as the emergence of new ones. As it turned out many of them were actively involved in the events leading to the outbreak of violence and the aftermath.

It was against this background that other incidents of urban violence in Jos within the period can be understood as shown by the urban riots and demonstrations in response to unpopular policies of the structural adjustment programme. In May 1988 and August 1989, barely three or four years into the implementation of the structural adjustment programme, urban Jos witnessed a spate of riots and demonstrations which were brought under control by a combined team of the Nigerian Army and the police. It, however, need be added that the
experience of Jos in this regard was by no means isolated. In several parts of Nigeria, especially in the erstwhile Northern region, ethno-religious violence of different kinds with attendant human tragedy were experienced as in Kafanchan, Kaduna and Kano.

Following the incident which lasted for two days, on the 12th and 13th of April, the then Military Administrator of Plateau State, Lt Col Mohammed Mana, on 22nd April reacted by setting up a Commission of Inquiry. The terms of reference of the Commission are: to establish the immediate and remote causes of the riots; identify the individuals and groups of persons, and institutions directly or indirectly connected with the riots, and their roles in precipitating the crisis; and identify and assess the property destroyed, their owners and those behind the destruction. The other terms of reference are to apportion blames on persons or groups of persons and recommend appropriate actions; recommending ways of avoiding future re-occurrence of such incidents; and make any other recommendations.

The seven-man Commission headed by Justice Aribiton Fiberisima was given four weeks to submit its report to the government. The findings of the Commission with respect to the remote and immediate causes of the riot appear to confirm that at the core is the unresolved riddle woven around the contestation between the Hausa community on the one hand, and the “indigenous” communities – the Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom on the other – as to who qualifies or not to enjoy the status of “indigene” and hence, legitimate access to resources and power and in Jos. Thus, the historical basis of the conflagration can be found in the production of history and the contradictory claims of the various communal groups that have been examined in the preceding chapter.
The Commission established that the historical claims over Jos between the two groups accounts for the remote cause of the disturbances. Its summary of the issue is worth quoting at length:

A recurrent friction for many years, between the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere tribes on the one hand, and the Hausa-Fulani tribes on the other hand, is a remote cause of the riot. Each part lays claim to Jos. The Berom, Anaguta and Afizere claim that they are the indisputable indigenous people of Jos, that the Hausa-Fulani are settlers, strangers, who migrated into Jos for various reasons which include commerce, employment and repair of fortune. But the Hausa-Fulani contend that they, as owners of Jos, had had the privilege of producing the rulers of the town since way back in 1902. They also claim political ascendancy over the other communities at all time. This feeling of one having supremacy over the other simmered for years, only to break out into open confrontation and riot on 12th April, 1994 (Plateau State Government, 1994:4).

The report of the Commission provides further insight into a series of events that over time heightened tension and culminated into the open confrontation between the groups at conflict, creating a situation which Nnoli (1989a) describes as the “threshol of irreversibility” in inter-group conflict. It noted, for instance, that the relationship between the “Hausa-Fulani” and the “indigenous” groups had continued to slide since 1987 when one Alhaji Sale Hassan, allegedly called on the JASSAWA community “to wrest the rulership and ownership of Jos from the other tribes” (Ibid.:5); claiming that the leadership slipped off the hands of the Hausa community in 1945.

This was followed by the split in 1991 of the Jos Local Government into North and South with the headquarters in Jos and Bukuru, respectively. According to the Commission this contributed massively to the degeneration in the relationship between the two groups. During this exercise in which a total of eighty-nine (89) local government councils were created throughout the country, the two groups presented different proposals based on some (ethnic) political calculations. While the “indigenous” communal groups requested for the creation of Federe Local Government which would comprise the Afizere, with the Berom in Jos Local Government,
the Hausa community supported the split of Jos Local Government into North and South. The split which was in accordance with the proposal of the Hausa community came to be perceived as a ploy to “seize” the town. Matters were not helped by the alleged jubilation of the JASSAWA community who were said to have “taunted the other tribes who would not brook any sarcasm from the JASSAWA” (Ibid.:5). Prior to this exercise, two federal constituencies were created in Jos Local Government Area. Jos metropolis largely inhabited by the “Hausa/Fulani” was recognized as one constituency, while the rest of the Local Government was recognized as the other federal constituency. That the delimitation of these federal constituencies became the basis for the subsequent split of Jos Local Government merely heightened the suspicion of the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom communities.

It was against this background of heightened tension and suspicion that the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato that sparked off the conflagration was made. Thus, it was his appointment, a “Hausa/Fulani” as the Chairman of the Caretaker Management Committee of Jos North Local Government that was the immediate cause of the April 12 riots. His appointment reinforced the existing differences and social distance between the “indigenous” communal groups and the Hausa/Fulani community. The latter gave unanimous approval because, for them, it legitimized their historical claims to the rulership of Jos. Not unexpectedly, the former considering this development as an affront on their claims roundly condemned the appointment. They were to give expression to this resentment on 5th April, when they embarked on a peaceful demonstration to the office of the Military Administrator. Later on the same day, at about 5pm, the same peaceful demonstration was staged to the palace of the paramount chief of Jos, the Gbong Gwom, Dr. Fom Bot. The tension was to reach a feverish height on the following day, the 6th of April, when all those appointed into the position of Chairmen of Caretaker Management
Committee were to be sworn in. Alhaji Aminu Mato was sworn in, but the “indigenous” ethnic communities vowed to stop Alhaji Aminu Mato from assuming the position.

Apparently, in keeping with their vow, people drawn largely from these communal groups thronged the Local Government secretariat where the hand-over exercise was expected to take place before Alhaji Mato’s assumption of office. However, realizing the security implication of the hand-over slated for 8th April, arising from the groundswell of opposition from these communal groups, government decided to put on hold the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato. A cabinet office letter written on the same day conveyed this and instructed that the Director of Personnel in the Local Government should continue to run the affairs of the council. This turn of events achieved the desired effect of calming nerves on the part of the Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom, but marked the beginning of tension and restlessness on the part of the leaders of the Hausa community who concluded that government had yielded to blackmail and intimidation.

What appeared as the first organized response on the part of the Hausa community came from the Butchers Association whose membership is predominantly “Hausa/Fulani”. On 11th April, on the eve of the disturbances, they slaughtered cows and other animals on the highway near the abbatoir to protest the decision of government to suspend the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato. The Plateau State Chairman of the Association, Alhaji Danlami Babajoda, was said to have boasted openly that this was the beginning of a series of actions aimed at pressuring the state government to rescind its decision in respect of the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato. A meeting held on the same day at the Central Juma’at mosque on the same day under the auspices of the JASSAWA Development Association and presided over by its president, Alhaji Yahaya Aga Abubakar, was said to have resolved to embark on a demonstration the following day.

It was this demonstration, embarked upon by JASSAWA youths, that elicited a response from members of the other communities. It is not unusual in circumstances such as this, that
intemperate utterances and unrestrained behaviours on the part of community leaders tend to heighten tension and push ordinary people to extreme. The Commission identified a number of people on the two sides of the divide, whose utterances and actions contributed to the degeneration in the relationships and the tragic events on the fateful day (Ibid, pp7-11). The violence that followed was unprecedented in the recent history of the city. Four people – Mallam Hassan Adamu, Mallam Sabo Abdullahi, Mallam Abdullahi Isah and Mallam Abubakar Yau – were all confirmed dead. According to the estimate of the Commission, property worth N215 million was lost in the violence. In addition to a number of private houses and vehicles, parts of Jos Modern Market, Gada-Biyu market and the Izala Headquarters and school along Rukuba road were all destroyed. The police arrested a total of 104 suspects for riots and arson at the various scenes of the violence.

6.2: THE POSITION OF THE HAUSA COMMUNITY

The Hausa constitute a formidable communal and cultural group, who have made eminent contributions to the social, economic and political life of Jos city, a fact which can hardly be challenged by the most avowed opponent of their cause. The Hausa or “Hausa/Fulani” as they are more commonly referred to are a major contending group in the political and civil life of the city. A dominant issue in the politics of identity and rights which have resulted in animosity and violence is the alleged political, economic and cultural domination of the ethnic minorities who are native to Jos. At the root of the Hausa question in Jos is the attempt to resist their exclusion as a response to this perceived domination. In so doing, they have built a very powerful historicised discourse in their claims to the "indigenship" of Jos town which they canvass at different fora (JASSAWA, 1994a, 1994b). The view is also widely shared by the
many 'third' and 'fourth' generations of Hausa domiciled in Jos (Interview: Hassan Wayo and Alhassan Wayo, 10/9/1997).

The grievances of the Hausa community derive from what they perceive as a feeling of animosity by the "indigenous" ethnic groups in Jos against them and a litany of discriminations and deprivations which they are subjected to, with severe limitations on their rights. Interestingly, their discourse is not centred on their citizenship rights but resorting to history to establish claims to indigeneity. They argue that members of the Hausa community in Jos are treated as "second class" citizens, they are discriminated against in matters of employment and admissions into educational institutions. Hausa children suffer a kind of double jeopardy as they are denied rights and opportunities in a place they were domiciled for centuries, while they have at the same time lost identity in places where they ought to be 'real' indigenes.

One important claim of the Hausa community is that they founded Jos. This rests on some historical factors and considerations. First, is the claim of a strong presence of Hausa elements around the Jos Plateau prior to colonization as well as the leading role of the Hausa in the early and subsequent phases of the mining industry. The most frequently cited source of this claim is a government publication titled *This is Jos* which states *inter alia*:

> Officially founded in 1915, the town was by 1912 referred to as "Hausa settlement of Jos". Attempts were made to segregate ethnic groups by having two separate administrative units namely the so-called Native Town which was extensive and subordinate to the Jos Native Authority with its headquarters at Naraguta and the Jos Township where the southern Nigerian workers and the Europeans and other aliens lived ..... The so-called Native Town continued to be treated like a Hausa indigenous city where Muslim rules applied and was complete with an Alkali court (Ministry of Information and Social Development, 1987: 13).

The fact that this is contained in a government publication appears like official legitimation of the claims of the Hausa community to the "ownership" of Jos.
The historical basis of this claim has to do with the critical role of the mining industry in the origin, growth and expansion of urban Jos in the context of colonial rule. For a number of historical reasons this is a valid claim. There had been a wave of Hausa migrations and movement south-ward for more than a century earlier, occasioned by the presence in Hausa land of a large number of people disconnected from the land following their "freedom" from slavery, especially from the on-set of the Jihadist movement. Even prior to the Jihad, constant south-ward migration of Hausa was also dictated by long-distance trading in various items of merchandise which made Hausa trading posts and resting places a common feature of the middle belt part of the country well before formal colonial rule. Early colonial chroniclers and anthropologists such as Meek (1921:142) attested to the pre-eminence of Hausa traders and industrialists among the "indigenous" people, and passing basic skills in dyeing and weaving to them. As a part of this there had always been a tendency for pockets of Hausa settlements to develop along with Islamic preachers, charms makers, artisans and people of other skills, thus giving rise to the emergence of full blown Hausa community life. It is instructive to note that early trade in tin straws on the River Benue which were later confirmed to have originated from around the Dilimi river was dominated almost exclusively by Hausa traders.

For this historical reason it was not surprising that the bulk of people recruited into the colonial military conquest machinery, especially on the Plateau, were of Hausa origin. The recruitment of Hausa soldiers was dictated by both availability and the conviction by the British that they possessed courage and special fighting skills. It was only logical that once the military conquest of the Jos Plateau was achieved, the Hausa was to remain forceful in the subsequent development of the city and of the mining industry in particular. Again, two other factors became very crucial in determining the preponderance of the Hausa in the tin mining industry. One was the recalcitrant attitude of the Berom who remained largely "un-co-operative" according to
colonial authorities because of the forced seizure of their land and the dislocation of their natural economy. Berom opposition remained difficult to be broken despite attempts to resort to forced labour.

The second was the deliberate recruitment of labourers from Hausa-speaking areas such as Sokoto, Zaria and Borno because of possession of skills as has been carefully documented (Freund, 1980). On the basis of this the Hausa community claims that the eventual creation of a Jos province out of Bauchi, Benue and Zaria provinces in 1936 was in recognition of the importance of the tin industry the development of which they significantly contributed to. By establishing a possible linkage between the tin industry in which they played a decisive role and the subsequent political status of the Jos Plateau, they seek to suggest that they directly contributed to enhancing the political status of the Jos Plateau.

As a part of this argument, the prevasiveness of Hausa language and the tendency of even elements of the indigenous ethnic minorities to adopt Hausa ethnicity as well the survival of Hausa names for villages and settlements founded by the Hausa such as Barkin Ladi, Rafin Bala and Gidin Akwati, to mention a few examples, are put forward in the claim of Hausa "indigeneity" status in Jos. Above all, the ethnic segmentation in settlement which led to the concentration of the Hausa in the Jos Native Town, while others including people from the three ethnic minorities - Berom, Afizere and Anaguta - settled outside of the secluded Hausa settlement. The Hausa community, thus, claim that this was so because these groups were somewhere else within the vicinity of Jos as opposed to “Jos Native Town” which was a virgin areas occupied by the Hausa community. To this is added the fact that most wards in Jos bear Hausa names which is cited as evidence regarding the hegemonic position of the Hausa in the social history of Jos, a proof to the authenticity of their claim to the “ownership of Jos. Examples of such ward names include Abba Na Shehu, Ibrahim Katsina, Gangare, Garba Daho, Sarkin
Arab and Tafawa Balewa, to mention some examples (Interview: Hassan Wayo and Hussaini Wayo, 10/9/ 1999).

Apart from the claims to have "discovered" Jos the Hausa community in Jos often cite the hegemonic political role played by the Hausa in the early phase of her colonial life. Between 1912 and 1948 the Hausa produced twelve (12) Sarkin Jos in succession and that it was not until 1948 that the first Berom, Mr. Rwang Pam, was appointed the Chief of Berom. The fact that he was appointed Chief of Berom as opposed to Chief of Jos is always emphasized to show that the institution of Gbom Gwom lacks authority and jurisdiction over non-Biroms resident in the city. The basis of the claims of the Hausa community is, therefore, provided by the obsession of the British colonial administration with the aristocratic system of rule as a way of coming to terms with what Mamdani (1996) calls the native question. Faced with the concrete problem of pacifying the "natives" and of establishing law and order, they resorted to the use of the emirate system of administration even on the non-Hausa-Fulani groups.

The presence of a large population of Hausa in Jos at the onset of colonial rule provided an additional impetus to the British in introducing emirate type of administration. The first response of the British was to make the hereditary Hausa headman in Jos the Bunu, responsible for tax collection, and law and order in Jos and the neighbouring Hausa or "stranger" settlements. Colonial records provide detailed accounts of how successive Hausa chiefs appointed by the colonial authorities ruled Jos (See NAK Jos Prof, CH1/4/1917). The hegemonic influence of the Hausas was further aided by the thin presence of Anaguta, Afizere and Berom in the centre of the city largely as a result of retreat from the "invaders", and what they assumed to be a preservation of their culture and identity.

The Bunu whose status was that of a vassal or protege of the Emir of Bauchi actually played the role of Emirs in a proto-type system of indirect rule, commanding the deep respect of
his subjects (Balarabe, 1992). Thus, from his elaborate palace in Naraguta (before 1915 when the headquarter of the town was shifted to its present position), he performed services which were considered invaluable by the British officials in consolidating the colonial project (See NAK Jos Prof, 2/9/394/1917 for example). Upon his death, Barde dan Galadima, who was renamed Sarkin Jos in 1914 was appointed as successor. However, his reign came to an end in 1920 following his conviction on account of corrupt practices and embezzlement. He was followed by a succession of similarly corrupt, fraudulent and sometimes incompetent Hausa leaders appointed Sarkin Jos and who, were accordingly, disgraced from office. It was not until January 1929 that one ex-sergeant Major of the W.A.F.F., Saidu, was appointed Sarkin Hausawa. He died in 1931 after a sterling performance. The last Hausa ruler in Jos, Isiaku was appointed after him, and when he died in 1948, the Chief of Berom was appointed, largely in recognition of the political ascendancy of the Beroms.

Very striking is the deployment of this account in the contest in matters of identity and indigeneity. A memorandum submitted sometimes in 1994 by the JASSAWA while presenting the demand for the creation of Jos Central Local Government quoted a colonial report to establish the authenticity of the claim of the Hausa community. The relevant portion of the report taken from Volume IV of The Gazetteers of Northern Provinces of Nigeria (Plateau Province) reads: “The cattle tax and the general tax of the non-indigenous natives are collected by the Fulani Chiefs and Hausa Village Heads and taken by them either to the District Head or direct to the Native Treasury”

Colonial account such as this is then invoked to suggest the pre-eminent position of the Hausa in both the pre-colonial and colonial period. Yet, despite the importance of this historical narrative to the Hausa community in building claims to indigeneity in Jos, and in protesting the
structures of power which they perceive to be heavily skewed against them, they are persistently denied their rights and subjected to undue political victimisation.

A frequently cited example is the alleged discrimination against members of the Hausa community in relation to admission into educational institutions and employment. In the early 1970s, the point at which labels of "non-indigenes" and "settlers" began to be applied to them, they allege, children of Hausa origins were refused admission into post-primary institutions owned by the then Benue-Plateau State Government. In response to this, they initiated several primary and post-primary institutions through communal efforts which, however, could not cope with their real needs. The situation compelled many of them "to seek refuge" in neighbouring states such as North-East, North West and North Central where they were compelled to make "false claims about their place of birth, state of origin and genital parents", while those who were able to "trace their ancestral homes" permanently migrated away from Jos (JASSAWA, 1994a:5). Frustrated by series of deprivations and discriminations, a large number of Hausas resident in Jos threatened mass exodus from Jos in the mid-1970s, while some actually relocated further north to the border towns between Jos and Bauchi state. The bitter memories of such experience have become a critical factor in the relationship between the Hausa community and the "indigenous" communal groups.

In addition to this is the alleged exclusion of members of the Hausa community from social and political life in the areas of access to education, employment and political appointments. They allege, for example, that apart from the federal agencies and institutions in the state, employment opportunities hardly exist for the Hausa within the Benue-Plateau State bureaucracy and the successor Plateau State. In addition, it is claimed that "despite our well known economic and political contributions, none of our people was ever appointed a Commissioner, a Director-General or even a Board Chairman, of an important Plateau State
government parastatals" (Ibid, P.8). The argument here seems to be that since they fulfill their civic duty in Jos they ought to enjoy the rights and benefits attached to the membership of the community. The protest which resulted in the reversal of the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato in 1994 and other related cases are used to support this position.

It is further alleged that in some instances, obstacles are placed on their part in securing federal appointments. Having been marginalised and excluded from the social and political life in Jos town, they claim that they have had to rely on either "self-help" and community development efforts or private initiatives to be able to establish a number of schools to meet the educational needs of their children. Such include among others, Zololo Primary and Secondary School in Naraguta, Muslim Community Primary and Secondary School, Reccos, Izala Science Secondary School along Rukuba road, Islammiya Primary and College of Science along Bauchi Road, and the Sardauna Memorial College which was handed over to the state government and rechristened Government Secondary School, along Zaria road.

Furthermore, they allege that systematic efforts were being made to obliterate the historical records of the Hausa community in Jos, including their contributions to the growth of the city. Often cited are the attempts that have been made over time to disposses the Hausa of the traditional title of ‘Sarkin Jos’ which was replaced with ‘Sarkin Berom’ or ‘Gbong Gwom’ as it was called from 1969. This development had the effect of bringing to an end the succession of Hausa title holders in 1948. To this was added, the removal in 1976 of Alhaji Ali Kazaure as the ‘Wakilin Jos’; a move perceived as the last ditch effort in wiping the historical records of the Hausa community in Jos. This feeling appears to find justification in the fact that consistent agitation for his reinstatement not only fell on deaf ears, the plea for the revival of the title has equally been ignored.
The control of the institution of traditional rulership is intricately tied to the wider struggle over identity, power and resources in the Jos metropolis. The contestation, however, is tied to the history of shifting hegemony and power which have characterized the political and social life of Jos from the beginning. The struggle over the “ownership” of Jos and, therefore, of control over traditional office necessarily involve the establishment of claims of “origin” and authenticity. In other words, it draws from the debate over local citizenship.

The demand by the Hausa community for the restoration of the position of Sarkin Hausa which is perceived by the indigenous ethnic communities as an affront started once Rwang Pam was appointed Sarkin Jos and the Hausa president of Jos Town Council given the title of Magajin Gari. In one of the early petitions written by the NPC on behalf of the Hausa community to the Jos Native Authority, the Resident of Plateau Province and the Regional Government in Kaduna, the argument was made that:

……as the Hausas who live in Jos constitute such a warrant number, and as these people who live in Jos have as their customs in accordance with their religious teaching that the Hausa community should have at all times as they use to have a Sarkin Hausawa……… the Hausa in Jos have it their right to have a say in their own adminstration, and that they believe by appointing Sarkin Hausawa of Jos the Native Authority will improve relations between the Hausa community and the Native Administration, and that any such person appointed shall be independent of political bias as he shall be for all Huasa irrespective of political leanings (NAK Prof.4/2/RO/ 597).

As can be read from the different accounts of the history of Jos in the previous chapter, and corroborated by quotations from written representation presented on behalf of the Huasa community in Jos is the very strong claim by the Hausa community in Jos is that the traditional office in Jos ought to be an exclusive Hausa affair consistent with the early history of Jos. The history being referred to, is the period between 1900 and 1948 when a succession of Hausas ruled as ‘Sarkin Jos’. Hausa rulership over Jos that had started when Jos was still a part of Bauchi Province continued beyond 1926 when Jos became a province. It was the termination of this
legacy and the refusal to restore it that provides one source of disenchantment within the community of Hausa residents in Jos.

The Hausa community still considers the appointment in 1948 of Rwang Pam, first as ‘Sarkin Berom’ (and later as ‘Sarkin Jos’) in response to the persistent agitation of the Berom as an affront on their hegemony and collective well being. They have continued to insist that since Rwang Pam was first designated ‘Sarkin Berom’, it should be clear that the colonial authorities did not intend that his jurisdiction extend to the non-Berom resident in Jos. After ending the reign of a succession of Hausas as the ‘Sarkin Jos’, some form of Hausa traditional authority continued to be exercised in Jos with the appointment of Hausas into the office of the ‘Magajin Gari Jos’. Thus, between 1969 and 1976, there were four of such title holders. These include Mallam Mammad, Mohammed Dankarfala, Othman Na Garba and Alhaji Ali Kazaure.

It was the last of these, Alhaji Ali Kazaure, who was removed in 1976, thus bringing to an abrupt end the existence of the office, and the formal abolition of any form of Hausa traditional rulership in Jos metropolis. As far as the Hausa community in Jos is concerned, this event represents the last ditch effort by the “indigenous” ethnic communities to humiliate the Hausa residents in Jos and consign them to the dustbin of history. In response to this, they have persistently demanded for the restoration of the office and the title in a plethora of petitions and memoranda on the grounds that the Hausa have been a critical factor in the history, growth and development of Jos.

However, the increasing consolidation of local state power in the hands of the power elite from these “indigenous” groups has made it impossible for this persistent demand to be looked into. While these power elites deny and challenge the history as constructed and rendered by the Hausa community, the latter in turn argue from this historical perspective that the “indigenous” ethnic communities do not have any historical basis to lay claims to traditional
office/title in Jos. In the memorandum submitted by JASSAWA to the commission of inquiry into the April 12th 1994 ethnic riots in Jos, the Hausa community dismissed the claims of the Beroms on the ground that they are “migrants” into Jos, allegedly moving from their original abode in Wukari to settle first at Oshono and eventually at Riyom. On the Berom, they conclude that they had never had any historical record of habitation within the vicinity of Jos (JASSAWA, 1994).

In the same memorandum they provided a counter to the historical claims of the Anaguta and Afizere. In respect of the Anaguta, the argument rests on the fact that “no Anaguta man has ever ruled Jos traditionally till date” (Ibid.), and that their claim to have settled in parts of Jos near the Dilimi River is no credible basis for laying claims to the “indigeneity” of Jos. Finally, they classify the Afizere as “strangers’ in the Jos metropolis who lack any credible evidence to lay claim to any form of power. They argue for example that apart from a handful of Afizere who are found in Lamingo in Gwom District, most of them had been part of Bauchi until 1976 when the Justice Irikefe Panel on Creation of States and Boundary Adjustment brought them into Plateau State. This in effect implies that only members of the Hausa community are historically favoured to occupy traditional office in the city.

Finally, there is a very deep feeling within the Hausa community that the discriminations and deprivations which they have been subjected to is a result of envy for their success in business and commerce in Jos. They attribute their success to industry and hard work, building on the achievements of early Hausa contractors, traders and businessmen who contributed to the initial growth and development of Jos. Allusion has already been made to the pre-eminence of the Hausa in trade and commerce and their massive investment in real estate and the sphere of circulation within the economy. What they seem to be suggesting in this regard is that animosity
against the Hausa is rooted in the existing patterns of social and economic differentiation which appear to coincide with the ethnic boundary.

There are a number of problems with the position of the Hausa community with regard to the discourse on citizenship. They fail to anchor their position on their citizenship of the Nigerian state and the fact that many of them have resided in Jos as far back as the beginning of the colonial project. It is the domain of the membership of the Nigerian state that the issue of rights and entitlement should be established. By insisting, through deployment of historical records, they seem to unwittingly accept the functional notion of citizenship which requires that one proves his/her membership of an ethnic community which is indigenous to the area. If this logic were to be followed to conclusion it is a matter of who is able to establish, by history of migration and prior settlement, that will be recognized as being indigenous to the community. At this level of disputation the claims of the Hausa community could be undermined.

While the Hausa community justifiably challenges their exclusion from mainstream political and civil life in Jos, pressing their claims around the construction of history which attempts to establish their “ownership” of Jos vitiates the basis of negotiation and reaching accommodation with the elite of the indigenous ethnic communities. Staking their claims on the basis of a long history of residence and the dilemma faced by the majority of Hausa residents who are disconnected from their “original” roots would create basis for bargaining and consensus-building.

Related to this is the reliability of colonial sources, especially in dealing with matters of inter-group relations, given the obvious bias of early conservative colonial officers in favour of the ruling aristocracy and Hausa civilization (Turaki, 1997), through which they sought to legitimize and consolidate the colonial enterprise. As Kuna (1998:83) has suggested the identity of Northern Nigeria was rigidly defined as Islamic and Hausa which as social categories were
elevated to be politically dominant. Given what was known to be the general fascination of the British colonial officers with the Hausa civilization which they perceived as idyllic colonial sources are likely to be the least accepted in the construction of identity and rights in post-colonial Nigeria.

6.3: THE CLAIMS OF THE "INDIGENES" - BEROMS, AFIZERE AND ANAGUTA

The Berom, Afizere and Anaguta see themselves as the natives who can claim the indigeneship of Jos and the rights and entitlements which the status confers. This status derives from their physical occupation of the areas that came to be known as Jos centuries prior to the arrival of Hausa “settlers” and the British colonial conquest that followed. They seem, therefore, to draw strength in building their claims, from the ideology of territorial possession which is a key element in the definition of ethnic identity in Africa.

The production of history at this level necessarily involves the use of symbols, names and origin of words. It is therefore not surprising that in the attempt to deconstruct the claims of the Hausa community to have "founded" Jos, ethnographic origin and analysis of the name "JOS" is used by the "indigenous" ethnic groups. On this, however, there is no agreement among the groups. One position canvassed by Gwom (1982) is that "JOS" is the corrupted Hausa version of "JOT" or "GWOSH" - a Berom word for water spring. And that the traditional area that was either called "JOT" or "GWOSH" was predominantly occupied by the Berom and Anaguta, with elements of the Afizere in Gwon district.

A related version which draws from the evidence provided by Colonel Laws who led the colonial occupation of the Plateau suggests that the name Guash, an Afizere settlement was mispronounced by the Hausa traders as Jos. Colonel Laws’ account of 1903 states as follows: "....
a small hill village called Guash, occupied the present location of Jos. Hausa traders who arrived supposedly mispronounced Guash for Jos and the name stuck”(Quoted in Bingel, 1978:2).

Ignoring for the moment the contradictory claims based on this evidence and propagated by both Beroms and Afizere elites, the contention seems to be that the Jos Plateau was not after all a virgin area that was "discovered" by Hausa traders as is often claimed by the Hausa community. In other words, other groups possessed effective settlement of the Plateau prior to colonial intervention, and even the emergence of trade in tin ore which was eventually traced to the Dilimi river.

It is further argued that the Gazetteers of Northern Provinces of Nigeria listed the indigenous people as Berom, Anaguta, Rukuba, Jarawa and Pengana among others, and excluded the Hausa because of their alleged settler status (Ames, 1932). Other early sources cited include the existence of Afizere settlement at the foot of the museum hill overlooking the present day Ahmadu Bello Way, Jos, and the existence of a number of Berom settlements around Kabong village which included wards such as Landura (Rock Haven), Laranto, Gura, Le-Manjei (Anguwan-Rogo), Jot (present-day Jos) and Title (Anguwan-Soya), among others.

In addition to this historical advantage of early effective physical occupation of the Jos area, these indigenous ethnic communities also claim that they successfully resisted series of attempts by the "Hausa-Fulani" to subject them to any kind of domination. Historical record is replete with the successful raid of several neighbours of the Hausa states to the south either for the purpose of extracting slaves in the period before the Jihad or successful Jihadist conquest after, and the islamisation of such people. Kirk-Greene (1972: 30-40) provides one of the most thrilling accounts of the failure of agents of Hausa-Fulani dynasty to subject the people of Jos Plateau. Although one of such expeditions from Bauchi under the first Emir, Yakubu, succeeded
in the conquest of Angas (not living in inaccessible hills), Yergam (Tarok), Ankwe and Wase, it was badly beaten back at Panyam by those pejoratively referred to as the "Sura tribesmen".

Thus, what is not in dispute is the fact that these groups had historically preserved their autonomy vis-a-vis the 'imperial' ambition of their "Hausa-Fulani" neighbours to the north, especially the Bauchi emirate whether for the purpose of slave-raiding or the Jihadist invasion. Lonsdale (1915) and the extensive fieldworks undertaken by Bingel (1978) suggest that the Hausa never extended their influence to the south beyond Naraguta settlement, and the last of such efforts was in 1873 when the Hausa-Fulani jihadists led by the Sarkin Yaki (war lord) Ahmadu, under the command of Sarkin Bauchi, Ibrahim, and his Chiroma, Usman, were badly beaten by the joint forces of the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta. The District Officer in charge of Bauchi, Mr. Lonsdale, provides a verbatim report of his conversation with Abdul, Wazirin Wunti, who was present at the last invasion in 1873 as follows:

Amadu Sarkin Yaki (war chief) told his son and us to get up to Leme and follow Ciroman Bauchi Usman, and Sarkin Bauchi Ibrahim. We found him and his fighting men and Rijin Makur. ... From Rinjin Makur we went to Barga, then to Toro, then Tilden Fulani and then onto Naraguta. Thence, we proceeded to Jos where about 3 p.m., close to the present site of Canteen stream, we were attacked by a large number of Naragutawa, Bukuruwa, Jarawa, Bujiawa and Amo men. They beat us and we all separated in flight reaching Tilde at night....After this we did not fight them again till the whitemen came. (Quoted in Bingel, 1978:2).

This apparently was the last attempt before the arrival of the British conquest forces at the beginning of the 20th century. Indeed, evidence pieced together from local accounts suggests that series of such invasion were unsuccessfully launched on these people between 1846 and 1873, but were repelled through military alliances. Memories such as this are very significant in matters of identity formation which tend to pitch them in opposition to the so-called settlers.

On the basis of this they claim that all the other ethnic nationalities resident in Jos are there to pursue commerce, trade and business, or to earn their means of livelihood. This applies
to the Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba and all other Nigerians. It is a claim that is justified on the ground that all Nigerians have their “own state” or “home” where they can claim local citizenship. The control of institutions and structures of local governance are therefore considered the exclusive sphere of the natives. As one time president of Anaguta Youth Movement, Yakubu Kankani bluntly puts it, indigenes can allow other ethnic groups to participate in local governance only as councilors, but the position of chairman should be left for them (Interview: 8/6/2000). Osaghae (1990: 608-609) puts such viewpoint rather sarcastically,

…..can it not be proffered that short of paying taxes, sometimes unwillingly, non-indigenes should not be treated as citizens in their state of residence because they do not feel they belong to the states? Put in other words, since there is a conspicuous notion of “my state” or “my home” which afflicts most Nigerians who live outside their states of origin, and makes them go “home” to build a house, marry a wife, or vote, are the states not justified in treating non-indigenes as non-citizens?

It is this kind of Janus-faced character of those who reside outside their “home state” and the objective need for the local elite to ward off threat and competition, a need rooted in fear of domination that provide the basis of how they frame the question of identity, rights and entitlements.

It is significant to note that the Beroms, Anaguta and Afizere have a relatively different perception of other "majority" ethnic nationalities such as the Yorubas and Igbos, as well as other smaller nationalities of Southern Nigerian origin. For the former, the latter group represent lesser threat in the sense that their primary pre-occupation is the peaceful pursuit of commerce and other means of livelihood, rather than making competing claims to the "ownership" of Jos and the available opportunities for control of political power. As a matter of fact, as will be shown later, there is a widely shared consensus among them that the Beroms and Afizere legitimately can lay claims to this (Interview: Pa Adeshina, 15/8/1995). What is at the root of their
antagonism with the Hausa community, therefore, is the overbearing influence of Hausa ethnicity.

These indigenous ethnic communities perceive the “Hausa/Fulani” as the most potent threat to their progress and development and have accordingly labeled them as “settlers” who migrated into Jos at different times for mining and trade. They allege that the Hausa residents in Jos, if granted the status of indigenes will enjoy dual benefits: in Jos and in places such as Kano, Bauchi, Sokoto and Gombe where they are natives. For instance, such people can run for elective office in any the two places depending on the circumstance, while they are denied the same type of luxury.

A related source of disaffection with the Hausa community stems from what they perceive as cultural domination, and ‘internal colonization’ through language, mode of dressing and, above all, the fear of islamisation. In a sense the language question in Jos and on the Plateau is real when it is realized that some languages face the danger of extinction on the Plateau as a result of the linguistic pressure of the Hausa language (Miri, 1998). To this perceived form of domination a pattern of response is emerging. The Berom, for example, through BECO, have instituted a Language Board to refine the orthography and standardize the language as a huge step in the direction of propagating it. Among many of these groups, the Bible and other christian literature that hitherto existed in Hausa are being interpreted and printed in the local languages. Although a number of these ethnic groups have converted to Islam, as is the case among the Afizere in particular, the religion is perceived by the majority as the religion of domination. In a sense, therefore, christianity becomes a part of the symbol of ‘cultural’ resistance and is integrated into their definition of ethnic identity.
Added to this is hate memories regarding how early Hausa “settlers” treated the natives with contempt, based on their predominantly “pagan” status. This includes the system of ethnic humour that has characterized the relationship between them and the Hausa community in Jos. Ethnic humour derives from making attributions to a group’s alleged inferiority, especially when the system of existing power relations puts such a group in the position that it cannot resist such attributions. And for a group like the Berom who remained opposed to the colonial state and the mining companies for the take over of their land and the ruination of their natural capital in land through massive ecological destruction, the Hausa played a leading role as intermediaries in the process whether as part of the army of conquest, and/or as labourers in the mines.

Although the differences and antagonism between the natives and the Hausa community had always been there, it remained latent for a long time owing partly to the colonial construction of a “Northern Nigerian” identity. It seems however that a profound fragmentation has occurred in terms of focal point of identity. In order to understand the basis of this changing identity and transmutation of boundaries, it may be important to understand the political and ethnic processes that have combined to weaken and fragment the monolithic identity of this Northern Nigeria. At least, up to the end of the First Republic, the northern fraction of the ruling class had relative advantage over other regionally-based fractions of the ruling class or power elite. This was despite the prolonged history of agitation for a separate political identity waged by the ethnic minorities of the north since the late 1940s. The numerous factors and developments which have accounted for this are well documented (Takaya and Tyoden, 1987; Tyoden, 1993).

The creation of new states laid the foundation for subsequent developments which sounded the death knell of a monolithic north. The series of coups and counter-coups which followed prolonged military rule was another. As many scholars and commentators have noted, a clear ethnic pattern can be seen in the selective manner of execution and killings of officers
involved in abortive coups. Bala Takaya and Sonni Tyoden (1987) have documented what appears like ethnic cleansing targeted at officers of ‘middle belt’ origin in the aftermath of the abortive coup which led to the death of General Murtala Mohammed in 1976. Similarly, recruitment and appointments into federal institutions and establishments within the ‘North’ have appeared to be skewed in favour of the ‘core’ north, despite its relative backwardness in terms of access to western education.

Alongside and in combination with these, is the deliberate construction of a separate political identity by the political elite of the ethnic minorities of the north. The base of this construction, however, is the reality of oppression and neglect which since the 1940s provided the basis for political agitation. In the Second Republic, for example, this took a profound dimension in Plateau State where the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) won the elections in ‘protest’ against the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) which was perceived largely as the political machine of the northern power elite. But more fundamentally, the NPP Governor of Plateau state, Chief Solomon Daushep Lar, a veteran in the struggle of the minorities invented the slogan of emancipation in his political mobilization (Adeyi, 1998). The slogan underscores, allegedly, the desire to challenge ‘Hausa-Fulani’ domination and hegemony perceived to be the most immediate threat to the ethnic minorities of the north.

Against this background, it is easy to understand in part, the antagonism of the ethnic minorities in Jos to the ‘Hausa-Fulani’ elements. As is usually the case, in situations in which contending parties engage in the production of history, especially in relation to contestation over identity and the attendant access to power and resources, the claims of the “indigenous” ethnic communities in Jos are diametrically opposed to that of the "settler" community. While the claims of the Hausa community can be said to be largely rooted in colonially constructed system of hegemony, the historical premise of these “indigenous” ethnic nationalities is much deeper,
drawing largely on shared historical experiences and memories between these ethnic minorities
in the period pre-dating colonial intervention. However, where notes and observations of early
colonial administrators and anthropologists support their claims they are copiously cited.

In a united effort to deconstruct and delegitimise the claims of the Hausa community, they
presented positions which were quite similar before the Commission of Inquiry into the Riots of
12th April, 1994 in Jos Metropolis. The Berom Elders Council, Berom Educational and Cultural
Organisation (BECO), the Anaguta Development Association, the Afizere Cultural and
Community Development Association as well as the Berom and Afizere youth movements and
the umbrella Plateau Youth Council, all presented historical facts and logic which were broadly
similar, emphasizing the “settler” status of the Hausa community.

There are two essential elements in the claims of the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta
communities in relation to their contestation with the Hausas which need to be pointed out. First,
they tend to play down the question of internal differences among them in relation to the claim as
to which group was the first to have settled on the Jos Plateau. As a matter of fact disputation
centred around this has hardly been a source of open conflict. Rather, what appears as a
consensus which has sustained their alliance in opposition to the claims of the Hausa is that the
three ethnic communities have equal, legitimate claims to the "indigeneity" of Jos, derived from
their physical accupation of the area before the 19th century. Thus, in confrontation with Hausa
ethnicity they articulate positions which are very similar. Nevertheless, such similarities should
not obscure the variation among these three groups in terms of anti-Hausa sentiment as a result of
the differential level of Hausa cultural impact on them. For example, among the Afizere where
Hausa cultural influence had the deepest root, and where Islam had made some considerable in-
road, anti-Hausa sentiment appears to be much lower. This, however, pales into insignificance in
their confrontation with the Hausa-Fulani "settlers". The second is that they perceive the main
threat and competition coming largely from the "settler" groups, and not other migrant ethnic communities such as the Yoruba and Igbo.

This clearly shows that by its nature identity boundaries are never fixed and stable. Whereas in the first decade of independence, identity boundaries were largely loosely drawn along the North-South dichotomy, the scenario has dramatically changed in the context of increasing politicization of ethnic minority identity. Although the “North-South” dichotomy may still remain the basis for the definition of relevant others in some context, the contestation between the three ethnic minorities – the Afizere, Berom and the Anaguta - who lay claims of authenticity over Jos and, therefore, exclusive claims to power and resources shows to a large extent new boundaries tend to supplant the previous ones as the basis for political action.

Within the “indigenous” ethnic communities in Jos, the contestation over the institution of traditional rulership in Jos could be as fierce as the one which pitches them collectively against the “Hausa-Fulani” community. The fascinating dimension in the struggle is the one which pitches the Afizere and Anaguta, against the Berom whom they accuse of establishing monopoly over the Gbong Gwom institution in Jos. The Afizere in particular, contend that the institution has been hijacked by the Berom over time.

They allege that the monopolistic claims of the Berom over Jos township and the traditional title of Gbong Gwom amount to an abuse of the headstart enjoyed by the Berom vis-à-vis other indigenous groups in terms of political awareness. It has been suggested earlier that the rapid increase in political awareness among the Berom was linked to tin mining activity and the land question this posed to the Berom peasantry. It formed the basis of the political organization of the emergent Berom elite trained by the mission and employed largely as school teachers.

The Afizere narration of history appears to contradict the claim of the Berom to justify their ethnic “patent” over the institution. They argue that Riyom which can be regarded as the
political cum spiritual headquarter of the Berom happened to be at the geographical centre of a number of villages belonging to ethnic groups such as Amo, Irigwe, Ganawuri, Anaguta, Rukuba and the Berom which comprised the former Jos Division. For this reason Riyom was favoured as headquarters of the Council of Chiefs for the entire administrative area which came to be known as Berom Native Authority.

They argue further that as a result of growing challenges of administration, a person with the requisite educational qualification was required to represent the Berom Traditional Council at the meeting of the regional council of chiefs as well as preside over the meeting of the Berom Traditional Council. Mr. Rwang Pam, then headmaster of Riyom Primary School was the only one who met the requirement and was so appointed. The circumstance of his selection, they argue, confers no special advantage on the Berom as a group as to provide the basis of exclusive claims over the institution.

It is further contended that when the task of the Berom Native Authority became more and more complex and it became necessary to appoint an executive committee of one Ciroma and four other persons who were not members of Council, the search for suitable candidates was not limited to the Berom. The four people identified for consideration included a non-Berom; one M. Adukucilli, a Rukuba who was a Native Authority Dispensary Attendant. The Berom candidates included Mr. Patrick Dokotori, Native Authority Forest Ranger, M. Bot Gwom, Headmaster of Riyom Primary School, and Lawrence Fom, an Agricultural Assistant based in Vom. For the Afizere and the Anaguta, the admission by a government memorandum that the inclusion of Mr. Adukucilli on the list of those to be considered was a means of avoiding revolt in the Berom Tribal Area (Memorandum No. 22734/214) lends credence to their position that the institution was not exclusively meant to be a Berom affair.
The Afizere in particular contend that the Beroms have relied on intrigues and subterfuge to exclude other groups in the former “Berom Tribal Area” from laying equal claims to the office of the Gbong Gwom. The first opportunity to challenge the monopoly of the Berom was presented by the death of the first Gbong Gwom, Rwang Pam. An Afizere and four other Berom contestants vied for the office. However, the only Afizere candidate who was said to enjoy wide popularity among the kingmakers was disqualified for an alleged offence. The development left the four Beroms as contenders, making it possible for Fom Bot, until then, the District Head of Ropp and Secretary of the Local Authority to emerge as the successful candidate.

The Anaguta see themselves as a ‘micro’ minority, being the least in numerical strength. Consequently, they see themselves as the most marginalized and alienated group in Jos. The resent the monopoly of the Gbom Gwom institution by the Berom, and instead, prefer a rotational system by which it would be possible for each of the contending groups to ascend the position. This at least would be an acceptable alternative to the creation of a chieftaincy institution for the Anaguta. In addition to the issue of traditional rulership, the Anaguta feel that they are grossly under represented in the Jos North Local Government because of the arbitrary manner in which wards were created. For example, they claim that the Anaguta are squeezed into one ward which is five times bigger than other wards within the local government (Interview: Yakubu Kankani, 8/6/2000).

As with the position of the Hausa community, some remarks need to be made regarding the position of the indigenes on the issue of citizenship and rights. They certainly are justified in their claim to exclusive control of rights and privileges in so far as they do so on the basis of what has been codified into public law. But the problem it creates is the bifurcated meaning of citizenship: a national citizen and a state citizen. It creates problem of building a sense of national citizenship and identity. A related problem has to do with the “settler” status ascribed to
the Hausa community in Jos, despite the fact that they have possessed effective residence of the Jos for over a century. While they seem to be right in pointing out the dual advantage they are likely to enjoy if they are recognized as indigenes, the position does not resolve the dilemma of many third and fourth generations of Hausa residents who are totally disconnected from their so-called roots.

6.4: THE POSITION OF THE IGBO AND YORUBA

The Igbo and Yoruba in Jos together constitute a formidable demographic force and have been historically associated with the growth and development of the city. The presence of the Yoruba community in Jos started with the military conquest of the Jos Plateau and the subsequent establishment of the colonial administration and the mining industry. The Igbo came primarily as traders and as providers of skilled labour of which many of them were absorbed into the colonial trading companies and technical services of government departments. The two groups have also made substantial contributions to local governance having been elected as councilors in Jos Local Government Council at different times. In the current dispensation which was ushered in by the 1998/199 elections, Igbo and Yoruba are represented by four and one councilors, respectively. To this extent, their feelings and perceptions of power and politics in Jos become critical in coming to terms with the crisis of citizenship and associated rights in Jos and at the national level.

The Igbo and Yoruba see themselves as migrants or sojourners whose primary concern is to earn their means of livelihood through trade, commerce and business. Participation in politics and competition for power which may bring them on a collision course with the local or host community has no compelling urge. In the construction of their identities and rights they appear to subscribe to the formal notion of citizenship which legitimizes individual and group choice
with regard to where to live in any part of Nigeria. This notion derives from the constitutional provisions which encourage Nigerians to live in any part of part of Nigeria and even inter-marry as a means of forging national identity and a sense of oneness. Beyond this, aspirations to power and positions which may threaten the host community and generate mutual fear and suspicion are avoided when necessary.

On the basis of acceptance of their ‘alien’ status the Igbo and Yoruba are more concerned about peace and tranquility that enable them engage in their legitimate pursuits. The Igbo consider themselves as the most mobile group of Nigerians who are found in all the nooks and cranies of Nigeria. The Yoruba share a similar concern that they are not interested in competing for the control of power with the indigenes of Jos – the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta. Consequently, the institutions of “Eze Igbo” and “Oba Yoruba” are seen by the occupants primarily in terms of mediating the relationship between these communal groups and the state on the one hand, and between them and other communal groups on the other.

However, the Igbo community harbour a deep sense of frustration and resentment at what they regard as frequent attacks deliberately targeted at Igbo persons and property, despite their attempt to maintain a harmonious relationship either with other communal groups and the host community. Many instances of such attacks can be easily cited in Jos and other northern cities. It happened for the first time in 1945 in the period immediately following the end of the second world war. In addition, apart from the politically motivated attack on the Igbo in 1966, Igbo property was the target of arson and looting in the April 12, 1994 crisis in Jos. Similarly, Igbo businesses and persons were attacked in the September 7, 2001 crisis that rubbished the relative peace the city had enjoyed after the 1994 episode. What is perhaps unknown to the Igbo community is the class dimension to the ethnic question which tends to make the economically successful groups vulnerable to attack, not necessarily because of their ethnicity.
Both the Igbo and Yoruba have a static and fixated notion of citizenship in the sense that they defer to the “son of the soil” syndrome. The Oba of the Yoruba in Jos, for example, maintained that the Yoruba community have no business aspiring to the traditional rulership of Jos. When asked to express his position, he responded with an analogy of how absurd it will be for the Hausa settler in Ibadan to aspire to become the Olubadan of Ibadan (Interview: Chief Olugbodi, 20/9/2000). A more intriguing example occurred in 1996 when the Eze Igbo and the Igbo community in Jos prevailed on an Igbo man who aspired to the Chairmanship of Jos North Local Government to drop the ambition.

What this suggests is that the Yoruba and Igbo residents in Jos appear to subscribe to a notion of citizenship that is ethnicised, accepting as it were, the formal distinction between a “national” citizen whose rights are formally guaranteed in the constitution and a “state” citizen who belongs to a community indigenous to that state. Consequently, they are not prepared to insist on the reciprocity of obligation that is implied in the notion of citizenship which is expected to accompany their discharging civic obligations such as payment of taxes. They would, therefore, not find any absurdity in their children being subjected to discriminatory fees in schools and exclusion from enjoyment scholarships as well as employment in the state and local government bureaucracy. This is perhaps a classical example of enduring denials and exclusions in passivity.


Although the question of citizenship is intensely and passionately debated in Jos with massive deployment of history by the various groups as shown above, there is need to look more closely at the specific nature of interests that are involved. One way of showing this in a graphic
manner is to examine the debates that were ignited by the 1976 proposal to extend all the privileges and opportunities available to indigenes to other Nigerians who satisfied residency requirement of twenty years. What appears as the standard response to this debate is found in the white paper issued by the government of Plateau State on the report of the commission which inquired into the April 12, 1994 crisis. A review of this would lay bare the basis of fear and anxiety that underlies the politics of exclusion and the nature of interests that pushes it.

In 1976, the then Military Governor of Plateau state, Colonel Dan Sulaiman sought amendment to the Plateau State General Order. The rationale behind the amendment appeared progressive in the sense that it attempted to expand the notion of local citizenship in Jos by introducing residency requirement. The specific amendment proposed by the Military Governor was to the effect that "any one born and (who) stays in Plateau State for at least twenty years, now qualifies for all entitlements and privileges of an indigene of the State" (Nigeria Standard, May 29, 1976). As explained, the amendment was "necessitated by the need to afford opportunities to members of communities of settlers who have had generations of families over a period of 40-50 years but were hardly regarded as citizens of their place of abode".

The amendment was proposed, it would be recalled, in the context of the new spirit of nationalism which followed the civil war and the dilemma faced by the Hausa community in Jos. The latter could be explained in terms of increasing agitation and restiveness among the Hausa community in Jos who, alleging extreme discrimination and marginalization, threatened mass emigration out of Jos. As a matter of fact, available evidence seem to suggest some families actually relocated to establish new settlements on the border between Plateau and Bauchi states, although the figure cannot be established. The idea, it would seem, was to extend the "indigeneship" of Jos to all Nigerians, especially members of the migrant ethnic communities who would meet the residency qualification. The early 1970s witnessed a dramatic upsurge in
access to western education by youths in Plateau State made possible by tremendous expansion of educational facilities and infrastructures of the post-civil war era. The state creation exercise of 1976 which led to the excision of the more educationally advanced southern part of the former Benue Plateau into Benue State created a sense of new opportunities for the emergent elite. It is such elite driven interest that explains the definition of access to available opportunities in restrictive terms.

It is understandable for such an ascendant elite to seek to articulate and defend its interests in terms of access to civil service employment, promotions, scholarship, contracts and political representation. This had to be decidedly directed at the Hausa community who hitherto had been hegemonic in public affairs as shown by their dominance in elective positions in the First Republic and their leading position in trade and commerce. It also, for the same reason, had to be directed at the more educationally advanced southerners.

This partly explains the massive opposition to this proposal from the educated elements on the Plateau who concluded that the amendment was a "result of pressure from a minute group of powerfully influential settlers who think they have found a kingdom for themselves here and are desirous of monopolising rights and privileges at two ends in this country" (JDSA, 1976:4). The opposition to this amendment to the general order has been used, not unjustifiably, by the Hausa community as evidence of their exclusion. The fact, however, is that it was not targeted at the Hausa "settlers" alone. Rather, it should be seen as a strategy of warding off competition from all migrant ethnic groups on the Plateau. The significance to the Hausa community is to be understood from the competing claims they make in relation to matters of indigeneity.

Yet, there is a specific sense in which the interest of the educated elites on the Plateau becomes a critical factor in the mobilization of ethnic identity and the exclusion of those defined ethnically as "others". It is a conventional wisdom in the discourse on ethnicity that the elites are
specific interest bearers who find ethnicity as a political resource among several others. However, in seeking to come to terms with the role of the elites in any context, one must ignore the objective basis of practices that seek the exclusion of other groups. In precise terms this has to do with the fear of domination, real or imagined, especially where a group realises that it is in a comparatively disadvantageous position to compete. The two examples of elite opposition to a progressive attempt in the 1970s to extend the status of indigenes to those who have had twenty years effective residency in Jos, and the discrimination against other Nigerians including the Hausa in matters of admission into schools and employment are classic examples of the role of the elites.

It was evident from the reaction of the elites in Plateau State that there are two sources of perceived threat. This much comes out from the position of the Jos Divisional Students Association (JDSA) which likened "this radical policy" to Ironsi's unification Decree No, 34, fearing that this would give undue advantage to migrant ethnic communities. The first source of perceived threat comes from migrant ethnic communities who are more educationally advanced. Thus, they rejected the proposal on the ground of the influx of people from the educationally well advanced parts of the country in search of a brighter future for their children and relatives in Plateau State. As they clearly articulated their position:

Certainly, due to our educational shortfall, it is impossible that we shall compete favourably with some of those who have been imposed on us as indigenes and with some of those who would be rushed into the state now by the 'amendment' in order to be made indigenes after their twenty-year stay (JDSA, 1976).

The second source of perceived threat comes from the Hausa-Fulani "settlers" whom, it was thought, might invoke the new legislation to legitimise their claims to power and resources in Jos. They, therefore, consciously made a distinction between "settlers" and the 'traditional'
indigenes of Plateau State whose interests may be jeopardised, and warned that such a move could be detrimental to the peace, stability and progress of the state.

In addition to a careful documentation of the events and circumstances leading to the April 12, 1994 carnage in Jos as well as the extent to damage and property in the Jos metropolis, a significant aspect of the work of the Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of this research, is how it approached the issue of who qualifies to enjoy the status of “indigene” of Jos. As noted already, this was not the first time the issue was placed in the arena of public debate. In 1976, the matter had been openly debated in response to attempt to confer the status on residents in Jos other than the “indigenous” communities who had enjoyed continued residency for a period of twenty years.

In dealing with this rather thorny and controversial issue, the Commission made a distinction between an “indigene” and a “citizen” of Jos, similar to the way it was posed in the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The position of the Commission deserves to be quoted in full for the purpose of clarity. On this matter, it says:

……an “indigene of Jos is one whose ancestors were native of Jos, beyond living memory. This does not include any person who may not remember from where his father or grandfather left his native home for Jos as a fixed home, domiciled there as of choice for life; or who is ignorant about from where his family moved to Jos permanently in quest of better living or in the process of his business. But to a “citizen” of Jos may be ascribed the status of an inhabitant of Jos who is entitled to qualified enjoyment of rights enjoyed by an “indigene” of Jos. In the light of the above consideration or careful thought, we concede to the claim of the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta tribes, and to declare that they are “indigenes” of Jos. But as to the Hausa-Fulani people’s assumption, we make bold, on the evidence at our disposal, to advice them that they can qualify only as “citizens” of Jos (Government of Plateau State, 1994:25). Emphasis mine.

This is merely a throw back to the debate occasioned by the provisions on the “indigeneity” clause in 1979 when it was first introduced into the country’s public law. Although the Commission attempted to reproduce the principle that informs the provisions in the constitution as well as the concepts, it created additional confusion to defining citizenship on the basis on
biological descent. For example, while it clearly defines an indigene in terms of persons “whose ancestors were native of Jos beyond living memory”, it quickly excluded “person who may not remember from where his father or grandfather left his native home for Jos as a fixed home”. The wordings, it appears, were deliberately crafted to exclude members of the Hausa/Fulani community in Jos who in some context could benefit from the clause “beyond living memory”.

The Commission in its view therefore took the position that the “Hausa/Fulani” community in Jos are “settlers” and to that extent cannot be conferred with the status of “indigene” in Jos. From the point of view of the position canvassed by the Afizere, Anaguta and the Berom, the conclusion reached by the Commission on this matter amounted to victory, while to their rivals, this was a complete political disaster. Nevertheless, it is far from a resolution of the dilemma. Perhaps, this explains why the government exercised undue delay in releasing the report of the Commission to the public, and following up as expected, to issue a white paper as a prelude to the implementation of the lead recommendations of the Commission. It is a fact that up till now the government has behaved as if the report does not exist, almost eight years after the Commission was set up to inquire into an incident that poked enormous fun at the claims of Jos and Plateau State to be the “home of Peace and Tourism”.

From all indications, given the basis for recurrent communal conflict in Jos, this kind of debate will continue to flourish. Consequently, contestations, antagonism and tension may continue to remain salient unless the conundrum of citizenship is politically and decisively resolved by consciously moving away from criteria which emphasize blood, ancestry and descent to one which favours the building of national citizenship around the question of residency as in most federal systems. In the concluding chapter which follows, attempt is made to summarise the issues raised in the research so far and to offer some policy recommendations which hopefully
may contribute to the resolution of the dilemma which ethnicised political discourse poses to the question of citizenship in Nigeria.
CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

7.1: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The major findings of the research relate to the research questions/statement raised in chapter one. These include the proposition that inter-ethnic hostility and conflicts appear to be rooted in the elite manipulation of history, ethnic, religious and cultural differences; that inter-ethnic conflicts are related to the degree of socio-economic and political imbalance between and among different ethnic groups; that economic decline and mass poverty exacerbates inter-ethnic and urban violence; that the possibilities of ethnic violence and conflicts are related to the degree of state involvement in the control of the economy, structure of opportunities, and the framing of identity and citizenship; and that the absence of a democratic framework in the context of politicized ethnicity has implication for the sharpening of the identity question and citizenship.

The research has established that there are deep-rooted issues of identity politics that are historically framed and reinforced by patterns of post-colonial encounters in urban Jos. The substantive elements in these encounters relate to the struggle for power and resources as mediated largely by the state. The way in which these issues are framed and the tensions and contradictions they generate, have implications, not only for citizens’ rights, but related issues of democratization, nation-building and national development. The discourses and political practices associated with these issues strike at the chord of the national question. This is so in the sense that they highlight the fear, anxiety, apprehensions and disillusionment associated with the
Nigerian project as envisioned by the early nationalists who were at the forefront of the struggle for decolonization. They touch especially, on the way in which successive Nigerian ruling class/elite, both civilian and military, have tried to grapple with the national question in the post-independence period. At issue here, therefore, are the two central issues: the nature of the ruling elite and the character of the post-colonial state. The findings of the research that relate to the role of the elite and the state will be highlighted later.

One significant aspect of the findings of this research relates to the very nature of ethnic identity and the kind of transformation and transmutation it is amenable to over time. It provides evidence to support the view that ethnic identity is by its nature fluid, situational and open to reconstruction and redefinition. It shows further that every form of identity is subject to internal divisions and fractioning, calling into question the tendency to give absolute attribution to any particular form of identity. With specific reference to the experience of Jos, there seemed to have occurred a fundamental shift in respect of groups at conflict. Despite the depth of the historical issues that that have pitched the so-called Hausa/Fulani community in Jos on the one hand against ethnic minority elements such as the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere on the other, evidence seems to suggest that they acted together against migrants of southern origin on the basis of a common “Northern Nigerian” identity in the earlier period. This was the case, at least, in the late colonial period and up to the end of the First Republic.

However, with the creation of twelve states and the dramatic re-awakening of minority identity which sounded the death knell of a monolithic “North”, ethnic minority consciousness and agitation created the basis of political conflict which came to pitch these minority elements against the “Hausa/Fulani” who were perceived to have dominated the former. The ascendancy of a “Middle Belt” political identity at once invoked geographical, cultural and religious differences fostered a great sense of social distance between the two groups. It had the
consequence of intensifying contradictions and antagonism between the two groups, thus replacing the previous patterns of collaboration and co-operation with conflict, tension and sometimes open conflict. A critical element of this is the attribution of “settler” status to the “Hausa/Fulani” community in the Middle Belt areas and the exacerbation of problems of citizenship for them in a political context in which they were given an “alien” status.

It is important to situate this within the context of the political interest of the rising power elite in the Middle Belt and their own calculation for power and access to resources that the control of power allows. The significant point, therefore, is that changing political context and interests often impact on the nature of identity and the kind of reconstruction and reconfiguration they are amenable to. This is further proved in the context of Jos by the tendency for the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere to enter into a “grand alliance” against the “Hausa/Fulani at one level, to split on issues such the institution of the Gbom Gwom and the history of “who owns” Jos. As in all situations the political mobilization of ethnic and related forms of identity is situational.

As noted earlier, the post-colonial state is a key factor in the crisis of identity in Nigeria. The findings of the research provide ample evidence for the role of the post-colonial state in the reproduction of ethnicity and the attendant crisis of citizenship. However, as revealed through the historicized discourse employed in this research, the role and place of the post-colonial state in this regard, occasioned by the absence of autonomy from the contradictions and cleavages of the society, has origin in the colonial state that was its forebear. Much of this can be gleaned from the very history of Jos as an urban centre, the establishment of the tin mining industry and the mode of labour recruitment in the tin mines as well as the pattern of ethnic segmentation in settlement. The implication of these developments which provided a framework of interaction for people of different ethno-religious and cultural backgrounds, coupled with competition for
resources in the context of colonially-generated scarcity necessarily transformed the competition along ethnic lines.

But even more crucial, in this regard, is the way in which policies promoted by the colonial state had implications for ethnic identity formation within the Jos metropolis, a development that continues to re-echo in the politics of identity and the contestation between the different ethno-cultural aggregates in the city. Some of these policies as has been shown include the subjection of the city residents to different administrative systems and laws such as the distinction between the “Native Town” and the “Township” administered under the Native Authority and the Residence, respectively. The differential manner in which different communal groups, secluded in terms of residence, related to the colonial state and administration in no small way forged a great sense of social distance. It is instructive that such colonially constructed communal sense of identity in Jos has remained an important element in the “production of history” by the various groups.

However, of more immediate and direct relevance to the problem of antagonistic inter-group relations, especially in relation to contestations over rights and opportunities, is the post-colonial state. In addition to the absence of autonomy of the state from societal cleavages, its mode of insertion into the economy and society in general has had profound implications for individual and group identity. The evidence from the study shows that in more ways than one the very nature and character of the post-colonial state has contributed to the crisis of identity as it relates to citizens’ rights.

For instance, the leverage exercised by the state in terms of control over resources and in determining access to opportunities for individuals and groups, has inevitably turned the state into a prized possession to be won and controlled by the various groups who perceive the struggle in ethnic terms. Despite the onslaught of the IMF and the World Bank inspired market
reforms which began in the 1980s, the state has remained the quickest and most guaranteed instrument of accumulation. For this reason it has remained a critical factor in the definition of access to opportunities and identities. As has been established in the study, contestation over identity and rights assumes a fierce dimension when it is in the context of resources either controlled by the state, or opportunities regulated and mediated by state institutions. Examples can be found in the communal mistrust and animosity generated by issues such as the control of the institutions and apparatuses of local government councils and the allocation of market stalls, and the tension generated over creation of districts and wards as well as appointments into these positions. Consequently, access to state power at the various levels as identified here tend to provide the most congenial ground for the playing out of the dynamics of ethnicity. A number of these issues re-echoed in the events of April 12, 1994, and the way the various groups have reconstructed their history on the basis of lived experience.

It has been established in yet another sense that the post-colonial state contributes to the intensification of the tension between ethnic identity and access to citizens’ rights. This has to do with the very fact that state definition of citizenship and its codification into public law is ethnicized. The fact that citizenship rights in the series of Nigerian constitutions are merely formally defined without mechanisms of realizing and enforcing them is one matter. The more critical, however, is the way in which the juridical definition of citizenship creates differential access between a “Nigerian citizen” per se on the one hand, and an “indigene” of a state or a local community on the other. Not only does this legitimize the politics of exclusion targeted at some communal groups in a defined local context, it negates the building and construction of a sense of national citizenship.

The Jos experience covered in this study does provide ample illustration of the problems and difficulties created for inter-group relations in a multi-ethnic polity. As shown in the study,
the bold initiative in 1976, taken by the State Government to redefine the concept of “indigeneity” and access to all the rights and privileges of being a “native” was rebuffed by the emerging ‘indigenous’ elite. Over the years, there has developed a pervasive feeling among the elite of the indigenous ethnic communities that the “Hausa/Fulani” residents in Jos are by and large “settlers”, and should be so treated. They, therefore, subscribe to the same notion of citizenship which legitimizes the bifurcation between a Nigerian “citizen” broadly defined and an “indigene” or “native” of local state or community. It is, therefore, instructive that the commission set up by the Plateau State Government to inquire into the April 12, 1994 riots in Jos arrives at the same conclusion that the “Hausa/Fulani” community in Jos possess not more than a “settler” status.

It further shows differential responses from the various groups to the question of denial on the basis of consciousness shaped by historical experience and perception of the nature of injustice. Thus, for the Yoruba and the Igbo, as for many other groups in Jos, certain rights and opportunities, are exclusive to the “indigenous” ethnic communities such as the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere. Their participation in the political and civil life of Jos, and the fact that they have produced elected councilors in successive local councils in the Jos metropolis, perhaps because of the progressive character of the electoral laws is seen as a matter of privilege. In other words, they hardly perceive this as rights inherent in the membership of their ethnic groups of the Nigerian state and their long residence in Jos. It can be said that in many spheres they endure their deprivations in passivity.

However, for the Hausa community in Jos, this is unacceptable. Consequently, they have remained unyielding and dogged in their demand for their rights as citizens. In so doing, they resort to history, not only of long residence of the Hausa community in Jos, but around a notion of “ownership” of the the town they claim to have founded. Consequently, they have contested
virtually all the existing social and political spaces in the city. The claims of the Hausa community which have pitched them directly against the Berom, the Afizere and the Anaguta cover a wide range of issues such as the control of the local government council, the restoration of lost Hausa chieftaincy titles, political appointment, and access to employment opportunities and scholarships for their children. As demonstrated in the study, the tendency on the part of the “Hausa/Fulani” to construct their history and identity as well as associated claims on the basis of colonial history and experience tends to create more problems than solution.

In the pursuit and contestation over these issues there is often a tendency to play the religious card. Perhaps, the only justifiable basis for relating the issues to religion may arise from the integration of ethnicity and religion into a system of identity. This has been demonstrated most vividly in the case of Hausa identity which is strongly interwoven with the Islamic religion. This tends to be reinforced by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the antagonists of perceived “Hausa/Fulani” hegemony are predominantly Christians which, to a large extent, has become a key marker of their ethnic and cultural identities defined in oppositional terms to the “Hausa/Fulani”. Although the substance of the issues hardly has any basis in religious differences as a few elements among the three ethnic groups are Muslims, a religious colouration was added to the 1994 crisis with the burning of places of religious worship. The religious dimension acquired more prominence in the September 7, 2001 events and in many respects compounded the nature of the contradictions. It is, therefore, important to recognize that religion, like other forms of identity, is a political resource invoked by social actors whose interests are not so narrowly defined. Thus, in one sense it provides excuse and rationalization for a certain cause of action in the sense of the perspective it offers on how to redress perceived injustice. In another related sense, it serves as an effective strategy of mobilizing support for issues that clearly fall outside of the domain of religion.
Finally, in relation to the role of the state is the phenomenon of state collapse, exhaustion and increasing irrelevance. The massive literature on state collapse which points to the increasing disjuncture in state-society relations, the waning administrative capacity of government to deliver the basic services to the people, the various strategies of “exit” from the state, and of avoiding the repression and the terror which it represents by groups and individuals and many more manifestations of the inadequacy of the post-colonial state bear relevance to the Nigerian situation. Even before the advent of the crisis of the 1980s, state incapacity characterized the performance of the “developmentalist” state which is well captured by all manners of epitaphs such as being “prebendal”, “patrimonial”, “kleptomanic”, among several others. These epitaphs which, to a large extent depict the character of the ruling class/elite, are enough in trying to come to terms with the failure of the modernization project in post-colonial Nigeria. The situation is, however, worsened by the unequal alliance with imperialism which has further exposed the state. All these explain the crisis of social citizenship which most Nigerians face in its most brutal immediacy as a result of lack of access to the essentials of life and survival that fall squarely in the domain of state action.

Consequently, what exists as the state is nothing more than a ramshackle agglomeration of interests that hardly correspond to the concept of the state. It creates a situation in which hospitals and health care are inadequate, unemployment becoming more widespread, inflation figures soaring, while education, agriculture and other vital sectors have experienced secular collapse. For the power elite the state is useful only to the extent that it fosters their desire for accumulation. It is a situation in which the state and the power elite have abandoned the citizens, and the latter, having exhausted all the available tricks of manipulation, seek refuge in ethnic and religious identities as ideological and social fortresses of survival. Such a strategy coincides with
that of the vast majority of the people who seek refuge in these identities in response to the profound conditions of alienation and identity crisis they face.

All these coupled with the absence of a culture of the rule of law point to the centrality of the state in explaining the crisis of identity and citizenship, as the experience in Jos tends to suggest. The question of the absence of the culture of rule of law itself is inseparable from the ethnicized character of the state pervading all the institutions, including the police and the judiciary. This ultimately limits the capacity of the state to deal with the elites who engage in opportunistic manipulation of differences, and those who resort to violence as a means of dealing with grievances and perceived injustice.

It is axiomatic in the literature to allude to the instrumentalist nature of the ethnic question in relation to the interest of the elite and the “new men” of power. In other words, the view that the phenomenon of ethnicity and its expression in conflict and violence is related to the use to which members of the privileged class or the ruling elite decide to put it in the circumstance. What this view admits implicitly is that differences exist in the first place; the role of the elite is to give such differences social and political meanings. In this sense, the view shares some common element with those that allude to some kind of “invention” and “construction”, despite the profound differences in their philosophical foundations. The study of the relationship between ethnicity and the crisis of citizenship in urban Jos provides empirical grounding for the view that opportunistic manipulation of differences by the elite significantly contributes to the problem of antagonistic ethnicity.

The study has established for example that the politics of differences and the tendency towards the identification of the “relevant others” takes place in the context of competition for power and opportunities, whether it is in relation to issues of creation of new local government councils, elections and appointments of chairmen and councilors. The politics of “production of
history” involving all the communal groups at conflict in Jos and the events leading to the outbreak of the April 12, 1994 violence, tend to point to the elite character of the problem of antagonistic ethnicity. Indeed, it is obvious from the reading of the political history of Jos that discourses woven around the “ownership” of Jos and the contentious question of indigeneity are intelligible only in the context of the struggle for resources, power and opportunities in which the elites and the privileged sections of the different communal groups are the primary stake holders.

The visibility of the elite in the arena of the political mobilization of ethnic and related differences in the struggle for power and opportunities is further strengthened by the prominence of ethnic associations which have acted as vanguards in the process. The study provides evidence to the effect that urban ethnic associations which are increasingly seen in terms of “migrant empire” building constitute a critical element of identity formation in the urban setting for at least two reasons: the fact that such ethnic organizations and networks provide both psychological and material (considering their welfare functions) bases for individual and group survival in the context of the fears and anxiety occasioned by urbanism. However, there is evidence to suggest that ethnic associations tend to go beyond these traditional roles to play more direct role in mediating and negotiating power relations at two important levels: between and among groups and between groups and the state.

The relevance of associational ethnicity to the wider issues of contestation over identity and rights comes out in very bold relief in the quest to redefine and renegotiate the power relations between the contending ethnic communities in Jos. The contestation between the “Hausa/Fulani” community in Jos and the indigenous groups such as the Berom, the Anaguta and Afizere take on a definite organizational and ideological character primarily because of the role played by ethnic organizations that have been formed as platforms of the different ethnic groups. These organizations have become elite platforms for articulating group positions, defining the
political agenda as well as determining group response to issues as the events leading to the 1994 violence and the aftermath tend to show. A similar, even much more vigorous, role has been played by these organizations in mobilizing group sentiments and solidarity around the issues that led to a more deadly communal violence in the Jos Metropolis on September 7, 2001.

However, it has been established that the discourses chosen and privileged by the elite in their struggle for power and opportunity is at variance with the complexity of economic and cultural linkages as well as the level of interpenetration among the people. Thus, the opposition and resentment to what is perceived as “Hausa/Fulani” hegemony by the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta and other indigenous ethnic communities in Plateau State, for example, exists alongside a process of acculturation and integration. The wide adoption of the Hausa language as a lingua franca and the prevalence of Hausa mode of dressing provide very good illustrations. Besides, many of the self-fulfilled and accomplished individuals from these ethnic minorities adopt without questioning Hausa titles such as Dan Masani, Sardauna and Wali,² to mention a few examples, as long as these titles are seen to enhance their social and political standing in the society. And despite the deep-rooted opposition to Hausa/ Fulani domination and civilization, a few of them have adopted the Islamic religion, largely out of the allurement for the power and wealth associated with the adoption of Hausa/ Fulani identity of which Islamic religion is a major component.

Relatedly, the dramatization of power associated with the institution of Gbom Gbom show a strong element of fusion with the Hausa/Fulani tradition, despite the claim by the elite of the indigenous ethnic communities that the creation and continued existence of the institution represents a complete rejection of the Hausa/ Fulani power system in Jos. True, the context for

²Current holders of these titles include Dr. Madugu, a leading Berom elite who is Dan Masani Jos; General Jeremiah Useni, former Minister of Federal Capital Territory under the General Sani Abacha administration who has proclaimed himself the Sardauna of Plateau and Nasarawa states; and Chief
the emergence of the Gbom Gwom institution in the late 1940s and the early 1950s reflected a
kind of self-enlightenment on the part of some colonial officials regarding the problem likely to
be associated with the imposition of Hausa/ Fulani rule, but even more critically the rising
political profile of the indigenous ethnic communities, especially the Berom.

However, as it remains clear after several decades, the Gbom Gwom institution, partly
deriving from an “invented tradition” remains highly infused with cultural elements of the
“Hausa/Fulani” power system. This is manifested at two levels. One is the mode of dressing of
Gbom Gwom. Although the first person to occupy the position, Rwang Pam, was a Christian,
turbaning in the mould typical of “Hausa/Fulani” title holders, remained a conspicuous element
of his dressing. The present occupant of the office, Dr. Fom Bot, also a Christian has maintained
the same tradition. Second, is the preponderance and visibility of Hausa drummers, flutemen,
praise singers and other paraphernalia of the “Hausa/Fulani” power system that have become
integrated into the palace routines.

Rather than seeing this as a hang over of “Hausa/Fulani” domination or legacy, this needs
to be contextualised in the reality of power and the need to entrench the Gbom Gwom institution
as it were. It is not a controvertible fact that deriving from centuries of existence dating back to
the 7th century and the transformation occasioned by the 19th Jihad led by Uthman Danfodiyo, the
Hausa have developed an elaborate system of manifesting power and exercising authority, largely
through a systematic method of keeping records, the use of palace praise singers, drummers and
magicians. What the Gbom Gwom institution has done is simply to incorporate elements of the
Hausa/ Fulani power system to promote its own consolidation and entrenchment.

In addition, there seems to be considerable evidence in the findings of the research to
suggest that the process of democratization necessarily triggers off tension and in many cases

Solomon Lar, former civilian Governor of Platea and first Chairman of the ruling PDP, who is known as
Walin Langtang.
violence. This accounts for the tendency for the heightening of ethnic violence in the course of implementing the political transition programme and the post-transition violence that follows. There appears to be two explanations for this. One, is the very nature of political liberalization: the formation of political parties and the restoration of open political and electoral competition which promotes the mobilization and expression of cleavages. Second, and perhaps more significant than the first in relation to the management of ethnic pluralism with specific reference to the case under study is the ethnic pattern of domination associated with the previous authoritarian regimes. As the Nigerian experience tends to show in this regard, validated by the specific experience of metropolitan Jos, post-transition period provides a space for groups who felt marginalized in the period of military dictatorship, to seek to re-possess the political space and out act out their grievances.

The Berom, Anaguta and Afizere perceive as undue the privilege conferred on the “Hausa/Fulani” community in Jos by military dictatorship. They perceive that successive military coups since the truncation of the second democratic experiment in 1983 favoured the “Hausa/Fulani” more than any other ethnic community in the country, precisely because of the ethnic character of the patron-clientile networks necessary for the survival of such military regimes. Nothing provides a better illustration of their perception than the series of contestation over the creation of local governments within the Jos metropolis as was the case in 1991 and in 1994 during which the split of Jos into North and South local governments and the creation of Jos East Local Government, respectively, were effected. The opposition of these ethnic communities to the 1991 local government creation exercise and the protest that greeted the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato as the Chairman of the Caretaker Committee of Jos North Local Government Council are issues that have been captured in the preceding chapters.
The point being made here is not to suggest that democratization is harmful to the management of ethnic diversity. Rather, it is to underscore that authoritarian rule and prolonged absence of democratic governance, including its institutional ensembles and core values such as dialogue, consensus building and elite pacting and coalition building tend to exacerbate ethnic differences and increase the possibility of politically induced ethnic violence. A further evidence of this is provided by the recent experience of the Jos metropolis in relation to the struggle for power. Evidence seems to suggest that despite the hardening of ethnic feelings and position, there is more tolerance for outcomes of elections by the various ethnic communities as opposed to appointments that are made through executive fiat. This, for example, explains the fact that the election of Alhaji Sumaila Mohammed as the Chairman of Jos North Local Government in 1991 on the tacket of the NRC did not provoke the kind of ethnic reaction that the appointment of Alhaji Aminu Mato generated four years later. Similarly, the opposition to the election of Alhaji Muhtar in 1996 may have ethnic undertones, but was expressed as a case of electoral fraud which was proved at the election tribunal where the election was invalidated.

It needs to be pointed out further that another fact that emerges from the findings of this research in relation to the political question in the Jos metropolis and of relevance to the national situation has to do with the absence of ideology. As a part of the erosion of the political landscape in post-colonial Nigeria, especially with the implosion of the military into the political arena is the de-ideologization of political discourses and practices. Indeed, one lasting legacy of military dictatorship in Nigeria is the systematic attempt to either expunge or rout ideological tendencies opposed to neo-colonial and dependent capitalism and, by extension, social and political movements that may seek to challenge the kleptomatic, repressive and politically suffocating political order conducive to the interests of the ruling elites. Although successive military regimes demonstrated opposition to restructuring of political competition along
ideological line, despite its faith in “political engineering”, the Babangida military junta openly waged a crusade against ideological politics. For instance, while setting up the Political Bureau in 1987, he stated the opposition of his regime to discourses that centre on ideology. He demonstrated this further in rejecting socialism which was a major recommendation of the Political Bureau following intensive debate and consultations involving different segments of the Nigerian society.

The consequence of the absence of ideological discourse is obvious from a reading of the political development in the Jos metropolis beginning from the period of anti-colonial struggles into the contemporary period. A robust and healthy environment of political competition and especially of ideologically based competition for political power has the advantage of building and forging solidarity around concrete social and political issues as well as strategy of access to power and resources for socio-economic aggregates, rather than solidarity built around differences which are primordial, ethnic and territorial in nature. Save from the NEPU and PRP in the First and Second Republics, respectively, one can hardly point to any other enduring political organization that has prospered on the basis of a clear ideological distinction. Despite what has been described as the populism which is alleged to characterize these political organizations, they attempted to pose the question of state power and political competition in class terms and using differential access to power and wealth for different socio-economic groups rather ethnic groups as basis of political mobilization. The massive resurgence of identity politics in Jos is, therefore, among other factors, significantly explained by the absence of ideological framework of political organization and mobilization.

This point has direct significance for the deep-seated nature of identity politics in Nigeria today and how it is manifested in contestation over identity and rights in Jos. It does show that a fundamental shift has occurred in the nature of ethnic alliances dictated by the character of
political mobilization and contest. For apart from the fact that political identity constructed on the basis of ‘northern Nigerian’ identity considerably whittled down internal differences between the “Hausa/Fulani” and the ethnic minorities in the immediate post-independence years, ideological politics provided additional basis for interlocking ethnic relationships in ways that weakened ethnic and territorial differences. This, indeed, was the case in Jos in the First Republic.

Outside Kano, the home-base of the founder and builder of NEPU, Mallam Aminu Kano, Jos was perhaps the next strongest stronghold of the party. NEPU which drew the core of its support from the talakawa (commoners), in contradistinction to the ruling circles, the Sarauta-emirate system in northern Nigeria, enjoyed tremendous following in Jos, especially among the Hausa. The party recorded a string of victories Jos in the elections preceding political independence and the period up to the breakdown of the political process in 1966 which was to the consternation of conservative ruling alliance in Northern Nigeria. Precisely because of its ideological plank which stood it in opposition to the NPC which represented the political machinery of the northern oligarchy, it collaborated with the UMBC which was formed largely in response to the perceived domination of the conservative “Hausa/Fulani” oligarchy. In a similar manner, the UMBC forged alliance with other parties with ‘progressive’ inclination such as the AG. This situation made it untenable to reduce the political identification among the “Hausa-Fulani” in Jos to the conservative political trends in Northern Nigeria, but more fundamentally suggested that cross-cutting solidarity based on class provided alternative to the ethnic platform.

The fact that both NEPU and UMBC shared some common interest provided a basis, as it were, of civic interaction and engagement between the “Hausa/Fulani” in Jos and such ethnic groups as the Berom, Afizere and Anaguta for whom the UMBC represented a platform of political identity and participation. The progressive weakening of such ideological framework
has created a situation in which party identification and electoral support have come to be dictated by ethnic interest, especially differentiation which pitches ethnic minorities of the north against political tendencies perceived to be represented by the “Hausa/Fulani” community.

What obtains is not more than ‘national’ political parties that are almagams of different ethnic groups and internally fractionalized along ethnic and regional lines as were the cases of the NRC and the SDP in the shortlived ‘Third Republic’, and currently in the three political parties that were established in the post-Abacha transition programme, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP), the All Peoples’ Party (APP), and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). In most local contexts ethnic cleavages are reflected in the patterns of party affiliation. This was the case in Jos in the shortlived ‘Third Republic’ where party identification within the Jos metropolis and on the Plateau in general reflected ethnic divide. Whereas the “Hausa/Fulani” community in Jos overwhelmingly identified with the NRC, the minority ethnic communities rallied around the SDP.

Finally, the findings of the research draw attention to the link between economic failure and decline on the one hand, and the rise in ethnic and religious consciousness on the other. The experience of Jos shows a dramatic rise in identity related conflicts, especially from the early 1980s when a deep economic crisis blew into the open at the national level, leading to the imposition of “Austerity Measures” and other “stop gap” policies before a thorough-going orthodox market reforms were imposed from the mid-1980s. It is obvious that the market-based reforms impacted negatively on the poor and the vulnerable social groups given the absence of social “safety nets”, thereby reinforcing previous patterns of inequality in the distribution of wealth and resources.

In this context, sentiments which feed on unequal development such as ethnicity and religion are thrown to the fore. The fear, tension, anxiety, uncertainty and the rapid changes
which accompany profound economic difficulties, often provide the most congenial ground for breeding religious feelings and expressions. Both ethnicity and religion may serve as platforms for some groups in either challenging or resisting existing distribution of power and resources, and in some instances provide the ideological framework for acting out their grievances on the basis of their perceived sense of injustice, and to challenge the state or groups perceived to be exercising domination and hence responsible for their social and economic conditions. In specific urban situations in which access to power and opportunities appears to be structured by ethnic discourses the outcome is often predictable.

The problem of material reproduction is therefore is at the root of anxiety, deep fear and mistrust which are expressed in ethnic and religious violence. Many social actors whose interests are not necessarily defined in either ethnic or religious forms, such as looters and people at the social margins take advantage of the breakdown in law and order.

7.2: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This study which focuses on the relationship between ethnicity and citizenship in Jos throws up a number of issues which have far reaching implications for national unity and integration, and for development and democratization. These issues call for policy recommendations aimed at building national citizenship and promoting nation-building in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic setting, yet recognizing at the same time that, fractured, differentiated and multi-layered citizenship is a reality of a multi-ethnic society. The very fact that Nigeria adopted a federal solution is a recognition that more than one centre of political identity is recognized.

Indeed, the unending debates, disputations, claims and counter claims by the various communal groups in Jos over questions of identity, citizenship and rights bear much relevance to a trend which is national, and has posed a mortal challenge to the national project. This is the
case either of the Hausa community who are locked in the struggle over the “ownership” of Jos with the indigenous groups, or the Yorubas, Igbos and several others who appear to have chosen the path of enduring passivity because they perceive themselves as lacking the historical basis for making similar claims. The critical aspect of the national question which coheres with the project of nation-building envisioned by the early nationalists is how to promote harmonious inter-group relations considerably devoid of acrimony and disharmony. The recommendations which follow attempts to deal with the manifold dimensions of the national question, a part of which is the tension between the exclusive claims fostered by the politicization of ethnic identity and the universal and inclusive imperatives of citizenship.

One policy issue that flows from this study is the need to engage with colonial historiography which has tended to compound the problem of inter-group relations in the post-colonial period. This is more prevalent in the former Northern Nigeria where the British colonial authorities imposed “Hausa/Fulani” hegemony which has had consequence for the history and identity of smaller ethnic nationalities. It is in this sense that the tension between the Hausa communities and the “host” communities in Jos and in southern Kaduna and several other flashpoints of communal conflict appear to be a backlash of colonial distortion of African history. This calls for a conscious effort to re-write the history of all Nigerian groups in order to distill the salient element of their identities and culture. However, such a recognition of differences should be regarded as the building block of national unity.

This is necessary because, as has been shown so far, the most difficult aspect of the construction of identity and citizenship relates to the attempt to rely on selected and politically manipulated historical facts and evidence. Such selective use of “facts”, especially “facts” rooted in colonial history and experience tend to widen the points of divergence and reduce the areas of agreement among the contending elites. This is simply a result of the fact that there is no such
thing as absolute historical "truth". The historical claims of a particular group often appear to be one version of several “truths”. It is therefore, important that public policy should promote and encourage research into the history of Nigerian nationalities to be undertaken by indigenous people on the basis of which identity can be constructed. Through indigenous research, it would be possible to remove the kind of distortions that characterize colonial historiography and which is at the vortex of many cases of communal violence related to access to resources and local power.

Apart from the contradictory notions of citizenship rooted in the production of history and woven around the notion of indigeneity between the contending communal groups, other issues being raised as a part of the on-going contestation is open to interrogation. For example, the opposition of the Berom to the hegemonic antics of the Hausa community, for which they took a position against the split of Jos Local Government in 1991, was anchored on the fear that it isolated the Gbong Gwom institution in a "Hausa-Fulani" dominated Jos North Local Government. The argument can be advanced that what the Berom power elites and “ethnic entrepreneurs” have consistently defended is an invented and undemocratic institution. The Afizere and Anaguta who complain about the tendency of the Berom to monopolise the institution are also struggling for the control of an undemocratic structure whose essence can either subvert the ‘tradition’ of the claimants, or their will. The same criticism can be advanced in respect of the persistence struggle on the part of the Hausa community for the restoration of Hausa ‘Sarkin’ Jos or ‘Wakilin Gari’ Jos.

One possible response is to suggest that all traditions in the first place are invented. Granted that all traditions including invented ones are legitimate as long as they are accepted by the people over whom they claim to rule, it is still possible to raise question regarding how democratic slogans are invoked in defence of institutions that are far from being truly
democratic. The point that is being made here is that all ‘traditional’ institutions in the country are not only undemocratic, most of these institutions were colonial “inventions” as are the cases of the institution of Gbom Gwom which came into existence in 1948 and Sarkin Hausawa which was a colonial implantation on a people to whom the institution was completely alien.

Against this background, government should institute a process of reform of traditional institutions especially in urban areas where it is not easy to establish which culture, tradition and culture predominates. The struggle over chieftaincy in Jos particularly draws attention to the difficulty of defining institutions of traditional rulership on the basis of a particular ethnic identity. Such a reform process should lead to the establishment of the office of Mayor to which people can aspire on the basis of election and free competition. In the early phase of the reform, government can define contestants to the office in the first twenty years in terms of the indigenous ethnic communities. This kind of “sun set” clause is necessary so that gradually the office can be open to all Nigerians. The beauty of subjecting such an office to competitive election is that this would encourage the emergence of ethnic alliances and cross-cutting linkages in the struggle to access the office and hence reduce the level of acrimony and animosity. The fact that an Hausa man, Alhaji Sumaila Mohammed won the Chairmanship of Jos North in 1991 and had to be tolerated despite the ill-feelings his victory generated among the indigenes shows that electoral legitimation is more enduring than any other basis of ascending positions of power and authority.

There is also a sense in which the inter-connection between ethnicity and religion in the discourse on citizenship comes out in the "production of history" by the groups in conflict in Jos. For instance, the fear of islamisation has always been expressed as a part and parcel of the discourse presented by the “indigenous” groups as the "Hausa-Fulani" hegemony in Jos. The constant reference to Islam goes back to the early history of the Middle Belt movement when
Islam and Christianity became a cultural marker for the 'core' Northerners (Hausa-Fulani) and the Middle Belt people, respectively. The fear arose partly from the pursuit of the first generation of the "Hausa-Fulani" ruling elites who not only used the machinery of the northern regional government and the instrumentality of the NPC, but relied heavily on the careful co-optation of the emergent Middle Belt elites into the northern system. Both Islamic religion and the spread of Hausa language were the clearest expressions of this attempt (See Tyoden, 1983; Takaya and Tyoden, 1987).

There is need for a clear public policy response to the fear raised by some groups regarding islamisation. The recent extension of Sharia legal code into criminal spheres in some states in the northern part of Nigeria has heightened the fears of ethnic minorities in the north and poisoned their relationship with the “Hausa/Fulani” elements. For instance, in response to the communal violence which erupted in Jos on September 7, 2001, and what was perceived as the cruel fate suffered by the Hausa community in Jos, the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria, through its president, Dr. Datti Ahmed, called for the introduction of Sharia in Jos North to protect the interest of the Hausa community (*The Guardian*, September 17, 2001). There is, therefore, the need to re-emphasize the secularity of the Nigerian state in a manner that is both clear and unambiguous. Given the very close interaction between ethnicity and religion as systems of identity, all Nigerians need to be assured that the state at all levels should be insulated from undue politicization.

The crisis of citizenship in Nigeria as framed by the urban context as has been shown in respect of Jos bears relevance to the situation in most urban settings. What appears as the most immediate challenge is building a sense of national identity and citizenship which provides for cross-ethnic civic engagements. Such a framework, too, can enhance the prospect for democracy.
and development. This requires that a number of issues and historical realities have to be engaged in this effort to construct a notion of national identity and citizenship.

One of such, to begin with, is raised by the history and peculiar circumstances of the Hausa community in Jos. Most of them for long have been identified as a group disconnected from their ‘roots’ following the migration of their forebears into Jos. Although a few of them had migrated to Jos for trading and commercial purposes before formal colonization, most came in the wake of the colonial conquest as soldiers and labourers in the tin mines. A majority of the Hausa residents in Jos who conveniently fall into this category are mostly of fourth and third generations. One of the witnesses who appeared before the commission of inquiry into the April 12, 1994 crisis, himself, an Hausa elite, was recorded as saying: “Having been cut off from their roots through the accident of history, and made the last ethnic group to settle permanently in Jos, they consider nowhere else as home”(p.17). For this category of Hausa residents in Jos, shock and alienation stare them in the face in the situation of near total exclusion from the civil and political life.

To deal with the conundrum, there is a need to transcend the debates as have been conducted between “indigenes” and “settler” in Jos, because each side in the debate take positions which are hardly reconcilable. For instance, there is a sense in which the Hausa community may be correct in drawing a historical parallel between their own experience and the blacks in the United States who suffered a similar experience of being uprooted from their homeland. However, the Afro-American community, through persistent struggles and sacrifices, have been conferred with full citizenship of the United States. This line of reasoning though may sound logical harbours the danger of what Mamdani (1996) describes as ‘history by analogy’. For one, it ignores the historicity of the process of state formation in the United States, in contradistinction to externally-imposed and constructed type of state system in Africa. The
establishment and maintenance of the state by an alien power precluded the possibility of the constituent members building consensus as to what constitutes the social purpose of the state and how the various component units of the state should relate to one another.

In yet another sense, this kind of analogy has its equivalent which can be drawn from the construction of history and real experiences of the “indigenous” ethnic communities in Jos, and what they perceive as “Hausa/Fulani” hegemony, which is then seen as the main obstacle to their progress and development. And so like the Hausa community who themselves through a representation of the Afro-American community in the United States, the “indigenous” groups see the Hausa community as the historical equivalent of the powerful white minority in the defunct apartheid system in South Africa.

There is, indeed, a sense in which we can make allusion to the Hausa dilemma in Jos, a dilemma borne out the difficulty of laying claims to authenticity anywhere, because of the way in which citizenship right is constructed by the Nigerian power elite: both in their ‘original’ abode and in Jos where they can be said to have possessed effective residency for decades and century. Dealing with the Hausa dilemma in Jos requires dialogue, accommodation and consensus building at the level of the elites between the Hausa community and the indigenous ethnic communities. In this regard, an irreducible minimum which will provide the basis for peace, harmony and development in Jos is to use this mechanism to work out an understanding which gives the Hausa community in Jos political recognition on the basis of their unique historical experience. This kind of recognition is possible without necessarily defining them as indigenes of Jos within the current context of the Nigerian discourse. It will ensure that representation in the institutions of governance through elections and appointments as well as access to vital social services.

In order to create the basis for peace, dialogue and negotiation, the Hausa community in Jos may have to revisit the manner in which they construct their history and identity within the
context of the struggle for power and resources in the Jos metropolis. For instance, their claim of “ownership” of Jos, or the claim to have founded Jos as a virgin area which is the source of friction with the “natives” need to be revisited. Rather, they can press their claim for political recognition on the basis of long residence which for some pre-dated 1900, and their contribution to the growth and development of the city.

Though more acute with the Hausa community in Jos, it is a dilemma which confronts Nigerian citizens who reside outside their home or state of origin. A national citizenship progressively defined both in terms of the bona fide membership of the Nigerian state with access legitimized by residency within a particular community or local domain which would have provided a “safety net” for such Nigerians has unfortunately been impeded by ethnically motivated considerations. As pointed out already, this pattern of exclusion has been codified in Nigeria’s public law as in the 1979 Constitution.

Since its introduction into the country’s public law in 1979, the issue of indigeneity and the exclusive claims and practices associated with it has been very contentious. Its definition in a purely biological sense or on the basis of descent in the 1979 Constitution was in relation to the implementation of the provisions on federal character. It is therefore clear that the issue of indigeneity is a political response to the fears and apprehensions of particular sections of the Nigerian community that such a clause is necessary to protect them from domination. However, when viewed in relation to the provisions in the independence and the republican constitutions in 1960 and 1963, respectively, it is a more reactionary document in the sense that it provided the basis for generating a new form of consciousness harmful to the process of nation-building. These two constitutions, which, comparatively, can be described as more “federal” than the subsequent ones, invoked residency as a determinant of access to the rights and privileges which
came to be defined exclusively on the basis of indigeneity. Each of the three regions had a separate constitution in addition to the federal constitution. While the East and the West provided for a period of one year continuous residency as a pre-condition for enjoying these rights and privileges, the northern region provided for a continuous residency of three years.

Unlike the 1979 Constitution, the 1999 Constitution makes reference to indigeneity without a definitional clause. In fact, only in Section 147, in relation to the appointment of Ministers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, does the constitution state expressly that a person that may be appointed Minister from a particular state must be an indigene of that state. Thus, the notion has continued to endure in Nigeria’s public law with the consequence of generating forms of consciousness which is inhibitive to national integration, democracy and development.

What is at issue here, therefore, is the relationship between law and consciousness. Concepts and ideas invoked in discourses are capable of generating consciousness which can either shape people’s political world view negatively or positively, depending on the political representation embedded in those ideas and concepts. This is the sense in which the notion of indigeneity needs to be confronted frontally. And it is primarily a political question in which a choice has to be made, taking cognizance of the reality of fractured or dual citizenship necessitated by multi-ethnic and multi-cultural political existence. At the level of practical politics, it is a simultaneous challenge of promoting national unity and protecting group fears and identity.

It is obvious from the patterns of political and communal violence since the 1980s that a choice will have to be made that seems to reinforce the historical, cultural, political and social integrative processes that have been at work and appear to have fused together many Nigerian communities. Whether it is in Zango-Kataf in southern Kaduna where the Hausa and the Atyab have had violent confrontations, or in Nasarawa Toto where a fratricidal conflict have pitched the Ebirra against the Bassa, or in Taraba state where a deadly confrontation had raged between the
Chamba and the Kuteb, the basis of disagreement lies in the invocation of the notion of indigeneity in the contestation over identity and rights. The notion is used either to exclude “others” from access to such rights and privileges or to contest exclusion. Yet, one realizes that the production of history associated with this shows clearly that each side has a case in the way its identity is historically constructed. The issues are so passionate and emotional that the consequence is often violence and carnage as the most recent experiences seem to drive home tellingly.

The simmering contestations over access to citizenship rights and the tendency to exclude people on the basis of their ethnic identity re-echoes what Englebert (2000:77), using Kalevi Holsti’s concept of “horizontal legitimacy”, describes as a very important component of the crisis of the African state that has militated against development: lack of agreement about those who constitute membership of the state. In the specific Nigerian context, it is not so much about inclusion within the territorial boundary of the national state, but the exclusion of groups from access to rights so constitutionally defined at the local levels of the state. It is the exclusive tendencies associated with this that is often referred to as “statism” in the Nigerian context. There is, therefore, the need to build a national consensus on these matters through open debate and discussions.

Furthermore, in confronting the national question as it is currently posed, there is need to creatively engage the past. For example, available evidence appear to lend credence to the prevalence in the pre-colonial order of what Lonsdale describes as “moral ethnicity”; it provides strong support to other observations to the effect that ethnic formation and identity is quite recent, weak and amenable to redefinition and reconstruction (Salamone, 1993; Mustapha, 1997). In addition, it has been observed that much of post-colonial identities, especially those drawing from primordial attachment like ethnicity, are products of elite invention and imagining. This is
because they clearly depart from pre-colonial patterns of inter-group relations. Not only was ethnic identity formation in the pre-colonial period characterized by flexibility, fusion and continued mingling of people of different ethno-cultural backgrounds, pre-colonial polities hardly coincided with ethnic boundaries. As Bala Usman (1994:8) correctly observes, there was hardly a single polity, sovereign or subordinate, which was co-terminous with a linguistic group before the British colonization of Nigeria.

It is a fact that Africans have the greatest attachment to the land which is central to their definition of individual and group identity (Ntalaja, 2003; Nnoli, 2003). The notion of “sons of the soil” or “daughters of the soil” is drawn from the ideology of territorial possession in which the land is represented as a possession, not only of the living, but also of the ancestors. Exclusive claims to the land become a critical issue in the construction of history and identity. Yet, Africans are known to be very accommodating and receptive of strangers. This explains why multiculturalism is an integral aspect of the social and political life of the African people and the basis for the fluidity and flexibility that characterized pre-colonial patterns of inter-group relations. There are numerous examples of such patterns of inter-group relations that mark the pre-colonial era from the present pattern of ‘post-colonial encounters’.

Grillo (1989), provides useful insight with the examples of the Ijesha among the Yoruba and the Nupe in the pre-colonial period. While the former would even prefer to treat a stranger with more respect, the Nupe kingdom was a peculiar example of multi-culturalism in which immigrant groups not only assimilated into the host communities, but were treated with utmost respect and integrated into the system of governance. Pre-colonial Kano provides yet another example of a healthy multi-cultural life that integrated not only immigrant Nigerian groups such as the Nupe, Beriberi and Yoruba, but also Arabs and people of other racial backgrounds.
In a more profound sense, Mustapha’s (1993) study of the small rural town of Rogo in Karaye Local Government of Kano State shows that the tension and conflicts generated at the level of inter-ethnic relations is a consequence of the dynamics of post-coloniality. He shows that although Hausa, Fulani, Wangarawa and Beriberi residents in the town are aware of their ethnic origins or roots at personal levels, it is more of preserved historical consciousness. Moreover, the occupational differentiation along ethnic lines promoted an atmosphere of mutual interdependence and healthy competition. Thus, awareness regarding Habe origin, Fulbe-speaking nomadic Fulani did not translate into antagonistic relationship. Together with assimilating patterns among the Igbo and Ijaw in southeastern Nigeria (Nnoli, 1989), the Yoruba, Nupe, Bariba and Bini in southwestern Nigeria (Falola, 1986), it can be suggested that accommodation, co-operation and reciprocity characterized inter-group relations, though latent tension and rivalry remained real.

Even the internal squabbles among these minority groups such as the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere is better understood in terms of the power game and the response of their elites to the diminishing prospects of material reproduction. The argument that they are a consequence either of elite construction or imagining of “otherness” in the context of the struggle for power and material wealth is buttressed by the significant absence of such patterns of inter-group relations in the period leading to formal colonial conquest. Historical record is replete with accounts of collaboration and alliance against common enemies who posed external threat to their collective existence at different historical points. It was the case in the successful resistance against the Fulani jihadist crusaders and, much later, in the less successful opposition to colonial conquest.

Apart from this evidence of mutual collaboration and alliances against common enemies, there exist linguistic patterns among the Afizere and Anaguta for example. The Gazetteer of the Plateau Province does provide evidence of strong historical and linguistic affinities between the
Berom, Afizere, Anaguta and Irigwe. The evidence contained in the documentation relates to a fusion of cultures and languages as a consequence of constant migration, movement and mingling of different groups. But it was a simultaneous process of fusion and fragmentation leading to either minor differences in dialects, language and customs. On the history of these core groups the recorded facts in the Gazetteer deserves to be quoted at length:

It can be briefly and yet comprehensively summed up as lines of migration of people, starting from different sources independently and at different times and arriving at those parts of the Province in which the present descendants of these early migrants are now living. More often than not after crossing the boundaries of the Province, all these lines of people have halted in one or more places and then moved on elsewhere. During such halts quarrel between members of the ruling families have caused factions to break away from the main body and move to another place, and sometimes fragments have broken away amicably and by mutual agreement. ….. they have preserved the main features of the customs and language of their parent body, but have adopted additional customs or have altered details of former customs and allowed variations and alterations to creep into the vocabularies of the language….. These causes of these changes from the present body can sometimes be directly traced to altered environment – for example, a move from rocky hills to plains – and sometimes to contact with new members ((Ames, 1932: 20-21).

The lengthy quote above provides useful insight into pre-colonial patterns of integration and the malleable character of ethnic identity. A significant proportion of the present Anaguta and Irigwe are of Jarawa origin. Many of those who were previously Berom have adopted Jarawa ethnicity as is the case of those found in Gashit District, some of who now speak Ron, and have taken on a new identity in place of the previous Berom identity (Ames, 1932: 54). Similarly, the dispersal and movement of the Jarawa into distant areas such as Kanam, Foron and Shendam is suggestive of the flexible character of identity in the pre-colonial period (Ibid, P.27).

There is need to emphasize this fact of history of integration and mingling of people rather than reinforcing differences among the various Nigerian groups. A comprehensive programme of civic education and national re-orientation should positively cultivate this history to forge ties and solidarities among the various Nigerian communities. It is even nmore so that such pre-colonial patterns of interaction is reinforced by current integrative processes such as
inter-ethnic marriages and mobility in labour and services across the length and breadth of Nigeria.

Additionally, the absence of a national passion and solidarity is not expressed at all levels of social interaction as demonstrated in the spontaneity of ‘national unity’ when the national soccer team plays in global fiesta. Similarly, ethnic and regional considerations do not prevent members of the various ethnic fractions of the ruling class from sitting on the same board of companies where they are united by the desire to share profit. After all, as Anderson (1983) reminds us, a nation is not more than an “imagined community”.

Yet, it would be wrong to dismiss or wish away emergent patterns and forms of identity on the ground of this historical reality, or on the ground of “recentness”. This would amount to denying the historical process of its essentially dynamic element. For the “recentness” of many of these identities and the fact that they are amenable to constant redefinition and reconstruction derive largely from the way in which ethnic and other primordial identities have interfaced with the Nigerian state at the various stages of its development beginning with the colonial period. And for what they are, these identities appear to shape peoples’ consciousness, enter into their definition of “otherness”, shape their attitude to power and authority and above all, their perception of justice and how to challenge perceived injustice. What this calls attention to is the fact that the politicization of these identities have to be recognized as political realities to be engaged at the level of reforming the state, and the design of constitutional and institutional arrangements for managing them. In short, it should be seen as an integral part of the challenge of managing diversity.

There is no doubt that creating a single nation out of a multiplicity of ethnic identities underlined the struggle for decolonization. As a matter of fact, the recognition and expression of ethnic differences has provided a strong impetus to the survival of this initial dream. Thus,
Jinadu (1996) draws our attention to the fact that the convergence of class and ethnic interests necessitated the adoption of a federalist ideology in organizing the Nigerian state. Nigeria’s experience in the First Republic clearly bears this out. The independence constitution which was by and large, a product of bargaining and negotiation among the different ethnic and regional factions of the ruling class expressed this pluralism. Apart from the federal constitution, each region had its own constitution, embodying its articulation of different historical and cultural experiences as well as future aspirations. Expectedly, the ethnic and regional characters of political parties, and the patterns of alliances and affiliations they generated provided the bulwark against excessive centralization of power. The advent of the military in politics, however, reversed these trends.

Among others, the crisis of national identity has been exacerbated by state failure and the failure of the modernization project. In reality, state failure and the failure of development are two related aspects of the crises faced by most post-colonial African societies. This is most aptly demonstrated at all levels of the society and expression of power relations in Nigeria. The project pursued by the post-colonial ruling class/elite using the instrumentality of the “reconfigured” or recast colonial state and couched both in the language and ideology of development is nothing more than the modernization project. Thus, in attempting to explain the failure of the modernization project, the state remains a major culprit. It is this failure of the state that is at the root of its legitimacy crisis as well as the crisis of social citizenship. For as Englebert (2000:1) explains, the weak capacity of the state to respond to environmental, external and other supply shocks and to design appropriate policies and institutions derive partly from a lack of norms of trust and civic participation which makes the state less accountable to societies.

While the point often stressed concerning the lack of root of the state in the people and their history (Englebert, 2000; Ekeh, 1972), or the substitution of neo-patrimonialism and/or
patron-client networks for its lack of moral foundation (Joseph, 1987; 1999) remain valid, what appears to be the most critical issue is the inability to build domestic consensus regarding the social purpose of the state. Addressing this problem requires altering the balance between state and society in favour of the latter, and empowering the people to demand and institutionalize accountability from the state. While democracy offers a useful framework for addressing this asymmetry, the western-type liberal democracy that is being promoted by the Fund and the Bank in the name of globalization falls far short of this challenge. This type of democracy which has been appropriately labeled as “choiceless democracy” (Mkandawire, 1999) means so little for the concrete struggle of the African people with the potential of resulting in the “democratization of disempowerment” (Ake, 1996)

It also appears that the dynamics of conflicts and politics of exclusion is largely dictated by the contemporary economic and political relations between the various communal groups. The crisis of material reproduction exacerbated by the economic decline since the 1980s and the failure of the state have impacted negatively on inter-group relations. As a part of the manifold response to the crises, the leading elements of the elite tend to invoke ethnic and religious identities as a strategy to re-position themselves for advantages. This perhaps provides explanation for the shifting character of inter-ethnic struggle and animosity in urban Jos. It has accounted, for example, for a shift from what was posed in the early history of Jos in terms of a simple North-South dichotomy in which all ethnic groups from the former northern region acted as “Northerners” in opposition to ethnic groups from the south who were simply labeled as “Southerners”, to more contemporary forms with various layers of cleavages and complex group alliances in matters relating to contestation over rights, access to power and resources. For while at one level, indigenous ethnic groups are pitched against the “Hausa/Fulani”, at another level,
the relationship between the indigenous ethnic communities is riddled with internal differences and schisms in keeping with the changing context of the struggle and competition.

Against this backdrop, there is need to re-examine our philosophy of development in a manner that puts the benefits of development at the door step of the people who are expected to be galvanized to produce and meet their daily aspirations. In contradistinction to the current wisdom that places unabiding loyalty in market forces and the economic blue-print endorsed by the IMF and the World Bank, there is need to bring the state back into development in the emergent context of democratic governance in which leaders are expected to meet the requirement of accountability and transparency. Relatedly, alternative development paradigm based on popular participation should be instituted to deal with the problem of development with the people as key actors in decision-making, mobilization of resources and implementation. Overcoming the crisis of development may not automatically remove tension in the relationship between groups, but would certainly whittle down anxiety and desperation which seem to fertilize conflict situations.

What is more, discriminatory and exclusionary practices are most pronounced in relation to access to public goods and opportunities determined by the allocating powers of the state at all levels. These include public sector employment and rewards, scholarships and access to land. This is well captured in the emergent patterns of ethnic and communal conflicts, especially in relation to access to local power and resources as shown in this study. This tendency for ethnicity and its conflict spiral to be associated with the pre-eminent role of the state in the economy has led many scholars to conclude rather wrongly that a corresponding reduction of the role of the state in the economy would reduce the propensity towards negative ethnicity (see Osaghae, 1994, for example).
A similar view is shared by Africanist scholars whose most sustained criticism of the post-colonial state, which is variously characterized as ‘prebendal’, ‘neo-patrimonial’ and corrupt, appear to have aided the Bank and the Fund in their efforts to achieve the ideological deconstruction of the post-colonial state (Beckman, 1993). This is most aptly demonstrated in the pervasive influence exerted by the imperatives of globalization in the design of economic policies by the current civilian administration. There is a clear affirmation of the leading role of the market in the allocation of resources given the adoption of a private-sector led development strategy and the aggressive pursuit of privatization. Consequently, the emphasis is liberal, as opposed to social democracy which places severe constraints on the state in the redistribution of resources.

Nevertheless, the task at the present historical conjunctures is to respond to the crisis of the nation-state project. And in confronting this task, the necessary starting point must be the recognition of the country’s pluralism, and the cultivation of diversity as the building block of unity. The phenomenon of politically re-charged ethnicities as evident in the emergence of ethnic political organizations such as Afenifere, Ohaneze N’digbo, Arewa Peoples Congress, and the militant Egbesu ‘warlords’ as much as they show the extent to which civil society can be ‘uncivil’, draw attention to the urgency of the task of state reconstruction, re-configuration and nation-building. Although these movements tend to articulate grievances which feed on unequal development and call into question the very unpopular, corrupt and unhegemonic nature of the Nigerian state, they can as well pose a mortal threat to the very fabric of the state if they are not creatively managed. This again, draws attention to the question of statecraft and the appropriate constitutional design for managing pluralism.

As it is however clear, the resurgence of these identities and the mortal challenge they pose to the state has taken place in the context of prolonged authoritarian rule and the systematic
closure of the political space on the one hand, and the vast political space offered by democratization on the other. Prolonged military dictatorship and the context offered by economic decline and adjustment programme impacted in no small way on ethnic and other primordial identities and the consciousness they foster, not to include the deliberate manipulation by the ascendancy political elites. One is the very machinations of military regimes in the realm of state reconfiguration as creation of new states and the frequent re-drawing of administrative boundaries threw up new forms of consciousness and territorially-based agitation.

Second, the pervasive culture of arbitrariness and militarism precluded a framework of negotiation, compromise, bargaining and consensus-building among the various factions/fractions of the competing elites. In addition, personalized rule fostered by patron-client networks often tend to favour some ethno-communal groups over others. It is worse when such group is perceived to be using the state which is at the same time perceived as too weak to offer protection to weaker ones. The immediate implication of this is that the seemingly neutral posture of the state necessary for its positive mediation in ethno-communal crisis is severely compromised.

On the other hand, democratization with its emphasis on majoritarian principle and political pluralism expressed in multi-party arrangement and competitive elections tend to contribute to increased ethnic tension and the awakening of communal solidarity. In a particular situation where the previous authoritarian regime favoured a group who, given a democratic dispensation would not hold sway, the restoration of democracy will threaten such a group whose response may be the source of tension. But even more critical is the tendency for party identification and electoral support to follow ethnic and communal divide.

Nevertheless, democratization and democracy provide opportunity for addressing ethnic demands and advance the management of diversity in a manner that drastically reduces the
tension in the polity. Despite the wide recognition of the possible tension that may exist between deep-rooted and identity-based conflicts and democracy, especially following long periods of authoritarian rule in which ethnic-based patron-clientele networks sustained the repression of groups excluded from power, democracy provides the most enduring framework. As Harris and Reilly (1998:17) have beautifully summed it up:

….democratic structures in their myriad permutations, can offer an effective means for the peaceful handling of deep-rooted differences through inclusive, just and accountable frameworks…..Democratic systems of government have a degree of inclusiveness, flexibility and capacity for constant adaptation that enable deep-rooted conflicts to be managed peacefully.

The only point that needs to be added is that the question of democracy has to be posed along with the question of constitutional and institutional designs that makes provision for power sharing and that seeks to deliberately address the fear of minority as well as a measure of respect for group right. Such rights need to be constitutionally entrenched and protected.

Closely related to the issue of democracy and the appropriate constitutional design is the need to reform and reconfigure the state. The imperatives of reform and reconfiguration which are mutually related projects need to be considered as a more feasible alternative to the socialist project of “smashing” the state and altering the social character and content of the state given the prevalence of reactionary political economy and the increasing de-ideologization of the development discourse. While the latter remains a more enduring solution to the different ramifications of the national question as raised by this study, it has less appeal at the moment. Reforming the state requires a re-examination of the social contract underlying the relationship between the state and citizens which lies in the domain of the crisis of vertical legitimacy. As noted in the preceding chapter 6, national citizenship in Nigeria is only formally constructed as guaranteeing fundamental human rights which are entrenched in the constitution. However, these
rights remain merely formal in so far as they are not justiceable or enforceable in a court of law as obligations that are binding on the state.

The anti-colonial alliance which undergirded the struggle for independence implicitly defined the social purpose of the state as the promotion of justice, equity, welfare and the basic means of livelihood for all Nigerian people and groups for whom the colonial order represented a negation. Much of what has been characterized as the failure of the state and the development agenda suggest a betrayal of the very hopes and aspirations that were embedded in the struggle for independence and nationhood. The challenge of reforming the state in the present conjuncture requires a building of domestic consensus across class, social and ethnic divide, and not to be taken as a given that a democratic framework can provide the magic wand. This caution is necessary because the current efforts at entrenching democracy derive largely from the neo-liberal assumption that both market reforms and democratization are mutually reinforcing. There is, therefore, the need to problematize the kind of democracy on offer given the current aggressive drive towards market reforms and the adoption of a private-sector led approach to development.

As Nzongola Ntalaja (2001:16) has noted in respect of developed societies, growing depoliticization of large segments of the population suggests that liberal democracy will conform to the market place model of public choice theorists. A democracy that fails to question the rationale and limits of market reforms, or that fails to engage globalization on the basis of domestic agenda and interests is not likely to provide a framework for an enduring development strategy and the management of pluralism. If the democratic context is to offer any meaningful answer to the fears and anxiety that trigger negative ethnic mobilization, it should assign a leading role to the state whose excesses is to be curbed and challenged by a virile civil society. And it has to be social democracy anchored on attack on poverty and redistribution of wealth.
A process-led and a people-driven approach to constitution-making and constitutional reform that consciously seek to incorporate the principles of inclusivity, participation, openness and transparency among others (see CFCSR, 2001), can be used through public debate and building of consensus from below, to redefine the social purpose and orientation of the state. This will commit and compel the state to policies that are geared towards the promotion of economic growth and development, the entrenchment of national control of the economy and, most importantly, the provision of employment, basic needs as well as systematic assault on poverty, social inequality and uneven development. It is through this that social citizenship can be enhanced for all Nigerians while at the same time whittling down the effect of negative mobilization of ethnic and primordial identities.

Restructuring the state, on the other hand, relates in a way to addressing the problem of horizontal legitimacy regarding inclusion and exclusion in the state at the various levels of its organizations – national, state and local government. Among others, “true” federalism offers a way out of the dilemma. Over centralization of political power and resources in the federal centre has been at the core of the crisis of the nation-state project in Nigeria. Here again, the current democratic framework and the emerging consensus at the levels of the state and civil society regarding the restoration of constitutional federalism through a reform of the centrist constitution can be used to redress the imbalance in favour of the constituent units of the Nigerian federation, especially the states and local governments.

It must be realized, however, that federalism is but a piece in a constellation of ideas concerning pluralism, cultural identity, nation-state and democracy. Thus, beyond formal distribution of power to deal with problems that are spatially and territorially distributed, there is need to pay attention to the problem of group rights even in the context of strengthening individual rights and the means of protecting them. Infact, one irresistible proposal is that
representative democracy should treat people not as individuals but as members of groups, especially those who are more oppressed than others (Young, 1989). The argument in support of this position is that a discourse on universal citizenship tend to ignore the inherent differential in the power relations between groups and may end up reinforcing existing relationships of domination and subordination.

Attempt to protect and promote group rights is not without its own problems. Phillips (1993) raises three important arguments against making provisions for group rights. These include the difficulty of establishing which groups are most pertinent to political identity, the danger of freezing group identities and ‘group closure’ which tend to block the development of wider solidarities, and the assumption that disadvantaged groups are homogenous. Despite these problems, it has been suggested that recognition of differences should constitute a starting point from which a particularistic understanding of human rights may be constructed which is both universal and specific (Einstein, 1998).

What this suggests is that, in addition to federalism, consociational measures which are specifically designed to protect minority rights and defended by entrenched independent commissions should be provided for in the Nigerian constitution. Minority groups such as the Afizere, the Berom and Anaguta need a guarantee that they are adequately protected by the Nigerian state through respect for their right to development, the survival of their languages and culture. At the same time, it should be recognized that minority identity is a conceptual variable. In which minority groups in whatever context require the same guarantee and protection. Such provisions must recognize the changing and dynamic character of minority identities as a means of de-escalating tension associated with the inadequacies of formal provisions on federalism.

The adjunct to this is that in a multi-ethnic urban setting like Jos, the cultural and traditional rights of “host” minority groups who feel threatened by the demographic power of
immigrant ethnic communities have to be expressly protected. In other words, the universality of rights that inheres in citizenship must respect traditional political institutions of the people as something that should not open to contest from “strangers” as long as the political leadership lacks the political will to democratize such offices and subject them to open and competitive politics. The *Gbom Gwom* institution in Jos, for example, ought not to be made open to groups outside of the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere as these groups constitute the autochthonous ethnic communities of the Jos area.

What all this means with respect to the festering political conflicts occasioned by conflicting claims to citizenship rights is that public policy can be tailored to de-escalate tension and conflicts. The Plateau State Government has a major role to play in addition to the larger concern for constitutional (and true) federalism that adequately guarantees political autonomy for the constituent units, the re-configuration of the state to promote development and democratic governance, the necessity of building a social democratic order, and to enthrone a constitutional framework achieved through a process-led mechanism that takes on board the principles of transparency, inclusiveness, participation and legitimacy.

There is a need to respond to the challenges of urban governance as thrown up by the contestations over citizenship rights. The first task is to creatively engage the diverse nature of the city and cultivate it as the basis for inter-ethnic harmony and peace. It is suggested that the Plateau State Government, in conjunction with Jos North, Jos South, and Jos East local governments should constitute a standing Committee on Inter-Communal Harmony, drawn from the leadership of the different ethnic, religious and cultural groups as well as other stakeholders such as labour, students and women. This would be the prot-type of a grand coalition of elites that should meet on regular basis and review the changing dynamics of inter-group relations in
the city. The repeated experience of violence should provide indications that a threshold of irreversibility has been reached in the form of antagonistic ethnicity.

In addition, there is need for a legislation that protects the interests of “indigenes” from more powerful competitors. One area of such protection is to expressly insulate traditional institutions and offices from the competition of groups who lack the traditional and historical claims. In the strict sense of the discourse on citizenship, traditional institutions do not fall within the ambit of political, social and economic rights of citizens. Even if it were to be argued that cultural right is a legitimate right to be protected, it should be seen as the right of the indigenous ethnic communities in the city. However, every cultural group should exercise the right to establish its own traditional institution as evident in emergent patterns of migrant empire building. Such institutions as “Eze Igbo”, “Oba Yoruba” or “Sarkin Hausa” would exist to exercise power in relation to the traditions and cultures of the various groups in a subordinate status to the Gbom-Gwom institution which ought to be the only one recognized by law.

Finally, while the political interests of the indigenous ethnic groups must take precedence in matters of local governance, it is imperative to recognize the multi-ethnic character of the city and introduce some notions of power sharing in political offices. It is in the interest of the city that institutions of local governance benefit from diversity of representation, while promoting a certain degree of inclusiveness. It becomes easy to entrench and deepen this given the history of multi-ethnic representation in the running of local affairs as Yoruba and Igbo candidates have always been elected as councilors. This is the challenge of multi-culturalism.

It is hoped that in this process, civil society groups, ethnic and cultural associations and religious groups as well as other stakeholders in a peaceful and harmonious Jos will provide support by reaching out to their members and educating them on the virtues of inter-group tolerance and mutual co-existence. The mutual inter-dependence of the various groups as evident
differentiation in economic activities along ethnic and communal lines should reinforce this process. The Igbo control merchandise, spare parts, timber and patent medicine. The Hausa predominate in kolanut trade, and transportation as well as control of merchandise. The same can be said of other ethnic and cultural groups.

Responding to the crisis of the nation-state is, indeed, a matter of adequate constitutional design and political architecture as it is of statecraft. All this re-echo the inadequacy of the present constitutional framework and more fundamentally the pitfalls of constitution-making in this country. For instance, it is quite obvious that apart from the independence constitution whose making involved intensive consultations and debates across the land as well as a series of constitutional talks and dialogue, subsequent constitution-making exercises have been state-led and elite-driven (Ihonvbere, 2000).

The recurrent nature of ethno-religious violence in Jos and several parts of Nigeria and the very contentious nature of the myriads of problems and suggestions call urgent attention to the need for a national conference or dialogue. Despite the controversy which the issue of a national conference has evoked across the land, especially in relation to whether it should be sovereign or not, the basic idea which has not been flawed is that, Nigerians from all works of life need to come together, discuss and think through the main contending issues of the polity. The argument that the idea of a sovereign national conference has been rubbished by the existence an elected government and the inauguration of civil politics with certain institutions and rules on the ground since May 1999 appears convincing. Nevertheless, the idea of a national conference is becoming more and more convincing because events on daily basis point to the complete breakdown of national consensus and a pattern of threat that appears systematic to the national project. There is, therefore, a need for a dialogue of all nationalities and contending social forces and stake-holders so that the national question can be addressed from multiple sites.
In this regard, civil society groups can illuminate the path by engaging the state and other stake-holders. There is even a more urgent need to incorporate the views and feelings of people on the margins rather than focusing on elite articulation of problems which are in the first place elite-driven. Such a national conference may be helpful in providing a general political direction on how to move forward.

7.3: CONCLUSION

“Politics of difference” is central to the festering political conflicts in urban Jos. It is clearly illustrated by the conflicting claims and contestations between the different communal groups with dire consequence for access to citizenship rights. As it became obvious in the outbreak of the September 7, 2001 ethno-religious violence in the city, political conflicts generated by “politics of difference” appear to have crossed the threshold of irreversibility. The challenge that this poses for public policy, in terms of restoring peace and inaugurating inter-group harmony, is enormous. The challenge is for the political leadership to recognize that issues that are central to the mobilization of identities and the resulting conflicts are beyond hatred or historical animosity between groups. Bitter memories dug from past history may be relevant, but cannot be the explanation for the current patterns of conflicts. Rather, it appears that it is the exigencies of the present moment, defined by acute competition for scarce resources as well as access to power, that accounts for the survival of bitter memories which are then rekindled in order to supply justification for group positions.

To resolve the conundrum of citizenship and stem the tide of violence that reached its highest level in the carnage of September 2001 and the snow-ball effects of the crisis in neighbouring towns and villages around Jos, there is a need to recognize a pan-Nigerian identity as a political reality. This reality is reflected in the multi-cultural attributes of the city of Jos right
from its inception in the colonial period. What this means is that citizenship of the Nigerian state carries a fundamental obligation for individuals, groups and state officials at all levels. This includes obligation on the part of individuals and groups to respect the civic virtues of paying taxes, observe law and order, and respect the rights of others which are entrenched in the Nigerian Constitution. On the part of the state officials, it entails taking as sacrosanct the rights of the Nigerian people entrenched in the 1999 Constitution with respect to fundamental rights and the “Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy”.

The political leadership also needs to recognize the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural character of the city. Fortunately, a vibrant associational life exists in the city based on construction of ethnic networks and solidarity. These associations which define their primary goals as the promotion of the welfare of their members provide entry points for cultivating healthy inter-group relations. The leadership of these associations can be the basis for establishing a grand coalition of elites that can meet periodically to evaluate the changing dynamics of inter-group relations. In any case, the recognition of the leadership of the conflict-ridden character of group dynamics, and seeking to appear as a neutral body that seeks to advance the interests, or protect the interests of all contending parties is a crucial factor in maintaining peace and harmony.

Without doubt, the basis of the politics of exclusiveness can be found in the unevenness in the levels of economic and social advancement between the different ethnic homelands, and the obsession with the distribution of the ‘national cake’, rather than its production. For it is when politics is geared towards the latter that there will be greater prospects for the transformation of productive forces and indeed, the whole society. The transformation of society and its productive system as envisaged here would not automatically translate into the resolution of the National Question. A careful political architecture and the entrenchment of institutions to
protect recognized differences may still be required. But the prevailing situation of scarcity and the predatory disposition of the ruling elite tend to exacerbate the crisis in the context of the politicization of differences.

The more immediate problem which needs to be confronted is the opposite effect generated by policies which were put forward to de-escalate the tensions and conflicts resulting from antagonistic ethnicity or the negative mobilization of primordial identities. These policies, including those that emphasize “federal character”, “quota system” or “ethnic arithmetic” in general, rather than fostering unity and cohesion, result in painful exclusion which is often met by the resistance of those who are excluded. It is simply traumatic that many Nigerians are labeled ‘settlers’ and ‘strangers’ where they have had effective residency for centuries prior to colonial conquest, or for decades before independence. Matters are hardly helped by the frequent and unending re-drawing of internal administrative boundaries in the name of creating new states and local governments which are fueled by the same dynamics.

There is need to return to the recommendation of the Political Bureau which suggested that citizenship rights should be tied either to place of birth or residence. The Bureau was definite in recommending the adoption of full residence rights for Nigerians wherever they may reside, provided such Nigerians are made to fulfill a minimum residency requirement.

The conundrum of “indigeneity” in relation to discourse on citizenship in Nigeria was one of the political issues that confronted the Political Bureau set up by the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida in 1987. The Bureau recommended the adoption of residency requirement as a way of building national citizenship in place of a more restrictive definition implied in the 1979 Constitution. However, long before the Political Bureau made this recommendation attempts had been made at the level of public policy to extend citizenship to Nigerians who had attained a certain residency requirement. As it turned out it was met with the fiercest opposition.
The on-going constitutional review exercise does offer an important avenue for civil society and concerned groups to seek to reform the constitution to make a document which guarantees pluralism and bind the ruling elites to the ethics of good governance, accountability, and the rule of law. In recognition of the limitation of democracy, especially its majoritarian principle, specific clauses and commissions which protect minority rights will have to be entrenched for the purpose of ensuring that minority nationalities are not excluded and alienated.

In a similar manner the constitution must address the question of citizenship with the commitment to the building of national citizenship. While the privileges attached to “state of origin” and “indigeneity” cannot be wished away, efforts must be made to build and promote national integration and citizenship by introducing residency requirement as precondition for accessing all the rights and privileges of “indigenes” for Nigerians who reside in places other than their ethnic homeland, and fulfill all the obligations of a citizen including payment of taxes. Such a constitutional amendment should contain specific clauses that discourage the discrimination suffered by the womenfolk.

However, beyond constitutional measures and provisions, there is a need to have a closer look at the general context of public policy. One point that comes out of both theoretical/philosophical introspection and the data generated in the study of the conundrum of citizenship in Jos, is the general context of state failure and the decline of social citizenship in Nigeria. While the decline of social citizenship and the failure of the state are largely a consequence of the contradictions of the neo-colonial political economy, the emerging context of globalization is more likely to deepen the crisis. The increasing involvement of the IMF and the World Bank in the domestic policy formulation processes, the insistence on demand management policies, the pressure to reduce the role of the state in the management of the economy and commitment to the goal of development, and the overall effect of these in weakening national
control as well as state legitimacy will impact negatively on group identity and inter-group relations. It is more likely to deepen the importance of ethnic and religious networks in the desperate efforts of the people to construct alternative means of survival and coping with the unpalatable effects of a market-driven society.

The obvious choice for the Nigerian policy makers is to re-examine the implications of a market-driven ideology as the principles undergirding development. The deleterious impact of the socio-economic policies, the tendency for the policies to heighten inequality between individuals and groups, and the increasing tendency for the struggles for access to state power to become more Hobbessean in character will provide the kind of atmosphere for “ethnic entrepreneurs”/ “conflict entrepreneurs” to continue to exploit differences in the quest to maintain their leading position in the political economy. The notion of re-designing, re-configuring and re-composing the state makes sense in the context of the desire to put in place a state system that is at once democratic, developmental and both responsible and responsive to the people. Such a state which is expected to play a crucial role in the process of development, the assault against poverty, ignorance and illiteracy, is a state that is accountable and transparent. It is also a state that needs to take on board the notion of participatory development in which the mobilization of people at the grassroots in programmes of economic development and political participation will be accorded priority.

Our age is remarkable in the sense that it is characterized by the massive resurgence of identity politics. The mobilization of identities by people who seek to gain or by people who perceive “ethnic justice” or justice anchored on any form of identity as the solution to the crisis of material existence of the present age, in which the nation-state project as defined by the modernist agenda appears to have waned, and in which the dogma of the market has become hegemonic, is a reality that has to be confronted at the level of public policy. It is at the same
time a challenge for the civil society to engage the state to checkmate the excesses of public officials, and to promote transparency and accountability in governance. The real challenge of the post-modernist era, therefore, is how to simultaneously advance multi-culturalism, cultivate pluralism in the building of democracy, and initiate a people-driven development agenda based on a delicate balance between the market and the state.
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